Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA185, IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 CONSIDER "WHAT NEXT?"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08UNVIEVIENNA185.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA185 2008-03-27 17:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0185/01 0871733
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271733Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7732
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0691
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0625
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0924
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0684
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0774
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 
TAGS: PARM AROC IAEA KNNP IR
SUBJECT:  IAEA/IRAN:  P5+1 CONSIDER "WHAT NEXT?" 
 
REF: UNVIE 175 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, 
d and h 
 
------ 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) At a U.S. hosted meeting of P5 1 Ambassadors on March 
26, the EU-3 shared their assessments of the March Board and 
considered next steps on Iran in the lead up to the June 
Board.  Ambassador Schulte underlined the need to support the 
Secretariat's investigation of past weaponization activities 
 
SIPDIS 
and verification of information provided by Iran on "issues 
no longer outstanding at this stage" (reftel).  France agreed 
that this was a "new phase" with the focus now on 
weaponization.  A less sanguine UK cautioned that there was 
significant risk of a stalemate between the Secretariat and 
Iran causing several months of drift.  Germany stressed the 
need for a more coordinated P5 1 approach in Vienna while the 
UK and France asked that P5 1 counterparts not rule out a 
Board resolution in June.  Russia and China had little to 
contribute to Vienna P5 1 deliberations but hoped that new 
and innovative approaches would emerge from the PolDirs 
meeting in Shanghai.  In a follow-on discussion, Ambassador 
Schulte and French Ambassador Deniau considered ways to keep 
the Iran issue at the forefront in Vienna, including the 
suggestion of an unclassified briefing on why the information 
reported by the IAEA is relevant to nuclear weapons R&D or a 
P5 1 technical experts meeting after Shanghai.  A U.S. 
priority for Shanghai should be agreement on the 
unacceptability of Iran's claim that the work plan issues can 
be considered "closed." End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Looking Ahead to the June Board 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Schulte invited P5 1 counterparts to take 
stock of the March Board outcome on Iran and exchange ideas 
on the way forward in the lead up to the June Board.  He 
noted that PolDirs would next meet on April 16 in Shanghai. 
Almost all Board interventions during the March Board, he 
observed, urged continued cooperation by Iran in two key 
areas, AP implementation and weaponization.  Ambassador 
Schulte underlined that passage of UNSCR 1803 reinforced the 
Board's authority and the role of the IAEA.  He also noted 
that the DG's 90-day report to the Security Council under 
UNSCR 1803 would coincide with the June Board.  Over the next 
two months, Ambassador Schulte suggested that Board members 
focus on providing support to the Secretariat's investigation 
of weaponization, verification of Iran's answers on formerly 
outstanding issues and implementation of the AP/additional 
transparency measures (reftel). 
 
3. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald encouraged the P5 1 to work 
together in Vienna toward common objectives.  He assessed 
that the DG's report to the March Board had been positive and 
the Secretariat's technical briefing added important new 
elements that need further explanation.  Although there 
seemed to be momentum on the Iran dossier at the beginning of 
the Board meeting, some Board statements, notably that of the 
NAM, glossed over the still outstanding issues and declared 
the work plan finalized.  He emphasized that the P5 1 work 
together to promote a realistic and balanced assessment at 
the next Board to ensure states do not "fall into this trap." 
 In contrast to Gottwald's pessimistic view of the NAM 
interventions, French Ambassador Deniau was encouraged that 
NAM members such as South Africa, Egypt and Iraq cited the 
"alleged studies" in their national statements and seemed to 
take seriously DDG Heinonen's technical briefing. 
 
4. (C) UK Ambassador Smith opined that the Board needed to 
pronounce itself as a whole, and asked that P5 1 counterparts 
keep an open mind about a Board resolution in June to clarify 
where the Board stands and that Iran's answers have been 
"unsatisfactory."  Deniau agreed and observed that the next 
Board would present a new situation with a fresh report from 
the DG and no prospect of UNSC action to complicate debate in 
Vienna.  He suggested that a Board resolution should be part 
of the overall dual-track strategy on Iran. 
 
