VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0662/01 3471603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131603Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1390
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0088

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000662 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE. EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017 
TAGS: BH EU KVIR LO PREL
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA:  EUR DAS DICARLO'S NOVEMBER 29 VISIT TO 
BRATISLAVA 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 623 BRATISLAVA 612 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik, for Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo met separately on 
November 29 with Slovak Foreign Minister Jan Kubis, MFA 
Political Director Roman Buzek, Head of the Parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala, and former Slovak 
Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan to discuss next steps on 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia. While conceding that Slovakia 
was unlikely to recognize an independent Kosovo. FM Kubis 
reaffirmed GOS commitment to stay in KFOR and to participate 
in an ESDP mission.  He outlined in greater detail than in 
previous meetings what Slovakia sought in the way of legal 
assurances and formulations to ensure its participation in 
these missions, as well as to maintain its liaison office in 
Pristina. In this vein, Kubis stressed the need for a firm 
commitment on the part of the Kosovars to work constructively 
with the international community and to treat all EU states 
with a presence in Kosovo on an equal basis, irrespective of 
recognition. Kubis urged that everything possible be done to 
lay the groundwork for an ESDP mission prior to a Kosovar 
declaration of independence, including an invitation from the 
UN Secretary General to the EU and a statement from him 
confirming UNSCR 1244's continued validity, so that no one 
(e.g., the Slovak Parliament) could question the basis of the 
deployment. Zala and Kukan expressed disappointment, if not 
surprise, at the outcome of the talks. They also expressed 
the view (as did Kubis) that the negotiating process had been 
stacked heavily against the Serbs, whom they argued had made 
genuine, albeit not major, attempts to bridge the gap between 
the two parties. Nonetheless, despite their clear unease and 
unhappiness with the outcome of the talks and the prospect of 
an independent Kosovo, Kubis and the others made clear that 
Slovakia intends to deal constructively with the situation on 
the ground and not to hamper the EU majority's recognition of 
a "coordinated declaration of independence." End Summary. 
 
DiCarlo-Kubis Meeting 
--------------------- 
 
2.(C) In his remarks to DAS DiCarlo, FM Kubis did not 
backtrack on recent statements to the Ambassador regarding 
Slovakia's commitment to behave constructively in the 
post-December 10 Kosovo process.  The GOS remains committed 
to KFOR and ESDP.  That said, the tone of Kubis's comments 
was harsher than it has been of late and was clearly intended 
to convey the depth of the government's displeasure with the 
lack of agreement and of any prospects for a UNSCR. Kubis 
opened by noting that it was his impression that while the 
Serbs had tried to move the talks forward, the Kosovar 
Albanians had merely stood their ground on independence. He 
then enumerated the risks associated with Kosovar 
independence: most notably, the possibility of regional 
instability, but also challenges to international law and 
multilateral diplomacy and institutions. That said, he 
concluded, "we have to face realities."  DAS DiCarlo pushed 
back firmly on Kubis's assessment of the talks, noting that 
Serb offers would have denied decision-making authority to 
the Kosovars on the key competencies. Frankly speaking 
DiCarlo added, having endorsed the Ahtisaari plan last 
spring, it would have been hard for the European Union and 
the United States o walk back from some form of independence 
for Kosovos. She added that we sought a "coordinated 
declaration of independence" (CDI) in Kosovo, not a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) that was 
uncoordinated with key international partners.. 
 
3.(C)  Kubis stressed the need for greater clarity on the 
status of UNSCR 1244.  He agreed with DiCarlo's analysis that 
1244 remains in effect until and unless the UNSC declares 
otherwise, but noted that a statement from the UN Secretary 
General to this effect would be very useful.  UNSCR 1244 is 
the only basis for Slovak participation in KFOR and ESDP.  As 
the responsible authority, the UN Secretary General should 
invite EU participation in Kosovo; an "invitation" from the 
Kosovar authorities would be very difficult for Slovakia to 
acknowledge.  As he has on previous occasions, Kubis stressed 
the importance of timing for the GOS. Kubis wants the ESDP 
issue settled before UDI, so that "no one can question" the 
legal basis.  Kubis urged a thorough evaluation of the 
ramifications of UDI, so that "we can maintain maximum 
unity." With a solid legal basis, he added, "we can walk 
together and work together" on everything save the question 
of recognition. While reiterarting the GOS could not 
recognize CDI immediately, he did not rule out eventual 
recognition. 
 
