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Viewing cable 08BANGKOK1348, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BURMESE EXILE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BANGKOK1348 2008-05-01 05:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO3601
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1348/01 1220505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010505Z MAY 08 ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SERVICES
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2894
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5913
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8662
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1654
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4559
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0870
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0684
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 2268
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5114
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1512
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0196
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0969
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0991
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0857
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 2172
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5190
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5315
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2015
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC  PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BANGKOK 001348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BURMESE EXILE 
COMMUNITY IN THAILAND 
 
REF: A. 07 BANGKOK 5224 
     B. 07 CHIANG MAI 179 
     C. CHIANG MAI 63 
     D. CHIANG MAI 10 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  001.3 OF 007 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Thailand's Burmese exile community, based in Chiang 
Mai and Mae Sot, has undergone drastic changes in recent 
years.   Younger members are taking on more grassroots 
endeavors aimed at addressing the immediate needs of Burmese 
inside Burma and Thailand.  Several prominent exiles have 
broken away from traditional political advocacy work and now 
focus their energies on crafting grounded, thoughtful 
analysis of the current situation in Burma and new options to 
facilitate change. The result is that these new leaders often 
bump heads with long-standing opposition forces like Maung 
Maung and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), 
whose two-plus decade efforts focus on international 
lobbying, fund-raising, and drafting position papers of 
questionable use, even as they lose touch with the reality of 
changing dynamics inside and outside Burma.  At present, it 
is unclear whether the principal leaders of the exile 
community in Thailand can act as credible agents for change 
in Burma.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Burmese exile community in Thailand is estimated 
to consist of more than 200 affiliated organizations.  This 
cable provides an overview of the current dynamics of the 
Burmese exile community in Thailand, based on numerous 
conversations, meetings, and site visits made by political 
officers in Bangkok and Chiang Mai over the past several 
months. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
EARLY EXILES ADOPT AN UNCOMPROMISING STANCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Arriving in Thailand in the late 1980's, leaders of 
Burma's pro-democracy movement recognized that Aung San Suu 
Kyi (ASSK) would remain the undisputed symbolic and visionary 
advocate for positive change in Burma.  The exiles deferred 
to ASSK's leadership but sought to reinforce her efforts by 
vigorously raising international awareness of the Burmese 
regime's brutality.  This was a useful strategy in the 
beginning, when the opposition's goal was to cast the Burmese 
junta as the worst violators of human rights and impediments 
to democracy.  These politically focused, hard-nosed 
activists proved capable international lobbyists at raising 
awareness about Burma.  Beginning with almost nothing, 
figures such as the current General Secretary of the National 
Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), Maung Maung, became 
particularly skillful at promoting themselves within the 
international community.  The international attention they 
brought to the situation in Burma resulted in important 
diplomatic and financial support for those opposition members 
who remained inside Burma, as well as the ongoing efforts of 
those working in neighboring Thailand.  More recently, these 
connections proved valuable during the September 2007 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
protests because when the crisis broke, many of these figures 
used their long-established networks to pass information to 
key international decision makers. 
 
4. (C) However, many exiles now believe that this 
antagonizing approach endured longer than it probably should 
have.  Vahu Development Institute Director Zaw Oo's 
assessment is that the exiled opposition began to internalize 
the 'bad cop' role, transforming them from democracy 
promoters seeking change to vociferous Burmese regime 
opponents, whose position focused principally on casting the 
regime in the most negative light possible.  The result is 
that many of their efforts today may conflict with the real 
purpose of those working for change inside Burma.  Various 
members of the exile community we spoke with complained that 
Maung Maung and his close-knit champions spend an inordinate 
amount of time advocating hard-line views to punish the 
regime for its actions rather than engage in constructive 
discussions about how to move forward in bringing about 
change.  Soe Thinn, currently a journalist trainer with 
Internews who used to work for Radio Free Asia and prior to 
that for the Burmese Foreign Ministry, said the NCUB and 
other exile groups had no sense of responsibility.  "They 
(the NCUB and NCGUB) believe democracy is doing what we 
want," he said, and they do not understand that "they have to 
accept the majority," he added.  Zaw Oo believed that "they 
(NCUB) suffer from mental fatigue at this point and many of 
their actions actually hurt the movement." 
 
5. (C) Several people we spoke with pointed out that Burmese 
Senior General Than Shwe and his subordinates repeatedly use 
provocative rhetoric from activists abroad as evidence that 
the exiles pose a serious threat to the stability of Burma. 
Than Shwe frequently claims that the exile community is 
plotting the Burmese junta's overthrow with assistance from 
"certain Western powers."  Unfortunately, this sets off a 
cyclical response from the hard-line exiles, who take the 
statements by the Burmese generals as confirmation that they 
must continue their uncompromising position and mobilize even 
further efforts to topple the regime using any means 
necessary. 
 
6. (C) The result, according to Zaw Oo, is absolute 
polarization of the issue.  Any moderates that may exist 
within the Burmese regime or the opposition then face the 
difficult task of getting their point of view heard without 
it being overtaken by extremists in either camp.  Debbie 
Stothard, Coordinator for Thailand-based ALTSEAN-Burma and a 
long-time Burma advocate, added that this back and forth 
ranting between the junta and the hard-line exiles amounted 
to little more than an endless stream of statements that 
never produced significant action.  This polarization has 
also prevented the hard-line opposition from coming up with 
alternative approaches.  More and more Burmese diaspora 
academics criticize the exiles' lack of vision about what a 
transition would look like and what would happen after a 
transition. 
 
-------------------------------- 
WHO REPRESENTS THE EXILES TODAY? 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) This circular finger pointing continues today.  Long 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
time Burma advocate Chalida Tajaroensuk (formerly with Forum 
Asia and now Director of People Empowerment) blamed this 
failing on the lack of a clear leader within the Burmese 
exile community.  "There is no Jose Ramos Horta like East 
Timor had," Chalida explained "and while the Burmese may have 
Aung San Suu Kyi inside Burma, there is no one outside the 
country who can provide a similar rallying point for the 
opposition." In the past, entities like the NCUB and the 
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) 
tried to organize various Burmese opposition members who fled 
to Thailand.  But as Chalida and others pointed out, this 
self-styled elitist group of exiles never moved beyond its 
political and diplomatic circles; it never made much of an 
effort to engage in grassroots outreach efforts inside Burma 
or even Thailand.  The NCUB and NCGUB's failure to organize 
any activities inside Burma to support "vote no" campaigns 
for the upcoming referendum exemplifies this limited reach. 
 
8. (C) Stothard stated that Maung Maung and his cohorts took 
for granted that high level discussions would trickle down 
through the various levels of the organization and result in 
action.  Instead, their secretive approach isolated those 
outside of their small circle and stunted the development of 
new leaders.  Many Burmese exiles lamented that after almost 
twenty years of trying to lead an opposition movement, the 
NCUB and NCGUB continue with the same faces proffering the 
same ideas year after year.  Soe Thinn of Internews described 
the stalemate of ideas as creating a situation where 
"activism has become a way of life;" the exiles have set up 
ever more organizations not because these reflect new 
approaches or increase coordination or impact, but 
principally in order to attract highly sought-after 
international donor support.  Activism is also a means of 
funding their own personal sustenance, he added. 
 
9. (C) While recognizing the important historical endeavors 
of the NCUB and NCGUB, Chulalongkorn University's Professor 
Pornpimol Trichote likened the exiles' situation to that of 
Burma's National League for Democracy 'uncles,' who have long 
held the torch for their country's democracy movement, but 
whose efforts in recent years have been criticized by many 
within the opposition movement as insufficient.  She added 
that the dynamics of the Burmese exile community have 
changed, but that not all of its leaders have changed with 
the times.  Leon de Riedmatten, former ICRC Chief in Burma 
and liaison between ASSK and the Burmese junta, recently 
stated to us that he is convinced Maung Maung and his 
colleagues do not grasp the reality of the current situation 
in Burma and therefore are not in a position to bring about 
change. 
 
------------- 
CLOSE ENOUGH? 
------------- 
 
10. (C) Over the years, continual international lobbying 
efforts -- through the release of statements and papers, 
meetings with government officials, and various fundraising 
activities --  have resulted in these border organizations 
capturing the bulk of international community support for 
democracy in Burma, financially and emotionally.  Recognizing 
the difficulties of operating programs and facilitating 
communication inside Burma, many members of the old school 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
exile community have successfully made the Thai border area 
the nexus of the Burmese democracy movement, at least in 
terms of the destination for international funding.  There 
are some exceptions, however.  The Norwegian Government -- an 
ardent moral and financial supporter of the Burmese democracy 
movement for many years -- refuses to fund either the NCUB or 
its sister labor organization, the Federal Trade Union of 
Burma (FTUB). 
 
