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Viewing cable 08CHIANGMAI17, KARENNI REFUGEE CAMP FEELING SQUEEZED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08CHIANGMAI17 2008-02-01 02:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO6709
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0017/01 0320243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010243Z FEB 08
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0659
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0036
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0715
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/1/2018 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM SOCI TH BM
SUBJECT: KARENNI REFUGEE CAMP FEELING SQUEEZED 
 
REF: CHIANG MAI 02 (DEATH OF KARENNI REFUGEE) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000017  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Morrow, Consul General, Chiang Mai, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C)  At the Karenni refugee camp where a violent clash with 
security forces last December left one refugee dead, order has 
been restored but follow-up actions promised by local officials 
have proceeded unevenly.  A post-clash formal dialogue involving 
camp residents, local Thai authorities, and NGOs has not yet 
gotten underway.  It will have a challenging array of issues to 
address given the extent to which the nearly 20,000 camp 
residents are feeling squeezed by official restrictions on their 
movement, education and employment.  On February 14 the 
Ambassador will announce USG plans to begin a large-scale 
resettlement program at the camp in the fall that could ease the 
Karenni's currently bleak outlook, but will not be a cure-all 
for the lingering mistrust between the Karenni and the Thai 
authorities.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Uneven Follow-up on December Clash 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  During mid-January trip to Mae Hong Son province, CG 
met with local officials, NGOs, and Karenni activists to discuss 
conditions at Ban Nai Soi refugee camp (aka Site 1), where close 
to 20,000 Karenni refugees from Burma reside.  Tensions there 
persist between the Karenni and local Thai officials following 
the December 15 clash between camp residents and security forces 
that resulted in the death of one Karenni refugee (Reftel). 
 
3. (C)  The December clash was sparked mainly by camp residents' 
displeasure over increasing official restrictions on their 
ability to leave the camp, and maltreatment by Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) forces responsible for camp security.  Although 
order was quickly restored and has held since the incident, 
follow-up actions promised by local authorities have proceeded 
unevenly: 
 
--  the MOI security unit involved in the clash has been rotated 
out.  It was temporarily replaced by Royal Thai Army and Border 
Police Patrol units, which were welcomed by camp residents. 
Since then, a new MOI unit has arrived to handle camp security. 
Camp leaders are wary that this group, like the one before it, 
could ultimately sink into the same corrupt and allegedly 
abusive practices as the one before it (see Reftel), and have 
requested the permanent removal of MOI security forces from the 
camp. 
 
--  In the incident's immediate aftermath, local Thai 
authorities agreed to form a committee comprised of the MOI Camp 
Commander, the camp's Karenni leadership, the Vice Governor and 
other local Thai authorities, and representatives from the local 
offices of the UNHCR and other NGOs.  The group was to meet 
monthly to address issues of concern involving camp conditions 
and administration.  However, the committee's first meeting has 
yet to take place, reportedly because all committee members need 
time to look over competing drafts of revised camp regulations. 
The plan is for camp residents and Thai authorities to each 
develop their own draft, and then meld these into a new set of 
regulations acceptable to both parties.  The camp leadership has 
already prepared its draft, which calls for the camp's 
day-to-day operations to be administered not by Thai authorities 
but by the residents themselves, as had been the case prior to 
an early 2005 surge in fighting between the Burmese Army and 
Karenni troops.  The draft also stipulates that, while Thai law 
will apply in the camp with respect to "serious cases," 
responsibility for everyday law and order should return to the 
Camp Committee working with Karenni security staff. 
 
--  Police investigation of the December 15 incident is still 
ongoing.  The investigation has two tracks:  the killing of the 
Karenni refugee (as insisted by camp leadership), and the 
destruction of government vehicles and other property (as 
insisted by authorities).  Camp leaders are disturbed that, in 
their view, Thai authorities have placed the two tracks on equal 
footing.  They are also displeased that the MOI Camp Commander 
is still actively involved in camp administrative duties, and 
has been relieved only of his responsibilities for camp security. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Camp Residents Feel Squeezed on Access, Education, Employment, 
Health 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000017  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4. (C)  Beyond the immediacy of the December violence and its 
aftermath, our interlocutors identified a range of issues 
indicating that the conditions of camp life have gotten tougher 
in recent months.  Moreover, they assert that these issues were 
the root cause of the December clash and ongoing, unresolved 
tensions between camp residents and local Thai authorities. 
 
