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Viewing cable 08SAOPAULO31, BRAZIL FACING DIFFICULT YEAR FOR NATURAL GAS SUPPLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SAOPAULO31 2008-01-23 11:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO8904
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0031/01 0231139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231139Z JAN 08 ZFF6
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7836
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3279
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8992
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 3031
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0648
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 3689
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 2585
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2282
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 3967
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 8546
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SAO PAULO 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/AND,WHA/EPSC, EEB/ESC/ENR, 
EEB/ESC/EPC 
STATE ALSO FOR E - GREG MANUEL 
STATE PASS USTR FOR KATE DUCKWORTH 
STATE PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBITAILLE 
STATE PASS EXIMBANK 
STATE PASS OPIC FOR DEMROSE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE 
NSC FOR TOMASULO 
DOE FOR GARY WARD 
TREASURY FOR JHOEK 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC 
UDSOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018 
TAGS: EPET ENRD EINV ECON PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FACING DIFFICULT YEAR FOR NATURAL GAS SUPPLY 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 3898 
     B. SAO PAULO 0639 
     C. SAO PAULO 0953 
 
Classified By: Econ-Pol Chief James B. Story for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Brazilian government began 2008 amid 
concerns of a possible electricity crisis due to a shortage 
of natural gas and lack of rain to fill hydropower 
reservoirs.  Energy sector experts have been pointing to a 
possible shortage of natural gas since 2006 when Bolivia 
nationalized its energy sector.  Nearly half of Brazil's 
natural gas supply comes from Bolivia and a large number of 
Brazilian industries run on natural gas.  In October, Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro states experienced first-hand the 
effects when Brazilian parastatal Petrobras was unable to 
fulfill its contract obligations to natural gas distributors. 
 Infrastructure bottlenecks limit additional production in 
both Bolivia and Brazil over the near-term.  Brazil is 
unlikely to increase domestic natural gas supply before 2009 
when several new natural gas fields become productive.  In 
addition, foreign investors in Bolivia have largely halted 
investments in that country.  In the interim, the private 
sector in Sao Paulo worked with its largest natural gas 
distributor Comgas to develop flexible contracts that allow 
Comgas to better calibrate the available supply of natural 
gas.  Brazil needs to develop legislation and a stronger 
regulatory framework as well as improve energy infrastructure 
to realistically improve the market for natural gas.  As a 
result, energy prices, especially prices of natural gas and 
electricity, are expected to increase by 10 to 25 percent 
this year.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Not a New Problem, No Big Surprise 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) The natural gas shortages are no surprise to those 
following the sector closely.  Brazil's parastatal energy 
company Petrobras had been warning the GOB of an impending 
natural gas crisis for some time.  Since the last major 
energy crisis in 2001, the GOB instituted several system 
checks and added new bureaucratic layers and organizations, 
but did little to improve the infrastructure required to 
increase the supply of natural gas.  At the same time, the 
GOB had introduced an incentive program in 1999 when it 
signed a natural gas contract with Bolivia; Petrobras was 
only using about 25 million cubic meters per day (MMm3/d) of 
the contract supply, and the GOB had encouraged wider use of 
natural gas to develop a market for Bolivian natural gas that 
Petrobras had committed to purchasing.  The GOB encouraged 
vehicular natural gas use, promoted thermal-electricity 
generation, and provided industry incentives for industrial 
plants to use natural gas.  As a result, demand for natural 
gas in Brazil has nearly quadrupled since 1998.   Brazil more 
than doubled its supply of natural gas via Bolivian imports 
and increased domestic production; however, the additional 
supply of natural gas has been insufficient to keep up with 
rising demand.  (Note: According to the National Energy 
Balance for 2007 prepared by the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, total consumption in 1998 was 18.4MMm3/d and in 2006 
was 61.2MMm3/d.  In 1998, before Brazil began importing 
natural gas from Bolivia, natural gas production totaled 
29.6MMm3/d; in 2006 production including all domestic 
production and Bolivian imports totaled 75.3MMm3/d.  The 
domestic production in 2006 is exaggerated by approximately 
10MMm3/d that Petrobras uses for internal consumption for its 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  002 OF 007 
 
 
refineries and re-injection into its oil wells to increase 
production.  As a result, the surplus of natural gas in 2006 
was closer to 4MMm3/d.  End Note.) 
 
3.  (U) Nearly half of Brazil's current 63.7MMm3/d natural 
gas supply comes from its neighbor Bolivia.  An abrupt change 
in Bolivia's energy policy in May 2006 has discouraged 
international investors from renewing investments in Bolivia. 
 As a result, natural gas production and supply in Bolivia 
are declining.  Furthermore, in December Bolivia publicly 
admitted it could not meet contractual obligations due to 
supply shortages after having contractually overextended 
itself over the last year.  In the Bolivia-Brazil gas 
pipeline (Gasbol) contract between the Bolivian State Oil 
Company (YPFB) and Petrobras, which expires in 2019, Brazil 
would buy 30MMm3/d in a take or pay contract whereby 
Petrobras pays for the total contract supply even if it 
doesn't have the adequate market demand. 
 
4.  (C) Comgas Manager for Natural Gas Supply and Thermal 
Generation Carlos Montagna told Econoff that since 2002, 
Comgas had been expecting a natural gas shortage sometime 
after 2006, depending on economic growth.  (Note: Comgas is 
Brazil's largest natural gas distributor and the largest of 
three distributors for the state of Sao Paulo.  End Note.) 
In 2004, Comgas submitted requests for proposals to increase 
its supply of natural gas.  Montagna said the expansion of 
the Gasbol pipeline was one in a series of options that 
included adding new potential suppliers; however, Bolivia's 
nationalization in May 2006 halted further discussions. 
Comgas resumed discussions with Petrobras in October 2006 to 
fill the supply gap and has been building contingency plans 
since that time without success. 
 
Supply Crunch Hits Sao Paulo and Rio Distributors 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (U) The most recent example of the impending shortage 
occurred last October 31 when Petrobras did not have enough 
gas to supply its distributors and feed thermal power 
generators.  The company reduced the supply of natural gas to 
Rio de Janeiro state gas distributors by 17 percent and to 
Sao Paulo distributors by five percent.  Low rainfall in 
October prompted the Brazilian Electricity System Operator 
(ONS) to fire up several thermal power generators to conserve 
water reservoirs.  (Note:  Approximately 70 percent of 
Brazil's electricity comes from hydroelectric generators, 
followed by natural gas (10 percent), imported electricity (7 
percent), petroleum (4 percent), biomass (4 percent), and 
nuclear (2 percent).  End Note.)  ONS told Petrobras to send 
more natural gas to the thermal generators at the same time 
that Petrobras took one of its big platforms in Espirito 
Santo offline for maintenance that supplies natural gas to 
Rio.  Petrobras didn't have enough supply to meet its other 
contract demands with Rio and Sao Paulo distributors, and the 
order of priority goes first to thermal generators, followed 
by consumers, and last to industry. 
 
Sources of Natural Gas in Brazil 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Brazilian consulting firm PSR Consultoria 
estimated that Brazil had on the order of 63.7MMm3/d of 
natural gas in 2007 from domestic sources and from Bolivia. 
The Gasbol pipeline from Bolivia supplied approximately 
28MMm3/d to Brazil and the remainder came principally from 
the two production areas in Brazil's southeast (current 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  003 OF 007 
 
 
production from Campos and Espirito Santo basins).  Comgas 
supplies approximately 14MMm3/d of natural gas for Sao Paulo, 
the state with the highest natural gas consumption.  Montagna 
told Econoff that Comgas currently has only 12.9MMm3/d of 
natural gas contracted--Petrobras supplies 3.5MMm3/d from 
domestic production and 8.75MMm3/d from Bolivia, and British 
Gas (BG) supplies 650 thousand cubic meters per day also from 
Bolivia.  Comgas said that Petrobras has previously provided 
an emergency supply when BG was unable to meet its contract 
with Comgas due to unrest in Bolivia (see ref A for more on 
natural gas and Bolivia).  As a result of the Bolivian 
government's announcement that it would be unable to fulfill 
its contract obligations with BG, Montagna told Econoff that 
Comgas' contract with BG is now a flexible contract that 
allows BG to supply natural gas when Bolivian gas is 
available.  Comgas recently signed a new agreement with 
Petrobras for 14.75MMm3/d beginning in 2009; however, Comgas' 
Vice-President and Director of the Large Consumers Market, 
Vehicular Natural Gas, and Gas Supply Sergio Luiz da Silva 
said that the natural gas market would be tight over the next 
two years because of the projected four to five percent 
increase in demand needed to sustain anticipated GDP growth. 
According to Brazil Focus, by 2012 production in Brazil will 
total 72MMm3/d, plus 30MMm3/d from Bolivia and 31MMm3/d from 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), totaling some 134MMm3/d, of 
which 46MMm3/d is earmarked for thermal-electric generation. 
 
