VZCZCXRO1281
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3973/01 3360834
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020834Z DEC 07 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 0004
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1611
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4293
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3710

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
EMBASSY DJIBOUTI PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF DEL VIA CAPT SCOTT 
SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT 
TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
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REF: A. (A) KABUL 3800 
     ¶B. (B) KABUL 3765 
 
Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NOFORN) SUMMARY:  Your visit, coming at the end of this 
year,s fighting season, is an opportunity to assess 2007,s 
military, political and development progress.  ISAF was the 
clear winner this year on the battlefield, which has pushed 
the enemy to resort increasingly to asymmetric attacks.  At 
least in the U.S.-controlled RC-E, good progress on key 
development and governance indicators has been achieved. 
Elections during the 2009-10 window have President Karzai 
focused on the need to deliver services and security to the 
population.  Northern-based opposition groups are 
increasingly critical of Karzai's leadership, including his 
idea of a national unity government led by a strong 
president.  Earlier this month the costliest suicide bombing 
in recent Afghan history took place n 
Baghlan Province, fueling partisan sniping between opposition 
members of Parliament and Karzai.  In your meetings with 
President Karzai and Defense Minister Wardak, you may wish to 
focus on the importance of improving domestic governance and 
strategic communications as part of an effective COIN 
strategy, the need to deal effectively with Iran as well as 
Pakistan, and our continuing concern 
over counternarcotics.  Both Karzai and Wardak may press you 
for a significant increase in USG support for a larger but 
unsustainable Army Air Corps.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (C/NOFORN) Under GEN McNeill, NATO-ISAF has worked 
closely with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to maintain pressure on 
insurgents, inflicting regular defeats on the battlefield. 
Recent intelligence indicates that senior Taliban leaders are 
exhibiting clear signs of stress as a result of ISAF 
operations, particularly the heavy casualties inflicted on 
mid-level commanders.  Nonetheless, the Taliban remain a 
determined and resilient foe, as evidenced by their ability 
to mass forces and seize at least temporarily territory in 
Farah, Helmand and Kandahar.  Overall attacks in 2007 are up 
from 2006, especially via asymmetric means (improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and kidnappings). 
 That up-tick also reflects greater engagement by ISAF troops 
with the insurgents as they sought from the first snow-melt 
this spring to take the fight to 
the enemy.  The Taliban,s indiscriminate use of violence is 
bitterly resented by the people, but at the same time it 
shakes public confidence in the ability of Karzai,s 
government and ISAF forces to protect non-combatants.  We 
need to reassure President Karzai that ISAF will continue to 
work closely with expanded ANA units to pursue stability 
operations in 2008, so that the government has more time and 
space to improve local governance and development.  ISAF 
analysts believe that while Pakistani military operations in 
Swat may be distracting Taliban attention away from 
Afghanistan for now, ISAF may find itself facing an 
emboldened enemy in spring 2008 if the extremists are 
successful in resisting the Pakistani campaign. 
 
¶3.  (S/NOFORN) ISAF is holding together, despite Allied 
governments having to manage shaky domestic public support 
for NATO,s role in Afghanistan.  While the Canadins and 
Dutch are shouldering heavy burdens, the south is certain to 
 
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become more unstable if they impose artificial timelines, 
reduce their involvement or depart.  Your strong statement to 
this effect at the NATO Noordwijk Defense Ministerial was 
most welcome, and we continue to press Allies stationed in 
the north and west to do more.  In this 
regard, German Chancellor Merkel,s October visit to 
Afghanistan has been followed closely by a tripling (from 12 
million to 35.7 million euros) of German assistance to the 
Afghan police in 2008.  European political wrangling has not, 
so far, harmed operations on the ground, but could if 
recriminations fly or Allies announce plans to depart.  The 
Dutch cabinet has moved to extend their mandate.  Also, 
Canada,s Manley Panel departed Afghanistan on November 28 
after a week-long visit in which they met with senior IRoA, 
ISAF and international community representatives (including 
Karzai and Wardak) and visited Canadian troops and 
development projects in Kandahar, Bamyan province and 
RC-North.  Although they did not tip their hand on possible 
recommendations, one Panel member close to PM Harper did 
focus on the desirability of another Ally sharing the 
Canadian burden in Kandahar. 
 
