VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #0018/01 0031446
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031446Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9004
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 2038
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 8834
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 4049
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1063
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 3290

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PM/WRA FOR STEPHANIE PICO AND SHO MORIMOTO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2018 
TAGS: MARR MASS PARM XW WET
SUBJECT: MANPADS STRATEGY: COMMENTS FROM ETHIOPIA 
 
REF: STATE 156001 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy Addis Ababa supports pursuit of 
the proposed Horn of Africa MANPADS strategy (reftel).  While 
counter-proliferation and acquisition-related strategy 
elements would likely be well received in Ethiopia, and will 
complement on-going arrangements, elements of the stockpile 
security and destruction component must be handled carefully 
to achieve U.S. objectives without offending Ethiopian 
sensibilities. End Summary. 
 
FEEDBACK ON THE PROPOSED STRATEGY 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Counter-Proliferation:  Ethiopia is a very proud 
country.  While it is generally willing to engage in 
partnership and receive assistance, such assistance must be 
framed in a way that is not perceived to be invasive or 
critical.  Embassy Addis supports approaching MANPADS 
supplier countries to encourage them to vet sales to the Horn 
of African (HoA) region, but emphasizes that if such 
approaches are perceived to suggest a concern against the 
legitimate procurement of MANPADS by the Ethiopian military, 
they could jeopardize the broader bilateral military 
relationship. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Stockpile Security and Destruction:  Post's 
interagency review team assesses that it is highly unlikely 
that the Ethiopian military would provide significant 
information about its own MANPADS stock or permit the United 
States to assess either that stock or security mechanisms in 
place to safeguard it.  Instead, Post believes that, if it 
even acknowledges the existence of a military MANPADS stock, 
the Ethiopian military is most likely to either confirm to 
the USG that it is already adequately secured or to ask the 
USG to provide funding for stockpile security improvements 
which it itself would implement.  While stockpile security is 
a major element of the proposed strategy, Post believes that 
the most effective way to approach the issue with the 
Ethiopian military is to offer a training course for 
Ethiopian officials on best practices in securing MANPADS 
stocks, as well as technical assistance for implementation if 
the Ethiopian military is receptive.  The USG may learn 
otherwise unavailable details of the extent of the Ethiopian 
military's MANPADS stock through discussions on the margins 
of such a training.  In light of the expected lack of 
Ethiopian disclosure of details about its MANPADS stock, 
securing Ethiopian military buy-in for collaborative or 
USG-assisted destruction of its surplus military stock may be 
difficult.  Post advises an approach to the Ethiopian 
military that unilaterally highlights safety threats from old 
technology MANPADS believed to be in their stock (i.e. such 
as the risk of batteries overheating causing pre-launch 
explosions in SA-18s or SA-7s) and only then offering 
assistance with the destruction of old or unstable military 
stocks.  Post believes that the Ethiopian Government would be 
receptive to assistance with legislation regarding MANPADS as 
well as to improved border security to detect and impede the 
cross-border transportation of MANPADS. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Acquisition:  Post is already implementing an 
arrangement with the Ethiopian National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) through which we purchase MANPADS 
seized by Ethiopian government entities.  To date this 
program has not been as productive as we would have liked, 
probably due to unclear chains of command and coordination 
among Ethiopian entities.  While Post assesses that an 
acquisition component in the MANPADS strategy would be 
productive, Post's interagency team notes that even if the 
military is not forthcoming on details of its own stockpile, 
the Ethiopian military may take advantage of such an 
arrangement to pass off to the U.S. old SA-7s from its own 
stock in exchange for cash.  If early discussions with 
Ethiopian military officials unveil a willingness to disclose 
to the USG details of its own MANPADS stock, those 
discussions may facilitate incorporating the Ethiopian 
military into the acquisition arrangement.  If not, the 
acquisition arrangement may either 1) remain limited to the 
NISS, or 2) to the extend that the Ethiopian military is 
incorporated, may be limited to SA-18s or other items not 
believed to be in the Ethiopian military's stock. 
 
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) 
Feasibility: Post assesses that the proposed strategy is 
generally feasible within the context of the challenges and 
information provided above. 
 
Ethiopian Counterparts: Post believes that the NISS would be 
the primary Ethiopian Government counterpart for 
implementation of this strategy.  The Ministry of National 
Defense (MoND) would be the appropriate counterpart for the 
stockpile management courses or destruction collaboration, 
and possibly also for part of the acquisition component.  The 
Foreign Ministry would be the appropriate conduit for initial 
discussions and arrangements for any formal agreements. 
While the Federal Police would not likely play a significant 
role in this strategy, they should be advised at least of the 
existence of the acquisition program. 
 
Timing: Post does not see any specific timing preferences for 
initiating discussions or the plan of action for this 
strategy. 
YAMAMOTO