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Viewing cable 08BUDAPEST345, U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUDAPEST345 2008-04-02 12:02 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Budapest
VZCZCXRO1102
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUP #0345/01 0931202
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021202Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2763
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0061
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0123
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0089
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BUDAPEST 000345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE MARC NORDBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM MASS PAO KNNP NATO EU EZ PL
RS, IR, HU 
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN 
BUDAPEST ON DECEMBER 13, 2007 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 146521 
     B. MOSCOW 05059 
     C. MOSCOW 04956 
 
Classified By: Ambassador April H. Foley: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: In the fourth round of expert-level meetings 
in Budapest December 13, U.S. and Russian delegations, led by 
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kislyak, continued to discuss U.S. plans to place a missile 
defense (MD) system in Central Europe (delegation lists at 
paras. 23-24).  U/S Rood put forward a number of transparency 
and confidence building measures to deal with Russia's stated 
concerns.  The Russian side responded to the U.S. proposed 
Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture and the threat 
assessment indicators and confidence-building measures, 
reiterating a number of objections made in previous talks. 
Kislyak stressed that Russia does not see Iran as a threat, 
believes there is no need for the proposed MD system, feels 
the system threatens Russia, and objects to the fact that the 
U.S. will "go ahead no matter what."  At the end, Kislyak 
undertook to look for ways to reduce Russian concerns as the 
U.S. goes forward with deployment, as damage control.  U/S 
Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S. 
disappointment on Russia's suspension of the CFE treaty. 
Kislyak responded that the U.S. and Allies are to blame and 
"we are not going to return to the old treaty."  END SUMMARY. 
 
"There is No Threat" 
==================== 
 
2. (C) Concerning Russia's thoughts on the U.S. proposed 
Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kislyak opened by stating "there is no threat 
compelling deployment of a defense any time soon," that the 
U.S. is "creating facts on the ground" and there needs to be 
agreement on what the threats are.  Kislyak said Russia had a 
problem understanding what "jointly" means in the 
architecture proposed.  General Buzhinskiy added that Russia 
does not understand the degree of jointness, asking about who 
would take decisions on engagement, the level of decision 
making, and what the command and control structure would look 
like.  Kislyak argued that it was more logical to go back to 
the original step-by-step proposal which President Putin 
offered at Heiligendam:  joint monitoring of the threat, 
development of a joint threat assessment, and then later 
developing a joint architecture based on the needs of the 
assessed threat.  Noting that the U.S. is proposing parallel 
monitoring and missile defense deployment for "threats yet to 
be defined," Kislyak said Russia does not understand the 
purpose of this system that is "not in our national security 
interest."  He said Russia had a problem "not only about 
technicalities, it's the concept" they have a problem with, 
but the U.S. will "go ahead no matter what" Russia says. 
 
No Missiles in Europe 
===================== 
3. (C) Buzhinskiy said he understood the discussion of 
"non-activation" of the European MD system at the "2-plus-2" 
meeting to mean that missiles would not be brought into 
Europe.  He said now the U.S. is instead talking about not 
activating missiles in silos, which is "a completely 
different thing."  Kislyak said sharing information and 
building a system before agreeing on what the threats are is 
not "joint" cooperation.  While stating that the U.S. has the 
right to do what it needs to do, so does Russia.  If the U.S. 
does something deemed "destructive to our own national 
security interests, we will take measures."  He stated there 
were a number of conditions that would reassure Russia the 
system will not serve against Russia interests.  The two most 
important Russian conditions are:  suspension of negotiations 
on a third site and no deployments of weapons in space.  The 
"best guarantee" for Russia, Kislyak said, would be for the 
U.S. to renounce current plans for the proposed European MD 
system. 
 
4. (C) U/S Rood supported cooperation on a joint regional 
missile defense architecture as the best way for Russia to 
gain confidence that the system would not adversely affect 
 
BUDAPEST 00000345  002 OF 006 
 
 
Russia's interests.  The U.S. is also open to more modest 
radar cooperation, and we have elaborated on President 
Putin's proposal in our ideas.  Rood expressed interest in 
hearing Russia's concept of jointness.  Responding to 
Russia's call for the U.S. to renounce its plans for a MD 
system in Europe, U/S Rood clearly stated that the U.S. is 
not prepared to do so and that the U.S. has been consistent 
on this point.  He noted U.S. funding for space-based efforts 
was very limited.  Rood also said the U.S. had not stated 
that we would not bring interceptors into Europe. 
 
 
"Not an Add-On to Whatever You Do" 
================================== 
5. (C) U/S Rood asked Kislyak to elaborate further on what 
Russia sees as "joint" cooperation and their development path 
on the Putin proposal.  Kislyak said Russia sees a 
step-by-step process whereby there is a "joint architecture" 
for a monitoring system and a joint center to exchange 
information.  Regarding a joint information center, he 
proposed another center in Brussels in order to include 
Europeans in a "joint" cooperation framework.  Kislyak said 
it is "too early to say" what a solution would look like 
because there are different assets to be offered and it 
depends on the threat.  Kislyak stated that these steps would 
represent real "joint" cooperation, "not an add-on to 
whatever you do."  Buzhinskiy added that it is not just about 
assets "but joint analysis, joint evaluation, and joint 
conclusions to make decisions.  Who will make the decision to 
fire the system?" 
 
6. (C) Kislyak said that by pursuing a parallel process of 
monitoring and missile deployment, the U.S. is rejecting the 
Putin proposal.  However, he also said in response to Rood's 
question that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave 
it" one.  He lamented that the U.S. was "cherry-picking" from 
Russia's proposal, using the Putin proposal as a "bolt on" to 
the U.S. approach.  Kislyak claimed that Poland and the Czech 
Republic were "making statements" of being "extremely 
unhappy" about a MD system. However, upon leaving the State 
Department in Washington, Polish and Czech diplomats were 
saying "it's not Iran, it's Russia."  He cited the Czech 
Foreign Minister's comment that the MD system was "against a 
big country that has the capabilities now," meaning Russia. 
Responding to the "cherry-picking" comment, U/S Rood 
expressed disagreement, further emphasizing that the U.S. has 
not rejected the Putin proposal, but rather has expanded upon 
it and reaffirmed U.S. interest in strategic cooperation with 
Russia on MD.  As for comments by Polish and Czech officials, 
the best step Russia could take would be to not make comments 
about targeting Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
Saving Iran's Face 
================ 
7. (S) Reiterating that Russia does not see Iran as a threat, 
Kislyak stated "we do not understand" why the U.S. is 
"rushing to establish" an architecture.  He asked what other 
realistic threats are there, offering that Israel is the only 
other "threat" in the region.  Kislyak said the U.S. is 
asking Russia to work jointly on a MD system that the Russian 
military believes "will work against us."  Furthermore, he 
said Russia has no desire to form an alliance with the U.S. 
against Iran.  He said Russia is attentive to Iran's national 
pride, as well as maintaining the "political instruments" to 
help provide the Iranians "a way out." 
 
8. (S) U/S Rood stated that North Korean proliferation has 
enabled Iran to acquire and produce missiles and created the 
potential and grave concern for the least responsible states, 
such as Damascus, to acquire this technology.  Technology 
transfers and the global availability of these technologies 
are concerns that will not abate.  Emphasizing that leading 
nations have a special responsibility for maintaining peace 
and security, U/S Rood stressed that Iran is in violation of 
Security Council resolutions and any face-saving measures 
need to be accompanied by continued international pressure to 
come clean on their nuclear development programs. 
 
Armavir Visit: Russia "Less Interested" 
======================================= 
 
BUDAPEST 00000345  003 OF 006 
 
 
9. (C) Regarding the Moscow ABM system, U/S Rood asked if it 
countered an Iranian threat.  Kislyak responded that the 
Moscow system was built to focus on the U.S., and 
furthermore, Russia does not see a strategic threat from Iran 
"politically, technologically, or economically."  Turning to 
the Qabala visit, U/S Rood asked if a similar visit to 
Armavir radar site would be possible.  Kislyak responded that 
the Qabala visit was for the purposes that Putin had 
proposed.  Kislyak said he was disappointed with the results 
of the visit and by General Obering's statement that Qabala 
"would not be a substitute."  Emphasizing that Qabala was 
meant to be part of a system to monitor the threat and not to 
serve to support a third site against Iran, Kislyak said if 
the U.S. proceeds with negotiations with the Czech Republic 
and Poland then Russia would be "less interested" in a U.S. 
visit to Armavir.  Referring to Kislyak's earlier comment 
that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave it" 
offer, DASD Green then asked if there was not a contradiction 
with Russia's condition that the U.S. not proceed with 
current third site negotiations.  Kislyak responded that if 
the U.S. goes ahead with the negotiations, then "you are 
brushing aside the Putin proposal." 
 
