VZCZCXRO3740
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1684/01 3040709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310709Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8991
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/SE NATSIOS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: AMIS INVESTIGATION REPORT ON HASKANITA ATTACK 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: An informal Ceasefire Commission (CFC) report on 
the Haskanita attack blames SLA/Unity and JEM for the unprovoked 
assault.  Rebel superior firepower and AMIS poor readiness and 
communications capability contributed to the worst battlefield loss 
since the deployment of AMIS. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander General Agwai set up an informal 
ceasefire commission (CFC) earlier this month to determine what 
happened in the September 29-30 attack on Haskanita.  After 
reviewing AMIS intelligence and operations reports, the committee 
submitted a report to Agwai on October 15.  The following summarizes 
key aspects of the report. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In early summer 2007 the town of Haskanita was under the 
control of SLA/Minawi.  In July Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
forces consisting of 84 armed vehicles moved south-east from Tine, 
Chad and attacked GOS and SLA/Unity positions in the Haskanita area. 
 AMIS Military Group Site (MGS) Haskanita reported a tense and 
unpredictable security situation in the area due to the presence of 
the JEM rebels.  On August 3 Mohammed Osman, the SLA/Minawi rep at 
MGS Haskanita, visited the camp to renounce his membership in 
SLA/Minawi and announced the emergence of SLA/Unity in partnership 
with JEM.  Skirmishes between the rebels and GoS continued 
throughout the month. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On August 27 JEM commander Mohammed "Abdulaziz" Nur Osher 
visited the MGS and said his forces were in charge of Haskanita. 
From the end of August through September 7, the GOS conducted air 
bombing raids on the JEM and SLA/Unity positions in and around 
Haskanita, in response to the rebel attack at Wad Banda in 
neighboring Kordofan which claimed 41 lives.  Approximately 1,500 
local civilians demonstrated at the MGS camp on September 6, 
complaining AMIS was not protecting them from the GOS attacks.  The 
struggle between the GOS and the two rebel forces for control of 
Haskanita began September 10.  On that day, JEM commander Nur Osher 
demanded the suspension of AMIS flights into the area and the 
eviction of the GOS representative, whom they accused of providing 
GOS pilots with coordinates of their positions.  AMIS complied with 
the flight suspension request (through September 12 when it was 
lifted by the JEM commander) but did not evict the GOS rep.  An AMIS 
re-supply flight did not land at Haskanita until September 16.  On 
September 28, GOS forces dislodged JEM and SLA/Unity from their 
stronghold outside of Haskanita, forcing them to withdraw towards 
the village.  The next day GOS planes bombed Haskanita. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On September 29 at 1930, coinciding with the evening meal 
breaking the Ramadan fast, JEM and SLA/U forces attacked MGS 
Haskanita with approximately 30 vehicles.  The attack was 
well-coordinated and targeted known gun positions, the radio room, 
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and locations such as the mosque 
where the soldiers were concentrated.  The radio room was destroyed 
in the first few minutes of the attack, cutting communication by HF 
radio.  The attackers quickly gained possession of most of the 
hand-held radios.  (The MGS had only one serviceable Thuraya in the 
possession of the MilOb Ops Officer).  Lacking communications 
equipment, the company commander lost contact with his soldiers, his 
battalion commander, and his Sector HQ.  As AMIS soldiers tried to 
maneuver APCs into firing positions, the rebels attacked them with 
AA guns (12.5mm) at close range.  A few AMIS soldiers grouped at the 
west end of the camp to offer resistance, but did not fire for fear 
of hitting MilObs, CIVPOL and other staff.  The rebels started to 
leave the camp around 0400 on September 30 after removing weapons, 
ammunition, food, bedding, communications equipment, fuel and 17 
vehicles.  By 0730, villagers began looting the camp.  GOS forces 
did not make contact with the camp until 1545 and the AMIS rescue 
team arrived at 1630. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to the commission's report, eyewitness accounts 
state the vehicles used by the rebels bore the JEM insignia.  In 
addition, eyewitnesses are unanimous in claiming SLA (U) commander 
Mohammed Osman led the assault.  The commission noted in its report 
that it was unable to determine the accuracy of allegations that 
locally-hired PAE staff aided the attackers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The report states the following conclusions: 
- The probable purpose of the attack was for the rebels to replenish 
their depleted logistic stock after losing their Haskanita 
stronghold. 
- The attack was led by Mohammed Osman of SLA/U. 
- Vehicles used in the attack had the JEM insignia.  Therefore it is 
highly probable JEM's commander authorized the attack. 
- The Protection Force was taken by surprise leading to loss of 
command and control. 
- The destruction of the radio room severed communications with the 
battalion commander and Sector headquarters. 
- The loss of communication resulted in conflicting and unreliable 
information after the attack. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001684  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The report states the following lessons learned: 
- AMIS camps and facilities are not insulated from attacks by 
parties to the Darfur conflict and need to be alert and prepared at 
all times. 
- The rebels have superior weapons and fire power compared to the 
AMIS Protection Force.  The strength and firepower capacities of the 
Protection Force need to be increased. 
- The layout of AMIS camps is restrictive and compact with little or 
no room for tactical maneuver when under attack.  It is impossible 
to defend the camp from within.  Perimeter fencing should, 
therefore, limit intruders and provide fire positions within the 
outer perimeter. 
- Accommodation of national staff, including party representatives, 
in AMIS camps negates all security considerations.  They should stay 
outside the camps. 
- AMIS communication assets are inadequate and ineffective.  Better 
and more reliable communications are needed. 
- Factions and persons indicted for ceasefire violations have never 
been sanctioned, encouraging recalcitrance on their part and 
imitation by others.  Such people need to be brought to justice. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: While the report stresses the need for 
perpetrators of ceasefire violations to be brought to justice, there 
is not suggested consequence for the violation.  This timidity on 
the part of the commission may well invite future attacks.  AMIS 
troops' lack of preparedness and inability to defend themselves is 
also a major deficiency and is now the subject of an AMIS board of 
inquiry.  The deployment of the UNAMID heavy package should improve 
the operational capacity of the peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur 
but that is only the beginning of having a substantive force with 
teeth that can at least defend itself. 
 
FERNANDEZ