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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SETTING A STANDARD OF FULL DISCLOSURE 
FOR THE NOVEMBER REPORT 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 631 B) UNVIE 634 C) UNVIE 628 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d,h 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: P3 Ambassadors and German Charge discussed 
October 24 the inauspicious Jalili-Laranjani-Solana meeting 
and reviewed Mission-proposed criteria for evaluating a 
"positive outcome" as defined by the September P5 1 
Ministerial statement (ref a).   All agreed on the need to 
set factual and objective criteria to evaluate the DG's 
report to the Board, which would likely contain subjective 
judgments of Iran's "willingness to cooperate."  This was all 
the more likely given that no one expected P1/P2 issues to be 
technically closed.  P3 1 Ambassadors remain concerned about 
"deadline creep" on the part of the DG.  P3 1 Missions will 
meet again on October 31 to discuss criteria and the French 
proposed further consultations on an IAEA Board resolution to 
"bridge the gap" with New York especially with reference to 
enrichment.  In separate consultations, Israel and Japan also 
did not expect a positive report by November.  As Mission 
continues consultations with like-minded and 
not-so-likeminded Board members on the need for full 
disclosure, Department feedback on proposed criteria for a 
positive outcome would be useful. End Summary. 
 
Changing Horses Midstream? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) P3 Ambassadors and German Charge discussed the 
Laranjani-Jalili October 23 meeting with Solana and reviewed 
Mission-proposed criteria for evaluating a "positive outcome" 
at the November Board (ref a).  Despite public 
characterization of the Solana meeting as "constructive," the 
EU3 readouts were universally negative.  UK Ambassador Smith 
relayed that the Iranians had put forward nothing of 
substance, progress or interest, and qualified the meeting as 
"miserable."  German Charge confirmed that Solana reported no 
substantial change in the Iranian position.  Iranian 
negotiators resuscitated an old idea on slowing down 
enrichment (akin to Swiss proposals but "worse").  The 
dynamics between Iranian negotiators appear to have been of 
more interest than the meeting itself.  According to the UK 
readout, at one point Solana turned to Laranjani and Jalili, 
asking who he should be  addressing, and Laranjani responded, 
"me."  The Germans also heard that Laranjani had dominated 
the meeting, and offered to attend the next meeting in 
November (date not yet fixed). 
 
¶3. (S) French Ambassador Deniau provided some insights from 
his Embassy in Tehran where Jalili is well-known.  He was the 
principal drafter of Ahmadinejad's recent missives to 
President Bush and Chancellor Merkel and his word view is 
basically defined by the negative impact of "North-American 
neo-colonialism" and the conviction that Western powers were 
interested in keeping the Middle East in disarray.  The 
French Embassy in Tehran also reported growing tensions in 
Parliament.  Amid all the speculation, Ambassador Schulte 
said we need to judge policies and not people, though the 
change in negotiators could presage a hardening of the 
Iranian position. 
 
DG Timelines 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Ambassador Schulte provided a readout of his meeting 
with DG ElBaradei the day before in which the DG committed to 
maintaining a high bar for the November report (ref b). 
ElBaradei had also sensed that Laranjani, who was frustrated 
for some time and did not like Jalili, could tender his 
resignation.  UK Ambassador Smith reported that ElBaradei had 
formally declined Foreign Secretary Miliband's invitation to 
the DG to visit London by prior to the November Board.  Smith 
expressed concern that during October 19 meeting with 
ElBaradei, the DG had mentioned three different timelines in 
the space of 20 minutes - "by the November Board," 
"November-December" and "at the turn of the year." 
ElBaradei's letter to Miliband was more definitive, stating 
that we would know by the November Board whether Iran was 
 
"demonstrating an open commitment to cooperate actively with 
the Agency."  Deniau noted that this formulation, like the 
DG's comments to the "Financial Times" on reporting by 
 
November Iran's "willingness to cooperate," was a subjective 
judgment of Iranian intentions not factual.  DDG Heinonen 
told the Germans that he expected the DG's November report to 
give an overall picture of P1/P2 and state with confidence 
whether or not Iran is cooperating but that the complex 
details of this issue would require more time to sort out. 
 
Criteria for a Positive Outcome 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mission shared with P3 1 our informal and 
preliminary thinking on possible criteria for judging a 
positive outcome as defined by the September P5 1 Ministerial 
statement (ref a).  The two basic criteria are: 
1) Full disclosure of P1/P2 activities including: 
--acknowledgment of withholding information; 
--acknowledgment of a military dimension; 
--explanation of military involvement; 
--responsive access to information and individuals. 
2) Commitment to full disclosure of other activities, 
including: 
--access to advanced centrifuge development; 
--explanation of "studies"; 
--implementation of all aspects of CSA and Subsidiary 
Arrangements; 
--implementation of Additional Protocol; 
--compliance with further transparency requests. 
 
 
¶6. (S) P3 1 interlocutors saw great value in this effort to 
sharpen our analysis, provided initial reactions and proposed 
a French-hosted follow up meeting on October 31.  They agreed 
in principle on the need for factual criteria to avoid what 
the French characterized as the trap of judging positive 
intentions.  The UK saw the criteria as a "test of 
reasonableness" and a concrete assessment of what Iran has or 
has not done.  In that vein, Smith suggested changing the 
first bullet from "acknowledgment of withholding information" 
to "production of previously withheld information" to assess 
whether the P1/P2 issue has been closed. 
 
¶7. (S) Ambassador Deniau noted the need to elucidate not just 
past P1/P2 but present centrifuge activities as part of the 
initial disclosure.  He also suggested setting factual 
criteria for assessing what issues related to P1/P2 would 
objectively need more time (e.g. environmental sampling) and 
those Iran could solve immediately, such as producing a copy 
of the 1987 offer.  An overarching concern for the French is 
the basic question of whether the work plan had been 
implemented as it was meant to be, meaning has P1/P2 been 
closed or not?  Since it probably would not be technically 
possible to close P1/P2 issues by November, the French are 
concerned that the DG will report some "progress" or proffer 
some judgment of the level of Iranian cooperation.  Deniau 
argued that the criteria for making such a judgment must be 
factual not "psychological."  The Germans agreed that if as 
we expect it is not technically possible to close P1/P2, we 
need criteria to assess what constitutes substantial progress 
and Iran's "willingness to cooperate" by November. 
 
¶8. (S) The UK likewise expects that P1/P2 issues will not be 
closed but also doubt that the DG report will say that Iran 
is not cooperating.  In other words, "we're not able to close 
P1/P2 issues but..."  Smith proposed that we maintain that 
Iran's failure to answer those questions demonstrates Iran's 
negative intentions.  We are in effect also judging 
intentions, he argued, and many on the Board are likely to 
argue that there is no conclusive evidence of Iran's bad 
faith.  Ambassador Schulte noted that the proposed criteria 
include both concrete indicators, concerning P1/P2 and 
intentions as they relate to the AP and other issues.  The 
DG's own comments regarding the "litmus test" and the need 
for Iran to "come clean" and "confess" all reinforce the need 
for full disclosure. 
 
Convincing the Board / P5 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S)  The French queried whether the criteria would be 
agreeable to the Board.  Ambassador Smith doubted that the 
Board could adopt these criteria but saw them as a basic test 
of "reasonableness" to convince enough Board members that now 
is the time for Iran to "confess."  Nuclear Counselor 
clarified that we do not need to convince the Board but the 
P5 1.  Ambassador Deniau believed it would be difficult to 
convince the Russians of the need for an acknowledgment of a 
military dimension, given Putin's recent public statement on 
the lack of any evidence of a nuclear weapons program. 
 
