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RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2942/01 2461148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031148Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3155
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR PROVINCE SECURITY UPDATE 
 
Classified By: Anbar PRT Leader Jim Soriano for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.  MNF-West 
leadership has commented on it. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary.  There were 421 security incidents 
throughout Anbar Province in August, marking the eighth 
consecutive monthly decline.  The improvement around Ramadi 
is more dramatic than in the province as a whole, with 
security incidents currently averaging less than one a day. 
A battlefield six months ago, Ramadi is no longer under 
insurgent control.  Four factors contributed to this 
situation:  public opinion turned against Al-Qaeda, tribal 
leaders aligned with us, police recruitment increased, and 
joint Coalition-Iraqi security operations proved effective. 
As a result, the provincial and municipal governments are 
reconstituting themselves.  Six months ago, local 
government was in disarray.  Today, virtually every city 
and town in the province has a mayor and functioning local 
council.  The missing piece in our counter-insurgency 
strategy is the spotty and erratic financial support from 
the ministries in Baghdad, but even that piece is slowly 
falling into place.  The improved security has stimulated 
an early round of political jockeying among tribal leaders 
and other provincial players.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Security incidents in Anbar Province in August 
continued a general downward trend that began last fall. 
According to MNF-West records, there were 421 incidents, 
about 14 a day, in the province last month, the eighth 
consecutive month of decline.  The tally compares to the 
1,700 to 1,900 security incidents typically seen on a 
monthly basis last summer and fall.  The high point was 
last September when MNF-West recorded 1,981 security 
incidents province-wide. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The security improvement around Ramadi, the 
provincial capital, has been even more dramatic.  There 
were only 27 incidents recorded in the Ramadi area in 
August, an historic low, compared to the 924 incidents in 
July 2006, the historic high.  Since June 1, the Ramadi 
area has experienced at least 32 days in which there have 
been no security incidents at all.  A battlefield six 
months ago, Ramadi is no longer under insurgent control. 
 
¶5. (C) To be sure, Anbar is not out of the woods yet.  Much 
of the battle has shifted to the eastern part of the 
province near Fallujah, in an arc running from north of the 
city to areas to its east and south.  In general, Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI) has been pushed from major population centers 
and into the rural areas.  Nonetheless, the enemy is not 
giving up easily, as seen in fighting north east of 
Fallujah in late August, and in AQI's attempt to re- 
infiltrate into Ramadi in June (see the account of the 
fighting near Donkey Island in "The Washington Post," 
August 19). 
 
--------------- 
Factors At Work 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The improvement in Anbar's security may be 
attributed to several factors, each of which tends to 
reinforce the others.  The most prominent of these include 
the following: 
 
- Public opinion turned against the enemy.  Al-Qaeda badly 
miscalculated in using murder and intimation to deter local 
residents from cooperating with the Coalition Forces (CF) 
and the Iraqi security forces (ISF).  Virtually all 
segments of society, from children to grey-haired tribal 
leaders, have been AQI victims.  Nor has AQI's extremist 
ideology resonated with the public.  The mosques are an 
indicator.  Eyewitnesses say that calls to insurrection 
typically spewed forth from Anbari mosques in 2003-04, but 
radical preachers were pushed aside and more moderate 
voices regained control.  Today it is unusual to hear a 
mosque sermon that is hostile to the CF. 
 
- The tribes mobilized.  AQI's murder and intimidation 
campaign kept many tribal leaders sitting on the fence, 
unable to cooperate with the CF.  The tipping point came in 
September 2006 when a group of Ramadi-based tribal sheikhs, 
under the leadership of Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha (see 
below), formed the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC).  That 
group quickly became the symbol of the anti-AQI resistance. 
It encouraged local youths to join the police force and it 
raised three "emergency police battalions" to patrol Ramadi 
streets.  Tribes in other parts of the province imitated 
the ASC, but did not necessarily align with it.  Today 
virtually all of the province's tribal leaders have moved 
to our side and are working to restore order. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002942  002 OF 003 
 
 
- Police recruitment.  Last summer there were fewer than 
4,000 police on the province's rolls, and only a few dozen 
applicants responded to police recruitment drives.  Today 
there are 21,000 police and more recruits than places at 
the police academy to train them.  The Ministry of Interior 
has approved five "emergency police battalions" in Anbar, 
whose rank-and-file will ultimately be integrated into the 
regular police force.  The key point is that the police are 
recruited locally, unlike the Iraqi Army, whose recruits 
come from other provinces.  This local base gives the 
counter-insurgent the home-field advantage against AQI. 
The rapid expansion of Anbar's police may be the decisive 
action that turned Anbar's security around. 
 