Who are the Consumers? 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (U) Brazil's two top consumers, excluding Petrobras 
itself, are industrial producers and the thermal electricity 
generators.  The industrial producers alone account for 38 
percent of national daily natural gas consumption, almost 
exclusively by Sao Paulo industry.  Brazilian industries used 
natural gas for 10 percent of their energy needs on average 
in 2006; however, several industries including chemicals (30 
percent), textiles (28 percent), and ceramics (26 percent) 
rely heavily on natural gas as their primary energy source. 
Thermal generators consumed 16 percent of Brazil's natural 
gas supply, and 10 percent of Brazil's electricity supply is 
from natural gas thermal generators.  Vehicular natural gas 
makes up about 10 percent of the market and residential 
consumers less than one percent of the market. 
 
8.  (U) The distribution of natural gas by Sao Paulo's three 
distributors reflects the state's role as the country's major 
industrial pole.  Statistics from "Brasil Energy" through 
November 2007 show that approximately 82 percent of natural 
gas distributed supplied the industrial sector and 11 percent 
for vehicular natural gas.  The state of Sao Paulo has only 
two thermal power generators, the largest with a capacity of 
2.76MMm3/d, which Petrobras supplies directly.  Therefore, 
the primary threat of natural gas shortages is that Petrobras 
would divert its contracted supply to other thermal 
generators outside of Sao Paulo state when the GOB mandates 
supplemental thermal power generation.  (Note: The average 
daily distribution through November 2007 in Sao Paulo was 
15.65MMm3/d, of which: industrial 12.9MMm3/d, transportation 
1.8MMm3/d, residential 0.4MMm3/d, commercial 0.3MMm3/d, 
co-generation 0.6MMm3/d, and thermal generation 0.01MMm3/d. 
End Note.) 
 
9.  (U) As expected, the shortages in October hit Sao Paulo 
industries particularly hard given their relative dependence 
on natural gas.  The 2007 annual survey by the Sao Paulo 
State Industry Center (CIESP - see ref B) of its 551 company 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  004 OF 007 
 
 
members conducted in November 2007 showed that 12 percent of 
the respondents use natural gas to operate. The study showed 
that the lack of natural gas would boost production costs by 
about 10 percent on average.  Furthermore, the Federation of 
Industries of Sao Paulo (FIESP) reported that an eventual 
natural gas shortage would totally interrupt 19 percent of 
Sao Paulo industries, 20 percent of industries would be 
partially affected with the absence of natural gas, and 61 
percent could substitute another fuel for natural gas if 
there was a shortage. 
 
Domestic Supply Uncertain and Infrastructure Limitations 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
10.  (C) Infrastructure is the biggest constraint to 
expanding the natural gas supply to distributors in the short 
and medium term.  Petrobras hopes to inaugurate the first LNG 
terminal in Pecem, in northeastern Brazil, with a capacity of 
7MMm3/d within the first half of 2008 and a second terminal 
in Rio's Guanabara Bay for 14MMm3/d in 2009.  Montagna told 
Econoff that he expects the Pecem terminal to succeed; 
however, he is less optimistic about the second LNG terminal 
in Rio due to environmental and regulatory obstacles.  FIESP 
Vice-President for Infrastructure Development Saturnino 
Sergio da Silva told Econoffs that although the LNG terminals 
will allow Brazil more market flexibility, Brazil would need 
to enhance existing infrastructure to transport the gas. 
Similarly, the expansion of the Cabiunas-Vitoria gas pipeline 
from Espirito Santo to Rio de Janeiro (24MMm3/d to 30MMm3/d) 
is scheduled to be finished in February.  Critics, however, 
are skeptical because the project has already been delayed 
several times.  Da Silva told Econoffs he didn't expect the 
pipeline expansion could be completed by 2008 and said that 
Brazil would need some sort of short-term solution for 
potential gas shortages until the infrastructure bottlenecks 
could be addressed.  Da Silva said that Petrobras expects to 
begin production at the natural gas fields in the Santos 
basin (Mexilhao, expected production of 9MMm3/d in 2009) and 
Espirito Santo basin (Paroa-Cangoa) to begin supplying the 
domestic market in 2009 after extensive delays acquiring 
infrastructure and services to set up drilling platforms. 
Natural gas reserves are unknown and unproven at the recently 
announced oil and gas find at Tupi (ref C) and would be 
available in the best-case scenario in 2014.  Similarly, 
Executive Vice-President for Latin America for BG Group Rick 
Waddell told Econoffs that a worldwide shortage of drilling 
rigs means that it would e years before BG could determine 
the market suiability of the natural gas reserves at Tupi, 
and several other industry specialists speculate it primarily 
would be used to supply oil platforms and maintain reservoir 
pressure. 
 
Bolivian Supply Prospects Limited 
--------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Brazil is unlikely to increase its natural gas 
supply from Bolivia until at least 2011 even if Petrobras and 
other investors ramp up investment in Bolivia because of 
infrastructure constraints.  Waddell told Econoff that 
although BG is fed up with the Bolivian government, the 
company plans to stay in Bolivia because BG would prefer to 
have the Bolivian government confiscate its investments than 
to abandon them.  Waddell opined that the Bolivian government 
didn't understand the investment process and how to build an 
appropriate investment climate.  He noted that BG cannot 
prepare an investment plan or field development plan without 
a sales contract with a creditworthy buyer--an industry 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  005 OF 007 
 
 
standard.  Furthermore, he said that inadequate 
infrastructure is also a dire concern for expanding 
production in Bolivia.  According to Waddell, BG and others 
aren't going to invest in Bolivia until they know they can 
transport gas and generate revenue there, which he said means 
no additional supply for Brazil in the near-term. 
 
12.  (C) Brazil's contract with Bolivia does levy hefty 
penalties; however, Petrobras would have to pursue 
arbitration in New York to recover them, and Waddell told 
Econoff that he doubted Petrobras would go to such lengths. 
He said he was not surprised when Bolivia declared that it 
would not meet its 2008 contractual obligations with BG and 
the Cuiaba power plant in western Brazil.  He told Econoff 
that BG's investment in Bolivia is relatively small and 
pursuing international arbitration under the UK Bilateral 
Investment Treaty for the violation of its contract would not 
be worth the effort.  He opined that the contract with the 
Cuiaba power plant involves a much larger investment, but 
that the plant's stakeholders to date (Ashmore Energy) have 
avoided challenging the Bolivian government. 
 
Industry Perspective for Investment Promises in Bolivia 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
13.  (C) Petrobras in December announced an investment of USD 
one billion in Bolivia's natural gas sector.  (Comment: Most 
interlocutors have opined that this investment was done for 
geopolitical reasons and was not a decision based on business 
considerations.  End Comment.)  Da Silva of FIESP told 
Econoffs he believes Petrobras' decision to renew investments 
in Bolivia was a strategic decision to counterbalance 
Venezuela's role in the region and especially in Bolivia.  Da 
Silva applauded the decision, saying Brazil had an obligation 
to help countries like Bolivia and Paraguay.  In his view, 
Bolivian gas is important for FIESP and is cheaper than 
domestically produced gas.  Da Silva calculated that Bolivian 
natural gas costs about the equivalent of USD 35 per barrel. 
For his part, Waddell told Econoff that Petrobras officials 
told him just before Christmas that their recent commitments 
in Bolivia were previously planned investments needed to 
maintain the flow of 30MMm3/d of gas to Brazil out of the San 
Alberto/San Antonio fields in Bolivia.  He said Petrobras had 
also agreed on conditions to begin discussing future 
exploration investments in Bolivia. 
 
Government Response Limited 
--------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) The GOB's response to potential natural gas 
shortages for the most part has been insufficient and 
sluggish.  Since winning his second term, President Lula has 
left several key energy positions unfilled (including leaving 
his Minister of Mines and Energy vacant from May 2007 until 
January 16, only to then be filled by a self-admitted 
novitiate in the energy sector).  Waddell's view is that 
Brazil is mostly operating out of the fear that Brazil could 
be in for severe electricity shortages similar to those in 
2001.  (Note: In 2001, the demand for electricity, following 
strong economic growth the year before, could not keep up 
with supply and the GOB had to implement an electricity 
rationing program.  Brazilian businesses spent millions on 
additional electricity costs and had to cut back production. 
As a result, the Brazilian economy suffered a serious 
setback.  End Note.)  The GOB's response to the limited 
prospects for natural gas, apart from ignoring the problem, 
has been to prioritize consumers.  Lula clarified in November 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  006 OF 007 
 
