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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000545 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S, D, P, G, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PDEM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA TALKS - KEY ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 515 
 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 486 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  Although both sides agreed to creation of 
a prime minister position following the Secretary's February 
18 visit, the talks have bogged down over the authority the 
PM will be given and over related issues, including formation 
of a cabinet.  Gordon Brown spoke with Kibaki February 23 to 
push for progress.  Annan met separately with Kibaki and 
Odinga on the 25th and may seek a joint meeting on the 27th 
if there is no movement in the talks.  There has been 
widespread positive coverage of the Secretary's visit, which 
highlights the importance Kenyans attach to the U.S. role in 
helping to resolve the crisis.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) As reported in ref A, the Secretary's February 18 
visit helped move the negotiations forward.  Following her 
visit both sides agreed on the creation of a position of 
prime minister.  However, the talks have since bogged down 
over the issue of the extent of the authority the prime 
minister will have.  While Odinga and his team accept that 
the prime minister will not have full executive authority, 
they insist that the position must have real responsibility. 
They want the prime minister's portfolio to include 
supervising government ministers and leading government 
business in Parliament.  The government side maintains that 
the vice president must continue to be the leader of 
government business and that the prime minister's authority 
should extend only to coordination of government ministers. 
Another key issue is whether Kibaki will have the authority 
to fire the PM, or whether only a vote of no confidence in 
Parliament can achieve that. 
 
¶3.  (C) There are several related issues.  One is how 
government ministries will be apportioned.  Odinga insists 
that there must be at least close to 50/50 sharing of 
ministries, with Odinga naming his ministers (once the two 
sides have agreed about which ministries they will get). 
Kibaki seeks to retain the sole power to appoint and fire 
ministers.  In the negotiations Karua has refused to agree to 
a specific number of ministers for Odinga's ODM. A second 
issue is whether dissolution of the Kibaki-Odinga coalition 
would result in the holding of new elections.  Yet a third is 
how the position of prime minister and agreement to form a 
coalition will be encapsulated within the bounds of the law 
and constitution. 
 
¶4.  (C) The media has carried the leaked text of an older 
draft "act on temporary regulation of the cabinet" that 
reflects the state of negotiations last week, according to 
Annan's staff.  The act, while establishing the position of 
prime minister, is heavily caveated regarding the points 
discussed above. 
 
¶5.  (C) Frustration at what the ODM team interprets as 
government foot-dragging in the negotiations led some ODM 
members to threaten return to mass action by February 27 if 
there has been no deal.  Odinga, however, has not agreed to 
this and is working to control his supporters. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although Karua has publicly warned of misleading 
reports of progress on some issues which have not yet been 
resolved, President Kibaki issued a positive statement on the 
23rd.  The statement read in part that the President has 
encouraged his team to resolve outstanding issues, "taking 
into account the broader national interests and also ensuring 
that the solutions they arrive at will withstand the test of 
time and enhance national cohesion, stability, and 
prosperity." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Meanwhile, Odinga's sudden February 22-24 trip to 
Nigeria at a time when the talks are at such a sensitive 
stage raised eyebrows and speculation. On the 25th he made a 
questionable one-day visit to Eldoret to be present at the 
court arraignment of an ODM supporter who is widely perceived 
as having been involved in violence. 
 
¶8.  (C) The British High Commissioner told me that Gordon 
Brown talked with Kibaki on February 23.  Brown emphasized 
the need to reach a deal quickly.  He laid out the incentives 
of the increased support that will come from the UK and 
 
NAIROBI 00000545  002 OF 002 
 
 
others if a deal is reached, but also the implications should 
the talks not succeed. 
 
¶9.  (C) Civil society organizations continue to make their 
influence felt in high profile calls for the two sides to 
strike a deal.  There are indications of similar sentiment 
developing in Parliament on both sides.  A number of 
pro-government and ODM Members of Parliament held an off-site 
this past weekend to develop ideas to help move the 
government-ODM talks forward.  On a more ominous note, we 
continue to receive reports that individuals on both sides 
are involved in arming supporters in anticipation of 
bloodshed should the talks not succeed (septel). 
 
¶10.  (C) The Secretary's February 18 visit continues to be 
the subject of extensive follow-up media coverage and 
commentary.  Comments such as "it wasn't business as usual" 
when the Secretary visited, "the U.S. must undo the Gordian 
Knot," and the Secretary "stuns all by her professionalism" 
reflect the importance the media attached to the visit.  The 
direct U.S. involvement in support of Annan and the eminent 
persons was welcomed with a sigh of relief by most Kenyans, 
many of whom continue to doubt the capacity and willingness 
of their leaders to put the nation above their personal 
interests.  We are continuing to make clear the importance 
the U.S. attaches at the highest levels to resolution of the 
Kenyan crisis along the lines laid out by the Secretary. 
 
¶11.  (C) In an effort to push the two sides to resolve the 
remaining issues, particularly regarding parameters for the 
PM position, Annan consulted late on February 25 directly and 
separately with Kibaki and Odinga.  If this does not result 
in progress, Annan may seek another joint Kibaki-Odinga 
meeting on February 27.  Additional pressure from us and 
others may be needed in the coming days to help Annan and the 
parties bring the process to closure.  Tensions remain high 
and if the talks drag on it will be hard for Annan to 
maintain his positive public posture that progress continues 
to be made. 
 
 
RANNEBERGER