Qabala "Turned Off" 
=================== 
10. (S) Moving the discussions to indicators on threat 
assessments, U/S Rood referred to Russian FSB General 
Vnietsiyev8 comments in Paris that a flight test of a 
two-stage solid propellant missile from Iran would be an 
indicator that would change their perception of an Iranian 
threat.  Kislyak and Buzhinskiy both responded, stating that 
General Vnietsiyev was unable to make it to this experts, 
round, but they did not recall this statement as a Russian 
threat assessment "criterion."  Kislyak emphasized that a 
missile's range is the important criteria for Russia.  U.S. 
delegation intelligence analyst Kozlusky provided details on 
the November 20 Iranian flight test of the two-stage, solid 
fuel "Ashura" from the Semnan region in central Iran.  The 
U.S. noted that, although the launch encountered guidance 
problems, the missile is projected to have a 2,000-2,500 km 
range.  Buzhinskiy acknowledged that Russia was not aware 
this had occurred, but doubted that it was a solid propellant 
missile, stating Qabala had been switched off for maintenance 
during that time period.  Kislyak drove the point home that 
"Qabala was created against you", but now "we are relaxed and 
could afford not to service it."  Buzhinskiy also added that 
there had been no "political decision" to use Qabala to 
monitor Iran, hence it was not configured to do so.  Pointing 
out the unprecedented nature of U.S. shared intelligence with 
Russia, U/S Rood suggested that Russia provide information to 
change U.S. views that Iran is not a threat.  Buzhinskiy 
responded by asking the U.S. to provide "real" technical data 
and "not just words." 
 
You Say Milestones, I Say Criteria 
================================== 
11. (S) Kozlusky provided a briefing on a number of 
indicators of long-range missile capability, including 
testing to a range of 2000-2500 km, demonstration of staging, 
and use of high energy propellants.  Kislyak commented that 
there is a difference in what he sees as "milestones" to 
watch for and "criteria" for joint action.  He believed that 
such criteria require a "political decision" based on an 
analysis of technical, military, and political 
considerations.  Buzhinskiy went further, stating that the 
indicators presented were very broad and general in nature, 
highlighting, for example, that some chemical "indicators" 
are also used to manufacture household paint.  He said the 
"only criteria" he would consider is a "successful test of a 
missile at a certain range."  When asked to provide a list of 
more detailed criteria, Kislyak responded that he was being 
asked for a "list for your criteria, for your decision." 
Summing up his views on the indicators presented, Kislyak 
said "we have not been convinced" and "the system you are 
deploying is targeted at us and not Iran."  He added that the 
U.S. threat indicator idea was "politically awkward" for 
Russia, because if they agree to criteria/milestones, then 
they are implicitly accepting the eventual construction of 
the MD sites.  Before there can be agreement on indicators or 
related actions, Kislyak stated, there must be agreement on 
 
BUDAPEST 00000345  004 OF 006 
 
 
if the threat is "real or not."  Continuing, he pointedly 
asked if the U.S. already had people permanently stationed at 
the proposed construction sites.  U/S Rood responded that the 
U.S. only had people at the site examining geographical 
suitability.  U/S Rood pointed out that not all indicators 
need to be present to reach a threat assessment.  He 
encouraged Kislyak to develop a joint set of indicators; this 
would help to bring about a convergence of views. 
 
12. (C) Kislyak said that the U.S. had presented a "serious" 
paper on indicators, which the Russian side would need to 
seriously study.  He added that Russia's concerns could be 
reduced through transparency and confidence building 
measures.  The ministers at the 2-plus-2 had come close. 
Some ideas had been put forward that must be developed. 
 
 
Addressing Russian Concerns 
=========================== 
13. (C) Responding to Russian concerns with the proposed MD 
system, U/S Rood provided nine transparency and 
confidence-building measures for Russian consideration that 
include: 
 
- Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program, 
technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia 
Transparency Working Group; 
- U.S. assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10 
silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior 
notification and discussions; 
- U.S. assurance of no major modifications of interceptor 
silo-launchers without prior discussions; 
- U.S. assurance to take into account developments in Iranian 
missile program in decision making to bring the interceptor 
site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to full 
operational status; 
- U.S. assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests from 
silo-launchers in Poland; 
- Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in 
Moscow and Brussels; 
- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at 
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia; 
- Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the 
Czech Republic (subject to Host Nation agreement); and 
- U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the 
Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of 
any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor 
launches. 
 
What Do You Mean By Operational? 
================================ 
14. (S) Considering the proposal to use missile interrupter 
plugs as a confidence-building measure, Buzhinskiy responded 
that since it would only take several hours to make the 
missile operational again, "it is not sufficient."  Regarding 
the possibility of storing missiles next to silos instead of 
in them, Russian MoD Division Head Yegeniy Ilyin expressed 
the concern that it would take only ten days to put the 
interceptor in a silo.  Mr Englander stated that MDA's 
experience is closer to 20  days for each interceptor. 
Reiterating their interpretation of Defense Secretary Gates, 
comments at the "2-plus-2" meeting, that not having missiles 
in silos meant no missiles in Europe, Buzhinskiy boiled down 
the Russian condition to "silos are empty, missiles not in 
Europe."  Kislyak, further elaborating the Russian position, 
stated that not fully operational means the interceptors 
don't work, that Russia knows they don't work, and that 
Russia knows this in advance.  The best way to ensure that 
interceptors are disabled is to keep them in the U.S. 
Furthermore, he said if there are no missiles in the silos, 
then there is no requirement for the radar to be turned on 
either.  This would allay Russian concerns about the radar 
reaching into their territory. 
 
15. (C) Rood said there are a number of ways to ensure that 
interceptors won't work.  Plugs could be installed in ways 
that physically disable the interceptors.  Visits or 
technical monitoring could be used to determine that the 
interceptors are disabled.  Kislyak said Gates had said that 
interceptors would not be put in silos.  Rood replied that 
 
BUDAPEST 00000345  005 OF 006 
 
 
our concept is to bring interceptors to Europe and store them 
in the silos.  Is Russia interested in not loading the silos? 
 Would that decrease Russia's concerns?  We propose an 
interrupt mechanism, if you suggest the silos be empty, then 
we can take that back to capitals. 
 
16. (C) Kislyak asked to expand on ideas for the radar.  Rood 
said the U.S. is open to Russian ideas, and we could examine 
ways to keep the radar off rather than on.  Buzhinskiy said 
the radar is useless when missiles are not in their silos. 
Englander said that the radar is generally off unless 
directed to engage a missile.  Green said the radar needs to 
be calibrated periodically.  Buzhinskiy repeated that if 
there are no missile in silos, that makes it easier to deal 
with the radar. 
 
17. (S) Buzhinskiy asked if the rapid alerts via the 
"Hotline" would be pre- or post-notification.  He said the 
Russian early warning system will automatically react and a 
post-notification would be too late.  U/S Rood said the U.S. 
could not assure Russia that it would be able to provide 
pre-notifications.  Buzhinskiy then went on to say that the 
U.S. "may simply change the warhead to be nuclear." 
 
18. (S) Responding to Kislyak's question on whether it was 
the Poles and Czechs that did not want Russian observers at 
the third site or the U.S., U/S Rood said it is a combination 
of both.  The U.S. does not think having daily observers is 
necessary, and, furthermore, the Poles and Czechs have 
obvious sensitivities with stationing a permanent Russian 
force in their countries.  Regarding the reciprocal 
stationing of personnel in the U.S. and Russia, Buzhinskiy 
said Russia does not see the U.S. as a threat and instead 
sees the MD system in the Czech Republic and Poland as the 
real threat.  DASD Green offered that the U.S. missile 
defense facility in Colorado is a worldwide monitoring center 
and would be well suited to reciprocal stationing. 
 
