VZCZCXRO7058
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0080 0321033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011033Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8540
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1062
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KO SE CY
SUBJECT: KOSOVO:  CYPRIOTS AGREE ON ESDP CONOPS, NOT YET 
THERE ON DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: A. "USEU TODAY 1/30/08" 
     ¶B. 07 NICOSIA 979 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Cypriot Political Director Euripides 
Evriaviades claimed victory in seeing the Kosovo ESDP Concept 
of Operations document stripped of text "dangerous" to the 
Republic of Cyprus, leaving instead acceptable, 
"status-neutral" language.  Cyprus has not yet agreed to 
support the deployment of the EU force, however, citing legal 
deficiencies in UNSCR 1244.  Bringing the RoC to "yes" on the 
ESDP mission looks difficult but not impossible (as 
convincing them to recognize Kosovo would be).  As to 
tactics, we recommend putting our own, more flexible 
interpretation of 1244 front-and-center.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Evriviades summoned the Ambassador January 30 to 
demarche on unrelated subjects, but the conversation turned 
quickly to Kosovo, since the MFA official only hours before 
had returned from the GAERC in Brussels where Balkans matters 
figured high.  "On the ESDP Concept of Operations, we're 
there," he noted.  The original ConOps draft had troubled 
Cyprus greatly, being full of references that essentially 
demanded member-states recogize Kosovo.  After hours of hard 
give-and-take, the status-neutral text that emerged was 
acceptable to Nicosia, Evriviades clarified. 
 
¶3.  (C) Not all of Cyprus's concerns had been met, however; 
it remained worried over the legal basis for the ESDP 
deployment in Kosovo (a day earlier, Foreign Minister Erato 
Marcoullis had announced that UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 was insufficient to allow the EU to undertake a rule of 
law mission in Kosovo).  Evriviades complained that his EU 
counterparts were attempting to "cherry-pick" the UNSCR in 
drafting the Kosovo Joint Action document; like Marcoullis 
earlier, he warned that a partial introduction of 1244 could 
set negative precedent for the Cyprus issue.  Cypriot legal 
sensibilities also were stoked by Ban Ki Moon's attempts to 
make international law via personal pronouncement, Evriviades 
argued, pointing to the UNSYG having "taken note" of the 
December GAERC's findings on Kosovo.  Only the UN Security 
Council held such powers, Cyprus believed. 
 
¶4.  (C) Evriviades had worked the phones in recent hours, 
calling fellow PolDirs from a handful of EU countries in an 
attempt to explain Cyprus's ESDP position and win converts to 
its arguments.  Kosovo was a matter of principle and 
precedent for the RoC, he explained; it was willing to fight 
hard for both.  And regardless of countless declarations from 
all sides claiming Kosovo was sui generis, Cyprus continued 
to fear that Turkey would attempt to capitalize on the 
situation to build support for an upgraded "Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus." 
 
¶5.  (C) Cyprus would "never" recognize Kosovo, Evriviades 
stated firmly.  Yet the Kosovars' "Managed Declaration of 
Independence" -- the international community's latest term 
d'art, he chuckled -- would soon arrive, and he was certain 
that many capitals would recognize Europe's newest "state." 
He understood the Secretary did not want to delay the MDI 
until March, as Spain and other EU member-states wished. 
Putting the declaration off a month would result in more 
countries backing it, he wagered.  But not the entire EU -- 
Brussels was far from adopting a consensus position.  On the 
Balkans the Europeans were divided, he asserted, highlighting 
their recent failure to secure an SAA for Serbia at the 
January GAERC. 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT:  On Kosovo recognition, the Greek Cypriots 
would willingly tolerate 26-1 isolation in Brussels over fear 
of creating negative precedent.  This fear, always present, 
is especially vivid now, with the prospect of Turkey taking a 
seat on the Security Council, and with some Turkish Cypriots 
talking about the need to abolish UNSCR 186, a cornerstone of 
international recognition of Nicosia as the legitimate 
government of the entire island.  As to deploying the ESDP 
rule-of-law mission in Kosovo, however, we believe they want 
to get to "yes."  The best approach to erase the RoC's 
legalistic red lines would entail emphasizing our own, 
broader interpretation of UNSCR 1244, with the demarche 
delivered in coordination with our European allies. 
SCHLICHER