11. (C) From their position on the Thai-Burma border, notes 
Human Rights Watch Burma consultant David Mathieson, 
organizations such as the NCUB claim close connections to 
groups and individuals working inside Burma.  The exiles cite 
these connections as evidence of their ability to influence 
the situation in Burma.  Donors facing challenges funneling 
money inside Burma turn to such exile groups as a logical 
alternative, recognizing that they are not ideal recipients 
but nevertheless provide a viable option.  The danger, cites 
Mathieson, is that in order to justify long-term financial 
support from the donor community, many exile groups overstate 
their ability to connect with democracy activists inside 
Burma, particularly those working in urban areas.  Despite 
these limitations, it appears to us that some resources from 
the Thai-based groups reaches Rangoon, as well as many areas 
along the border. 
 
------------------------------ 
REACH OF BORDER GROUPS LIMITED 
------------------------------ 
 
12. (C) Exiles do appear to maintain varying levels of 
contact with Burma-based associates.  The Open Society 
Institute's Liz Tydeman described meeting with activists in 
Thailand's Mae Sot in the midst of Burma's September 2007 
protests.  Repeatedly throughout their meeting, her contacts 
made and received multiple calls to activists in Rangoon and 
Tydeman overheard them discussing strategy, locations of 
colleagues, and exit options.  However, as far as we can 
determine these contacts appear to be based on personal 
connections and do not translate into or reflect formal 
organizational ties, or a chain of command in the democracy 
movement. 
 
13. (C) In early October 2007, the NCUB took credit for 
organizing the protests that occurred inside Burma the 
previous month, stating that the protests were a part of a 
long term strategy the NCUB had organized to put pressure on 
the Burmese regime (ref A).  While many of our contacts agree 
that the NCUB helped place communication equipment in Burma 
that aided in alerting the world to and detailing the Burmese 
junta's violent crackdown of the protests, Embassy Rangoon's 
contacts repeatedly state that the protests were only loosely 
organized by scattered groups in and around Rangoon.  In a 
November 2007 meeting with Chiang Mai Poloff, the Political 
Defiance Committee also claimed credit for the September 2007 
uprising in Burma (ref B).  When asked whom these groups work 
with inside Burma, Committee members are quick to respond "we 
have our network, but we will not give specifics."  In the 
absence of at least some specifics, it is difficult to accept 
their statements at face value, particularly in light of the 
conflicting statements from activists working inside Burma. 
 
14. (C) Democracy activists inside Burma recognize the value 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
of the exile community's efforts to raise international 
awareness of Burma's political impasse, according to Embassy 
Rangoon.  They especially appreciate the exile media, which 
broadcasts daily news into Burma.  However, they do not see 
the exile organizations as a central component to Burma's 
pro-democracy movement, which is led by the activists inside, 
despite what some of the exiles claim.  Since many of the 
exiles left 20 years ago, they have lost touch with the 
ever-changing dynamics inside Burma, both within the 
pro-democracy movement and Burmese society in general.  This 
is the feeling of the overwhelming majority of Burmese whom 
Embassy Rangoon comes into contact with, including the NLD, 
88 Generation, younger activists, community leaders, 
church-based leaders, and ordinary citizens.  It was 
reinforced by the cool welcome the Thailand based-exiles gave 
those fleeing the September 2007 crackdown in Burma (ref C). 
 
15. (C) One recent example of the disconnect between exiles 
and their Burma-based counterparts was NCUB's February 15 
release of an alternative constitution for Burma (just days 
after the junta's announcement of the completion of the 
drafting of its constitution).  The NCUB publicized its 
constitution as an inclusive document approved by a broad 
spectrum of civil society groups focused on Burma, including 
ethnic nationalities and women's organizations.  However, 
when pressed by an international journalist, the NCUB 
conceded that the drafting and approval of the document had 
been completed by a relatively small group of Burmese living 
outside the country, who had no legitimate basis to claim it 
reflected the views of the 55 million Burmese living inside 
the country, or even the more than 1 million Burmese migrant 
workers and refugees living in Thailand.  We have repeatedly 
been unable to extract from our exile contacts a reasonable 
explanation for their confidence that their views represent 
those of the Burmese people, much less a credible plan for 
action to turn their vision into reality. 
 