- Effective CF and ISF operations.  The turn of public 
opinion, tribal mobilization, and police recruitment did 
not happen in a vacuum.  These developments happened 
because of the sacrifices of MNF-West Marines, soldiers, 
and sailors, who created the conditions for the Anbaris to 
take back their cities.  They happened because of years of 
patient engagement with tribal leaders by local MNF-West 
commanders.  In Ramadi, the CF and ISF systematically 
cleared one neighborhood after another, and backfilled 
those areas with combat outposts, often jointly manned by 
the CF and ISF, and Iraqi police stations.  These positions 
reassure local residents and hinder AQI's freedom of 
movement.  Even as local security forces expanded in the 
past year, they were under constant pressure from AQI. 
They have performed well, staying on the job even after 
taking casualties.  Today their key vulnerability is the 
erratic financial and logistical support from the central 
government. 
 
------------------------ 
Reconnecting government 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) If the four preceding factors are contributing 
causes for Anbar's improved security, the immediate effect 
would be the re-establishment of local government.  Last 
winter Anbar's provincial and municipal governments were 
non-existent or in disarray.  The Provincial Council had 
fled Ramadi for the relative safety of Baghdad in March 
2006 amid insurgent violence.  Civil servants went 
underground.  Little if any GOI funds flowed into the 
province.  Today that situation has turned around.  The 
Provincial Council has returned to its seat of power in 
Ramadi, civil servants are back on the job, and virtually 
every city and town has a mayor and functioning municipal 
council. 
 
¶8.  (C) In this sense, the battle against AQI turns on 
which side can most efficiently administer the population. 
During the insurgency, government administration was 
crippled and in key instances ceased to function.  Today, 
AQI is on the outside of the cities looking in.  The 
counter-insurgent holds the initiative on local 
administration.  The missing piece, however, is the still 
spotty and erratic support coming from central government 
ministries.  But even that piece is gradually falling into 
place.  Today, GOI Cabinet ministers and provincial 
officials are regularly discussing ways to meet Anbar's 
needs for economic recovery. 
 
------------------- 
Political Jockeying 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Anbar Province is emerging from a violent insurgency 
into the post-conflict period.  It is in a messy and 
precarious transition period, but some of the key political 
actors are as follows: 
 
- The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP).  Anbaris cast only 3,775 
ballots, in population of 1.2 million, in the January 2005 
provincial council election.  The IIP won some 2,700 votes 
and the right to form the Council.  It is on that shaky 
foundation that the Council's legitimacy rests today. 
Nonetheless, the province's IIP leaders are pragmatic and 
have filled Council vacancies, and even increased the 
Council membership, to accommodate its critics and to 
broaden council representation by adding tribal sheikhs. 
Since last spring, the IIP has been in talks with Sheikh 
Sattar's "Iraq Awakening Movement" (SAI), a vocal critic of 
the IIP.  The purpose is to create unity among Anbar's 
tribes and political factions, and to present a united 
Sunni face to the central government. 
 
- The Iraq Awakening.  Sattar rose to prominence last 
September when he formed the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), 
a grassroots reaction to Al-Qaeda's murder and intimidation 
campaign.  In April, he formed the SAI, a move seen as a 
bid to compete with the IIP in future elections.  Sattar 
 
BAGHDAD 00002942  003 OF 003 
 
 
maintains that the SAI is non-sectarian, but sees it as the 
home for Sunni aspirations.  To date, the SAI as a 
political movement does not appear to have much traction 
either within the province or without.  Sattar himself is 
openly pro-Coalition, has made overtures to Shia Muslims, 
and is contemptuous of Islamist politicians.  After the 
August 1 Tawafuq walkout of the Cabinet, PM Maliki 
approached him to help fill the vacancies.  So far Sattar 
has declined the offer and is proceeding cautiously. 
 
- Sheikh Hamid Al-Heiss Al-Thiyabi and Sheikh Ali Hatem Al- 
Assafi.  Heiss is one of the co-founders with Sattar of the 
ASC, but the two have had a falling out, ostensibly caused 
by Heiss' acceptance of PM Maliki's overtures to join the 
government.  Heiss has told the Iraqi press that he is 
ready to name candidates to fill Cabinet vacancies for PM 
Maliki's consideration.  Meanwhile, Heiss appears to be 
moving in concert with Shiekh Ali Hatem Al-Assafi, the 
thirtysomething heir to Anbar's large Duleimi tribal 
confederation and a powerful challenger to Sattar.  Both 
Heiss and Ali Hatem have reportedly been talking with the 
PM about the Cabinet.  The two seem to be unlikely 
bedfellows.  Heiss, like Sattar, is openly pro-Coalition, 
whereas Ali Hatem, playing to the nationalist resistance, 
has made threatening comments in the press about the 
Coalition's presence in Anbar. 
 
¶10. (C) These political maneuverings are taking place 
because AQI is on the defensive.  Anbaris are increasingly 
turning towards the post-conflict period.  Today there is a 
mood in the public of rising expectations for economic 
recovery, jobs, and responsive local government.  Those 
expectations themselves are evidence that public opinion in 
western Iraq, which was noted for its feelings of 
estrangement from the national political scene several 
years ago, has shifted to a more pragmatic approach with 
respect to the Coalition and to Baghdad. 
CROCKER