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DE RUEHFR #0202/01 0351656
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O 041656Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1876
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER FR MO AG MR WS
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON WESTERN SAHARA BEFORE VAN WALSUM'S 
EXPECTED VISIT TO THE REGION 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4. (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa 
Nathalie Loiseau indicated January 29 that France is 
increasingly impatient with UN-led talks on Western Sahara 
and believes the process may even be moving backward.  She 
blamed part of French frustration on UN Personal Envoy Peter 
van Walsum, who will stop in Paris after visiting the region, 
but also on a growing concern about regional security. 
Loiseau claimed that France has decided it cannot possibly 
accept anything other than a solution based on autonomy 
within Morocco after the recent death of French tourists in 
Mauritania.  A potential independent Sahrawi state posed too 
grave a risk in terms of AQIM terrorists having more sparsely 
inhabited territory in which to circulate.  She expressed 
concern about recent provocations by Polisario and Morocco 
and claimed that France had asked Morocco to prevent a 
planned protest march across the berm to the 
Polisario-controlled town of Tifariti going ahead.  Loiseau 
would like to have further discussions after van Walsum's 
tour focused on planning for further deadlock at the next 
round of talks in Manhasset.  End summary 
 
¶2.  (C)  French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa Nathalie 
Loiseau met with us January 29, at her request, to review 
positions on the UN-led Western Sahara negotiations in 
advance of UN Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum's upcoming tour 
of regional capitals, Madrid, and Paris.  Loiseau made clear 
at the outset that France had been disappointed by the last 
round of talks in Manhasset and hoped against hope that the 
round set for mid-March would make some progress.  She was 
not optimistic, however, given the refusal of the parties to 
engage on the core issues and van Walsum's inability or 
unwillingness to press the parties to do so.  As she would 
several times, Loiseau evinced strong skepticism that van 
Walsum was willing to or capable of putting sufficient effort 
into bringing about a negotiated settlement.  She complained 
that the momentum was rapidly disappearing from the process 
and that it would soon be frozen like the overall dispute or 
even show signs of regression. 
 
¶3.  (C)  With respect to van Walsum's intention to visit 
capitals (including Nouakchott), Loiseau said that the French 
had few details on his itinerary or on the level at which he 
would be received.  The Moroccan leg was confirmed, but there 
was nothing about Algeria vis-a-vis the GOA or Polisario 
(i.e., including a side trip to Tindouf to meet with 
Polisario leaders).  Loiseau stated that France had delivered 
a demarche to the Algerians urging them to receive van Walsum 
at a sufficiently senior level.  As regards the Paris leg, 
Loiseau reported that van Walsum was currently scheduled to 
arrive February 18.  That date was proving problematic, as 
presidential diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte would be 
unavailable.  On the MFA side, Loiseau noted that FM Kouchner 
(who she claimed did not know van Walsum) was interested in a 
meeting if his schedule permitted.  Loiseau asked whether van 
Walsum planned to brief Washington officials after his tour. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Loiseau expressed frustration at not knowing what 
van Walsum intended to say during his upcoming mission.  She 
welcomed suggestions that he might hammer home his view that 
an independent Sahrawi state was not a viable outcome but was 
not sure he would actually follow through.  The French are 
studying the draft interim UNSYG report following the third 
round of talks.  Loiseau took some exception to van Walsum's 
evenhanded criticism of all parties for having failed to 
enter into real negotiations.  She shared our understanding 
that the two sides had discussed confidence-building measures 
and various other elements (like local administration) that 
could figure in a final settlement but was not convinced that 
evidence of such limited engagement would lead to much else. 
 
¶5.  (C)  As the conversation continued, Loiseau made clear 
that the GOF has decided to align itself more clearly than 
before with the Moroccan autonomy plan as the only feasible 
solution to the conflict.  She explained that security was 
the major driving force behind this shift.  Morocco's fragile 
security situation and its connection to the status of the 
Western Sahara figured prominently in French thinking. 
Loiseau said that Morocco alone among the key players on this 
issue had come up with a plan and made a good faith effort to 
negotiate on that basis.  The others were stalling.  Despite 
its imperfections and slow pace, Morocco was making progress 
on reforms.  It deserved our support.  Algeria and Polisario, 
meanwhile, had done little or nothing in response.  Loiseau 
rejected the prospect of an independent Sahrawi state as not 
only unviable but an unacceptable security risk to the entire 
region.  The murder of four French tourists in Mauritania had 
changed things fundamentally for the French government. 
Attacks and threats in Algeria had already underscored how 
France is one of the main targets for al-Qa'ida in the 
 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  The attack in Mauritania was a 
horrific reminder of the seriousness of this threat.  She 
noted that it further exposed how easy it was for AQIM 
operatives to operate freely in Mauritania.  Parenthetically, 
she described Mauritania as a regime on the edge of a 
precipice and said the U.S. and France need to discuss how to 
increase economic and other support.  Loiseau's message on 
Western Sahara was clear, however:  France could not accept 
giving AQIM another large, empty space in which to circulate 
with little or no control. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Loiseau claimed that Moroccan Foreign Minister 
Fassi-Fihri had not gotten the unequivocal pledge of support 
for Morocco's position that he wanted when he last visited. 
She said, however, that France has privately told Algeria 
that it believed the Moroccan plan was the only realistic 
basis on which to achieve a settlement and that an 
independent Sahrawi state was not feasible.  President 
Sarkozy has also publicly stated, in his speech in Morocco 
and to Arab journalists in Paris, that the Moroccan plan is 
the best basis on which to negotiate a solution.  She chided 
the U.S. for being more circumspect in its public statements. 
 Although France recognizes the risk to maintaining a 
balanced relationship with Morocco and Algeria, Paris also 
believed that the Algerians would ultimately be very 
pragmatic.  Loiseau repeated that the Algerians continued to 
be remarkably restrained on this issue, perhaps because of 
the growing focus on mobilizing public support behind 
reelecting President Bouteflika to a third term. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Loiseau lamented the unremitting hostility between 
Algeria and Morocco, although she was most critical of 
Algeria for openly admitting that it had no intention of 
improving ties until the Western Sahara issue was resolved. 
She was dismissive of the overly ideological mindset of the 
older generation in power in Algiers and was convinced that 
nothing would change until it finally passed from the scene. 
Loiseau criticized the Polisario for its saber-rattling in 
the context of a recent congress, but she also referred to 
the irresponsible efforts on the Moroccan side to raise 
tensions by organizing a protest march to Tifariti in the 
"liberated zone."  The connections between the main organizer 
and Moroccan intelligence were well known.  Fassi-Fihri's 
protests over the Polisario congress in Tifariti and its 
activities in the areas east of the Moroccan berm were 
extensive and had caused French experts to review the area's 
legal status (the answer was that there was nothing to 
sustain Moroccan claims of a violation of the 1991 cease 
fire).  France had firmly advised the Moroccan government to 
restrain the marchers to avoid a needless provocation. 
Loiseau left little doubt, however, that something like it 
would happen again. 
 
¶8.  (C)  In concluding, we agreed that we would meet after 
van Walsum's regional tour and subsequent meeting in Paris. 
Loiseau suggested we discuss how to deal with continued 
deadlock after the next round of talks in Manhasset. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON