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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, S/CRS, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC 
FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE 
STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: PROGRESS STALLED ON CRITICAL VETTING 
PROCESS 
 
Classified By: CDA Alex Laskaris for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Competencies with national security 
implications are slowly being transferred from UNMIK to the 
Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), making it 
critical that the legal framework and implementing mechanisms 
are in place for the PISG to vet personnel, classify 
information, and safeguard the security of classified 
information.  While the Transition Working Group on 
Governance completed its policy paper on vetting in May 2007, 
the paper was never approved by the government and the 
process subsequently has stalled.  At a key meeting on 
September 4, the International Civilian Office (ICO) planning 
team will request that UNMIK jumpstart the process by taking 
the lead on drafting a classified information law and other 
measures, which will be a first critical step.  Given the 
lack of PISG experience with security and vetting issues, the 
international community will need both to assist and pressure 
the PISG to move this essential process forward in the 
timeframe required. End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Screening and vetting of government personnel in 
Kosovo has been a reserved competency of UNMIK. In 2004 the 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) began for the first time to train 
its personnel in background investigations.  To date, outside 
of the KPS only Department Director level personnel and above 
in the PISG are given cursory screenings by UNMIK.  In 
addition, there is no basic verification system in place for 
civil servant applicants.  As new Ministries have been stood 
up or expanded, new staff have often been recruited based on 
ties of loyalty to higher level officials rather than 
qualifications or suitability for the position.  There have 
been several cases where the lack of screening has had 
serious consequences, most notably in the case of the 
attempted assassination of Kosovo Telecommunications 
Authority head Anton Berisha earlier this year, where two of 
the four people arrested in connection with the case were 
active Ministry of Internal Affairs employees.  Given the 
anticipated responsibilities and sensitivity of the data 
controlled by this Ministry, including control of the Central 
Civil Registry, and immigration, asylum, and citizenship 
decisions, having qualified and trustworthy personnel is 
critical to both the national security of Kosovo and 
counter-terrorism interests of the United States. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Recognizing the need to implement comprehensive 
vetting procedures, the Transition Working Group (WG) on 
Governance approved and submitted to the Prime Minister a 
policy paper on vetting in May 2007.  The paper laid out 
several findings on the state of screening and vetting of 
government personnel in Kosovo and made some recommendations. 
 It found that:  1) a basic verification system is lacking in 
the hiring procedures of the Kosovo Civil Service and must be 
instituted; 2) the Senior Public Appointments Committee lacks 
a systemic procedure for verifying the integrity of a 
candidate or the veracity of supporting documentation and 
should do so; 3) that more advanced background checks and 
classification of sensitive data must only be done on the 
basis of a clear and democratic legal framework (which 
requires legislation and establishment of an independent body 
to carry out such responsibilities): and 4) that transitional 
arrangements are necessary since many sensitive positions 
will require vetting before necessary laws are enacted and an 
independent body stood up.  This WG consisted of members from 
the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), relevant ministries, 
UNMIK Pillar 1, the ICO, and UNMIK Civilian Police. 
 
¶4. (U) Members of the WG also took a study visit to Slovenia 
to look at the system that had been put in place there, and 
discussed the policy questions inherent in setting up a 
vetting process with the non-governmental organization Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).  In 
July 2007, DCAF expert Marjan Antoncic, the primary force 
behind the Slovenian system, held consultations in Kosovo and 
authored a report that laid out recommendations on next 
steps.  This report was presented to the WG on Security and 
 
PRISTINA 00000643  002 OF 003 
 
 
will be tabled at the next meeting of the WG on Governance in 
September 2007.  It has been provided to stakeholders, 
including Liaison Offices, for comment. 
 
¶5. (C) The key players in moving the process forward include 
Frank Neiss, ICO security adviser, Besnik Tahiri, PM adviser 
and chair of the WG on Governance, Vedat Gashi, PM legal 
adviser, and Arber Gorani, political adviser to the minister 
of internal affairs.  Beyond this small group, few people 
within the PISG or the international community in Kosovo 
either have a background or interest in vetting and 
information classification and storage procedures.  That the 
policy paper has not been approved six months later by the 
OPM shows the lack of priority assigned to this issue within 
the government. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The DCAF report makes recommendations about 
outstanding policy decisions and highlights the steps 
necessary for implementation.  The first is legislative; laws 
on classified information and data protection must be drafted 
and enacted, and portions of the criminal code and the law on 
access to official documents must be amended.  Second, an 
independent body must be established to fulfill the 
responsibilities outlined in the law and oversee 
implementation.  (Comment: There is no clear candidate to 
head this body, but the ICO as well as the OPM feel that it 
should be an inter-ministerial body within the OPM. End 
comment.)  The report proposes that the KPS and two 
still-to-be-created organizations, the Kosovo Security Force 
and Kosovo Security Agency, carry out the vetting of their 
respective personnel, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA) taking responsibility for vetting all other civil 
service personnel.  Other outstanding tasks highlighted in 
the report include determining which positions require 
clearances, determining who is entitled to access to 
classified information by virtue of their appointment, the 
process and extent to which persons already employed in 
positions requiring access are vetted and reassigned as 
necessary, the appeals process, who is entitled to classify 
information, and how classified information is stored and 
declassified.  In addition, there is the politically 
sensitive issue of whether the vetting process should reach 
back before June 1999, when UNMIK begain its administration 
of Kosovo; the ICO feels strongly that it should not because 
of the state of records from that era and the potential for 
manipulation by Serbia. 
 
¶7. (C) Given the lack of movement by the PISG on these 
issues, the ICO plans to request at the WG on Security 
meeting on September 4 that UNMIK take the lead on drafting a 
law on classified information along with the required 
amendments to other legislation and the Criminal Code.  This 
is a critical first step to moving forward on vetting and a 
classification process, since it forms the basis for all 
other action.  This legislation could be subsequently updated 
as new ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Defense, are stood up under the Ahtisaari 
plan. 
 
¶8. (C) Simultaneously, the ICO is adding language requiring 
screening and vetting for new hires as well as making certain 
draft laws that establish new ministries mandate a seat on 
hiring boards for the international community.  Since these 
new ministries would be stood up slowly and in most cases are 
small even at full strength (the Kosovo Security Council 
would have around ten people, and the Kosovo Security Agency 
initially around 20), more stringent hiring processes with 
checks and balances on final decisions would not be overly 
burdensome for the benefit it brings to national security. 
The ICO is also working to ensure that new job offers are 
contingent on successful attainment of required clearances. 
¶9. (SBU) Once an independent body with responsibilities for 
vetting and classification is established, Antoncic has 
expressed willingness to work as an embedded adviser.  Both 
DCAF and NATO's Office of Security Services have offered to 
assist with training and implementation.  However, until 
 
PRISTINA 00000643  003 OF 003 
 
 
their Kosovo counterparts are identified, there is little 
they can do to move the process forward. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Given the national security interests 
affected by personnel at critical Kosovo government 
structures, both existing and anticipated, it is essential 
that vetting processes be put in place for both existing and 
new employees.  Completing the multiple steps required to 
take Kosovo from where it is today - little capacity to 
implement any of these procedures - to having a functioning 
system for vetting personnel and classifying and storing 
information will be the project of many years.  U.S. 
government resources, both in technical assistance and 
political pressure, will likely be required to keep things on 
track. End Comment. 
LASKARIS