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C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR 
DEPARTMENT FOR P STAFF GEORGE KENT, EAP/K ANDREW OU, EAP/EX 
PATRICIA MCCARTHY, IO/PSC DOUGLAS WAKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: ETRD OSCE PARM PHUM PREL ABLD ROK
SUBJECT: OSCE MINISTERIAL:  U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH KOREAN 
DFM SHIM 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1. (U) November 28; 6:20 p.m.; Madrid, Spain. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
Under Secretary Burns 
Special Assistant Sumona Guha 
¶E. Strother Murray (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
Republic of Korea 
Deputy Foreign Minister Shim Yoon-joe 
Kang Kym-gu, Director, European Regional Cooperation 
Division, MFA 
Jeepio Hong, Deputy Director, North America Division I, MFA 
 
¶3. (C) Summary. In a November 28 bilateral meeting on the eve 
of the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, U/S Burns and Korean 
Deputy FM Shim exchanged views on critical issues including 
Middle East peace and North Korea denuclearization as well as 
mutual concerns regarding Iran, Darfur, Afghanistan, and 
Burma.  In a far-reaching conversation that began with 
baseball and ended with buildings, Shim tested U.S. 
receptivity to a four-party ministerial framework to deal 
with Korean peninsula matters, and made it clear the ROKG 
could not accept a separate trilateral forum that excluded 
both Koreas.  On matters involving the deployment of ROKG 
resources to Sudan and Afghanistan, Shim deferred discussions 
and decision-making until after Korean elections December 19. 
 The same was true of market access for U.S. beef.  Shim 
stressed the importance of Chinese engagement to bring down 
the Burmese junta, and pledged his government's support for 
implementation of Annapolis next steps.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Shared Goals in the Middle East 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Deputy FM Shim congratulated U/S Burns on the 
successful November 27-28 Middle East peace conference in 
Annapolis, saying it seemed to be a good start.  Shim 
nonetheless asserted the ROKG should have been invited to 
participate not just in Annapolis but in the October 
conference of Iraq's neighbors.  He asked the Under Secretary 
who would represent the USG at the December 17 conference in 
Paris.  If Secretary Rice attended, Shim believed Korea's 
Foreign Minister would also.  U/S Burns promised to advise 
him and, regarding Annapolis, thanked Shim for his phone call 
and said there was no reason Korea could not be part of the 
effort going forward.  Shim expressed interest in Hamas and 
assured U/S Burns the ROKG would cooperate on Iran.  Shim 
understood the importance of the region to President Bush and 
to Secretary Rice, citing the Secretary's eight trips there. 
 
--------------------- 
DPRK Denuclearization 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the North Korean nuclear issue, Shim 
mentioned EAP Assistant Secretary Hill's travel to consult 
with counterparts in Tokyo, Seoul, Pyongyang, and Beijing 
beginning November 28, including a visit to the disablement 
site.  When asked whether the USG planned to lift the DPRK 
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, U/S Burns 
affirmed it was a good idea for A/S Hill to go to Pyongyang, 
but cautioned that engagement would have to be step by step. 
Responding to Shim's query about D.C. views on the Six Party 
Talks, U/S Burns conceded there were some critics in Congress 
but that the overall atmosphere was good and that the 
Six-Party format was right, provided the DPRK met its 
commitments.  In Seoul, Shim stated, the atmosphere was 
upbeat, as long as the DPRK was serious.  It might be 
desirable to encourage the DPRK with an added thrust sometime 
in January.  If by the end of 2007, North Korea had fulfilled 
its complete declaration of nuclear programs, Shim posited 
that Foreign Minister talks among four of the six countries 
could be appropriate. 
 
¶6. (C) When U/S Burns asked what purpose additional 
four-party negotiations might serve, Shim hastened to clarify 
such a summit right after the six gathered was purely 
theoretical.  Yet he hoped such a meeting would provide a 
chance to explore the Korean peace regime and armistice 
 
agreement.  The Under Secretary noted that the U.S. has not 
agreed to a four-party format.  The first priorities were to 
resolve the nuclear issue and to normalize U.S.-DPRK 
relations.  Only after those steps could the U.S. revisit the 
peace agreement.  Launching of such an agreement 
simultaneously and in parallel, Burns thought might be a 
problem for the United States.  U/S Burns said he would let 
the Secretary know, but reiterated the DPRK must do what they 
said and noted it was not possible to move forward on all 
fronts.  The USG remained committed to a Six-Party 
ministerial, and A/S Hill's trip would help determine a 
course of action. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iran:  ROK Reducing Economic Relations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Under Secretary Burns noted Russia and China were 
continuing to block progress on a third UNSC sanctions 
resolution.  The EU was considering a separate sanctions 
effort against Iran.  Shim said Treasury U/S Levy's visit to 
Seoul had been productive, and the ROK would cooperate in the 
international effort against Iran.  The South Korean 
government has met to discuss actions against Iranian banks, 
and the private sector was already taking its own measures to 
diminish economic interactions.  After strong ROKG warnings 
to Korean banks about the risks involved -- with specific 
reference to the October designation of the Revolutionary 
Guards (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization by the 
Unites States -- many banks and other companies had reduced 
their interactions with Iranian interests.  Bank Mellat had a 
branch in Seoul and its business was going down.  The volume 
of construction contracts with Iran had gone down 25 per 
cent.  Shim acknowledged it was important for Korea to secure 
its oil supplies, given eight per cent reliance on Iranian 
oil.  He said the ROKG was reviewing contracts on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure they had nothing to do with 
Iran.  He offered to keep U/S Burns apprised of additional 
Korean actions and progress.  U/S Burns said these actions 
were very helpful and asked if the ROK could make its actions 
public. 
 
------------------------------------- 
No Decision Yet on Support for UNAMID 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Asked whether the ROKG could provide helicopters and 
transport in support of the UN mission in Darfur, Shim 
summarized the Korean Ministry of Defense's initial negative 
response but surmised there was a possibility for 
cooperation, especially in the event ROKG troops currently in 
Kuwait withdraw in the next few years.  Urged to review the 
possibility of transferring those assets to Darfur, Shim said 
the decision might best be made by a new, stronger 
government, considering the current Korean political season. 
The ROKG would reconsider providing assets to UNAMID after 
the December 19 elections. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Afghanistan:  With More Info, Could Support Electricity 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶9. (C) Shim referenced the ROKG's decision to withdraw its 
military medics and engineers from Afghanistan and replace 
them with civilian medical personnel.  U/S Burns hoped Korea 
would be able to act on past proposals to lead a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team and provide funding for the Northern 
Electricity Power System (NEPS) project.  Shim asked for more 
information on the so-called Uzbekistan project and said no 
one had specifically asked the ROKG to participate.  Though 
he would need more information, Shim felt sure the Korean 
Ex-Im Bank would be willing to provide the $25 million 
needed.  Shim called the situation of South Korean hostages 
in Afghanistan "exceptional." 
 
---------------------------- 
China Key to Change in Burma 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) "Burma cannot be changed overnight," the Deputy 
Foreign Minister said, but the junta must change.  Shim 
shared USG concerns about the unmet expectations of UN envoy 
Ibrahim Gambari, who U/S Burns noted might need an 
international "energy boost" in order to be more active in 
Burma itself.  Shim agreed Gambari's exclusion from ASEAN in 
 
mid-November had been a great loss of face.  He promised to 
keep in touch with Under Secretary Burns on Burma.  It would 
take time, but there had been fruitful three-party meetings 
with China in October, and  it would be important to embrace 
China and to present a united front.  U/S Burns added he 
would discuss Burma with the Chinese in Paris. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FTA:  "Beef"ing Up Unlikely Before February 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) U/S Burns raised the U.S.-ROK FTA, urging DFM Shim to 
fully implement the guidelines on imports of U.S. beef. 
Deputy FM Shim responded by asking U/S Burns what he thought 
of the ROKG proposal to do so in two steps, the first 80 per 
cent with the remainder to be discussed.  He confessed it was 
a political decision that might have to wait until February, 
following approval Shim hoped the National Assembly would 
grant in early 2008.  He asked whether the USG would 
re-submit the FTA after February.  The Under Secretary 
insisted he thought a one-step, 100 per cent agreement was 
best in order to establish the right climate and build 
momentum for passage on the Hill. 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S.-China-Japan Trialogue? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Shim raised the matter of a trilateral dialogue among 
the United States, China, and Japan.  Calling the idea 
"unacceptable" to the ROKG, he admitted it was too close for 
comfort to the Korean peninsula.  Though he appreciated the 
Under Secretary's offer to inquire with the Japanese as to 
why the concept had resurfaced, Shim noted the USG should 
keep a low profile and be careful in asking Japan -- lest the 
GOJ think there was room for re-visitation. 
 
------------------------ 
And about that NOB . . . 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Finally, Shim asked Under Secretary Burns to look 
into what he believed was a misunderstanding over the 
transfer to a new site of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.  The 
best way to resolve the issue, he said, was for the USG to 
keep the "original" site.  Shim believed the dispute was to 
blame for the apparent reluctance the Koreans had encountered 
when opening a new consulate in Alaska.  He accepted the 
Under Secretary's suggestion the ROKG raise the matter with 
U.S. Ambassador Vershbow. 
 
 
AGUIRRE