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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000156 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2033 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: RISING KMT STAR ERIC CHU ON ELECTIONS, "TYPHOONS" 
(DIRTY TRICKS), AND UN REFERENDA 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 
1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Taoyuan Magistrate Eric Chu, a rising 
younger generation KMT leader, told the Director on January 
28 that he expects the KMT to "take off the table" its 
support for the UN referendum before the March 22 
presidential election.  He urged that the U.S. not make 
further statements, stressing that the KMT itself opposes the 
referenda and "knows what to do."  Echoing others in the Blue 
camp, Chu stated the KMT is deeply concerned over Ma 
Ying-jeou's personal security.  Ma's current "Green Card" 
imbroglio -- does he or doesn't he have -- is another of the 
DPP's "typhoons," the KMT's new term for dirty tricks, that 
are surfacing in the presidential campaign.  The Director 
emphasized to Chu, a close Ma advisor, that the U.S. will 
remain strictly neutral in the Taiwan presidential race and 
looks forward to working with whichever candidate wins to 
rebuild trust and to repair the damage to U.S.-Taiwan ties 
over the last couple of years.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Taoyuan County Magistrate Eric Chu (Chu Li-lun) 
visited the Director on January 23 for a wide-ranging 
discussion of the legislative and presidential elections, UN 
referenda, and other issues.  Forty-six year old Chu, who has 
a Ph.D. in Accounting from NYU, is one of the rising stars of 
the KMT political firmament and a close advisor to Ma 
Ying-jeou.  He is also close to LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, 
whom he calls "uncle," and to Taichung Mayor Jason Hu, with 
whom he is working to push forward KMT reform.  Chu has 
consistently placed at the top of island-wide public opinion 
surveys measuring the performance of Taiwan's 25 city mayors 
and county magistrates, making him an obvious candidate for 
next-generation KMT leadership. 
 
LY Election Retrospective 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Magistrate Chu told the Director with evident pride 
that he had orchestrated and led the KMT campaign to win all 
six Legislative Yuan (LY) seats in Taoyuan County.  He 
attributed the KMT's perfect score there to the aggressive 
campaigning by Ma Ying-jeou and himself . . . and President 
Chen Shui-bian.  The last, he explained with a grin, was 
perhaps most important, particularly President Chen's three 
visits during the final week of the campaign to District 2, 
traditionally a DPP stronghold.  Chen's visits, he claimed, 
helped KMT candidate Liao Cheng-ching win District 2.  Chu 
said he had "assigned" Liao, his Deputy County Magistrate, to 
run in this "green" district, but Liao had resisted on 
grounds of a lack of money, absence of any political 
experience, and seeming hopelessness of the race.  Chu 
pressed Liao and personally raised the money and campaigned 
for Liao along with Ma, who visited the district several 
times.  But it was President Chen's three visits that 
"greatly helped us." (Comment:  Chu's point was that the 
polarizing and unpopular Chen helped increase Blue turnout on 
election day.) 
 
Looking Forward to the Presidential Election 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The KMT must be careful and "conservative" in the 
wake of its landslide LY victory, Chu told the Director, 
because the March 22 presidential election will be very 
different from the January 12 LY election.  The legislative 
victory, he explained, was a product of personal ties and 
local conditions that will not carry over to the presidential 
election.  Rather, the presidential election will be 
"superficial" and not deeply rooted in each district, so that 
the grass roots ties that worked on January 12 will have much 
less resonance in the presidential election.  Therefore, Chu 
is mobilizing the KMT town mayors and district magistrates of 
Taoyuan County to tap their personal ties to help Ma and 
maintain the KMT margin of victory in the presidential 
election. 
 
 
TAIPEI 00000156  002 OF 004 
 
 
Neutralizing "Typhoons" 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Maintaining these grass roots ties will, in turn, 
reduce the impact of "typhoons," Chu stated, explaining that 
"typhoon" is the term the KMT uses for DPP campaign surprises 
and dirty tricks.  Strong KMT "ground troops," Chu said, 
would enable the party to counter "air raids" from the DPP. 
With 52 days left before the presidential election, he said, 
"typhoons" can be very damaging to the Ma/Siew campaign. 
 
Security First 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Director asked what is the worst surprise that 
could happen, to which Chu replied simply, "assassination." 
He explained that he is very worried about Ma's security 
situation and the possibility of an assassination attempt and 
that he has long urged Ma to enhance his security protection. 
 Last week, he noted, Taiwan security forces confiscated 
fourteen guns and detained a group of people whose jokes 
about using the guns on Ma had been intercepted.  Immediately 
after Ma formally registered his presidential candidacy on 
January 27, the National Security Bureau (NSB) dispatched 
forty-five guards to provide full-time security for Ma.  Ma 
and the KMT, however, are concerned about Ma's security 
situation, Chu said, and are relying on eight "inner guards" 
drawn from the Taipei police, who worked for Ma when he was 
Mayor and are personally loyal to him.  Although Ma "is being 
more careful," Chu told the Director he remains "not so 
confident" about Ma's security situation, 
 
¶7.  (C) The KMT is also concerned about Frank Hsieh's 
security, Chu continued.  Violence toward Hsieh, he said, 
could elicit sympathy votes for Su Tseng-chang and possibly 
win him the presidential election.  (Comment: Chu appeared to 
be hinting at the suspicions several KMT leaders have voiced 
to AIT that some in the ruling DPP might want to get rid of 
Frank Hsieh, a long-time Chen competitor, to make way for Su 
Tseng-chang, who is closer and more acceptable to President 
 
SIPDIS 
Chen.) 
 
Green Card Imbroglio 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The second "typhoon," or dirty trick, Chu told the 
Director, has already hit:  Hsieh's attack on Ma's "Green 
Card" (U.S. permanent residence) status.  Chu told the 
Director that the KMT had known about DPP plans to raise this 
a month ago.  The Director asked whether Ma's initial press 
statement insisting he does not have a Green Card had been a 
tactical mistake, given Ma's subsequent admission that he 
earlier had a Green Card.  Chu responded that Ma's main 
campaign organizer, King Pu-tsung, had advised Ma to respond 
to Frank Hsieh's challenge by treating it as a personal or 
family issue.  Chu said he would have advised Ma to explain 
clearly and not to call a press conference, but unfortunately 
he (Chu) was in Japan last week when the issue broke.  Chu 
agreed with the Director that how a candidate acts is often 
as important as what a candidate does, noting that people are 
now watching Ma's responses very closely.   He added that Ma 
needs to learn to respond to challenges quickly but in a 
relaxed manner and with humor. 
 
Presidential Election:  Chen, PRC 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Chu told the Director that President Chen appears to 
have retreated from the campaign front line, which is 
reviving Hsieh's campaign prospects.  Hsieh's situation is 
reminiscent of the 2000 presidential election in which former 
President Lee Teng-hui was a burden on KMT candidate Lien 
Chan, who was unable to separate himself from Lee. 
Similarly, Chu said, Hsieh is finding it difficult to 
disconnect himself from Chen.  Hsieh, moreover, is distracted 
by the need to raise funds for his campaign, which is proving 
difficult.  Ma, on the other hand, is able to campaign 
 
TAIPEI 00000156  003 OF 004 
 
 
non-stop, as the KMT has a strong grass roots organization 
and its landslide LY victory is pulling in business 
contributions. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Director asked whether Chu thought China might 
do something to affect the presidential election.  Chu 
responded that while a "typhoon" (surprise) from either China 
or the U.S. could affect the campaign, the real challenges 
come from within Taiwan.  China, he said, has become much 
smarter than it was in earlier elections.  Nevertheless, it 
continues to "stupidly" push its foreign policy isolating 
Taiwan, most recently by coaxing Malawi away from Taiwan, 
which could affect the presidential election. 
 
Let Us Handle the Referenda 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The Director asked about the status and prospects 
for the UN referenda, noting that last week's efforts to take 
them off the ballot seem to have failed.  "No one in the KMT 
leadership," Chu replied, "believes the referenda are 
important to the KMT."  While the two referenda will not 
pass, it would be best for the KMT to simply "take them off 
the table."  He anticipates the KMT will decide to boycott 
the referenda, which he predicted would prevent both from 
reaching the fifty percent (of eligible voters) threshold for 
validity. 
 
¶12.  (C) Chu urged that the U.S. "does not need to play a 
role" in the UN referenda, because the KMT itself opposes and 
knows what to do.  Conversely, he argued, a U.S. public 
statement could cause an emotional reaction in Taiwan and 
increase the vote for both the referenda and Frank Hsieh. 
The KMT "knows what to do," Chu repeated, "and will boycott" 
the referenda, just as it did the two earlier referenda on 
January 12.  The party will explain to voters that it 
supports the referendum as a tool of democracy, but it should 
not be conjoined with elections.  The voters, he insisted, 
will understand and this will not damage Ma's election 
prospects. 
 
¶13.  (C) The Director asked what Ma would do if he wins and 
the DPP UN referendum passes.  "We have seriously discussed 
this possibility," Chu replied, and do not think it is a big 
issue.  In any event, he added, the KMT has a three-fourths 
majority in the LY and can control developments.  If Ma wins 
and both referenda fail, asked the Director?  Then, Chu 
responded, Ma would make an effort to join the UN, "but not 
so strenuously as President Chen."  While the formal goal is 
UN membership, the KMT government would focus its efforts on 
the practical and achievable goal of enhancing participation 
in international organizations 
 
U.S. Neutrality 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) The Director emphasized to Chu that the U.S. will 
remain neutral toward Taiwan's presidential election, and 
will work with the winner to rebuild trust and repair the 
damage to U.S.-Taiwan ties over the last several years.  We 
will cooperate with Taiwan on increasing participation in 
international organizations, particularly those dealing with 
health, trade, and social issues.  At the same time, the U.S. 
hopes Taiwan will increase its interaction with China.  The 
U.S., he explained, has no prescription for Taiwan's future. 
Rather, our primary concern is that any agreement between 
Taiwan and the PRC must represent the free will of the people 
of Taiwan.  This free will is important in the face of 
China's use of both persuasion and threat. 
 
¶15.  (C) Chu responded, "Ma is not nave about China; he is 
not Lien Chan."  While the People First Party (PFP) is no 
longer a viable party, James Soong still seeks to influence 
KMT policy on cross-Strait and other issues.  However, Chu 
noted, "Ma dislikes Soong very much" and "does not listen to 
Lien Chan." 
 
 
TAIPEI 00000156  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶16.  (C) The Director explained that the U.S. wants good 
relations with China and also hopes Taiwan and China will 
develop healthy and stable cross-Strait relations.  The U.S. 
will cooperate with Taiwan within clearly defined limits -- 
i.e., not on the UN or on Taiwan's diplomatic allies.  If Ma 
wins, the U.S. looks forward to cooperating with him.  "That 
would be," replied Chu, "with Ma, Su Chi, Jason Hu, and me." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C) In the glaring absence of any real evidence that 
Ma's safety is in real danger, we have to attribute 
persistent KMT claims that their candidate is in danger to 
the party's conviction that the DPP will stop at nothing to 
win in March.  That said, we continue to stress to all sides 
the importance of hewing closely to democratic and peaceful 
processes as the presidential contest heats up. 
YOUNG