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GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C/NOFORN) President Karzai faces elections sometime 
during 2009-10, and the campaign season has already begun. 
Opposition groups, including the United Front (whose core 
leadership comes from the old Tajik-based Northern Alliance) 
are encouraging the population to focus on what the 
government is not delivering in terms of security and 
services, while the central government is focusing on 
demonstrating it can deliver.  Initiatives include a new 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) within 
the Palace to encourage greater coordination and 
effectiveness in the areas of security, service 
delivery and governance at the local level.  The challenges, 
including resource shortages, are significant.  As the 
opposition increases the pressure, Karzai must fight the 
temptation to give up on his vision of national unity and 
fall back on his ethnic-Pashtun base, which is troubled by a 
counter-insurgency strategy that targets a largely Pashtun 
insurgency.  He needs to be reminded that his credibility and 
power comes from strong leadership of Afghanistan as a whole. 
 
¶5.  (C/NOFORN) With the licit economy improving (albeit from 
a low starting point) and terrorist attacks increasing, polls 
show that the people,s number-one concern has shifted from 
employment to security.  Karzai has only a short window to 
demonstrate that the government is meeting people,s needs. 
U.S. forces under ISAF command in RC-East, working in close 
collaboration with State, USAID and USDA officers through the 
PRTs and local officials, have achieved significant progress 
on development and governance goals, including reductions in 
infant mortality, enrollment of 96 percent of school-age boys 
and 68 percent of girls in school, construction of 85 
district center facilities (starting from zero) with 53 more 
under construction, major progress in road construction and 
canal repair, and significant 
improvements in access to health care.  We are starting to 
see signs of growing economic activity, a key to long-term 
prosperity and satisfaction with the government.  This work 
has been done in partnership with provincial and district 
authorities, with credit going to Afghan government entities. 
 In order for ordinary Afghans to see the government as a 
credible alternative to parallel structures, including shadow 
Taliban governments operating in some provinces, the IRoA 
 
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needs to do more to empower 
provincial and district officials to take the lead on (and be 
held accountable for) providing services. 
--------------- 
ISSUES TO RAISE 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) You may want to be prepared to address the following 
topics: 
 
- Governance:  The IRoA increasingly recognizes that good 
governance is central to an effective COIN strategy, but it 
is struggling to in place the reforms and initiatives that 
would convince the population that the government is here to 
stay and prepared to deliver.  You should underline U.S. 
support for the new Independent Directorate for Local 
Governance, and encourage Karzai to give ministers, governors 
and district officials more authority and resources to 
deliver the services that will connect the people to the 
government.  Governors, in particular, are too often 
shuffled.  Picking good people, investing in them and giving 
them resources and authority, and holding them accountable is 
the key to good governance.  The Afghan government needs to 
do a better job against corruption and in the effective 
formulation and execution of policy. 
 
- Strategic Communications:  We must react faster to tactical 
events, good and bad, and use our technological edge to 
advance our offensive messaging agenda both domestically and 
abroad.  Both the Afghans and the international community 
need to do a better job in publicizing successes.  All 
recognize the need for a strong and visible Afghan lead in 
the messaging effort.  A new Government Media Center will 
provide opportunity for Afghans and the IC better to 
coordinate communications 
strategy.  Essential Taliban weaknesses include the damage 
they do to the reconstruction effort and their role in 
civilian casualties, both of which reinforce poll results 
showing that Afghans do not want a return to Taliban rule. 
We must keep reminding Afghans of the progress which has been 
achieved, notably in transportation, health and education, 
but also in new areas like the availability of cell phones 
and a free and independent media. 
 
- The Neighbors:  Karzai will be interested in your 
assessment of the political situation in Pakistan.  On Iran, 
Karzai has shown increasing concern since the Edelman visit 
(REF A) regarding Iranian meddling, especially regarding 
evidence of Iranian support for Karzai,s political opponents 
in the United Front party.  His advisors highlight the risks 
of "a second front" and the utility of Iran as a bulwark 
against radical (Wahabist) influence in the region.  They 
hope to manage the Iranian threat, including by encouraging 
expanded U.S. presence in Western Afghanistan as 
counterpoint.  We are prepared to deepen our presence; this 
will provide an opportunity for you to reinforce with Karzai 
the need for him to speak out against Iranian 
mischief-making. 
 
- Counternarcotics:  At the moment, Karzai remains opposed to 
both aerial and ground-based spraying.  Poppy cultivation and 
opium trafficking grew at an alarming rate in 2007, feeding 
the insurgency and undercutting development and good 
governance efforts.  You should emphasize that Karzai needs 
to take personal responsibility for improving the narcotics 
situation, including pushing governors for progress.  Defense 
Minister Wardak is resisting providing force protection to 
Afghan eradication 
 
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teams.  You should strongly urge Karzai to persuade the 
minister to reverse that position. 
 
-------------------- 
TOPICS TO ANTICIPATE 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) It can be difficult to predict what issues the 
mentally peripatetic Karzai will raise.  Among the issues 
that could come up include: 
 
-- Senior UN Special Representative:  Karzai may ask you for 
an update on the status of this appointment.  Karzai has 
resigned himself to the appointment of a senior UN Special 
Representative to coordinate the international community,s 
civilian efforts, but he has made clear his sensitivity to 
any IC infringement on Afghan government sovereignty.  To the 
contrary, voices within IRoA increasingly call for the 
"Afghanization" of policy formulation and execution. 
 
-- Afghan Army Air Corps:  During the November 29 visit of 
Senator Bennett and his delegation, President Karzai 
protested our refusal to agree to the insistent requests by 
MOD Wardak to support an Army Air Corps far beyond the means 
of the IRoA to sustain in the long run.  This has been a pet 
gripe of Defense Minister Wardak, who has managed to get the 
subject on the President's mind.  ADM Fallon has endorsed the 
Combined Air Power Transition Force,s plan for an 
appropriately-sized and effects-capable 
Afghan National Army Air Corps focused on air mobility, 
Presidential/DV lift, casualty evacuation, and close air 
support. 
 
-- Reconciliation:  There is growing recognition that the 
reconciliation program (PTS) established in 2005, under 
Karzai's personal mentor, former Afghan President Mojaddidi, 
to receive individual reconcilees, is not up to the task of 
dealing with current challenge of larger groups or organized 
elements of the Taliban looking for guarantees before 
committing to reconciliation.  Karzai has expressed a 
willingness to talk to Taliban who are willing to commit to 
the authority of the government; it will be useful to hear 
his views on the scope and methods for the process he 
envisions.  We are prepared to support an expanded 
PTS/reconciliation program, beginning with a statement of 
principles to guide efforts by international partners as the 
process moves forward. 
 
¶8. (SBU) - Condolences over Baghlan Bombing Victims:  Your 
visit comes three weeks after Afghanistan's deadliest suicide 
attack to date.  Both President Karzai and Parliament Speaker 
Qanooni declared three days of national mourning.  Six 
parliamentarians died in the November 6 attack, of whom all 
but one were buried in a memorial ceremony at the site of the 
new Parliament building still under construction.  Some 59 
children, along with teachers and factory workers, also 
perished in the blast.  The Taliban and HIG denied 
responsibility for the bombing.  It remains unclear who is 
actually responsible; public 
speculation has centered on Hekmatyar-allied forces having 
carried out the attack. 
DELL