VZCZCXYZ6360
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVB #0203/01 0650905
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050905Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8685
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFNSAA/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT

UNCLAS ZAGREB 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ZAGREB SENDING FOR BELGRADE 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: WHO'S RUNNING SERBIA 
 
REF: ZAGREB 184 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) By keeping Serbians fixated on Kosovo, Prime Minister 
Kostunica has retained control of Serbian politics despite President 
Tadic's reelection last month.  Kostunica's hard-line nationalist 
response to Kosovo is obstructing Serbia's path to EU integration by 
paralyzing the government and exposing deep political rifts.  Some 
leaders of pro-EU parties, however, have finally begun to challenge 
Kostunica by trying to shift the focus back to Serbia's European 
path.  End Summary. 
 
Kostunica Emboldened 
-------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Kosovo has been and remains a deeply emotional issue among 
Serbs, as both polling and anecdotal evidence suggest.  However, the 
February 21 protest in Belgrade -- a serious GOS undertaking in 
every aspect including arranging free nationwide transportation and 
a school holiday -- has been the only sizable public rally against 
Kosovo independence in Serbia since February 17.  Kostunica's 
manufactured massive protest and the ensuing government-sanctioned 
attacks on embassies on February 21 in Belgrade was the latest 
evidence that PM Kostunica has effectively neutralized his rivals by 
keeping Kosovo the preeminent national issue.  With President Boris 
Tadic and all other Democratic Party (DS) officials keeping their 
distance (Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic were in Romania), 
Kostunica shared the stage with only his coalition partner Velimir 
Ilic of New Serbia (NS) and the opposition Radicals (SRS).  After 
the rally, rather than repudiating the deadly violence committed by 
Serbs both in Serbia and northern Kosovo, Kostunica and hard-line 
nationalist allies blamed the "legal violence" committed to Serbia 
through Kosovo's independence as a catalyst for the havoc (reftel). 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) In addition to the rally's success, the slower than 
expected pace of countries recognizing Kosovo, as perceived by the 
GOS, has further emboldened Kostunica and other hard-line 
nationalist leaders.  Contacts at the UN Office in Belgrade, who met 
with Kostunica on February 28, told poloff that Kostunica appeared 
upbeat and expressed optimism that the number of Kosovo recognitions 
would "not reach critical mass."  Foreign Minister Jeremic, who has 
generally been in lockstep with Kostunica on his diplomatic 
offensives against Kosovo, echoed this during a gathering of 
regional leaders in Bulgaria on February 28, saying that Kosovo 
would only be recognized by about 40 countries "once the dust 
settles." 
 
Tadic Inert 
----------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) President Boris Tadic won 2.3 million of his citizens' 
votes just last month, but has thus far refused to fight Kostunica 
over the core principle that secured his reelection: Serbia's future 
in the European Union.  Tadic and his advisers insist that Serbia's 
path to the EU remains open, even though Kostunica has ruled out any 
steps towards integration while the EU deploys its mission in 
Kosovo.  Addressing the DS executive board on March 2, Tadic 
insisted that Serbia could have both Kosovo and the EU, stressing 
that he would both defend Serbia's "territorial integrity" but 
"never abandon the policy of...European integration."  Tadic also 
said that the DS would not leave the government. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Tadic's efforts may be limited out of fear of retribution 
from Kostunica and other hard-liners.  According to contacts in 
Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic's (DS) cabinet (protect), Tadic 
will likely continue to remain quiet in refuting the DSS on Kosovo 
and pushing EU integration.  Djelic's senior advisers told poloff, 
March 3, that Tadic is concerned that if he speaks up too much 
against DSS and current Kosovo policy he could be impeached by a 
DSS/SRS majority in Parliament for not upholding the Constitution. 
 
Unity on Kosovo 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kostunica has called for continued unity among the 
governing parties on Kosovo at the expense of the government's other 
priorities.  The DS-DSS-G17 coalition agreed at formation in May 
2007 that the government would maintain five governing principles: 
Kosovo, EU integration, combating corruption and organized crime, 
increasing standard of living and full ICTY cooperation.  Tadic won 
reelection last month based largely on delivering on EU integration, 
also the G17 Plus' central issue.  For months, Kostunica has 
stressed Kosovo as more important than the EU or any other issue. 
Since January 2008, Kostunica has vowed to block any movement 
towards the EU, including the interim political agreement offered on 
January 28, because of EU plans to deploy the EULEX mission to 
Kosovo.  On March 2, DSS spokesperson Andreja Mladenovic said "the 
DSS calls on all parties not to split the country over the issue of 
EU association. Instead, we must all assume a joint position that 
Serbia wants to join the EU together with Kosovo and Metohija as its 
integral and unalienable part." 
 
Conflicted Priorities 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) DSS insistence that Kosovo must remain the top, and perhaps 
the only, issue for Serbia has exposed serious rifts within the 
governing coalition.  DSS officials have dismissed any instability 
within the coalition due to a common Kosovo policy.  DSS Vice 
President Milos Aligrudic told Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti on 
February 29 that the GOS was stable due to its united Kosovo policy. 
 He said he expected decisions on EU accession to be resolved 
"later."  DSS spokesperson Andreja Mladenovic told the press, March 
2, that "it is of the greatest importance that we preserve this 
policy and thus maintain Serbia's state and national unity," and 
noted that all major parties had supported the Serbian Constitution 
in October 2006 which "says Kosovo is Serbia." 
 
¶8. (SBU) DS and DSS officials both cite the government's "five 
principles" but Kostunica has successfully brought two of them -- 
Kosovo and the EU -- into direct opposition.  Former Tadic adviser 
and Kosovo negotiator Leon Kojen told poloff February 29, that these 
"conflicted" priorities resulted in the "bad marriage" of the DS-DSS 
and dysfunctional government.  Even Kosovo Ministry adviser Edislav 
Manetovic (protect) told poloff, February 28, that Serbia's EU track 
was "currently held hostage" because of different DS-DSS priorities, 
and he acknowledged splits "even within DSS" on Kostunica's 
tactics. 
 
G17, LDP & (Some) DS Ready to Change the Subject 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (SBU) As reported in reftel, some Serbian leaders have begun 
speaking out against Kostunica's fiery rhetoric.  Officials in the 
three pro-EU parties (G17 Plus, LDP, DS) have publicly accused 
Kostunica of obstructing EU integration.  In bold, pragmatic 
comments, G17 Plus Vice President Ivana Dulic-Markovic told a Novi 
Sad daily on February 27 that the GOS could fall if Serbia did not 
make progress towards the EU, starting with the interim political 
agreement. "Our position in the fight for Kosovo will be stronger if 
we have friends in the EU and if we are economically prosperous.  If 
these politics of the government continue, I am afraid that we will 
be left without Kosovo and without the EU," Dulic-Markovic told 
Gradjanski List.  Dulic-Markovic said that the GOS was solely 
focusing on Kosovo and that the GOS "has forgotten about" the other 
four government principles.  She blamed the DSS for "obstructing" 
Serbia's path to Europe and urged the DS work on EU integration 
noting Tadic had been elected by a majority of Serbians to do so. 
On March 2, Economy Minister Mladjan Dinkic (G17 Plus) said on a B92 
program that Kostunica had employed "Milosevic-like" strategies to 
stoke anti-US and anti-Western sentiments over Kosovo.  Dinkic 
called Kostunica's strategy of entering the EU only with Kosovo 
"unrealistic" and the DSS-NS pre-election campaign, "Kosovo is 
Serbia," was the party's only and entire platform.  Like Milosevic, 
Dinkic argued, Kostunica has used the plight of Kosovo Serbs to 
dominate Serbia's political scene "however, this time it will not 
happen."  In response, DSS spokesperson Mladenovic told the press on 
March 4 that the DSS would no longer speak with G17 Plus and that 
Serbia will continue its "single state policy." 
 
¶10. (U) The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has repeatedly invited 
"all democratic forces" to join together for a pro-EU coalition.  On 
February 8, the LDP issued the statement blaming Kostunica for a 
"silent coup" obstructing Serbia's EU integration.  On February 11, 
the LDP "reminded" Tadic and the DS that Kostunica is "the main 
obstacle to the European future of Serbia."  On February 22, the LDP 
cited the rally and violence in Belgrade and called for "joint and 
resolute action" by a pro-EU coalition to "save Serbia's future." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Though Tadic has not led the way, some in the DS are 
working on changing the subject.  Deputy PM Djelic's advisers 
(strictly protect) told poloff, March 3, that Dinkic was 
coordinating his rebuttals against the DSS closely with DS leaders. 
The DS will become more vocal on changing the public debate and tone 
over the next month.  In a sign of this shift, Djelic told the press 
on March 3 that Serbia still aims to sign a Stabilization and 
Accession Agreement (SAA) with the EU this year.  His advisers 
insist they are realistic, however, telling poloff "differences" 
within the governing coalition would prevent an SAA but that work on 
EU integration can still be done in the meantime.  Djelic's staff 
cited recent progress on financial and visa facilitation agreements 
between Serbia and the EU, and said their aim was for Serbia to be 
eligible for EU candidate status once Serbia signs the SAA.  Djelic 
said publicly, March 3, "nothing prevents Serbia from starting the 
implementation of the SAA so as not to lose precious time."  Post 
has cautioned DS officials not to promise Serbians an SAA like they 
did during Tadic's reelection campaign and suffer the consequences 
of not meeting expectations.  In addition, Tadic's domestic policy 
adviser, Nebojsa Krstic, told the press on March 4 that the DS was 
considering "a referendum on a European path" in the event the 
DSS-NS and the SRS insisted on blocking an SAA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) It is a dark time for Serbia's European future.  Although 
the pro-EU forces in Serbia realize their imperative -- getting EU 
integration back on track -- Kostunica continues to successfully 
drown out their voices with nationalist furor on Kosovo.  The United 
States must keep supporting pro-European efforts here, but it is 
incumbent upon these pro-EU forces, especially President Tadic, to 
build upon their majority base of 2.3 million citizens and move the 
political discourse in Serbia past the myth of Kosovo in Serbia and 
onto the promise of Serbia in Europe.  End Comment. 
 
MUNTER