¶10. (S) Speaking without instructions, Ambassador Deniau 
raised the prospect of a Board resolution in November, as he 
explained to Ambassador Schulte previously (ref c) to bridge 
the growing gap with New York, to address fundamental 
elements such as reiterating the Board's unanimous call for 
suspension, and to use the work plan to our advantage. 
Deniau feared that the Board had been de-legitimizing UN 
Security Council resolutions.  He argued that the risk of 
Board action detracting from New York was mitigated because 
the Security Council would not act until after the Board.  No 
one could give an assurance of a consensus outcome, though 
this Board was much better constituted than the previous one 
and if Russia and China were in agreement, it was not clear 
who would call for a vote.  UK and Germany questioned what a 
Board resolution would do beyond reaffirming past 
resolutions, and noted that any new elements would be less 
likely to command consensus.  The French proposed that a 
resolution could qualify Iran's cooperation under the work 
plan, set a December 31 deadline and clarify a positive 
outcome.  Ambassador Schulte cautioned that any such deadline 
may conflict with New York.  The French will continue 
consultations on possible resolution language, though much 
would depend on the content of the DG's report.  As the 
Germans pointed out, if the Board is fundamentally 
dissatisfied with Iran's cooperation, then a resolution would 
be easy. 
 
Other Reactions - Israel, Japan 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Ambassador Schulte also discussed October 22 the 
Laranjani meeting and criteria for a "positive outcome" with 
Israeli Ambassador Michaeli.  Michaeli feared that ElBaradei 
would use Laranjani's resignation as an excuse for further 
delay.  He also doubted that P1/P2 issues could be finished 
before November.  Given the number of questions, interviews 
and documents, the Secretariat would not be in a position to 
close the issue.  Michaeli also doubted that Iran would 
proffer confession of military involvement as this would open 
a Pandora's box.  He agreed with Ambassador Schulte that such 
a confession would signal a strategic shift on Iran's part 
but there was no sign of such a shift, and Laranjani's 
resignation probably signaled the opposite.  Rather than 
assess a "positive outcome", Michaeli queried what would 
force ElBaradei to declare failure.  The Ambassador responded 
that any partial progress or unwarranted closure of an issue 
must be seen as a failure.  Michaeli feared that ElBaradei 
was inclined to cast anything as a success and/or to request 
more time, noting that it was not just the Agency's 
credibility that was on the line but ElBaradei's reputation 
as a peacemaker. 
 
¶12. (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano also told the Ambassador 
October 23 that he had seen no indication of a strategic 
decision by Iran and that Laranjani's resignation was not a 
sign of an improvement.  Noting the DG's September remarks, 
Amano believed it would be difficult for the Agency to move 
the goal post this time.   We were close to a situation where 
the twin P5 1 conditions would not be met, he argued, or the 
Agency made a non-persuasive statement to the Board, leading 
to further complications.  Amano also noted that the 
composition of the new Board would give us more leverage at 
least on technical cooperation issues with Iran, if not on 
broader issues. 
 
 
¶13. (C) Ambassador Schulte is also continuing consultations 
with not-so-likeminded Board members on the need for a 
"positive outcome" meaning full disclosure on Iran's part. 
In an October 19 meeting, Bolivian and Brazilian Ambassadors 
continued to hew closely to compliance with the work plan, 
though both admitted that if Iran failed to comply it would 
be completely isolated.  Brazilian Ambassador Vieres de Souza 
expected an "interim" report by the DG in November while 
Ambassador Schulte underlined the fact that this was the 
critical report, and a litmus test.  Bolivian Ambassador 
Bazoberry said that it was in Iran's interest to keep 
discussions in Vienna.  Both Ambassadors were inclined to 
view suspension as a separate set of issues that obeyed a 
different, more "political" logic. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Many countries, including our closest allies, are 
still grappling with the notion of a "positive" report. 
Almost all expect a report showing some progress, but need a 
way to evaluate that progress in terms of the P5 1 
ministerial statement.  Our initial, informal suggestions are 
beginning to get traction.  We need to set a high bar of 
"full disclosure" that indicates a fundamental change in 
Iran's relationship with the IAEA. 
SCHULTE