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Viewing cable 08BRUSSELS180, VISIT OF S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON TO BRUSSELS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRUSSELS180 2008-02-05 09:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL USEU Brussels
VZCZCXRO9608
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #0180/01 0360913
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050913Z FEB 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL EUM
SUBJECT: VISIT OF S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON TO BRUSSELS 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3543 
 
Classified By: Alyce Tidball, Deputy Minister Counselor for Political A 
ffairs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
Clint Williamson visited Brussels January 8 and 9 to discuss 
war crimes issues with EU and Belgian officials.  Discussions 
focused on current operations of war crimes tribunals, 
judicial development programs in Rwanda, and the general 
future of the system of international criminal law.  He also 
met with HR Solana's Representative for Human Rights to 
discuss resettling some Guantanamo detainees in EU Member 
States.  While unable to make any promises, the EU expressed 
hope that Europe would be able to offer informal support. 
End Summary 
 
2.    (SBU)  Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint 
Williamson and Special Assistant Matthew Lavine visited 
Brussels January 8 and 9.  This trip was a follow-up to a 
visit by Deputy for War Crimes Issues Milbert Shin in 
December 2007 (see reftel). 
 
3.    (C) At the European Commission, Amb. Williamson met 
with Rolf Timans, Head of Unit for Human Rights and 
Democratization.  They discussed several war crimes processes 
in Africa, including the potential for accountability 
mechanisms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Burundi, the trial of ex-Liberian leader Charles Taylor, and 
the proposal to try former Chadian leader Hissene Habre in 
Senegal.  Mr. Timans was especially happy with the 
developments regarding Habre, since it represented the first 
example of the AU supporting the trial of an African leader 
on African soil.  When asked about the Khmer Rouge tribunal 
(KRT), Timans suggested  Amb. Williamson's best points of 
contact would be the Member State representatives to the 
COJUR working group.  Timans confirmed that, in principle, 
the EU supports continued funding for the KRT, but that it 
would be coordinated by the EuropeAid office. 
 
4.    (SBU) Amb. Williamson next visited Doris Pack, a German 
Member of the European Parliament with a long history of 
interest in Balkans issues.  Pack and the Ambassador shared 
views on the current status of the ICTY, Serbia's prospect 
for accession to the EU, and other regional war crimes issues. 
 
5.    (C) Amb. Williamson met with Dr. Riina Kionka, HR 
Solana's Personal Representative for Human Rights, and Dr. 
Christiane Hoehn from the office of Transatlantic Relations. 
After reviewing some of the points Shin made to Kionka's 
staff, the Ambassador asked about potential roles for the 
European Council in resettling former Guantanamo detainees. 
He stressed that the United States wanted to avoid formal 
Council deliberations on this issue.  Instead, the United 
States would prefer that HR Solana use his stature to 
publicly and/or privately support the idea of European 
resettlement of detainees, and an EU statement of support 
after Member States had made their announcements to accept 
them. 
 
6.    (C) Kionka promised to bring this issue to Solana, 
stating that it was a serious proposal that demanded a 
serious response.  She argued that since the EU had 
criticized the United States on Guantanamo, it now had an 
obligation to help if at all possible.  She agreed that it 
was best to approach this informally, as any attempt to form 
a common position at the European Council on this topic would 
likely fail.  In response to Amb. Williamson's statement that 
human rights groups would publicly support any Member State 
that made the humanitarian gesture of accepting detainees 
from GTMO, she cautioned that some Member States might react 
negatively to high profile statements from civil society this 
early.  Kionka inquired how the acceptance of 20 or 30 
detainees would potentially speed the closing of Guantanamo. 
Williamson explained that the current population at GTMO, 275 
(down from 785 or so originally), comprises several distinct 
groups of individuals, making any single resolution for GTMO 
difficult.  There are 23 "hard cases" for whom repatriation 
is not possible, the ones we are now discussing with EU 
Member States.  This group includes Uighers, Uzbeks, and 
others from states that are chronic HR abusers.  In response 
to a question from Hoehn, Williamson said the detainees we 
are seeking to resettle in Member States did have ties to 
terrorist organizations, but the United States currently 
assesses them to be of low security risk, and so they would 
not require detention or constant surveillance.  The United 
States is asking states willing to accept these detainees to 
ensure that they won't engage in terrorism, but is not 
demanding any specific plan of action.  Measures may include 
travel restrictions, random visits, or other measures 
consistent with the local legal framework.  Williamson closed 
 
BRUSSELS 00000180  002 OF 003 
 
 
the meeting by stating that Secretary Rice has made closing 
Guantanamo a priority; Kionka promised to convey Solana's 
response through USEU staff. 
. 
7.    (C) Ambassador Williamson met with the European 
Commission's Elisabeth Tison, Head of Unit for Central 
Africa, and Beatriz Salvador Garcia, Rwanda and Burundi desk 
officer, to discuss judicial reform in Rwanda, the truth and 
reconciliation process in Burundi, and the planned Habre 
trial in Senegal.  On Rwanda, Tison and Salvador Garcia 
agreed with Williamson that Rwanda must provide adequate 
prison facilities before those convicted at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha can be sent home to 
serve their sentences.  They also noted that the improvements 
should be comprehensive throughout Rwanda to avoid a 
two-tiered system in which those convicted of genocide are 
housed in nicer facilities than Rwandan common criminals 
 
8.    (C) Williamson shared with the EC a written assessment 
of the Rwandan judicial system that was requested by the 
Rwandan government and carried out by the International Legal 
Assistance Consortium (ILAC) with funding from a human rights 
NGO.  Salvador Garcia said that the EC would be willing to 
organize a conference of international donors to share ideas 
and plans for assisting Rwanda with judicial reform.  Tison 
would like to expand the group beyond traditional donors to 
include some non-Western countries like South Korea.  She 
noted that many donors have an interest in seeing the Rwandan 
judicial and prison system brought up to international 
standards because they would like to extradite Rwandans to 
stand trial domestically, but cannot because their courts 
have barred transfer out of concern for due process within 
Rwanda. 
 
