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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA240, IAEA/IRAN: FRANCE PUSHES P5+1 FOR AN EXPERTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA240 2008-04-25 13:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0240/01 1161341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251341Z APR 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0696
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0628
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0930
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0687
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0785
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1205
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA. IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 
TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT:  IAEA/IRAN:  FRANCE PUSHES P5+1 FOR AN EXPERTS 
MEETING 
 
REF: UNVIE 185 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for 
reasons 1.4 b,d and h 
 
1. (C) Summary:  At a French-hosted meeting April 22, P5 1 
COMs exchanged views on Iran developments post-Shanghai and 
expectations for forthcoming Iran-IAEA discussions on 
weaponization.  The UK, Germany and U.S. were skeptical of 
this latest development while Russia and China predictably 
highlighted positive progress in Shanghai as well as on the 
Iran-IAEA front.  The U.S. also raised the prospect of a 
Board resolution in June but neither Russia nor China 
engaged.  Following up on their PolDir's proposal, France 
attempted to get P5 1 agreement for an experts meeting in 
Vienna and proposed May 6 or May 14 as possible dates, but 
now expects the date may slip to May 24.  Russia and China 
sought more specificity on the topics to be discussed and 
disputed both the purpose and the timing of such a meeting in 
advance of the next DG report, or even the next Board.  The 
UK pushed back arguing that the P5 1 experts could produce 
their own "progress report" independent of the Secretariat's 
investigation.  Russia was more receptive to the U.S. 
suggestion that the purpose of an experts meeting would be to 
support the Secretariat, but noted that the Secretariat had 
been reluctant to engage the P5 1 experts last year.  It was 
clear that Russia and China's Vienna Ambassadors remain a 
hard sell on any P5 1 (or P5) experts meeting, particularly 
on weaponization, despite the Shanghai PolDir's discussion. 
France intends to demarche Moscow and Beijing.  End Summary. 
 
Expectations of Iran-IAEA Engagement 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) French Ambassador Deniau called the meeting as part of 
what he hoped would be regular P5 1 consultations in Vienna 
and sought to take stock of developments post-Shanghai. 
Speaking under instructions, Deniau relayed the French 
suggestion at the Shanghai P5 1 PolDir meeting that an 
expert-level meeting be held in Vienna.  The purpose, he 
said, would be to review developments since the last such 
consultations in June 2007. 
 
3. (C) In addition to the Shanghai outcome, German Ambassador 
Gottwald hoped to exchange views on Vienna developments, 
particularly Iran's agreement to address weaponization issues 
with the Secretariat.  This seemed to be a "dramatic 
turnaround," though he noted that Iran did not have much of a 
choice given the DG's upcoming report to the UNSC and Board 
of Governors.  Germany would be "highly surprised" if Iran so 
dramatically changed course and divulged a weapons program. 
The UK agreed with Germany and noted there was nothing to 
give "huge" encouragement that great progress would be made. 
At a minimum, UK Ambassador Smith said, Iran has agreed to 
answer the Secretariat's questions -- the least one could 
expect -- but much will depend on the quality of Iran's 
engagement.  As with previous reports, Smith expected that 
the DG's next report would be "grey", noting progress in some 
areas but unable to draw conclusions. 
 
4. (C) The U.S. agreed that Iran's renewed "engagement" is 
consistent with its past efforts to appear cooperative when 
faced with the prospect of Board or UNSC censure.  Nuclear 
Counselor noted that PolDirs had discussed possible 
activities in Vienna during while in Shanghai.  Charge 
confirmed that a Board resolution on Iran would be an 
important U.S. priority at the June Board, and explained our 
desire to coordinate closely with the other P5 1.  France did 
not rule out a Board resolution, contingent on the content of 
the DG's next report, and added that a resolution in June 
would be easier as no UNSC action is anticipated.  Germany 
also agreed to consider and prepare for a Board resolution in 
June, though the content would depend on the DG's report. 
 
5. (C) Neither Russia nor China addressed the prospect of 
Board resolution in June.  China predictably focused on the 
positive progress of the Shanghai meeting, and the package to 
be finalized in the London Ministerial.  The most important 
thing was to encourage Iran to negotiate, Chinese Ambassador 
Tang observed, and to continue cooperation with the IAEA. 
Tang related that ElBaradei confirmed to him that Iran had 
agreed to clarify the "alleged studies" by May.  Russian 
Ambassador Zmeyevsky also highlighted the positive 
developments and positive signs from Iran. 
 
 
Purpose/Timing of Experts Meeting 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) According to the French, prior to the P5 1 meeting, 
the Chinese Mission claimed it had not been advised of any 
PolDir agreement in Shanghai to an experts meeting in Vienna. 
 France demarched China on the subject.  At the P5 1 meeting, 
Tang claimed he still did not have instructions and 
questioned the subject matter of such an experts meeting. 
Reading from his instructions, Deniau explained that experts 
would review the status of Iran's nuclear program since the 
June 2007 meeting, including developments on enrichment, the 
work plan, and Iran's answers on the "alleged studies." 
 
7. (C) Russia disputed both the content and timing of an 
experts meeting.  If Russia were to agree to a meeting, 
Zmeyevsky said he would need more specificity on this wide 
range of topics in order to bring the appropriate experts. He 
also questioned the mandate of such a group.  As to the 
timing, Russia argued that it would need information from the 
next DG report to discuss the "alleged studies" and suggested 
holding an experts meeting after the June Board. France 
countered that since June 2007, there had been three DG 
reports and all the while Iran continued to make progress on 
enrichment.  There would always be a next report or a next 
Board session, Deniau observed, and experts should meet in 
advance of the June Board.  Russia insisted that an experts' 
discussion would be inappropriate before the DG has provided 
his assessment (i.e. of weaponization), and that such a 
discussion should not be based on past assessments. 
 
8. (C) China also contended that there were too many topics, 
some of which were more technical than political, and that 
such a meeting should have a result.  Tang noted that last 
year's experts meeting had been focused on enrichment issues, 
and had produced consensus.  China questioned the timing of 
an experts' meeting, arguing that the P5 1 should wait for 
the DG report to have more information, a clearer picture and 
more to talk about. 
 
9. (C) The UK agreed with France on the pretext of waiting 
for the next Board or report.  Smith argued that the purpose 
of an experts meeting would be for the P5 1 to take stock of 
ongoing programs in Iran, and offer our own "progress 
report."  The P5 1's assessment would not be tied to that of 
the Agency and could be discussed at any time, he said.  If 
the P5 1 were to wait for the DG report, he noted there would 
only be a few days before the June Board meeting. France 
underlined that this was an expert level meeting to address 
technical issues such as Iran's new centrifuge design.  An 
experts meeting probably should have been held in late 
February after Heinonen's technical briefing on 
weaponization, Deniau noted, arguing that a meeting take 
place at the earliest opportunity and not be linked to the 
next DG report. 
 
 
Experts to Support the Secretariat 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Russia further questioned the purpose of an experts 
meeting and whether it would be productive.  The U.S. 
observed that such a meeting would allow the P5 1 to reach a 
common understanding of information on Iran's nuclear program 
in advance of the June Board.  Charge explained that the 
experts could support DDG Heinonen's investigation and help 
the Secretariat achieve a holistic understanding of Iran's 
nuclear program.  The bottom line objective, he said, would 
be to support the Secretariat in its efforts to get full 
disclosure from Iran.  Although he had no instructions, 
Gottwald was enthusiastic about the idea of supporting the 
Secretariat's investigation and exchanging information at the 
 
SIPDIS 
expert level. 
 
11. (C) Zmeyevsky said he needed to report to capital but 
agreed that it would be helpful to support the Secretariat. 
He noted, however, that the Secretariat had been reluctant to 
meet with the P5 1 experts last June.  Russia would also need 
more specificity on what experts would discuss. 
 
12. (C) France was open to the idea of the Secretariat 
briefing the P5 1, but saw a P5 1 experts meeting as useful 
of its own accord.  This was the spirit in which the French 
 
PolDir had made the proposal in Shanghai.  There was already 
a large amount of information for experts to digest since 
their last meeting a year ago, and numerous topics to be 
covered.  The French proposed holding an experts meeting on 
May 6 or May 14, and would make a demarche to that effect in 
the other P5 1 capitals.  Charge informed the P5 1 of U/S 
Rood's visit to Vienna on May 6, and suggested that this 
would be a good opportunity to exchange views after the 
London Ministerial.  French DCM Gross subsequently confirmed 
that France would demarche Moscow and Beijing, and suggested 
that the date of the experts meeting may have to slip until 
May 24, which would presumably be after the next DG report. 
 
13.  (C) In a private discussion on April 25, Heinonen 
indicated to Msnoff a willingness to consult with P5 states, 
perhaps separately, on weaponization, but did not seem 
willing to request or participate in a formal IAEA-P5 1 
experts discussion.  He mused, however, that perhaps the 
experts could meet amongst themselves and then could have a 
"social outing" somewhere with Heinonen and IAEA 
weaponization expert Chris Hutchison.  As to timing, Heinonen 
was under the impression that any experts meeting would 
happen in early May, but professed not to have been engaged 
with the French on planning for such a meeting. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (C) The French probably made a tactical error in casting 
their net too broadly, seeking an experts meeting on 
everything under the sun.  The UK agreed afterward that we 
should probably narrow the scope but doubted that Russia and 
China would be ready to participate in a P5 1 (or P5) experts 
discussion of weaponization.  Russia and China are likely to 
continue to drag their feet if the premise of the experts 
meeting is to have a P5 1 exchange on this issue. However, 
they might be persuaded to participate in such consultations 
if they included a meeting, even if "social," with the 
Secretariat/Heinonen. 
 
SIPDIS 
PYATT