VZCZCXRO5810
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #0238/01 1500846
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290846Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2582
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
PROG

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000238 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PMIL ASEC GV
SUBJECT: EMBASSY CONAKRY - SITUATION REPORT 8 
 
REF: A. CONAKRY 0224 - 0228 
     ¶B. CONAKRY 0231 - 0233 
     ¶C. CONAKRY 0236 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY.  The following reports are a round-up of 
various events yesterday evening.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FLIGHTS DIVERTED FROM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) A routine Embassy support flight carrying classified 
materials landed at Conakry International Airport on May 28 
at approximately 19:00.  Despite receiving guarantees of 
security from the host government and the gendarme forces at 
the airport, three trucks, carrying approximately 45 armed 
soldiers, from Camp Alpha Yaya drove directly onto the tarmac 
and demanded to know why a U.S. military aircraft was landing 
in Conakry and what it was carrying.  The soldiers lacked any 
evidence of rank, and there was no clear commander, 
suggesting that they belonged to the forces supporting the 
ongoing military mutiny. 
 
¶3.  (S) Embassy officers and the airfield security chief 
attempted to calm the soldiers, explaining that it was a 
routine flight carrying diplomatic support materials.  The 
soldiers refused to depart the airfield and maintained an 
aggressive posture and threatening manner.  Embassy directed 
the aircraft to take off without unloading its cargo.  The 
local press, as well as BBC, is calling it a "mercenary" 
flight and reporting that it carried weapons to support the 
Guinean military. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Later that evening, Air France diverted its 
regularly scheduled commercial flight due to security 
concerns.  Royal Air Maroc and Air Senegal followed suit. 
The SN Brussels flight landed at the same time as when the 
U.S. aircraft was on the ground, took on passengers, and 
departed without incident. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER REQUESTS ASSISTANCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) The recently fired Minister of Defense, General 
Baillo Diallo, showed up at the Ambassador's residence, along 
with his niece, at 20:00 on May 29, seeking USG assistance. 
He told the Ambassador that he had been in hiding and needed 
protection because people were hunting for him.  General 
Diallo confirmed that his residences in Dubreka and Conakry 
had been attacked and looted by the mutineers.   The 
Ambassador asked if the General had reached out to his own 
government for protection.  According to General Diallo, the 
"politicians" cannot offer him any protection.  When the 
Ambassador asked why the president was not protecting him, 
General Diallo shrugged his shoulders.  The Ambassador told 
the General that the USG has specific policies on political 
asylum and could not offer protection.  He called the UN 
Resident Representative to see if the UN might be able to 
offer assistance, but she also said that the UN was not in a 
position to provide protection.  The General thanked the 
Ambassador and then left for the Chinese Embassy to see if 
they could offer him any assistance. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MINISTER OF FINANCE OUT OF THE LOOP 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Around 21:30, Ambassador Carter was able to connect 
with Finance Minister Ousmane Dore over the telephone to 
discuss the current situation.  When asked what was 
happening, Dore said he didn't know and that he had not been 
part of any of the day's meetings.  He said that when the 
mutiny started a few days ago, he was working with the PM and 
president later at Camp Samory Toure to respond to the 
mutineers' initial demands, including the payment of the 
first installment of the 5 million GnF payment.  Dore told 
the Ambassador that he had signed the authorization for 
payment on May 27 and given it to the paymaster. 
 
¶7.  (S) After leaving the military base around 21:00 on May 
27, Dore reported to work at his office on May 28 to conduct 
business as usual.  He said that he was unaware that the 
mutineers were making further demands and that he had not had 
any conversations with other senior government officials.  At 
one point, he walked over to Prime Minister Souare's office, 
 
CONAKRY 00000238  002 OF 002 
 
 
but found the PM meeting with political parties.  The PM 
reportedly told Dore that he was too busy to meet with him at 
that moment, but that he should come back later in the day. 
When Dore returned in the late afternoon, Prime Minister 
Souare reportedly told him that he should hide because 
"people were looking for him."  Dore said he packed up his 
things and went to stay with some friends. 
 
¶8.  (S) Dore also commented on President Conte's initial 
response to the mutineers' demands.  According to Dore, the 
President was firmly against paying out any funds to the 
mutineers.  He said that Conte was equally against the 
initial payment of 2 million GnF authorized by former Prime 
Minister Kouyate in January because he was afraid that it 
would only encourage the soldiers to ask for more money at a 
later date.  After several hours of discussion on May 27, 
Conte reluctantly agreed to meet the mutineers' demand of an 
additional 5 million GnF.  Dore said that he was there when 
they called the mutineers and that they could hear 
celebratory shouting and gunfire over the speaker phone, 
indicating that the mutineers were satisfied with the 
concession.  Given the day's developments with the mutineers 
making additional demands, Dore stated that the situation was 
muddled and confused.  He added that there appears to be a 
power struggle among the military's senior leaders. 
CARTER