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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 FEST TWO 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: NDJAMENA 006: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEBY 
 
FEST TWO 00000014  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: LucyTamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission  , U.S. 
Embassy N'Djamena , State Department . 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lucy Tamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. 
Embassy N'Djamena State Department . 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In discussions with the President of Chad and 
other GOC officials, Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan stressed 
that the time was ripe for moving forward on internal political 
dialogue and expressed USG support for regional initiatives to 
end the cycle of violence in Chad.  President Deby warned that a 
new rebel attack was expected in less than three weeks and 
raised the issue of a UN Security Council resolution  directed 
against Sudan.  President Deby said that the Sudanese intention 
was to "create a new Arab state in central Africa."  Possibly as 
a result of international pressure, former President Lol Mahamat 
Choa was moved from prison to house arrest on February 26.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for 
Central African Affairs met with Chadian President Idriss Deby 
Itno on February 26 to express support for the Government of 
Chad in the face of externally-supported rebel attacks and to 
highlight the importance of continuing to work on the August 13 
2007 political agreements, as well working with regional 
structures with a view to ending the recurring cycles of 
violence which have wracked Chad and the region.  The Ambassador 
and DCM (notetaker) attended.  The Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Moussa Outman (with whom DAS Swan had met 
earlier in the day), Presidential Adviser for Foreign Affairs 
Youssef Saleh Abbas and Djimranjor Dadnadji (Presidency 
Secretary) participated on the Chadian side. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  DAS Swan opened by recalling the importance of the 
U.S./Chadian partnership and explaining that his presence in 
Chad was the result of the Chadian Ambassador's request to 
Assistant Secretary Frazer for a sign of U.S. support for the 
regime and to discuss initiatives to secure a durable peace and 
democratic reforms.  He expressed his condolences for the loss 
of civilian life during the battles of February 2-3 in 
N'Djamena, and thanked the President for actions to protect 
American citizens and U.S. government property in N'Djamena. 
DAS Swan detailed the diplomatic efforts that the U.S. had taken 
to support Chad, including backing the UN Security Council 
Presidential statement and demarching other capitals on the need 
to put pressure on Sudan to cease supporting Chadian rebels.  He 
called attention to upcoming USG visitors in support of 
assistance to refugees and Chadian IDPs.  He also noted strong 
U.S. support for the rapid deployment of EUFOR, including a 
financial contribution for MINURCAT police training. 
 
¶4. (C) Having underscored USG support for the regime, DAS Swan 
stated that that it was also an opportune time for President 
Deby to put in place political reform.  He called on the 
President to make progress on the August 13, 2007 political 
agreement  and to create a "political space" for political 
parties and civil society.  He expressed hope that the State of 
Emergency would be kept short.  Concerning those political 
leaders in detention or in unknown circumstances, DAS Swan asked 
that the Government ensure the effective and transparent 
functioning of the proposed Commission of Inquiry. 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the regional situation, DAS Swan noted USG 
desire to see a regional security structure which would put an 
end to the cycles of violence in the region.  He noted that such 
a structure would necessarily contain a bilateral aspect, and 
hoped that Chad and Sudan would continue to try to resolve their 
bilateral differences.  Regional efforts had already been 
launched by the AU and the CEEAC.  He assured President Deby 
that the United States would like to support these African 
initiatives but asked for his view on their prospects.  Swan 
stressed that in any agreement Sudan would need to commit to 
stop supporting Chadian rebels; at the same time, the Government 
of Chad also needed to stop supporting Darfur rebels.  He 
acknowledged that Sudan's role was greater than Chad's in this 
respect, but cautioned that each side needed to make efforts. 
He welcomed any ideas from President Deby on next steps. 
 
¶6. (C) President Deby expressed his appreciation to DAS Swan for 
the visit.  On suggestions for "next steps" he answered bluntly, 
"we are expecting more aggression from Sudan in the coming days 
 
FEST TWO 00000014  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
-- in one, two, but no more than three weeks."  He explained 
that the conflict in Darfur had "contaminated" Chad.  He had met 
Sudanese President Bechir numerous times, and had signed the 
Tripoli accord; Sudan might appear to be cooperative, but in 
actuality it never did what it promised.  He thanked the United 
States for support at the United Nations.  He hoped that the 
Presidential Statement would be turned into a UN Security 
Council resolution stating clearly that Chad was being crushed 
by a powerful neighbor.  He noted that on February 3, Sudanese 
state TV had announced "we are going to create a new Arab state 
in Central Africa." 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to regional initiatives to resolve the crisis, 
President Deby explained that Senegalese President Wade had 
invited him and President Bechir to Dakar on March 3.  This was 
a personal initiative on Wade's part and not under the aegis of 
the African Union.   President Deby had asked to have this 
postponed until March 13.  He did not appear enthusiastic about 
the visit.  "We'll sign and see" he explained.  He called the 
AU's efforts "the ostrich policy" for failing to identify 
Sudanese aggression.  He doubted it would yield much.  He also 
noted the "Congolese-Libyan" mediation mandated by the AU to 
address the internal rebellion and said Chad had called for a 
CEEAC heads of state summit in the coming weeks. 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to the situation of Chadian political leaders, 
President Deby explained that former President Lol Mahamat Choa 
had been picked up by the army.  The Commission of Inquiry would 
shed light on the actual details of the arrest.  He welcomed 
international participation in the Commission of Inquiry.  He 
noted that Choa had now been transferred from jail to a more 
comfortable house arrest, and that his situation was "in the 
hands of justice."  Concerning other members of the political 
opposition he remarked that, if it turned out that they were 
among those that had "formed a government" with the rebels, then 
they were pure and simply "Sudanese mercenaries."  Concerning 
the State of Emergency, he noted that governmental institutions 
needed time to start working again.  For 48 hours rebels had 
controlled parts of the city.  The damage had been extensive - 
institutions such as the National Assembly and the Supreme Court 
were totally sacked.  Under the constitution, after 15 days the 
State of Emergency could be extended only by the National 
Assembly; he expected an extension of an additional 15 days 
(noting ruefully that the parliamentarians would need to find a 
place to meet first).    Turning to the August 13 agreement, he 
stressed that the government accorded great importance to the 
agreement.  He noted that some rebel leaders had taken advantage 
of the invitation therein to return to legitimacy; others had 
not.  Nonetheless, the Government would continue to implement 
it. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
¶9. (C) President Deby's comments regarding the internal 
political situation generally responded to USG concerns.  The 
President appeared to appreciate the visit, but his primary 
interest was in alerting to the possibility of renewed rebel 
attacks and requesting international support against Sudan.  We 
have learned from other sources that the Wade initiative 
involves bringing together the political movements and the armed 
movements in the same location, for talks in two tracks.  For 
now, there is not an agreed diplomatic track for Khartoum and 
N'Djamena to resolve their differences. 
NIGRO