-------------------------- 
IMPACT ON ASEAN GOVERNMENTS 
--------------------------- 
 
16. (C) The hard-line approach take by some exile groups has 
also contributed to th opposition movement's loss of 
credibility amongASEAN governments over time.  Vehement, 
hard-lin tactics tend to alienate ASEAN governments that 
generally adhere to foreign policies promoting consensus and 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of their neighbors. 
The result is that many governments in the region are 
unwilling to work with the Burmese opposition and are 
uninterested in what these groups have to say.  According to 
Asda Jayanama, a former Thai Ambassador to the UN, the 
Burmese junta has successfully pressed other ASEAN 
governments to distance themselves from the opposition, in 
part by playing on fear of instability in the region, citing 
the harsh rhetoric of Burmese exiles.  An important exception 
to this disconnect is the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar 
Caucus (AIPMC), whose members (elected legislators from 
various ASEAN member countries) include many long-time Burma 
advocates.  The AIPMC supports democratic change in Burma 
within their respective governments and has collaborated with 
the exile community in the past.  Unfortunately, Thailand's 
AIPMC members -- currently opposition MPs Kraisak Choonhaven 
(recently appointed president of AIPMC) and Alongkorn 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
Polabutr -- have not been able to successfully move the Burma 
issue forward within the RTG. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
TARGETED, GRASSROOTS EFFORTS MORE EFFECTIVE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) While there may be growing skepticism among some 
members of the exile community about the value of 
international lobbying, efforts geared towards action on the 
ground are gaining momentum along the border.  Many newer 
Burmese groups in Thailand employ a more grassroots approach 
that focuses on community development for Burmese on the 
border and those inside Burma. According to Zaw Oo, the best 
examples of this new area of activity in the Burmese exile 
community come from some of the women's and ethnic groups 
that have appeared in the past decade.  (see Ref D for some 
detail on one such group) Soe Thinn described these groups as 
less fragmented than the exile groups that concentrate their 
efforts on purely political activities.  At the same time, as 
these smaller organizations begin drawing greater recognition 
and funding from the international community, the NCUB and 
FTUB are seeking to co-opt their work. A representative from 
the International Republican Institute (IRI), repeating 
assertions from other donors, confirmed that IRI is 
encouraging its grantees "to stand up for themselves" and to 
resist NCUB and FTUB efforts to step in and direct their 
projects. 
 
18. (C) Stothard emphasized that there are not strict 
ideological distractions or even animosity between those 
working inside and those outside Burma.  Rather, she viewed 
the divide as much more nuanced, particularly at the 
grassroots level.  Recognizing the differences, groups such 
as the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma 
(AAPPB) and the Political Defiance Committee (PDC) emphasize 
the need to support groups inside Burma.  In addition, many 
exile groups are recognizing the value of cultivating new 
leaders on the border as well as inside Burma and 
facilitating dialog with partners up and down the ladder. 
Unfortunately, as new leaders come across the border, the 
need for sponsorship from established groups -- to gain a 
degree of protection from the Thai authorities -- creates a 
dependence on those who are already established in Thailand, 
making it difficult for activists with more recent experience 
in Burma to present themselves as equals. 
 
-------------------------- 
COMMENT - THE WAY FORWARD? 
-------------------------- 
 
19. (C) Many of the exile leaders from the NCUB and the NCGUB 
deserve credit for their early efforts to criticize the 
Burmese regime and engage in international lobbying.  While 
this has played an important role in raising and maintaining 
international awareness about Burma, these hard-line 
activists have not moved beyond this role.  As a result, they 
are losing credibility among their own community and ASEAN 
governments.  Many opposition groups along the border have 
used the renewed attention and publicity about Burma to 
increase their funding and expand the influences of their 
various organizations, but their reach and effectiveness 
inside Burma only appears to be diminishing.  Money and 
 
BANGKOK 00001348  007 OF 007 
 
 
equipment supply lines to the activists, the most useful role 
played by the exile organizations, have been disrupted since 
September 2007, with only a trickle now getting through. 
 
20. (C) It is not yet clear to us that the current leadership 
of the Burmese exile community in Thailand can establish 
itself as constructive and effective advocates of change in 
Burma.  Positive steps would include balancing rhetorical 
attacks with concrete and practical proposals; adopting a 
more inclusive approach that provides a credible basis to 
claim they represent both a broad range of activists and 
perhaps even the large Burmese refugee and migrant community 
present in Thailand; and building or demonstrating a greater 
degree of coordination with and support for the pro-democracy 
movement inside Burma.  At this time, the exiles' will and 
ability to accomplish these tasks remain unproven. End 
Comment. 
 
21. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon and 
Consulate General Chiang Mai. 
JOHN