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Viewing cable 07PARIS2890, CODEL WEXLER'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH FM KOUCHNER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARIS2890 2007-07-05 07:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO3375
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #2890/01 1860742
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050742Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8727
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0515
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0811
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR H - PLEASE PASS TO CONGRESSMAN WEXLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
PTER 
SUBJECT: CODEL WEXLER'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH FM KOUCHNER 
FOCUSES ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS, LEBANON AND 
HIZBALLAH, KOSOVO, AND TURKEY/EU 
 
REF: PARIS 2787 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a July 2 meeting with Congressman 
Wexler, FM Kouchner said that the current disarray in the 
Palestinian Authority presented an historic opportunity for 
an initiative on the peace process, but he described Israeli 
"inertia" -- mainly PM Olmert's weakness -- as the main 
obstacle.  The key would be to find a practical way forward 
with Israeli support, perhaps through Barak.  Kouchner viewed 
Syria rather than Hizballah as the primary bad actor in 
Lebanon and argued against designating Hizballah a terrorist 
organization in order to have an interlocutor.  He defended 
his own initiative for a Lebanon national reconciliation 
conference in France while acknowledging that Hizballah and 
other Shia representatives would probably boycott it in the 
end.  Kouchner restated French determination to recognize 
Kosovo's independence while noting the difficulty of 
obtaining a common EU approach to this "European problem." 
Kouchner expressed open disagreement with Sarkozy's exclusion 
of eventual Turkish EU membership and urged the USG to be 
frank with Sarkozy about the dangers of Turkish alienation, 
but he also defended the EU's need to determine its borders 
in order to become a more cohesive political entity.  (Septel 
reports Wexler's meeting with Sarkozy Diplomatic Advisor 
Jean-David Levitte.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Congressman Wexler (D-FL), accompanied by the 
Ambassador, met July 2 with FM Bernard Kouchner to discuss 
Darfur, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lebanon (with a 
particular focus on Hezbollah), Kosovo, and Turkey/EU. 
Kouchner was joined by cabinet advisor Alice Guitton, 
Americas Director (AS-equivalent) Daniel Parfait, Americas 
desk officer Sameh Safty, and Deputy Spokesperson Brieuc 
Pont.  (Minister-Delegate for European Affairs Jean-Pierre 
Jouyet was originally scheduled to attend the meeting, but he 
departed with President Sarkozy for Strasbourg.) 
 
U.S.-French Relations 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Wexler assured Kouchner of Washington's strong 
interest in the Sarkozy government and expressed the hope 
that change in tone would also be productive in terms of 
results.  Kouchner responded that time would tell, while 
noting that the U.S. and France were already cooperating 
closely on Darfur, Lebanon, and the Middle East. 
 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Kouchner stressed the importance of restarting the 
peace process, while criticizing the "inertia" of the 
Israelis, notwithstanding the Israeli decision to distribute 
tax monies to Mahmoud Abbas.  He blamed Olmert for focusing 
only on domestic politics; according to Abu Mazen, Olmert was 
insisting that all contacts with the Palestinians go through 
him, as a way of buttressing his authority.  Wexler 
encouraged France to work with the U.S. to restart the 
process, saying that leadership by the U.S., with France by 
its side, could make a real difference given Olmert's 
inability to do much on his own.  Kouchner did not disagree, 
but stressed the need to find a practical way forward, saying 
little would be possible without Israeli support.  He hoped 
that Ehud Barak could play a positive role.  He expressed his 
intention to publish an article in the U.S. and French press 
on what he called an "historic opportunity" -- at a time when 
the Palestinians were weak and Palestinian terrorists in 
Lebanon were under siege. 
 
5.  (C) Wexler queried whether France was potentially 
interested in an international summit with the participation 
of the U.S., European and Arab countries that might serve as 
a vehicle for a concerted push toward a final settlement, 
suggesting that more European pressure on the USG might 
produce higher-profile U.S. engagement.  He noted the 
less-than-positive result of Saudi mediation of the national 
unity government (NUG), which was not supported by the United 
States.  Kouchner was dubious that the USG would be prepared 
to engage in this manner, but suggested he might be 
interested in hosting a conference in Paris to get the ball 
 
PARIS 00002890  002 OF 003 
 
 
rolling.  He said it was time for a new initiative, one that 
went beyond the release of prisoners and would appeal to 
Israelis and Palestinians alike fed up with war.  The 
Fatah-Hamas split offered a perfect opportunity. 
 
Hizballah/Iran 
-------------- 
 
6.  (C) Noting reports that a Hizballah operative was being 
held in Iraq, Wexler stated that Iran was clearly stirring 
the pot there and cited the detention as proof of the 
connection between Iran and Hizballah.  He asked whether the 
incident would change European attitudes toward listing 
Hizballah as a terrorist organization.  Kouchner rejected 
putting Hizballah on the terrorism list, since doing so was a 
"trap."  He noted the catch-22 of not being able to talk to 
those with whom one needed to negotiate; political access was 
essential.  Moreover, he argued, Syria, not Hizballah, was 
responsible for the recent violence in the Palestinian camps, 
and dialogue among all the communities was the only possible 
means for avoiding a civil war in Lebanon.  Hizballah 
represented the Shia part of the Lebanese community. 
 