 
and again in January that thermal power plants continue to be 
the top priority consumer for the country's supply of natural 
gas.  In contrast to 2003 when the GOB was encouraging the 
use of natural gas, Petrobras and the GOB have started 
encouraging alternatives to natural gas.  Petrobras president 
Sergio Jose Gabrielli and then interim Energy and Mines 
Minister Nelson Hubner in November publicly discouraged the 
use of vehicular natural gas.  Due to insufficient supply, 
Brazil's National Agency for Electricity (Aneel) withdrew 
from its projected energy matrix some 3,600 megawatts of 
electricity that it had estimated that natural gas generators 
would supply. 
 
Private Sector Contingency Planning 
----------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) In the absence of a government-led solution for 
natural gas supply and infrastructure development, Brazil's 
private sector had been working to find an alternative.  In 
the face of possible natural gas shortages since Bolivia 
nationalized its energy sector in 2006, FIESP has been 
working with Comgas to develop a contingency plan, together 
with Petrobras, to avoid short-term hiccups in the supply of 
natural gas, da Silva said.  He told Econoffs that FIESP had 
formed a working group two years ago to identify industries 
that could use different fuels for power and had developed a 
contract with Petrobras that would allow Petrobras to supply 
other fuels besides natural gas in the case of emergency 
without penalties. 
 
16.  (C) The natural gas shortages in October pushed their 
contingency planning into practice.  On December 18 Gabrielli 
and Comgas President Luis Domenech signed contracts that 
create new modalities for Sao Paulo industrial consumers 
which took effect this month.  In addition to the existing 
inflexible contracts, they created flexible and interruptible 
contracts between Comgas and industrial consumers that 
compensate for intermittent natural gas shortages in the 
domestic market due to technical problems or lower volume 
from Bolivia.  According to Montagna, the flexible contract 
allows Petrobras to substitute natural gas for oil at its own 
expense and is designed for industrial consumers that can 
alter energy supply without interrupting their operations. 
Comgas expects that approximately nine percent, or one 
MMm3/d, of its industrial customer base would opt for the 
flexible contracts, and told Econoff that Comgas had already 
secured nearly that amount in new contracts in 2007. 
Interruptible contracts, on the other hand, allow Comgas to 
interrupt distribution to industrial consumers with these 
contracts if the GOB mandates additional thermal electricity 
generation.  Montagna said Comgas expected to sign 
interruptible contracts totaling 1.5MMm3/d with industrial 
customers.  In total these two contracts would provide Comgas 
with a cushion of 2.5MMm3/d of natural gas in the event of a 
supply shortage.  He said Comgas believes these contracts 
will prevent legal challenges and offer Petrobras and Comgas 
a coordinated solution to intermittent supply shortages for 
Sao Paulo industrial consumers. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
17.  (C) Brazil is entering what many believe will be the 
most difficult year for guaranteeing enough natural gas to 
supply thermal power generators if a possible electricity 
crisis were to occur due to insufficient rain for hydropower 
or larger than anticipated increases in demand for 
 
SAO PAULO 00000031  007 OF 007 
 
 
electricity.  (Note: Septels will further address the current 
energy situation in Brazil.  End Note.)  Despite some efforts 
to avoid a crisis similar to 2001, the GOB failed to plan and 
develop a natural gas supply to feed its growing thermal 
generation capacity.  The private sector has stepped in where 
the GOB could not; however, distributors such as Comgas are 
limited by national infrastructure bottlenecks and incomplete 
regulation in the sector.  Clearly Brazil needs a new and 
specific natural gas regulatory framework, but the bill is 
languishing in Congress and the Lula Administration has not 
used its considerable strength to get it moving. 
Furthermore, the impending gas crisis will require 
fundamental changes to Brazil's model for electricity 
generation.  As a result, Brazil will expect higher energy 
prices, on the order of 10 to 25 percent, in the interim 
because of tightening supply and additional domestic demand, 
coupled with a worldwide shortage of natural gas and higher 
exploration costs for the potential fields discovered in Tupi 
and elsewhere.  Higher energy prices could drive up inflation 
as well as constrain growth in Brazil over the next several 
years until new supplies of gas come on line.  END COMMENT. 
WHITE