Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07SEOUL3024, MOFAT READOUT OF NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT: ROH "WENT TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SEOUL3024.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL3024 2007-10-05 08:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3024/01 2780844
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050844Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6859
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 6890
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3210
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8551
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 2144
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 2457
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0734
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 2581
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8285
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 0323
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2511
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 5792
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3350
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1555
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 1188
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0501
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 2230
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 
TAGS: PROG PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: MOFAT READOUT OF NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT: ROH "WENT TO 
BAT" FOR U.S. 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) In an October 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Vice 
Foreign Minister Cho Jung-pyo said that the ROK had reached a 
comprehensive agreement on the future direction of 
inter-Korean relations during the North-South Summit.  Peace, 
inter-Korean economic cooperation, and reconciliation were 
the major takeaways for the ROK.  An agreement on the need 
for a peace regime to replace the Armistice and Kim Jong-il's 
public commitment to pursue denuclearization through the 
Six-Party Talks were also major achievements.  The Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) was not discussed, though a proposal by Roh 
to turn disputed areas in and around the West Sea (Yellow 
Sea) into a joint fishing area was accepted by Kim Jong-il, 
with details to be worked out by Defense Ministers following 
ROK coordination with the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces 
Korea (UNC/USFK).  Cho emphasized that President Roh made 
clear that further inter-Korean economic cooperation would be 
dependent on progress on the nuclear issue in the Six Party 
Talks.  The two, Roh told Kim, would have to be mutually 
reinforcing structures.  The Ambassador welcomed Kim 
Jong-il's commitment to implement the Six-Party Talks 
agreements, but reiterated the U.S. position that a peace 
regime to end the Korean War could only follow complete 
denuclearization.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
Denuclearization 
---------------- 
 
2. (C) Cho said that Roh "went to bat" on the nuclear issue 
on behalf of the U.S., stressing that progress in 
inter-Korean economic cooperation efforts would be contingent 
on progress in the Six Party Talks.  In response, Kim Jong-il 
reportedly called in Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign Minister and 
lead DPRK negotiator for the 6PT, to report on the status of 
the 6PT.  VFM Kim cited a lack of U.S. action on the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list and Trading with the Enemies Act, 
as well as its insistence that the DPRK address the Japan 
abductees issue, as the major roadblocks to the 
implementation of 6PT agreements.  Kim Jong-il said that the 
DPRK had given its best effort in order to reach an agreement 
for the second phase, and that all parties should carry out 
their commitments specified in the October 3 Six Party 
agreement as soon as possible.  Cho pointed out that Roh 
ultimately obtained a commitment by Kim Jong-il to resolve 
the nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks in accordance 
with the September 19, 2005 and February 13, 2007 agreements. 
 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador thanked the ROKG for its efforts in 
extracting a public promise from Kim Jong-il to denuclearize, 
noting Kim Jong-il's signature and public statement 
committing to denuclearization.  Cho stated that the ROK had 
tried to include the denuclearization pledges of the 1992 
North-South Basic Agreement and the October 3 6PT agreement 
in the summit's Joint Declaration, but had been unable to 
persuade the DPRK to include this language.  The DPRK, 
however, said the October 3, 2007 agreement was part of the 
February 13, 2007 agreement. 
 
------------ 
Peace Regime 
------------ 
 
4. (C) VFM Cho said that Roh raised the need for the two 
Koreas to take the lead on peace regime discussions, but also 
emphasized that peace regime efforts would be contingent on 
progress in the DPRK's denuclearization efforts.  Roh 
conveyed President Bush's remarks that he had "already made 
his decision" on pursuing a potential peace treaty with the 
DPRK, and emphasized that Kim Jong-il should make the most of 
this opportunity.  Kim was receptive to Bush's statement, and 
expressed a desire to hold a U.S.-DPRK summit.  Kim agreed in 
principle to work toward a peace regime, and asked about 
U.S.-ROK discussions on a potential declaration to end the 
Korean War. 
 
5. (C) Cho Byung-jae, Director General of North American 
Affairs, said that the "three or four directly related 
parties" language on peace regime was suggested by Roh, but 
did not explain why.  Only the U.S., DPRK, and ROK should 
negotiate the strictly military portions of a peace 
agreement.  The DPRK agreed that the two Koreas should play 
"leading roles" for the peace regime discussions, so there 
was no question that the ROK would be included in both the 
three and four party discussions.  DG Cho stated that Kim and 
Roh agreed in principle on the need for a future summit 
meeting, including the U.S. President, to officially end the 
Korean War.  This would be different from a peace treaty, DG 
Cho said.  DG Cho later called the Embassy to retract his 
statement that the "three or four" language had been 
President Roh's idea.  Cho said that the ROK had wanted the 
"directly related parties" language from the September 19, 
2005 6PT agreement, but the DPRK had held firm on the "three 
or four parties" language.  Another MOFAT DG told Pol M/C 
that the "three or four parties" language was proposed by 
Roh.  COMMENT: Post believes that this indicates that Roh 
was, in fact, the first to raise the "three or four parties" 
language.  DG Cho was probably cautioned after the meeting 
with the Ambassador for revealing this point, which was 
probably why he retracted his statement almost immediately. 
END COMMENT. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador replied that an end-of-war declaration 
and a peace treaty were essentially the same idea, in the 
U.S. view, and that the U.S. would be unlikely to support an 
interim summit meeting to declare an end to the Korean War. 
The Ambassador stated that a final agreement on a peace 
regime, including a peace treaty, would be possible only 
after complete denuclearization by the DPRK, as President 
Bush had stated in Sydney.  The Ambassador expressed his 
appreciation that this was made clear to Kim Jong-il by 
President Roh, but urged the ROK to make this clear publicly 
as well, lest there be any perception of U.S.-ROK differences 
on the subject. 
 