4.(C) DAS DiCarlo noted that UNSYG Ban believes that the 
 
status quo is not sustainable and wants to be as helpful as 
possible in laying the groundwork for a new international 
presence in Kosovo. Despite resistance from Russia, DiCarlo 
said she was confident that the UN will act to ensure that 
the international community has the proper mandates in 
Kosovo.  She expected that a scaled back UNMIK mission likely 
would remain, and stressed the need to maintain an OSCE 
presence. If Russia and Serbia block OMIK, as is likely, its 
competencies would need to be absorbed by another mission. 
UNMIK has done all it can, but what Kosovo needed now was the 
type of capacity-building capabilities that an ESDP mission 
and the nascent Civilian office would provide. The U.S. will 
contribute 100 police officers to the ESDP Mission, as well 
as judges and and prosecutors.  Regarding a Kosovar 
invitation, DiCarlo argued that the U.S. sees it as a means 
of securing Kosovo's commitment to work constructively with 
the international community. 
 
¶5. (C) DiCarlo said that the Kosovar leaders understood the 
need for close cooperation with the international community 
and had provided assurances along those line, but added that 
the Kosovar people might not be so patient. Kubis noted that 
this was a positive step, adding that radicals in both 
Pristina and Belgrade must understand that there is no room 
for provocation.  With an eye to selling Slovakia's 
participation in Kosovo operations to the Slovak Parliament, 
Kubis again noted that the Kosovars should "welcome," not 
"invite" international engagement, and commit to cooperation. 
 This would be a good solution to the issue. A continued UN 
presence would provide the coverage Slovakia and some other 
states would need. He added that the Kosovars should make no 
distinction between those states that have recognized Kosovo 
and those that have not.  This should be a clear and public 
stance; any other approach could jeopardize Slovakia's 
presence. When questioned about alternative courses of action 
other than swift implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, Kubis 
stated his preference for a supervised interim phase in which 
the Kosovars would take steps to comply with the Ahtisaari 
Settlement and after which the international community could 
-- based on the progress -- bless independence.  Responding 
to DiCarlo's description of the internal Kosovo dynamic (and 
implictly acknowledging the unlikeliness of this scenario) he 
said curtly: "I know they (the Albanians) are impatient, but 
I don't buy it. Let them wait." He added that it would be 
difficult to have the Kosovars in the OSCE or in the UN, at 
least initially. "This is the price they pay for UDI."  Kubis 
pledged to counsel restraint on all sides during his December 
2-4 visit to Belgrade, Pristina and Mitrovica. 
 
Buzek Meeting 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C) DAS DiCarlo opened the discussion with an update on 
the situation in Bosnia and a call for firm EU support for 
Bosnia HiRep Lajcak. In addition to the internal problems 
within the BiH, outside interference from Belgrade and Moscow 
is further complicating the situation. We need to send a 
clear message that this is unacceptable.  Buzek responded 
that Slovakia is "3 times more concerned" about instability 
in Bosnia, given its proximity to the region.  Fragmentation 
of Bosnia along ethnic lines could have negative effects far 
beyond Europe.  The GOS has urged the Bosnian Serbs, 
including during the recent visit of former PM Spiric to 
Bratislava, to act in a "European" way and to support HiRep 
Lajcak. 
 
¶7. (C) On Kosovo, Buzek responded to DiCarlo's request for 
cooperation during the upcoming UNSC session on Kosovo by 
saying that "You may rely on Slovakia.  We will not spoil the 
game...we want a united approach between the EU and U.S." 
Quick, coordinated efforts on the ground are essential to 
precluding unpredictable developments.  While Slovakia would 
prefer a UNSC, "we are realists." Buzek repeated earlier 
complaints about lagging EU preparations, noting with some 
irony that come December 10 the EU would be considering "road 
maps" for an ESDP mission; it would not be in a position to 
approve it. He offered his view that the upcoming Slovenian 
Presidency would be more active, but might be limited in some 
ways by their emotional ties to the region. When an ESDP 
Mission is approved, Slovakia is prepared to deploy 
immediately 8 police officers to Serb areas of Kosovo. 
Echoing Kubis, Buzek drew a bright line between ESDP and 
recognizing an independent Kosovo.  ESDP demonstrates Slovak 
commitment to stability in the region; UDI is a completely 
different matter.  Asked whether an emphasis by the 
international community on the "sui generis" nature of Kosovo 
might help facilitate eventual Slovak recognition of Kosovo, 
Buzek responded affirmatively.  We aren't acting in a vacuum, 
Buzek stated, and Slovakia doesn't want to be the last EU 
 
state to recognize Kosovo, but the way the process unfolds 
will be very important. 
 
¶8. (C) DAS DiCarlo reported with concern statements by 
Serbian President Tadic and FM Jeremic that Serbia would 
respond to any unilateral actions on the part of Kosovo. 
While she was confident that the Serbs would not respond 
militarily -- even though Kostunica has not explicitly ruled 
out the use of force -- Belgrade was discussing options such 
as embargoes, sanctions and electricity cutoffs.  According 
to DiCarlo, while such measures would hurt Kosovo, they will 
be more damaging to Serbia.  The radicalization of Serbian 
politics and the single-minded focus of Serb politicians on 
Kosovo was contributing to an unfortunate, downward spiral. 
Meanwhile, DiCarlo noted, the Russians are playing a 
pernicious role in the region. The U.S. and EU members would 
be talking to the Russians in the coming weeks on the way 
forward, but we were realistic and did not expect a 
constructive approach from Russia. 
 
¶9. (C)  Buzek and DiCarlo spoke briefly about Macedonia's 
NATO candidacy. Buzek reported that during the recent visit 
of the Macedonian PM, FM Kubis bluntly warned that Macedonia 
needed to redouble its efforts to fulfill NATO criteria.  A 
false sense of confidence has led the Macedonians to be 
lackadaisical, assuming -- as the Slovaks mistakenly did in 
the mid-1990's - that NATO would be willing to overlook 
aspects of its performance because of geogstrategic concerns. 
 DiCarlo and Buzek agreed, that, contrary to expectations, 
Albania had surpassed Macedonia's performance.  At the same 
time, Slovakia has also told the Greeks that the name issue 
should not be permitted to block Allies from making a 
decision that affects the security of the region. 
 
The View from Parliament 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala 
(a member of Prime Minister Fico's Smer party) lamented that, 
in his view, Serbia was being forced to accept the 
politically and historically unacceptable: Kosovar 
independence.  A resigned (about Kosovar independence) Zala 
thinks this outcome is fraught with future dangers and is 
particularly concerned about the precedent it could set for 
other national minorities.  Yet, the bulk of his comments 
were focused on the need -- particularly for the EU -- to 
manage the situation.  Zala advocates a lengthy period of 
internationally-supervised independence.  He is convinced 
that a long-term EU presence will be required in order to 
maintain stability in Kosovo and to develop its institutions. 
DAS DiCarlo agreed that, at least initially, Kosovo should be 
supervised and expressed confidence that the international 
community will be able to set up the right kind of presence 
with the right kind of authority.  Responding to points Zala 
had made about Serbian autonomy proposals, DiCarlo noted that 
the kind of autonomy Serbia had offered was fundamentally 
undemocratic, as the Kosovars would have had no 
decision-making authority on any of the competencies Serbia 
reserved for itself. Furthermore, this approach was 
unrealistic given the fact that Serbia has not exercised any 
authority over Kosovo for years. 
 
¶11. (C) DiCarlo reprised this theme in her meeting with SDKU 
MP and former Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, after he 
recounted a comment by Kostunica that Serbia had offered 
Kosovo "ninety-five percent independence."  Kukan alluded to 
the careful line his successor must walk in order to balance 
the government's desire to be in sync with EU partners while 
being mindful of strong domestic sentiment against Kosovo 
independence. (Comment: SDKU,former PM Dzurinda's party, was 
a driving force behind the Slovak Parliament's unhelpful 
resolution on Kosovo last Spring.)  Kukan pledged, however, 
that SDKU -- whose bona fides had been proven under much 
tougher circumstances -- would, while taking Slovakia's 
national interests into account, take a realistic stance on 
Kosovo.  (Comment:  We believe Kukan "gets it" on Kosovo and 
does not want to compromise Slovakia's responsible role in 
the world over Kosovo.  However, Dzurinda will determine his 
party's stance, and we cannot rule out that Dzurinda will 
want to make more hay out of the issue strictly for domestic 
purposes. All that said, DAS DiCarlo's engagement with Kukan 
was a positive and very useful step in managing Slovakia's 
stance.  End Comment.) 
 
OBSITNIK