9.    (C) On Burundi, Williamson said there is widespread 
support on the ground for the UNSCR establishing a truth and 
reconciliation process but debates still continue on a 
special court to try perpetrators.  Salvador Garcia said that 
echoes the sentiments of members of the Burundian government 
who have come to see the European Union saying they favor a 
truth and reconciliation process but oppose the creation of a 
court.  Finally, on the planned trial in Senegal of former 
Chadian President Hissene Habre, Williamson said the original 
cost estimate of 66 million Euros presented by the Senegalese 
government and its revised estimate of 29 million Euros were 
still much too high.  He noted, however, the important 
precedent being set by Africans taking ownership of a 
prosecution for crimes against humanity. 
 
10.   (SBU) The U.S. Embassy in Belgium organized a 
roundtable discussion for Williamson with representatives of 
the Belgian MFA who will participate in Belgium's 
chairmanship of the UN Security Council Working Group on 
Tribunal Residual and Legacy Issues.  This working group will 
ultimately present recommendations to the Security Council on 
the process of closing down the ICTY and the ICTR, including 
the potential transferal of cases to Rwanda.  The Belgian 
delegation was led by Amb. Benedicte Frankinet, Director, 
United Nations Office.  Other attendees were Rwanda desk 
officer Paul Jansen, Nathalie Rondeux from the Rights Office, 
Alexis Goldman from the Legal Department and Gerard Dive from 
the Public Federal Service Justice.  Amb. Williamson was 
accompanied by his Special Assistant, PolMin Counselor from 
U.S. Embassy Belgium and USEU PolOff. 
 
11.   (C) Amb. Williamson said the GoR had approached the USG 
, stating that they want to be able to accept the transfer of 
ICTR trials.  Williamson said that in recent visits with all 
embassies in Kigali, the consensus from the international 
community was that, despite solid progress in its judicial 
sector ) due largely to Belgian support ) enhanced 
coordination and targeted capacity building was still 
necessary.. 
 
12.   (C) Amb. Williamson referred to the ILAC report; the 
Belgians criticized this report as being disconnected from 
the political and judicial realities in Rwanda.  In 
particular, they expressed concern that it did not account 
for the development work that was already on-going. 
Williamson explained that the report's purpose was to do an 
overall assessment of the condition of the Rwandan judiciary, 
without prejudice to what is already being done to improve 
the situation.  He suggested convening an informal "donor's 
conference" to discuss its recommendations and to discuss 
which of the deficiencies cited by the report were not 
currently being addressed.  The Belgians responded that they 
were pleased to find out that this report would not be a 
stumbling block to further action.  The MFA also said they 
expected the international community in Kigali would also be 
pleased with this news. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00000180  003 OF 003 
 
 
13.   (C) Participants discussed the future of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and of the ICTR.   Amb Williamson outlined the 
difficulty of finding a balance between not having completely 
open-ended tribunals, while at the same time not giving the 
impression to any remaining fugitive ) especially Mladic, 
Karadzic, and Kabuga ) that they could avoid  prosecution by 
just staying in hiding long enough.   Williamson indicated he 
expects neither tribunal will meet its completion strategy 
goals, but hopes that both will finish all first instance 
trials in 2009, with appeals running through 2010 for ICTR 
and 2011 for ICTY. 
 
14.   (C) The Belgians asked for U.S. reactions to the 
Rwandan request for the transfer of ICTR archives to Rwanda. 
Amb. Williamson replied that the United States has major 
concerns with respect to Rwanda's ability to ensure survival 
of the materials and the security of witnesses and other 
participants given current resources.  The United States is, 
however, open to consideration of all proposals, including 
the return of the ICTR archives to Kigali, so long as they 
are detailed and address all our concerns. 
 
15.   (SBU) The meeting ended with discussion of the United 
States and the International Criminal Court.  Amb. Williamson 
noted that, while it is very unlikely that the United States 
will join the ICC for the foreseeable future, the United 
States recognizes the role of the ICC in international 
justice.  However, for practical reasons, it should remain a 
court of last resort, not become a replacement for national 
courts and hybrid tribunals.  The ICC has a limited capacity, 
and, with the costs of translation, interpretation, travel, 
and other administrative tasks, it can not manage more than 5 
or 6 cases at a time.  Consequently, it remains a U.S. 
priority to maintain support for domestic and hybrid courts. 
He also explained the importance of developing templates for 
future tribunals that incorporate lessons learned from ICTY, 
ICTR, and other courts. 
 
16.   (C) Amb. Williamson's final meeting was with Myriam 
Verger from the cabinet of Commissioner for Enlargement Olli 
Rehn.  She stated that, in her opinion, the EU should not 
sign the SAA with Serbia until Serbia fully cooperates with 
the ICTY.  Verger asked if the United States could share 
information with the EC regarding the whereabouts of the most 
wanted war criminals from the former Yugoslavia. 
 
17.   (U) Note:  Amb. Williamson has cleared this cable. 
.