VZCZCXRO3417
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #1195/01 3511225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171225Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7401
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PNUC ETTC IAEA IR QA
SUBJECT: QATARI MFA OFFICIAL OFFERS ADVICE ON POST-NIE 
DEALINGS WITH IRAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 165967 
     ¶B. STATE 162558 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, 
for reasons 1,4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  U.S. Representative to the IAEA Ambassador 
Gregory Schulte briefed MFA Assistant Minister for Follow-Up 
Affairs Al-Rumaihi December 11 on the recent National 
Intelligence Estimate on Iran and U.S. policy toward Tehran 
in the wake of it.  As Qatar prepares to leave the UN 
Security Council at the end of December, Schulte briefed on 
the steps on a new UNSCR against Iran that would be taken 
before the end of the year.  Al-Rumaihi responded that 
China's concurrence with any new UNSCR was key, as was 
addressing the concerns of countries bordering Iran that 
relied on Iranian ports to export their goods.  He also said 
any new sanctions should be portrayed as an inducement for 
Iranian cooperation on behalf of the international community. 
 Al-Rumaihi agreed with Schulte that Iran's uranium 
enrichment program, and overall nuclear weapons program, 
remained on track to produce nuclear weapons in the future if 
Iran chose to do so.  Only the timeline, in Qatar's view, 
remained in question.  Al-Rumaihi said Iran sought an 
invitation for its president to attend the December 3-4 Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Doha, but his attendance 
did not mean the GCC and Iran were increasing their 
cooperation.  On the contrary, Al-Rumaihi said it was not in 
the GCC's interest to cement ties with Iran.  On a positive 
note, Al-Rumaihi said Saudi King Abdullah's summit attendance 
led to the expectation in Doha that Saudi Arabia would soon 
post an ambassador to Qatar.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Schulte's Brief on Iran's Nuclear Program 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) U.S. Representative to the IAEA and Ambassador to UN 
Organizations in Vienna Gregory Schulte, accompanied by 
Charge and P/E Chief, met December 11 with MFA Assistant 
Minister for Follow-Up Affairs Mohammed Al-Rumaihi. 
Al-Rumaihi opened by expressing appreciation for Schulte's 
visit and the opportunity to hear current U.S. views on the 
Iranian nuclear threat.  Schulte briefed Al-Rumaihi on the 
recently released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and 
current U.S. thinking on Iran.  Schulte noted that upon the 
release of the NIE, it seemed everyone paid attention to the 
first sentence of the key judgments:  "We judge with high 
confidence that Tehran in the fall of 2003 halted its nuclear 
weapons program."  Schulte admitted this was a significant 
finding but said the NIE contained much more.  It also stated 
that the U.S. intelligence community had higher confidence 
than before that Iran had a military-led nuclear weapons 
program under the direction of the political leadership. 
This program, stressed Schulte, Iran had yet to acknowledge 
to the IAEA.  It was the intelligence community's judgment 
that Iran stopped the program in 2003 under international 
pressure and out of fear of being caught and exposed to the 
world.  Iran, he continued, could restart the program at any 
time.  In the meantime, Iran continued to work on creating 
fissile material, especially highly enriched uranium. 
 
¶3.  (C) Enriched uranium clearly would not be used for 
civilian purposes in the Iranian context, noted Schulte, 
since Iran had no nuclear plants requiring it.  The only 
possible explanation of the enrichment program's existence 
was the need for enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. 
Another worry, laid out in the NIE, was the Iranian 
government's retaining the option, deliberately, of producing 
a weapon.  It was the judgment of the U.S. intelligence 
community, said Schulte, that Iran could produce a weapon 
early-to-mid next decade should the program halted in 2003 
resume.  In sum, underscored Schulte, there was good news and 
bad news in the NIE.  Iran shut down its nuclear program in 
2003 but continues to develop the capacity to enrich uranium, 
which was the "long pole in the tent" of a nuclear weapons 
program. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Next Steps in UNSC and with IAEA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Schulte said President Bush believed it was important 
to declassify the NIE and share its conclusions with our 
partners.  What does this mean for policy?  The dual-track 
approach with our European partners of offering Iran 
diplomatic incentives for good behavior but at the same time 
ratcheting up diplomatic and financial pressure was still 
needed.  Iran had to come clean to the IAEA on all its past 
nuclear activities.  IAEA Director General Mohammed 
 
DOHA 00001195  002 OF 003 
 
 
ElBaradei, said Schulte, had told him when Schulte briefed 
him on the NIE that ElBaradei was more convinced than before 
of the need for Iran to acknowledge all past activities.  The 
IAEA, Schulte noted, needed the international community to 
tell Iran clearly that full transparency was its only option. 
 The U.S., as a result, would continue to push for sanctions 
in the UNSC and for full disclosure of all past and present 
Iranian nuclear activities. 
 
¶5.  (C) Schulte noted that some in the international 
community hoped that positive reports from EU High 
Representative Solana and the IAEA's ElBaradei about Iran 
would lessen the pressure for additional sanctions against 
Iran.  Iran disappointed them by not cooperating fully in 
each venue.  Schulte noted that Solana reported no progress. 
In fact, Solana said that, if possible, there had been less 
progress in this meeting than in the last year.  ElBaradei's 
most recent report was also not positive, added Schulte.  As 
a result, Schulte said it was possible that the U.S. would 
seek a new UNSC resolution seeking to tighten travel and 
financial restrictions on key Iranian officials.  Perhaps, 
added Schulte, the draft resolution would contain additional 
measures on Iranian export credits and arms trade.  Enforcing 
implementation of the sanctions might be another provision. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Qatar:  China, Iran's Neighbors Key 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Al-Rumaihi thanked Schulte for his extensive overview 
and said it was important that China be on board for any new 
resolution.  According to Al-Rumaihi, Chinese trade with Iran 
was increasing.  China preferred to pay for the 1.5 million 
barrels of oil it imported from Iran daily with goods, as 
opposed to cash.  China, said Al-Rumaihi, was focused on its 
bilateral relationship with Iran at this time and would not 
"be moving strategically into the (Middle East) region before 
2020."  Besides China, Al-Rumaihi noted other countries 
trading with Iran had to be taken into account.  Pakistan, 
for one, wanted to increase exports to Iran.  The small 
countries on the Iranian border, likewise said Al-Rumaihi, 
were of concern because they needed to trade with Iran to 
retain the privilege of using Iranian ports for the export of 
their own goods.  Of course, added Al-Rumaihi, Iran wants to 
overcome any economic embargo. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Sanctions as Inducement to Change Iran's Behavior 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (C) Al-Rumaihi observed that a new Security Council 
resolution might push Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA. 
In any event, he cautioned, a new resolution should not be 
billed as punishment of Iran.  Rather, it should be portrayed 
as trying to gain Iranian cooperation and bringing Iran into 
compliance with its international obligations on behalf of 
the international community.  Schulte said the U.S. sought 
change in Iranian behavior and had nothing against the 
Iranian people.  He underscored the importance of convincing 
Iran to suspend its pursuit of uranium enrichment 
capabilities.  Al-Rumaihi agreed, observing that the 
enrichment program remained on track and that a resolution 
was necessary to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons in 
the future.  Only the timeline, Al-Rumaihi said, remained in 
question. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Iran Sought President's Invitation to GCC Summit 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8.  (C) Asked for insights into the Iranian position from 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Doha for the 
December 3-4 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) heads of state 
summit, Al-Rumaihi said the GCC states were unsure of Iranian 
intentions.  Since Ahmadinejad came to power, he had tried to 
consolidate his position, including by replacing a large 
number of government officials, since his policy direction is 
very different from his predecessor.  Ahmadinejad sought an 
invitation to the summit, explained Al-Rumaihi, because Iran 
sought to reinforce its position and cooperation vis-a-vis 
the Gulf.  Reiterating that Ahmadinejad's participation in 
the GCC summit was an Iranian initiative and noting that 
Turkey and other regional countries were invited, Al-Rumaihi 
said Iran had sought to sign treaties on different subjects, 
mostly economic, with every GCC country. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Not in GCC Interest to Increase Cooperation 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
DOHA 00001195  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶9.  (C) According to Al-Rumaihi, big differences remained 
between the GCC states and Iran, and no agreements are likely 
to be signed anytime soon.  Aside from the economic 
considerations, the GCC members considered Iranian behavior 
in Iraq not helpful.  Qatar's vision of Iraq, stressed 
Al-Rumaihi, was certainly not shared by Iran.  Al-Rumaihi 
said PM Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al Thani had also made this 
point alongside U.S. Defense Secretary Gates in a recent 
meeting held in Bahrain.  Asked if Iran's pursuit of nuclear 
weapons came up in the Doha meetings, Al-Rumaihi said the GCC 
leaders did not want that issue to be discussed.  It was not 
in the GCC's interests, according to Al-Rumaihi, to move 
forward on Iranian cooperation with the GCC or cement ties. 
Schulte asked if Al-Rumaihi had any insights into Iranian 
reaction to Saudi proposals on uranium enrichment. 
Al-Rumaihi responded that there was much media speculation 
about Iranian cooperation with Gulf states, but the bottom 
line was that Iran was no more interested in cooperating with 
regional states than it was with Russia on enriching uranium 
outside of Iran. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Improvement in Qatar-Saudi Relations 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Wrapping up the discussion on the GCC summit, 
Al-Rumaihi said the most positive outcome of the summit was 
that all GCC heads of state attended the meeting in Doha. 
Qatar, he noted, was often known for being at odds with the 
states of the region, so this was a big achievement. 
Al-Rumaihi characterized the climate of the leaders' meetings 
as "warm".  He said this was especially true with respect to 
the relations between Saudi King Abdullah and Qatar's Amir. 
Asked by Charge if Qatar expected Saudi Arabia to send an 
ambassador to Qatar to cement the warming relations, 
Al-Rumaihi said this was indeed the case. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Qatar Rotates off the Security Council 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Turning to the end of Qatar's tenure on the UN 
Security Council, Al-Rumaihi expressed relief and sadness 
that Qatar would finish its term December 31.  Qatar, noted 
Al-Rumaihi, suffered from taking positions on matters that 
ordinarily would not concern it.  In this respect, leaving 
the Council was a relief.  At the same time, Qatar 
appreciated the opportunity to play a role at the highest 
level of the international system and represent the interests 
of the Asian group in the UNSC.  The end of this opportunity 
was a cause for some sadness.  Schulte responded that Qatar 
took its role on the Security Council seriously and noted 
that important decisions are never easy. 
 
¶12.  (C) Al-Rumaihi said he would be remiss in not noting 
that Qatar's experience on the UN Security Council affirmed 
its perspective that reform of the UNSC membership was 
necessary in order to increase regional perspectives. 
Al-Rumaihi said transparency was very important to the work 
of the Council, and he encouraged the P-5 to be more 
inclusive in its work.  Perhaps, remarked Al-Rumaihi, Qatar 
surprised the P-5 by insisting on a greater role for the 
"sixth player" on the team. 
 
¶13.  (U) UNVIE has cleared this message. 
RATNEY