7.  (C) Kouchner reviewed his proposal for a national 
reconciliation dialogue on French soil, stating that the idea 
was to get all sides to begin talking to each other about 
their views toward each other and the future of Lebanon. 
There would be no documents, since recently the attempt in 
Lausanne to produce even an extremely weak statement had 
failed.  Dialogue was not a "magic solution," but it was 
important "not to refuse to talk to the main protagonists 
even if one condemned their actions."  It was not a powerful 
step, but the only one at their disposal for the time being. 
 
8.  (C) Kouchner insisted that the proposal did not represent 
a change in French policy: France supported the March 14 
movement and the Siniora government, and intended to continue 
working closely together with the USG.  He concluded that his 
expectations were low that representatives from all 
communities would be willing to attend in the end.  Wexler 
asked if that meant Hizballah.  Kouchner said he suspected 
Hizballah would not come in the end, and that other Shia 
representatives would refuse as well, although he said later 
that the conference still had a 50-50 chance of taking place. 
 Claiming that all parties had been on board until the recent 
assassination of the parliamentarian Walid Eido, he announced 
that he would call PM Siniora later that morning to obtain an 
update. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
9.  (C) Saying he had been briefed by EUR A/S Fried on the 
Kosovo situation (reftel), Wexler asked about next steps. 
Kouchner responded that this was a European and not a U.S. 
problem, while assuring Wexler that France supported the 
Ahtisaari plan (even if he had moved too quickly) and 
independence for Kosovo.  It was important to avoid a Russian 
veto and to achieve EU unity on a strategy -- both of which 
were proving problematic.  Recognizing Kosovo following a 
Russian veto would undermine the UN system.  It was useful to 
extend talks until the end of the year in order to bolster 
the election chances of the democratic parties in Serbia.  In 
the end, however, independence would be inevitable, as stated 
by President Sarkozy.  Guitton noted the imminent circulation 
of a new draft UNSC Resolution designed to ensure a continued 
international presence.  Kouchner reiterated that it would be 
necessary "to play theater" for another six months, at the 
end of which a determination would need to be made on the 
feasibility of yet another resolution (although he seemed to 
doubt it would be possible).  He stressed the importance of 
language stressing "the future" of Kosovo and not using the 
word "independence."  He hoped the other EU member states 
would accept this solution. 
 
10.  (C) Wexler asked how this strategy furthered the chances 
of democrats in Serbia.  Kouchner did not have a good answer 
(and appeared to concede that he did not fully understand 
Serbian thinking on this issue), but said he would travel to 
the region July 12 and 13 to try to massage them.  He said 
the Serbs needed others to make the final decision so that 
they could move on and turn their attention to joining the 
 
PARIS 00002890  003 OF 003 
 
 
EU.  He complained that EU-Serbian relations had been frozen 
too long over Serbian failure to turn over war criminals to 
the ICTY.  Now that SAA negotiations had resumed, it would be 
possible to offer more political incentives.  He concluded 
again that this was a European problem. 
 
Turkey 
------ 
 
11.  (C) Asked about Turkey, Kouchner made clear that he did 
not agree with Sarkozy's policy of excluding Turkey from EU 
membership.  He claimed he was trying to convince Sarkozy to 
change his position, noting that future memberships would be 
subject to popular referendum in any case and that the 
accession negotiations would take at least 15 years.  That 
said, he noted that Sarkozy had agreed that 30 of 35 chapters 
could be opened up in Turkey's ongoing accession negotiations 
with the EU.  Wexler asked if there was anything the USG 
should do.  Kouchner responded that the USG should be frank 
in making its own views known, by arguing the danger inherent 
in allowing Turkey to drift toward extremism, its secular 
tradition, and its good relations with Israel.  He argued 
indirectly that the USG should also pressure Turkey on 
reforms and on recognizing the Armenian genocide. 
 
12.  (C) Kouchner nonetheless argued that Sarkozy was right 
in calling for an EU brainstorming session by the end of the 
year that would focus on European frontiers and identity and 
deal with the questions of Ukraine, Turkey, and the 
Mediterranean Union.  Wexler noted the potential negative 
implications of putting an early end to many countries' 
membership aspirations.  Kouchner said he understood, but he 
defended Europe's long-term goal of becoming a cohesive 
political entity; the EU at 27 was already proving difficult, 
and the EU was losing energy.  He said it was also necessary 
for the EU to deal with unwanted immigration in a context of 
high unemployment.  While the game was not over for Turkey, 
Sarkozy was determined. 
 
Darfur 
------ 
 
13.  (C) Kouchner judged that the June 25 ministerial meeting 
on Darfur had been constructive, but he admitted that the 
Sudanese had already veered from an initial statement in 
support of the conference's decisions to one more sharply 
critical. 
 
14.  (U) Representative Wexler did not have an opportunity to 
clear this message. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON