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FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5581
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0458
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1018
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0958
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, 
SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT 
MEETING: POLITE BUT DULL 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The 2008 Annual Implementation Assessment 
Meeting (AIAM) on March 4-5 was not contentious, delegations 
restricting themselves to broad recommendations that were 
intended for further concrete development in the Forum for 
Security Cooperation.  Russia did not spend much time 
berating participating States for the lack of progress in 
adopting its various CSBM proposals, and refrained from 
lengthy discussion of them.  Many of the topics discussed 
were aired at previous AIAMs, including the inspection "quota 
race," improving the rate of defense planning and budget 
submissions, and reporting significant military activities. 
There was no attempt to negotiate proposals in the AIAM, 
although Germany drew much support when it referred to its 
"quota race" Food-for-Thought paper.  Discussion of improved 
implementation was desultory and brief.  In the closing 
minutes, Germany, Turkey, Italy, France and others opposed 
linking the impasse over CFE to work on the Vienna Document 
1999 and other CSBMs.  End summary. 
 
WORKING SESSION 1 
 
Annual Exchange of Military Information 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The coordinator (Donagh, Ireland) asked if 
presentations by participating States (pS) at the FSC 
Security Dialogue on their submissions to the Annual Exchange 
of Military Information (AEMI) would enhance transparency 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) said that while the AEMI enhances 
transparency the quality of submissions differ.  France 
(Fournier) asked why there were so few responses to paragraph 
10.3 on "surplus" forces.  Switzerland (Chaudhuri) commended 
the training provided on the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) to 
participating States (pS), noting the recent workshop in 
Kyrgyzstan.  Finland (Olin) hoped a recent decision on 
electronic filing (FSC.DEC/17/07) would enhance transparency. 
 (Note: Finland was the original sponsor.  End note.) 
Finland commended the high rate of returns, but recommended 
improvement in the quality of the information submitted. 
 
Defense Planning 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The coordinator noted there were four returns fewer 
in 2007 than the year before.  There were five nil reports 
and 32 pS had consistently provided information over the last 
five years. 
 
¶5. (SBU) France (Fournier) asked the Conflict Prevention 
Center (CPC) whether budget calendars accounted for late or 
missing submissions of defense planning information.  The CPC 
(Werth) said the data was ambiguous on this question.  Russia 
(Uskov) called for support of its earlier proposal to create 
a single September 30 deadline for submission of annual 
defense planning and budget information 
(FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.2).  The single deadline, Russia claimed, 
would make it easier for the CPC to track responses and would 
improve the information exchange. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Finland saw nothing that would prevent pS from 
submitting defense planning and budget information at the 
same time and could support the Russian proposal of a single 
deadline.  Finland said the problem was not the calendar but 
a lack of national will to provide the information.  Sweden 
 
USOSCE 00000060  002 OF 008 
 
 
offered support for any proposal, including Russia's, which 
would increase the number of returns and enhance compliance. 
Ireland (Hynes) recalled that compliance was better when 
there was a deadline.  Canada (Higgins) supported the status 
quo, adding that the accuracy of the information provided was 
more important than the timing of the submission and 
transparency was more important than the convenience of the 
CPC.  Canada doubted a single deadline would enhance 
compliance.  Italy (Amadei) and the UK (Osment) supported 
Canada.  (Note: Only Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan do 
not provide the required information on a continuing basis. 
End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Russia and Switzerland tentatively supported the 
coordinator's suggestion of a workshop on defense planning. 
 
Risk Reduction 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The coordinator noted that VD99 Chapter III risk 
reduction mechanisms were not invoked over the last year and 
asked why.  He noted the CPC director (Salber) briefed the 
range of OSCE risk reduction mechanisms available to pS last 
November (Note: This was in the aftermath of the FSC Security 
Dialogue discussion of the August 2007 Russian missile 
incident in Georgia.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) said the lack of use was not a 
question of lack of need for these mechanisms but lack of 
will to invoke them.  There was also some confusion among pS 
because of the complexity and number of these mechanisms. 
Greece recommended updating and streamlining the mechanism to 
correspond with current conditions.  Perhaps this effort 
could begin in the FSC with a discussion of the CPC paper on 
risk reduction mechanisms that was circulated in late 2007 
(SEC.GAL/216/07). 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia, referring to its earlier CSBM proposals for 
requiring notification of transit and deployment of military 
forces through the OSCE area (FSC.DEL/20/07, FSC.DEL/21/07), 
said it wanted to introduce more measures that would enhance 
transparency and security.  Although there had been little 
engagement on these proposals by pS, Russia remained hopeful 
they could be discussed in 2008. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Finland noted that its concept paper for the 2008 
Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) included discussion 
of an OSCE "toolbox" of risk reduction mechanisms 
(CIO.GAL/27/08). 
 
