VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0638/01 3381703
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041703Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1357
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, INR/EU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV LO MARR KIVR
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL DINNER WITH PRIME 
MINISTER FICO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee, for Reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Prime Minister Robert Fico hosted a 
farewell dinner for Ambassador Vallee on December 2. Interior 
Minister Kalinak, Speaker of the Parliament Pavol Paska, and 
the Prime Minister's Director of Foreign Relations, Marek 
Estok, also attended the dinner. The tone of the conversation 
was frank and very cordial; the substance reflected PM Fico's 
thorough preoccupation with domestic politics.  Fico, Kalinak 
and Paska had each appeared on television throughout the day 
to contest opposition leader Mikulas Dzurinda's accusations 
of impropriety in connection with a 2002 land purchase by 
Fico. Fico angrily noted that he would file libel charges 
against Dzurinda and described the recent opposition attacks 
on himself and Parliament Speaker Paska as "unprecedented." 
Fico also spoke frankly about his recent battles with 
Vladimir Meciar, referring to him alternately as a "beaten 
dog" and dangerous.  Nevertheless, the Prime Minister would 
prefer to see the current coalition hold until 2010, but not, 
as he as said publicly, at any price.  Regardless of the 
timing of elections, he predicts that they will likely 
produce a two-party coalition led by Smer. 
 
¶2. (C) On Kosovo, Fico commented that EU heads of government 
felt enormous pressure to reach a unified position (including 
on recognition) on Kosovo.  This would be very difficult, he 
added, in the event of a unilateral declaration on the part 
of the Kosovars.  In response to the Ambassador's thorough 
update on U.S. Missile Defense consultations, the Prime 
Minister claimed that he would not be very engaged in the 
topic, but states his personal views when asked by the press. 
Fico inquired about the status of discussion on Missile 
Defense in NATO and stated clearly -- drawing parallels to 
U.S. intelligence failures on Iraq -- that he does not 
believe that the ballistic missile threat affects Central 
Europe.  End Summary. 
 
 
Domestic Politics: Constant Turbulence 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Fico, Paska and Kalinak provided colorful and at times 
humorous accounts of various pivotal moments in recent the 
Smer-HZDS land fund drama. "Meciar is a beaten dog and we 
will continue to beat him day and night," commented Fico. 
When asked by the Ambassador whether Meciar might, at this 
point, be more interested in exacting revenge for his public 
comeuppance than in remaining in the coalition, Fico agreed, 
adding that Meciar was both clever and dangerous.  In fact, 
Fico and Paska asserted that HZDS was the source of 
Dzurinda's claims that Fico's purchase in 2002 of a small 
vineyard was an example of the very same sort of crooked 
transaction which he himself had just condemned.  (Comment: 
More than one opposition politician has confirmed that HZDS 
was behind Dzurinda's attack. However, the information that 
has come to light to date does not make a compelling case of 
wrongdoing on the part of the Prime Minister. End Comment.) 
Paska added that HZDS deputies had even stated (stupidly) 
publicly that the reason the party had not joined Smer and 
SNS in blocking the opposition's recall attempt last week was 
to exact "revenge" on Smer.  Throughout the dispute, Fico had 
reached out to HZDS deputies, giving rise to speculation that 
he could woo enough MPs away from the party (6-7) so that he 
could govern without Meciar.  The Prime Minister said he had 
rejected this path because he concluded that while these 
renegade MPs would vote with Smer initially, there would 
likely be an unacceptable price attached to their subsequent 
support. 
 
¶4. (C)  In spite of the drama and distractions, Fico claimed 
that he would prefer to maintain the current coalition until 
the 2010 elections. "It is our responsibility to govern, so 
we will try to keep the coalition together," he commented. 
The Prime Minister also predicted that once Meciar had left 
the political stage the bulk of HZDS voters would join Smer. 
 After the next elections, Fico opined, it was likely that 
Sme would govern with only one other partner, possibly the 
Slovak National Party (SNS) or the Christian Democrats (KDH). 
 Speaker Paska, who, contrary to his boss favors early 
elections, responded with a ringing "no" to the possibility 
of a Smer-SDKU partnership.  Implicitly drawing a contrast 
between the success of his social democratic approach and the 
unpopularity of Dzurinda's reformist agenda, Fico mentioned 
that he had just opened another state-funded community soccer 
field.  (The government plans to open another 150 next year.) 
According to Fico, Dzurinda could have undertaken easily such 
 
initiatives, but he either didn't understand or didn't care 
about the impact such programs had on public opinion.  As for 
Dzurinda's current opposition tactics, e.g., his insistence 
on pursuing a recall of Fico following expected passage of 
both the budget and a motion of confidence in the government, 
Fico expressed contempt and anger.  He confirmed that he 
would bring charges against Dzurinda for making false claims 
against him on the land deal. Apropos of false claims, Fico 
added that the government was pursuing actively legislation 
aimed at forcing the press to publish the government's 
response to reports its deems inaccurate. (Comment: Such a 
move would be widely view as a step backwards.  End Comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) Although Fico asserted that Smer has been very 
successful in creating a coherent center-left movement in 
Slovakia, he  acknowledged that the party needed to broaden 
further its social democratic base and message.  To that end, 
Smer had recently signed an agreement with the Greens.  Fico 
hopes the parties can find mutually acceptable policy 
initiatives --  aimed in particular at the youth vote -- 
that could be incorporated in the Smer platform.  It remains 
to be seen, he concluded, whether SDKU and the other 
opposition parties could consolidate the center-right space 
in a similar fashion. 
 
 
Kosovo, Missile Defense and the Euro 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's call for U.S.-EU unity 
on Kosovo in the weeks and months ahead, PM Fico responded 
that while Slovakia would not recognize a unilateral 
declaration of independence, he did not believe that Kosovo 
was an issue of importance for the Slovak people.  Recalling 
conversations with other EU leaders, however, he emphasized 
the great importance they attached to reaching a unified EU 
position on Kosovo, including on the question of recognition. 
On missile defense, Fico claimed that although he was not 
engaged in the issue, he provided his personal views when 
asked by the press.  Fico did not pose any questions 
following the Ambassador's thorough briefing on the status of 
consultations in NATO and Russia.  Instead, he harked back to 
U.S. claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and 
said that he, like his friend Czech opposition leader 
Paroubek, would need to see convincing proof of a threat to 
Central Europe before he would be willing to support plans 
for missile defense.  Fico was more animated on the topic of 
his travel the following day to Brussels to lobby for 
Slovakia's entry into the Eurozone. He expressed confidence 
that Slovakia was on track, but noted that he and Finance 
Minister Pociatek needed to convince Brussels that the GOS 
was committed to a path of fiscal responsibility and 
restraint that would enable it to sustain inflation rates and 
other Maastricht criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALLEE