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DE RUEHBO #0737/01 0590056
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1569
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
(C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ADDED CAPTIONS SIPDIS & SENSITIVE, ADDED 
TAGS: ELAB ETRD FIXED NUMBERING FOR PARAGRAPH AND
ADDED TEXT TO PARAGRAPH'S 1 & 19.) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ETRD FIXED NUMBERING FOR PARAGRAPH AND
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 29-MARCH 3 VISIT OF LABOR 
SECRETARY CHAO AND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO COLOMBIA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
------- 
Summary 
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¶1. (U) Your visit to Medellin comes at a crucial time in our 
relations with Colombia.  Labor issues have moved to the center 
of our relations and form the heart of the debate on a Trade 
Promotion Agreement with Colombia.  Colombia finds itself safer, 
economically stronger, better governed and more democratic than 
it has been in decades. Rates of murder, kidnapping, and violence 
nationwide, including against union members, have fallen 
dramatically.  Increased security has led to an economic boom 
that has reduced poverty by 20 percent since 2002, lowered 
unemployment 25 percent, and attracted record levels of investment. 
 More than 40,000 combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have laid down 
their arms and are participating in GOC reintegration programs. 
Desertions among the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
increased in 2007. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Nevertheless, Colombia remains a work in progress. 
Consolidating recent gains and making further advances on 
human rights, security, and poverty reduction--while also 
managing increasingly tense relations with Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez--represent the greatest challenges for 
the remaining 2.5 years of the Uribe Administration. 
Our continued commitment to Colombia--through approval of the 
U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Act (CTPA) and support 
for Plan Colombia--will help lock in Colombia's democratic 
security gains, promote regional stability, and contribute 
to a Colombia that provides security and opportunity to all 
its citizens.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CTPA Solidifies Advances: 
Investment, Poverty, and Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have spurred the economy.  GDP growth 
approached seven percent in 2007 after averaging more than 
five percent annually since 2003.  Colombia's trade volume 
grew more than 65 percent in the same period.  The United 
States remains Colombia's largest trade partner 
(approximately 40 percent of exports and 26 percent of 
imports), though Colombia's trade with Venezuela has soared 
in the last two years, and Colombia could shift to greater 
agricultural imports from Canada and the European Union when 
free trade negotiations with them conclude in 2008.  Nearly 
93 percent of Colombia's exports already receive duty-free 
access to the U.S. under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), 
which expires February 29, 2008, while U.S. exports to Colombia 
face an average tariff of 12.5 percent.  Investors from 
around the world boosting investment in Colombia in anticipation 
of the CTPA.  In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
exceeded $7.5 billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 2002. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by 
a substantial margin, and it remains the Colombian government's 
highest economic priority.  Delays in U.S. approval or rejection 
of the accord would deal severe political and economic blow to 
Uribe and his policy of strengthened ties with the United States 
-- especially given recent tensions with Venezuela's President Hugo 
Chavez.  Colombia's second largest trading partner, Venezuela, has 
already begun commercial retaliation over Uribe's decision to end 
Chavez' formal facilitator role in a humanitarian exchange with 
the FARC. Venezuela has restricted automobile imports from Colombia 
and deployed troops to the border to stop unofficial cross border 
trade. 
 
¶5. (U) Analysts estimate the agreement with the United States 
would add between one and two percent annual GDP growth to 
the local Colombian economy.  This growth would add the new 
jobs in the formal sector employment that Uribe needs to meet 
his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent to 35 
percent by 2010.  Trade-based formal sector growth will also 
provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to shoulder 
a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan Colombia 
support falls. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Continued Progress on Labor Rights 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) In response to concerns identified by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the GOC has 
introduced bills in Congress that would bring Colombia's 
labor laws closer to ILO 
 
 
standards.  The proposed legislation would: transfer authority 
for declaring strikes from the executive to independent labor 
judges; make binding arbitration an option rather than a 
mandatory process after a strike has lasted 60 days; require 
workers' cooperatives to pay into the social security system and 
benefits programs; and levy heftier fines for cooperatives that 
do not comply with current laws. The GOC has made the bills' 
passage a top priority in a special legislative session, which 
began this month, with approval expected in April. 
 
-------------- 
Labor Violence 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, 
with the government making greater progress than is regularly 
reported. Since 2002, labor union data demonstrates that 
murders of unionists for political reasons or common crime 
have fallen more than 75 percent.  A resident International Labor 
Organization (ILO) representative arrived in Colombia in 
January 2007 to help implement the tripartite agreement committing 
the GOC to provide $4 million to finance the ILO Special Technical 
Cooperation program and to provide $1.5 million a year to the 
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia).  The Fiscalia operates 
as an independent agency responsible for prosecuting cases of 
violence against trade unionists.  The additional funding 
enabled the Fiscalia to create a special sub-unit with nearly 
100 prosecutors and investigators to investigate 187 priority 
cases.  Since 2001, the Fiscalia has resolved 56 cases of 
labor violence, leading to 118 convictions.  For 2008, the 
Fiscalia has received an additional $40 million in GOC funds 
that has allowed it to add 1,072 new positions, including 175 
prosecutors and 200 investigators. 
 
¶8. (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic 
security policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect 
labor leaders and other vulnerable individuals.  In 2007, the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's $34 million Protection 
Program helped protect more than 6,900 human rights 
activists, journalists, politicians, and other threatened 
individuals, including 1720 trade unionists.  The murder rate 
for unionists is now lower than that for the general 
population. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Pro-CTPA Unions Work to Support Agreement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. The three main Colombian labor confederations -- whose 
members largely come from the public sector unions -- oppose 
the CTPA, fearing that it will cost Colombian workers jobs. 
However, a substantial number of private sector based unions 
support the CTPA, believing it will foster economic growth and 
FDI in Colombia.  On February 14, representatives from over 
60 unions who support the CTPA proposed forming a new labor group 
(central) as an alternative to the three main labor confederations 
that oppose the CTPA. The 60 unions -- which represent more that 
45,000 workers -- said the existing confederations do not represent 
all members' interests. They plan to lobby for permanent access to 
U.S. markets and better workers' benefits.  Leaders of the three 
existing confederations dismissed the group, saying there was 
"no room" in Colombia for another labor central.  The pro-CTPA 
group expects its central will include members from unions and 
other labor federations, as well as individual workers.  The 
organizers hope to form the labor central by August. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government 
territorial control and the paramilitary demobilization have 
created the space for civil society and political parties to 
operate more openly than ever before.  The GOC maintains a 
police presence in all 1099 municipalities for the first time in 
history. Increased security of roads and highways have allowed for 
greater freedom of movement for people and commerce.  Murders fell 
from over 29,000 in 2002 to less than 17,000 in 2007, and kidnappings 
fell from over 
 
 
2800 a year to less than 600 during the same period. Local 
elections in October 2007 reflected the improved security with 
over 86,000 candidates participating.  The leftist Polo 
Democratico Party (PDA) won 1.2 million more votes than in 
2003, and its candidate won the key Bogota mayoral race. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Record 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress 
on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with paramilitaries.  All members of the 
military and police receive mandatory human rights training. 
In October 2006, Defense Minister Santos named the first 
civilian -- and the first woman -- as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  Santos has strongly backed 
initiatives to deter extrajudicial killings, changing 
promotion criteria to favor demobilization or capture of 
illegal fighters and ordering military personnel to 
facilitate civilian investigations of all combat deaths. 
Human rights groups allege that security forces committed 955 
extrajudicial killings over the last five years. 
 
¶12.  (U) The Fiscalia has made advances in prosecuting 
military personnel alleged to have committed human rights 
abuses. In August 2007, a court convicted three military 
personnel for the murder of three unionists in Arauca in 
¶2004. In November 2007, the Fiscalia ordered the detention of 
Army Captain Guillermo Gordillo for his participation in the 
massacre of eight civilians near San Jose de Apartado in 
February 2005.  The Fiscalia has set up a special 
prosecutorial team to investigate cases of alleged 
extrajudicial killings. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC government presented a Plan 
Colombia "consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian 
investment of $78 billion through 2013.  The proposal 
emphasizes the importance of building social cohesion, 
assigning substantial resources to help strengthen local 
governance, protect human rights, and help displaced people, 
Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate more than 45,000 demobilized ex-fighters and 
deserters and to promote Colombia's licit exports.  The GOC seeks 
funding from the United States and European countries to complement 
its own resources. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in 
economic and social assistance. USG security assistance 
combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, 
equipment, and technical assistance.  It supports Colombian 
military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or 
military - outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and 
economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced 
and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels 
in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but understands that manual eradication cannot 
replace aerial eradication without a sharp increase in 
spending.  He seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  In 2007, the National Police and military forces 
seized almost 150 metric tons of cocaine and coca base, and 
destroyed 200 cocaine laboratories.  We continue to work with 
the Colombian government to refine our eradication strategy 
and determine how best to transfer key tasks from the USG to 
the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 614 extraditions to the United States, including a 
record number of 164 in 2007.  Among those extradited in 2007 
were 11 members of the FARC and three members of the 
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 14,000 have deserted from other 
illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC).  The OAS 
estimates there are 30 emerging criminal groups with a 
combined membership of over 3000 persons.  Reintegration 
programs and targeted law enforcement are working to counter 
these groups.  Under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, 
over 50 former paramilitary leaders have been jailed, and 
many have confessed their participation in violent crimes. To 
date, the JPL process has revealed the location of the 
graves of almost 1200 paramilitary victims and provided 
information on 3600 crimes.  Almost 100,000 victims have 
registered under the JPL, with the GOC working on measures to 
accelerate the payment of reparations. The Supreme Court 
and the Fiscalia--with GOC support--continue to investigate 
politicians with alleged paramilitary ties. Fifty-two 
Congressmen, 19 mayors and 11 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated 
with the Colombian government for over two years on a 
cease-fire agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure 
have prevented a deal.  The ELN kidnap civilians to fund its 
operations, but its military capability is declining.  The 
FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to engage in any meaningful 
peace talks, and killed eleven state legislators held hostage 
in July 2007.  The GOC authorized Venezuelan President Chavez 
to facilitate peace talks between the Colombian government 
and the FARC and ELN in late August 2007, but subsequently 
suspended his role after Chavez intervened in Colombia's 
internal politics.  The GOC issued a communiqu in January 
2008 urging Chavez to "stop his aggression towards Colombia" 
after Chavez proposed that the international community grant 
the FARC "belligerent status" and remove the group from 
worldwide terrorism lists.  Chavez subsequently announced the 
militarization of Venezuela's 2200 kilometer border with 
Colombia. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are the longest held U.S. hostages in the 
world.  A November 2007 video seized by the GOC from a FARC 
urban cell showed proof-of-life of the three Americans. 
Their safe release remains a top priority.  A February 26 FARC 
communique referred to the three Americans as "spies" and 
threatened to hold them for 60 years in retaliation for the 
U.S. conviction and sentencing of FARC Commander Simon 
Trinidad.  President Uribe has assured us that any humanitarian 
exchange will include the U.S. hostages.  In January, the Colombian 
Government authorized the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) -- working with Venezuela -- to recover two FARC-held 
hostages. The FARC released four additional Colombian hostages on 
February 27, again working with the ICRC and Venezuelan Government. 
 
 
Brownfield