 
"First Time in History" 
======================= 
19. (C) Emphasizing again Russian concerns about the MD 
system, Kislyak stated that the "best guarantee for us is 
canceling the program."  He said it would be the first time 
in history that such missiles would be on "our borders."  He 
repeated that "if there is a threat to our assets, we will 
take on the threat."  Responding to the U.S. proposed 
transparency and confidence-building measures, Kislyak said 
Russia is being transparent in expressing the concerns of the 
Russian people to a "non-existent threat" and that "we have 
to respond to our people."  He emphasized the U.S. needed to 
understand that Russia sees this MD system as working against 
them and "this is how we see the system." 
 
 
The Road Ahead 
============== 
20. (C) Concerning the U.S. proposed confidence-building 
measures, Kislyak said that he would delegate to his experts 
for further consideration.  His delegation will report 
everything that had been discussed to Putin by the end of the 
year.  Kislyak said he appreciated the effort to address 
Russian concerns.  He had come to the view, however, that the 
U.S. has decided to deploy without Russia, no matter what. 
We now have to consider what can be done for "damage 
control."  He went on to say that the consequences of the 
program will be much larger than what "you do in the Czech 
Republic and Poland", that it will have long-term 
consequences regarding proliferation, and "we will have to 
calculate our options" about the "problems you are creating." 
 Russia will look at what can be done to reduce the concerns 
it has as the U.S. goes forward.  Most probably there are 
significant limits on what the U.S. can do.  The U.S. paper 
was carefully written to ensure there would be no veto for 
Russia.  Kislyak said Russia would look at the ideas 
presented.  Russia wanted a way to gain a feeling that a 
system, deployed in the absence of a threat, could not be 
used against its interests. 
 
21. (C)  U/S Rood countered that the U.S. wants to continue 
 
BUDAPEST 00000345  006 OF 006 
 
 
to find a way to address most of Russia's concerns.  We will 
reflect on today's discussions and Russia's initial reactions 
to our ideas on indicators and confidence-building measures, 
and the point that had come out in the discussion that the 
radar would be off in the absence of a missile launch except 
for calibration.  He expressed optimism that there was still 
time for dialogue since 2013 would be the earliest the U.S. 
could make the third site operational.  Expressing a desire 
for continued dialogue, the U/S proposed that the group 
reconvene in January or early February 2008. 
 
CFE and MD: Separate Issues 
=========================== 
22. (C) U/S Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S. 
disappointment regarding Russia's suspension of the CFE 
treaty.  Kislyak reiterated Russian claims that the U.S. and 
Allies are to blame for the failure to ratify the Adapted 
Treaty.  He said "we are not going to change our views, we 
are not going to return to the old treaty."  He also said the 
CFE treaty suspension has nothing to do with the MD 
discussions.  Providing a final thought on the treaty 
suspension, Kislyak said "we are waiting for you."  (NOTE: 
The U.S. provided Russia with a revised Parallel Action Plan 
on 21 December.) 
 
Participants 
============ 
23. (SBU) U.S.: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security John Rood (Head of 
delegation), Ambassador Foley, EUR DAS Judy Garber, DASD 
Brian Green, State/T Senior Advisor James Timbie, State/T 
Chief of Staff Hugh Amundson, OSD Missile Defense Policy 
Office Paul Dodge, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, OSD Col. 
Jon Chicky, DOD Regional Expert Richard Trout, JCS J5 Scott 
Roenicke, MDA Keith Englander, MDA Dan Lally, Senior 
Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozlusky, MD Delegation Executive 
Secretary William Shobert, Interpreter Yuri Shkeyrov, and 
 
SIPDIS 
Embassy notetaker. 
 
24. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak 
(Head of delegation), MoD Chief of Directorate General 
Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MFA Deputy Head of North America 
Department Oleg Burmistrov, MFA Deputy Head of Security and 
Disarmament Department Sergey Koshelev, MFA Division Head 
Vladimir Pavlov, MoD International Treaty Directorate 
Division Head Evgeniy Ilyin, and MFA Counselor and 
Interpreter Alexander Obukhov. 
FOLEY