¶12. (SBU) Belarus declared support for its joint proposal 
with Russia for an information exchange on rapid reaction 
forces (FSC.DEL/545/06) and recommended a special working 
group meeting to discuss it. 
 
Significant Military Activities 
------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Russia said that the same pS from year to year 
reported sub-threshold significant military activities.  The 
only notification under this provision in 2007 was Swiss 
training. However, there were significant activities during 
the last year, particularly those involving rapid reaction 
forces.  Russia had proposed in 2005 to make such reporting 
mandatory but there was no consensus. Russia had more 
 
USOSCE 00000060  003 OF 008 
 
 
recently made another proposal on reporting significant 
military activities and called for discussion of it 
(FSC.DEL/455/07/Rev.2/Corr.1).  Russia also noted that VD99 
paragraph 44.1 required notifications of land exercises held 
with air or naval components. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Sweden declared that it had provided notification 
of six activities in 2007.  Sweden explained that 
"significant" activities need not include large numbers of 
military personnel. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Switzerland said it had earlier notified that over 
9,000 soldiers would provide support to civil authorities 
during the UEFA football games in June. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Finland said it supported mandatory reporting of 
significant military activities, but wondered whether 
provision of information on sub-threshold activities enhanced 
transparency. 
 
Air Base and Military Facilities Visits 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The coordinator (Gare, United Kingdom) noted a new 
five-year period began in 2007 that might explain the four 
visits to air bases or military facilities in 2007 compared 
to 18 in 2006.  She asked if more pS would participate in the 
visits if technical or financial support were provided. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The UK (Osment) suggested developing a Best 
Practice Guide for conducting air base and military facility 
visits.  Germany said it could participate in the drafting of 
a guide, but warned that the effort would not excuse 
continued efforts by pS to fulfill their obligations in this 
area.  The UK also announced a combined airfield/military 
facility visit for May 12-16 involving a visit to RAF Marham, 
a Tornado GR-4 base, and the Royal School of Artillery at 
Larkhill, where the British light gun and Mastiff armored 
personnel carrier would be displayed.  The UK POC is Lt Col 
Philip Osment, tel 44 207 218 3562 email philip.osment574(at 
symbol)mod.uk. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Switzerland suggested less experienced pS could be 
invited to observe the planning and implementation of these 
visits. 
 
Evaluations and Inspections 
--------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The coordinator noted 88 inspection were requested 
in 2007 and 84 were conducted, with four refusals, of which 
three were unexplained. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Ireland (Hynes) asked if EU membership status had 
an impact on the conduct of inspections and evaluations. 
(Note: Ireland was alluding to possible restraints on 
intra-EU inspections.  End note.) 
 
¶22. (SBU) Armenia (Yedigarian) noted it had received three 
inspections in 2007, and had already in 2008 hosted two 
inspections from Greece and Turkey.  Armenia hosted an air 
base visit in 2007, its second, and asserted it was the only 
South Caucasus pS to host an air base visit, calling on the 
others to follow its example. Armenia noted the value of VD 
99 in the South Caucasus, where security concerns and threat 
 
USOSCE 00000060  004 OF 008 
 
 
perceptions were higher than in other parts of the OSCE area. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Germany (Eichorn) called for a remedy to the annual 
VD99 inspection "quota race", and referred to its proposal 
for reorganizing the inspection year into three periods 
during which only a portion of the annual quota would be 
available (FSC.DEL/51/08).  This would, at the very least, 
avoid the need to conduct many inspections in the winter 
months when military activities were less frequent and 
climatic conditions made inspections more difficult.  The 
proposal would not, Germany asserted, require reopening VD99. 
 (Note:  On the margins of the meeting, Germany emphasized to 
USDel that it was open to other proposals to address the 
problem of the quota race and stressed it would welcome U.S. 
edits to the text.  End note.) 
 
¶24. (SBU) Greece supported the German proposal, although it 
would prefer a less complicated calendar.  Norway, Belgium, 
the UK, and Sweden welcomed the proposal, Sweden noting that 
it had voluntarily forgone performing inspections prior to 
March 15 this year to ameliorate the quota race.  Italy 
called the German proposal "useful," noting that the real 
problem was the absence of military activities to inspect in 
the first months of the year. The quota race is contrary to 
the "spirit" of VD99.  Finland suggested other solutions 
could include bilateral agreements or guest inspectors. 
France noted it continued to study the proposal.  It endorsed 
multinational inspection teams as a possible solution. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) termed the German proposal 
"interesting," noting that in 2007 inspection quotas for 
Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the U.S. were exhausted within 
the first two months of the inspection year.  (Note: Russia 
was probably referring to the U.S. evaluation quota as the 
U.S. lacks an inspection quota.  End note.)  Russia said it 
would be useful to analyze the data to know who goes where, 
noting that Ireland had suggested EU membership might affect 
inspections and NATO members presumably do not need to 
inspect each other. 
 
Regional Measures 
----------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) Lithuania (Ziugzda) announced it had bilateral 
agreements with Russia and Belarus to supplement the VD99. 
Hungary (Szatmari) described the provisions of its bilateral 
agreements with Serbia and Ukraine that enhance the 
transparency provided by the VD99.  The U.S. (Silberberg) 
called for the continued use of regional, sub-regional, and 
bilateral measures.  Germany and Belarus also supported 
regional measures, Belarus adding that "knowing who is on the 
other end of the telephone" greatly enhances confidence. 
 
OSCE Communications Network 
--------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) Greece noted that although new OSCE Communications 
Network (CommNet) software had been distributed to all pS in 
2007 (INA version 2.2), the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia had not installed it and instead used an altered 
template.  As installation of the latest version of the INA 
was mandatory and partial installation of it was not allowed, 
Greece asked the CPC to address this concern. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Ireland (Donagh) noted that delegations in Vienna 
 
USOSCE 00000060  005 OF 008 
 
 
did not ordinarily have access to the CommNet and recommended 
that they be provided terminals. 
 
Global Exchange of Military Information 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) The coordinator asked if there would be any 
advantage to combining the deadlines for the submission of 
data under the GEMI and AEMI.  Although Sweden, Finland, and 
Serbia insisted that single deadline would be more efficient 
and enhance compliance, the UK, Canada, Greece, Italy, and 
the U.S. preferred separate deadlines and submissions, citing 
differences in the purpose and nature of the two exchanges. 
 
WORKING SESSION 2 
 
Conventional Arms Transfers 
--------------------------- 
 
¶30. (U) There were no comments. 
 
Non-proliferation 
----------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) The coordinator (Pavlov, Belarus) asked what had 
been done in the FSC to address earlier proposals on 
non-proliferation, including enhancing implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 and reviewing the OSCE 
principles of non-proliferation. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The U.S. commented favorably on the progress made 
throughout the year on non-proliferation initiatives, 
including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
and UNSCR 1540.  The U.S. invited pS to contribute to the 
UNSCR 1540 Best Practices Guide and urged them to develop 
national action plans for implementation of UNSCR 1540. 
 
Stabilizing Measures 
-------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) The coordinator asked why the provisions for 
stabilizing measures had never been used since their adopting 
in 1993.  Greece (Sourani) reprised its comments from earlier 
in the AIAM that lack of political will explained why 
stabilizing measures were not used, not a lack of crisis 
situations.  Canada (Linteau) compared this agreement to a 
fire extinguisher, pointing out that just because he had not 
used it in ten years did not mean that he did not need it. 
Instead, he suggested, as Greece had earlier, that the 
measures should be reviewed to see if they were still 
adequate. 
 
Anti-Personnel Landmines 
------------------------ 
 
¶34. (SBU) Discussion focused on the results of the special 
January 23 FSC meeting on anti-personnel landmines (APL) and 
the need to make the proposals from that session "more 
tangible."  Germany, Canada and Turkey discussed ways of 
improving the OSCE's role in the international effort to 
eliminate APL. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
 
USOSCE 00000060  006 OF 008 
 
 
¶35. (SBU) The pS welcomed the recently adopted FSC Decision 
(FSC.DEC/1/08) on awareness raising and outreach for the Code 
of Conduct.  Several pS stated the Code was very important as 
one of the most important contributors to security and 
stability in the OSCE area. 
 
¶36. (SBU) There was an extended discussion on the latest 
proposal to update the Code Questionnaire, which was 
introduced by the FSC Coordinator for the Code (Eischer, 
Austria).  Turkey asserted some of the new questions went 
beyond the scope of current Code provisions and will need 
extended further discussion before the updated Questionnaire 
could be approved.  Finland (Olin) said that past surveys 
have "proven" that the Questionnaire needs to be updated 
while Sweden (Nilsson) said that this was "probably one of 
the most important issues for the rest of the year for the 
FSC." 
 
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
---------------------------- 
 
¶37. (SBU) Pavlov (Belarus) introduced the topic, speaking as 
both session coordinator and chair of the Informal Group of 
Friends of SMALL Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), by giving a 
status report on the projects in Tajikistan and Belarus. 
(Comment: Pavlov mentioned plans for a donor visit to 
Tajikistan in September or October 2008.  As a major donor, 
delegation recommends that U.S. should participate in the 
visit.  End comment). 
 
¶38. (SBU) Discussion followed on an OSCE contribution to the 
2008 Bilateral Meeting of States (BMS) of the UN Program of 
Action (POA) for SALW.  Several states including Finland, 
Germany, and Belarus supported a special FSC session to 
prepare for the BMS. 
 
¶39. (SBU) Finland (Olin) pointed out that reported quantities 
of SALW exported from one country and imported by another do 
not always correspond in the OSCE data exchange.  Turkey 
offered that one possible explanation could be that importing 
and exporting pS use different rules to determine when to add 
the equipment to their registers. 
 
Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶40. (SBU) Turkey also suggested adding information about 
stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) to the Annual 
SALW Data Exchange.  Switzerland supported Turkey.  The 
coordinator pointed out that the data exchange requirement 
was contained in the OSCE Document on SALW, but not in the 
Document on SCA, and pointed out that the negotiations "could 
be difficult."  Turkey rejoined that many negotiations in the 
past at the FSC had been difficult and this issue could be 
solved as previous issues had been. 
 
MANPADS Export Controls 
----------------------- 
 
¶41. (SBU) The coordinator reminded that there was still a 
Food-for-Thought on the table for updating the OSCE 
principles on MANPADS export control to reflect December 2007 
Wassenaar Arrangement amendments (FSC.DEL/46/08/Rev.1).  In 
response to a question posed by Russia, the U.S. confirmed 
that its MANPADS proposal (FSC.DEL/52/08), which would adopt 
 
USOSCE 00000060  007 OF 008 
 
 
the latest Wassenaar amendments without reopening the 2004 
FSC decision (3/04), was still on the table. 
 
SALW Brokering 
-------------- 
 
¶42. (SBU) The CPC (Kitomaki) gave a brief synopsis of the 
results of the "one-off" exchange of information on SALW 
brokering.  She reported that 39 States had submitted the 
information in time to be included in the Survey, and that 
three more had submitted the information since then.  Finland 
(Kangaste) proposed that the CPC be tasked to issue a 
revision with information from the three other States 
included, then this could be followed up with a more detailed 
discussion in the FSC on ways to improve implementation. 
 
End User Certificates and Verification for SALW Exports 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶43. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) recommended that the FSC follow 
the pattern established for the other "principles," i.e., 
MANPADS export controls and SALW brokering of SALW, by 
agreeing to a one time data exchange, to be followed by an 
assessment of the implementation.  This item would also be 
useful under the "future activity" entry for an OSCE 
contribution to the UN BMS on the UN SALW POA. 
 
WORKING SESSION 3 
 
Improvement of Implementation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶44. (SBU) The coordinator (Kleinjan, Netherlands), who had 
not distributed a separate agenda for the session, invited 
comment on any aspect of implementation.  Apart for the brief 
comments noted below, there was no discussion and the session 
finished an hour early. 
 
¶45. (SBU) Germany said each pS should decide what they can 
and will do to enhance implementation of VD99.  For example, 
Germany had decided to include information and notifications 
beyond what was required in the document.  Germany believed 
it was important to set an example of enhanced compliance. 
Belarus asserted its preference for FSC decisions rather that 
Chairman's statements as a means to improve implementation. 
 
¶46. (SBU) Turkey noted that although one State Party's 
suspension of its CFE obligations was a problem, pS should 
beware of allowing this concern to cause a "self-destructive 
domino effect."  The impasse over CFE should not be allowed 
to kill debate in the FSC on the VD99 and other CSBMs. 
Turkey would continue to welcome discussion of all CSBMs in 
the FSC and consider each on its own merits. 
 
CLOSING SESSION: "Keep CFE Out of FSC Work on CSBMs" 
 
¶47. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, and 
Sweden called on pS to continue their work in the FSC on 
CSBMS "without reference to problems encountered in other 
arms control fora," as Germany put it.  Italy said that 
"artificial linking" of the CFE problem to other arms control 
work should not be allowed. 
 
¶48. (SBU) Spain and the UK traded reservations over the 
application of the VD99 to Gibraltar in light of their 
 
USOSCE 00000060  008 OF 008 
 
 
dispute over sovereignty. 
SCOTT