Risk of Drift in this "New Phase" 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Between now and the June Board, however, Smith feared 
there was a significant risk that "nothing much would 
happen," which could lead to a general perception that no 
additional progress could be made on the Iran file.  He 
warned that the Secretariat had no detailed vision and no 
clear plan on next steps regarding outstanding issues.  At a 
minimum, Board members needed to support the resumption of 
the Secretariat's work with Iran.  For its part, however, 
Iran had not signaled any willingness to re-engage with 
Solana and had sent an inflammatory letter to the UNSC 
President on UNSCR 1803.  P5 1 partners would work on 
improving the June 2006 offer in Shanghai but there was no 
evidence that Iran was prepared to address that offer. 
 
6. (C) While he acknowledged the risk of "drift," Deniau 
seconded the words of an unnamed diplomat (himself), quoted 
in the press, following the Secretariat's technical briefing, 
that the Iran file had "entered a new phase."  The 
Secretariat, he noted, had attached enough significance and 
 
SIPDIS 
credibility to the information presented on "alleged studies" 
to show it to the Board.  In entering this "new phase" the 
key objective would be to support the Secretariat's 
investigation of that issue and verification of other issues. 
 To counter the perception in parts of the Secretariat that 
not much will change, DCM suggested that the P5 1 help shape 
expectations for the DG report.  DCM noted divisions among 
the Secretariat as to how activist it should be and a lack of 
clarity on the DG's plans for June. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Russia and China Want "New Ideas" 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky referred to the dual 
track logic of the March 3 P5 1 Ministerial statement, which 
acknowledged work plan progress while expressing serious 
concern about the "alleged studies."  He called for 
innovative approaches and fresh ideas, and underlined the 
importance of the Solana-Jalili channel as a place where such 
ideas could be raised.  Zmeyevsky also supported the 
continuation of Iran-IAEA discussions, which had produced 
results. 
 
8. (C) Chinese Ambassador Tang cited Iran-Agency cooperation 
since last August on all outstanding issues except for the 
"alleged studies."  He unhelpfully noted the DG's opening 
remarks to the March Board on the need for "due process" in 
verifying the "authenticity" and substance of the "alleged 
studies".  Tang stressed the need to encourage the 
Secretariat and Iran to continue efforts to clarify this 
 
SIPDIS 
issue so as to strengthen international confidence.  A 
long-term comprehensive solution based on the March 3rd 
Ministerial statement is needed, Tang said, and he hoped that 
the Shanghai meeting would produce new ideas for the 
resumption of negotiations. 
 
9. (C) Ambassador Schulte advised against use of the term 
"alleged studies," as according to the Secretariat, the 
information it has collected comes from multiple sources 
including procurement data.  He also cited P5 1 Ministers 
statements that refer to activities with a "military-nuclear 
dimension."  Deniau noted, moreover, that Iran has 
acknowledged some of the studies while claiming that they 
were for non-nuclear purposes. 
 
---------------------- 
Moving Ahead in Vienna 
---------------------- 
 
10. (C) Russia and China had nothing to add on next steps in 
Vienna or the role of Vienna in the broader P5 1 strategy. 
Gottwald suggested that the P5 1 in Vienna could contribute 
new ideas and feed into the overall P5 1 framework.  He 
encouraged the P5 1 here to move forward in a more 
coordinated manner than in the past and consider how we 
position ourselves in the June Board.  Ambassador Schulte 
noted that the P5 1 need a common understanding in the Board 
given that UNSCR 1803 reinforces the Board's responsibility. 
P5 1 Missions agreed to regroup after the P5 1 PolDirs 
meeting in Shanghai.  Ambassador Schulte suggested to Tang 
that he host the next meeting but Tang  preferred that the 
EU-3 do so. 
 
11. (S) In a follow-on discussion, Ambassadors Schulte and 
Deniau brainstormed on ways to keep the Iran nuclear issue at 
the forefront in Vienna.  Deniau suggested that PolDirs in 
Shanghai consider convening a meeting of P5 1 technical 
experts in Vienna to conduct a joint analysis of 
weaponization or centrifuge work (the topic was less 
important than the optic of a joint approach).  He further 
suggested intensifying our involvement in verification of 
formerly outstanding issues, such as polonium, by feeding the 
Secretariat additional information.  Deniau liked Ambassador 
 
SIPDIS 
Schulte's idea of an unclassified briefing for Board members 
on the ABCs of nuclear weapons work as it relates the Iran 
file, thus helping to explain why the activities reported by 
the Secretariat are relevant to nuclear weapons R&D.  Deniau 
also proposed that the EU-3 could provide Board members an 
assessment of the information presented in the Secretariat's 
technical briefing. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
12. (S) We share UK Ambassador Smith's concern that little 
public and private discussion of Iran in Vienna will mean no 
progress on the Iran file by the June Board.  That would both 
feed the perception that we are at a stalemate and fuel 
pressure by ElBaradei and others that the P5 1 -- and 
specifically the U.S. -- need to make a concession to revive 
negotiations.  The IAEA Secretariat, meanwhile, appears 
divided between those, like Heinonen, who want to press ahead 
on the weaponization investigation, and others who want to 
use passage of 1803 as an excuse to slow-roll the Iran 
account for the rest of 2008.  The perception of a stalemate 
would feed into Iran's strategy to delay and divide the 
international community and make it more difficult to get 
support if we decided to pursue a June Board resolution that 
reaffirmed the role of the Board.  In the wake of the Majles 
elections and Iran's declarations that the work plan is 
closed, this drift could also give additional fuel to Iranian 
hard-line arguments that non-cooperation and aggressive 
diplomacy will be successful on the nuclear issue and thus 
make Tehran's cooperation even less likely. 
 
13. (S) The Vienna-based process needs to be better 
integrated into the broader P5 1 framework to pressure Iran 
to come clean and, if it does not, convince the international 
community to take action.  While our EU-3 counterparts in 
Vienna continue to do their part, Russian and Chinese 
counterparts are not engaged on issues such as weaponization 
and seemed content to let the Iran discussion rest elsewhere. 
 During the March IAEA Board, Russia objected to the EU-3 
resolution on Iran, in part, because it claimed 
disingenuously that a Board resolution had not been discussed 
by PolDirs as part of the broader P5 1 framework.  To bring 
the P5 1 on board, it may help to clarify Vienna's role in 
the broader dual-track strategy on Iran, given the role 
ascribed to the Board in UNSCR 1803.  The French suggestion 
of a P5 1 technical experts meeting in Vienna could be a good 
first step in this direction. 
 
14. (S) PolDirs could consider setting expectations for the 
next DG report to the Security Council and the June Board 
that would emphasize Iran's continued and repeated refusal to 
address seriously questions on its past weaponization 
program.  It might also be useful to seek a consensus in 
Shanghai on the unacceptability of Iran's claim that the work 
plan issues should be considered closed.  Given the 
possibility -- and perhaps the likelihood -- that Iran will 
proffer some cooperation prior to the June Board, we should 
encourage the P5 1 to maintain the standard that Iran needs 
to explain the weaponization information and pressure the 
Secretariat to describe in detail in its next report Iran's 
 
SIPDIS 
failure to do so (e.g. how many times the IAEA has asked and 
how many times Iran has refused to engage).  This could 
reduce the weight any "new" Iranian cooperation would have in 
the report and keep the focus on Iran's need to answer the 
Secretariat's questions as well as reducing the voices 
 
SIPDIS 
arguing that Iran has not had enough time to provide answers 
(despite the fallacy of this argument).  Noting early both 
publicly and privately that we expect such "just-in-time" 
cooperation, which distracts from the core issues of IAEA 
verification, could undercut Iran's ability to exploit any 
small steps deployed just before the Board.  End Comment. 
SCHULTE