5. (C)  Tightened restrictions on movement and access is one 
such concern.  According to both Karenni activists and NGO 
workers, action by district authorities to tighten control of 
access to and from the camps pre-dates the December violence and 
also predates the unrest inside Burma of late last summer.  Camp 
leaders report that, over the last several months, new 
restrictions included greater difficulty for camp residents to 
get passes to leave the camp; greater difficulty for NGO workers 
and other non-residents to get passes to enter the camp; and the 
ordering of community based organizations (CBOs) working just 
outside the camp to move back inside the camp, thus restricting 
their mobility. 
 
6. (C)  International Rescue Committee (IRC)  managers echoed 
this concern, complaining that district authorities have 
restricted movement of their Karenni staff members, and moved 
their CBO partners - such as Karenni health, social and news 
organizations - back into the camp.  This prevents CBO workers 
from coming into Mae Hong Son town to access email and internet, 
effectively cutting them off from the outside world.  The IRC 
has tried to push back on these access and movement issues, but 
so far to no avail.  Camp leaders are calling for a system of 
weekly passes allowing travel into town, but have little 
leverage with district officials.  The local UNHCR office 
explained to us that, since Thailand is not a signatory of 
international refugee conventions, the movement of camp 
residents is subject to restrictions under Thai immigration law. 
 
7. (SBU)  Education is another area of growing concern for camp 
residents and NGOs.  Camp leaders assert that education 
standards inside the camp are falling due to access restrictions 
that prevent skilled, outside volunteer teachers from entering 
the camp and block refugees from attending courses outside the 
camp.  A broader issue is the Thai Government's policy of not 
sanctioning post-secondary education in the refugee camps, nor 
allowing students to leave the camps to study externally. 
 
8. (SBU)  The restrictions on movement and education create 
employment hardships, our interlocutors said.  Camp residents 
are now increasingly unable to get out for work as agricultural 
day laborers or to sell camp-made products.  Karenni activists 
and NGO workers at the Thai-Burma Border Consortium both 
highlighted the economic hardship brought on by this loss of 
income-generating opportunities. 
 
9. (C)  Health care in the camps is also under growing stress, 
we were told.  The IRC, the camp's primary health care provider, 
reported the camp is losing IRC-trained Karenni nurses and 
physicians to resettlement programs, mainly in Australia, New 
Zealand and Scandinavia.  This necessitates training new medical 
staff, bringing in outside doctors, and/or referring more cases 
to outside hospitals, all of which strain IRC's budget. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Thai, Karenni Perspectives on Burma Clash 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  Our separate meetings with the Governor, the local 
Chamber of Commerce, and the Karenni National Progressive Party 
illustrated how far apart the communities are on the broader 
issue of Burma and how it relates to the Karenni's plight.  Mae 
Hong Son Governor Thongchai Wongrianthong, in an initial 
courtesy call prior to our other meetings, told us that his 
underlying condition for working with the Karenni camp residents 
was that the Karenni should refrain from activities that would 
arouse Rangoon's ire, including political activities inciting 
anti-GOB sentiment.   Chamber of Commerce officials' comments 
about the Karenni were limited to expressions of concern about 
camp overpopulation and the alleged diversion of Thai medical 
care resources from Thais to Karenni.  The KNPP, meanwhile, 
complained to us about the curtailment by Thai authorities last 
year of a peaceful candlelight vigil in support of monks 
protesting in Burma.  They also said the MOI Camp Commandant 
cautioned the KNPP last fall to hold back on anti-GOB agitation 
due to nervousness in Bangkok. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C)  The committee talks that are now finally underway give 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000017  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
camp residents the opportunity to have direct contact with Thai 
officials whom they normally cannot access.  For the talks to 
succeed in addressing the lingering mistrust between Karenni 
refugees and local authorities, there will have to be a genuine 
two-way dialogue, which remains to be seen.  Meanwhile, in 
mid-February the Ambassador will announce that this fall the USG 
will begin a large-scale resettlement program from Ban Nai Soi 
and the other three refugee camps in Mae Hong Son.  This could 
ease the Karenni's currently bleak outlook, but will not be a 
cure-all for the difficult issues between the Karenni and the 
Thai authorities on movement, education, and employment. 
MORROW