VZCZCXRO7224
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHNC #0685/01 2341534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221534Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8095
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0928
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT WILL MEET, BUT IS WARY OF PAPADAPOULOS'S 
INTENTIONS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 675 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 674 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Domestic political concerns -- mainly the 
need to show Greek Cypriot voters that their president sought 
a Cyprus Problem solution -- was driving Tassos 
Papadopoulos's push for a meeting of community leaders, "TRNC 
President" Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador August 20. 
Despite reluctance to tender Papadapoulos any electoral 
assistance, Talat had agreed to meet, and Turkish Cypriot 
negotiator Rashit Pertev would attempt August 21 to negotiate 
a date with counterpart Tasos Tzionis (Note:  they agreed to 
September 5).  Turning to the August 18 hijacking of a 
Turkish jetliner flight that originated in northern Cyprus, 
Talat concurred that T/C aviation experts should revisit 
procedures at Ercan airport, and that T/C law enforcement 
should cooperate with USG counterparts to confirm or disprove 
the hijackers' alleged al-Qaeda connection.  On petroleum 
exploration in Cypriot waters and the recently-concluded 
first bidding round (Ref A), Talat again argued that 
Papadopoulos was playing electoral games; worse, the "Greek 
Cypriot President" had no right to represent the entire 
island in negotiating international treaties. 
 
¶2.  (C) His visage grew even grimmer when discussing 
interfaith dialogue and Cyprus's most visible religious 
leaders.  South of the Green Line, the Archbishop had dropped 
all attempts at cloaking his hard-line political leanings and 
in essence had become Papadopoulos's second spokesman, Talat 
claimed (Septel).  He himself had erred in nominating the 
now-departed Mufti, a reputed hard-partying womanizer and 
world-class name-dropper whose activities had brought shame 
on his community (Ref B).  On domestic T/C politics, the 
"President" avoided showing his cards on the future of the 
CTP-OP coalition and downplayed possibilities the "TRNC" 
would swap out its parliamentary system for a presidential 
one.  Talat concluded the conversation with assurances the 
"government" would protect the pristine Karpass Peninsula 
from unbridled development, a growing fear now that 
high-voltage electrical power has nearly reached its tip 
(Septel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Agreement to Meet, but Doubts Over Usefulness 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Talat remained skeptical of RoC President 
Papadopoulos's intentions vis-a-vis a possible meeting of 
community leaders.  "Papadopoulos needs this meeting to show 
his electorate and the international community he has not 
abandoned the bizonal, bicommunal solution," he declared to 
the Ambassador.  Despite his desire not to throw the 
hard-line President an electoral lifeline, Talat -- no doubt 
trying to mitigate the damage to his international reputation 
wrought by the last several months of clear obstructionism in 
the UN process -- had agreed to meet, instructing negotiator 
Pertev to seek an early date.  "The closer we get to the UN 
General Assembly, the more spin he'll put on the 
get-together," he asserted.  Talat doubted any substantive 
breakthroughs would occur, but agreed with the Ambassador's 
assertion that the high-level gathering offered an 
opportunity to improve the negative climate currently 
characterizing bicommunal relations.  (Note:  Meeting under 
UNFICYP auspices August 21, community representatives Tzionis 
and Pertev set a September 5 date for their respective 
leaders to meet; UN SRSG Michael Moller will host the 
widely-anticipated gathering at his Nicosia residence.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Talat plainly hoped Papadopoulos would lose the 
February's RoC presidential elections.  The candidacy of AKEL 
General Secretary Dimitris Christofias had resulted in the 
first "truly democratic" campaign in Greek Cypriot history, 
he argued.  "Before, it was all coalitions.  Kyprianou, 
Vasiliou -- what support did they have individually, 10 
percent?" he questioned.  Now, however, G/Cs would enjoy a 
real choice, and Talat hoped they would cast their ballot 
against the incumbent.  He particularly appreciated 
DISY-supported challenger Ioannis Kasoulides's announcement 
he would seek to meet Talat as his first official duty. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Ercan Hijacking:  Relief Over Outcome 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ercan Airport had returned to normal after the August 
18 hijacking, Talat revealed.  Relieved that Turkish police 
 
NICOSIA 00000685  002 OF 004 
 
 
in Antalya had reported the "plastique" the hijackers carried 
in reality was Playdough -- indicating no security breach had 
occurred at Ercan -- he now was directing his attention and 
ire at the "know-it-all" Turkish Cypriot journalists who had 
leveled charges of incompetence at T/C aviation authorities. 
The Ambassador shared his relief, but pressed Talat to 
exploit the hijacking by reviewing aviation security 
procedures in north Cyprus; even if existing procedures were 
effective, cautioned the Ambassador, such incidents provided 
an opportunity to review whether measures could be further 
improved.  Further, while personally skeptical, the 
Ambassador voiced great concern over reports of the 
Palestinian suspect's alleged al-Qaeda links, and urged 
seamless cooperation between USG and relevant law enforcement 
in investigating whether the reports had any basis in fact. 
Talat agreed the allegation merited further checking and 
close coordination. 
 
-------------------------------- 
On Oil, Obliged to Seek Own Deal 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) "For inter-communal political gain" also described 
Papadopoulos's motivations for exploitation of Cyprus's 
offshore oil and gas reserves, Talat reasoned, alleging the 
President would manage the bidding process to eke out every 
last vote.  Under the current state of affairs, with Turkish 
Cypriots excluded from the Republic of Cyprus machinery, G/Cs 
had no right to negotiate treaties on behalf of the entire 
island, he emphasized.  "Regrettably we don't have the 
military to stop them," a rather odd comment given the 
balance of forces on the island.  On the other hand, Turkey 
would act decisively in defense of Turkish Cypriot interests. 
 Talat offered no convincing argument why his "government's" 
own hydrocarbon agreement with Turkey passed muster, while 
the RoC's with Egypt and Lebanon did not.  "Ours was 
negotiated by a previous 'administration' and never 
implemented," he lamely offered.  Nonetheless, were the RoC 
to continue with the tendering and exploitation process, 
Talat felt obliged to reciprocate. 
 
¶7.  (C) Continuing the negative run, the T/C leader protested 
the Embassy's alleged statements of support for the RoC's 
gas/oil decisions.  The USG had voiced a narrow opinion 
solely on the legality of sovereign states to negotiate 
international instruments, the Ambassador retorted; our 
alleged "broader support" was the product of Commerce 
Minister Antonis Michaelides and other RoC officials 
publicizing (and altering the content of) private 
conversations.  He reiterated the Embassy's fundamental 
message:  that any plans and activities to exploit Cyprus's 
mineral wealth should benefit all Cypriots and serve to edge 
the sides closer together, and that all parties should chart 
their actions according to how the possibility of new mineral 
wealth could facilitate reunification, not deepen divisions. 
Talat dismissed out of hand the Ambassador's suggestion to 
Michaelides that the RoC deposit a percentage of possible 
future energy royalties into a separate fund for T/Cs.  "We 
would never accept it," he assured.  "Neither did 
Papadopoulos," the Ambassador responded. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Will No One Rid Me of this Priest...and this Mufti? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Talat's Communist roots emerged in discussing the 
island's two most-prominent clerics.  "By shining spotlights 
on religious leaders and emphasizing their importance," Talat 
accused, "the U.S. created people like (Orthodox Archbishop) 
Chrysostomos," leader of the Church of Cyprus.  Concentrating 
such power in spiritual figures seemed anachronistic in 
modern times, he thought.  Conversely, in the Turkish Cypriot 
community the position of "Mufti" held real power only during 
the British colonial period (1871-1960); the last Mufti, 
Ahmet Yonluer, was in fact only a mid-level civil servant in 
the Religious Affairs department.  Talat admitted to having 
erred in naming the ambitious, unpredictable, and 
anything-but-pious Yonluer to the position last year. 
Claiming that interfaith dialogue actually had deteriorated 
during the Mufti's tenure despite the latter's high-profile 
meeting with Chrysostomos, Talat was untroubled by his August 
resignation. 
 
¶9.  (C) Talat reserved his harshest appraisal for the 
Archbishop's recent rantings.  "It is simply not possible to 
cooperate with this Church," he stated matter-of-factly, 
pointing to Chrysostomos's hard-line interventions into Greek 
Cypriot politics.  He disparaged the Archbishop's intentions 
 
NICOSIA 00000685  003 OF 004 
 
 
to rehabilitate every Orthodox site in northern Cyprus as a 
thinly-veiled attempt to re-exert authority there, promising 
to fight the effort.  Nonetheless, "TRNC officials" would 
continue to preserve religious properties and ensure that 
Christian minorities enclaved in the north could freely 
practice their faith.  "At the same time, the Greeks are 
bulldozing mosques and entire T/C villages in the south, yet 
the international community punishes us," he decried.  The 
Ambassador, after declaring that religious freedom issues are 
vital in any case, told Talat that Turkish Cypriots had a 
very strong interest in cooperating with Church figures in 
the preservation of churches and other cultural heritage 
sites, and that they should also seek to maintain their own 
sites in the south.  Such actions helped to mend relations 
between the communities and help to address in foreign 
capitals a very potent weapon that T/C enemies used against 
them. 
 
-------------------------- 
Coalition Holding, for Now 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Dodging the Ambassador's inquiries over the health 
and continued viability of the CTP-OP coalition, Talat 
claimed such political maneuverings lay squarely in "Prime 
Minister" Ferdi Soyer's lap.  The OP arrangement had proven a 
mistake, he offered, but the alternative -- bringing DP back 
into "government" -- was worse.  "I do not trust (DP leader) 
Serdar Denktash's intentions, Talat explained.  As to 
recently-floated plans to seek "constitutional" changes that 
would exchange the "TRNC's" parliamentary system for a 
presidential one, the T/C leader acknowledged a possible 
positive outcome:  reducing the impact of internal party 
politics on governance.  Entrenched leaders across the 
political spectrum likely would oppose the move, Talat 
surmised, and the exigencies of changing the "TRNC 
Constitution " -- a two-thirds majority in "Parliament," and 
a referendum decision on every article -- looked impossible 
to meet. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Karpass:  Serve the Citizens, not the Developers 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶11.  (C) Turkish Cypriot media had inflated the negative 
effects on the environment of the "government's" decision to 
bring high-voltage power to Karpass's tip, Talat alleged. 
One specific complaint, that the line's current vastly 
exceeded the needs of the few T/Cs residing there, was 
explained on technical grounds:  high voltage was required to 
transmit electricity great distances.  "Environmentalists 
should not doubt my credentials," he asserted, pointing to 
his efforts in 1995 when, as acting "Minister of Agriculture" 
and "Minister of Environment," he had pushed the "Council of 
Ministers" to declare parts of Karpass a "national" park. 
Now, his "government" sought to upgrade the "COM" decision 
into "law" in order to safeguard the area's fragile, unique 
ecosystem.  Casting some doubt on his green intentions, 
however, Talat noted that authorities concurrently were 
crafting a "balanced" development plan that weighed the needs 
of preservationists, Karpass residents and land owners, and 
developers alike. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Mehmet Ali Talat appeared drained August 20, whether 
from normal "presidential" stress or something worse 
(persistent rumors claim he suffers from prostate or another 
form of cancer).  We have no better guess than his weak 
constitution to explain Talat's self-contradictory, off-base 
arguments over negotiating rights for oil and gas 
exploration, for example.  Not so illogical were his 
observations on Papadopoulos's intentions at the upcoming 
leaders' meetings -- undoubtedly the President seeks to 
burnish his pro-solution ("but a solution that benefits Greek 
Cypriots, unlike the Annan Plan") credentials in hopes of 
winning more votes.  Our most recent response to Talat echoed 
the Embassy's recommendations the moment July 8 was signed: 
walk in prepared to talk substance.  If Papadapoulos engages 
seriously, both sides win.  If not, you'll have smoked out 
the President's true intentions and can hang the intransigent 
label on him.  Talat seems to be thinking similarly; our UN 
contacts report that T/C representative Pertev voiced his 
boss's eagerness to meet Papadopoulos September 5, sans 
preconditions. 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000685  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Talat's commentary on the state of interfaith 
dialogue troubles us.  Not that he's wrong on Chrysostomos, 
whom we suspect desires to replace "Archbishop" with 
"Ethnarch" on his calling cards.  Talat has failed, though, 
to see real ideological divisions within the Church that he 
could exploit to bring the communities closer together.  We 
see similar naivete (or worse, obfuscation) in his conviction 
that a "government" promise alone will prevent Kyrenia-style 
development from following the voltage to Karpass. 
SCHLICHER