--------------- 
Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) VFM Cho confirmed that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) 
would remain unchanged from the current status quo. 
President Roh had proposed the "West Sea Peace Area" as a way 
of shifting the dialogue on the issue from a military one to 
an economic one.  After Kim Jong-il sought input from his 
defense-related advisors, he agreed to the principle of 
transforming the disputed West Sea area into a special 
economic zone, Cho said.  The details of the idea, including 
the logistics of NLL crossings by civilian ships, would be 
further fleshed out during the meeting of the Defense 
Ministers in November.  The ROK would actively consult with 
the UNC/USFK before the meeting. 
 
8. (C) Cho noted that the two sides agreed to the termination 
of hostilities, the use of dialogue in settling disputes, 
mutual nonaggression, and opposition to war on the peninsula. 
 Further demilitarization of the border areas, including 
 
guard post pullbacks, were not discussed.  The DPRK also made 
no mention of the U.S. Forces Korea or the Ulchi Focus Lens 
exercise. 
 
-------------------- 
Economic Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
9. (C) President Roh conveyed his goal of transforming 
inter-Korean economic cooperation into a long-term and 
reciprocal relationship to Kim Jong-il.  Roh emphasized that 
the DPRK had to work to reduce barriers to the business 
community, and ensure military cooperation on joint economic 
projects.  Progress on the nuclear issue had been taken into 
consideration and was reflected in the expansion of joint 
economic projects with the DPRK.  Roh also stressed that 
DPRK-Japan and DPRK-U.S. relations needed to improve in order 
to allay investor concerns about the economic climate of the 
DPRK. 
 
--------------------------- 
Inter-Korean Reconciliation 
--------------------------- 
 
10. (C) VFM Cho stated that the ROK had made progress on the 
issue of North-South family reunions, but not on ROK 
abductees or POWs.  The 2000 North-South Joint Declaration 
remained the authoritative statement on unification, so the 
two summit heads simply reaffirmed those points on 
unification.  Roh told Kim that the South Korean public did 
not want a sudden Germany-style unification, but rather a 
gradual unification of the two Koreas. 
 
---------------------- 
Atmosphere of Dialogue 
---------------------- 
 
11. (C) VFM Cho believed that the overall atmosphere of the 
summit discussions was very quiet and businesslike.  The 
atmosphere of the Day 1 sessions between Roh and Kim Yong-nam 
was "rigid," as Kim Yong-nam adhered strictly to the party 
line during discussions.  During the morning session of the 
second day, there were noticeable disputes between Roh and 
Kim Jong-il, though by the afternoon most of the issues had 
been smoothed out.  In particular, Kim was displeased by 
characterization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as 
an effort to "open" and "reform" DPRK society.  Cho said that 
Kim Jong-il cancelled the offer to extend the summit by one 
day after most of the issues had been resolved during the 
second day's afternoon session. 
 
-------------- 
Future Summits 
-------------- 
 
12. (C) Roh told Kim Jong-il he wanted North-South summits to 
be held once a year.  Kim Jong-il wanted them "as frequently 
as necessary."  Kim Jong-il opposed calling for "regular" 
meetings in the declaration, emphasizing that the 
relationship between the two Koreas was not of the 
state-to-state variety.  When Roh invited Kim Jong-il to 
visit Seoul, Kim Jong-il proposed that Kim Yong-nam, the 
titular head of state, visit instead, and that Kim Jong-il 
might visit after the "relevant conditions" were met. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C) It was clear that MOFAT was left out of the loop on 
the summit planning, and the debriefing to the Ambassador -- 
a recitation of canned talking points -- showed their lack of 
access to the more substantive meetings.  Other MOFAT 
contacts told Post that Foreign Minister Song had objected to 
the language of "three or four" related parties to a 
potential peace regime, but that phrase ultimately made its 
way into the official Joint Declaration.  Still, the repeated 
emphasis on denuclearization by President Roh, and the 
subsequent commitment in the Joint Declaration by Kim 
Jong-il, are solid achievements for MOFAT.  END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW