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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHLI #1858/01 1991735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181735Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6064
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEC/MIDDLE EAST MULTILATERAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1475

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LISBON 001858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017 
TAGS: CVIS MOPS PHUM PREL PO EUN UN XA AF ZL RS
XF 
SUBJECT: U.S.- EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSSES KOSOVO, 
RUSSIA, AFRICA, AND MIDDLE EAST 
 
Classified By: Dep Pol/Econ Counselor Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (B) and 
 (D) 
 
 Summary 
----------- 
¶1. (SBU) A/S Fried met July 13 in Lisbon with Political 
Directors (PolDirs) from the 27 EU member states and with the 
EU Troika political directors.  The agenda included Kosovo, 
Russia, NATO coordination in Afghanistan, conflicts in 
Africa, institution building in the Palestinian Territories, 
and Iran's troubling activities in the Middle East.   The 
Visa Waiver Program and Guantanamo were also raised.  DG for 
External and Political-Military Affairs Robert Cooper 
represented the EU Council Secretariat and Portugal's PolDir 
Vasco Bramao Ramos represented the EU Presidency. 
 
Kosovo 
--------- 
¶2. (C)  Kosovo was front and center in A/S Fried's one-on-one 
discussion with Portugal's PolDirector Bramao Ramos and 
during lunch with all 27 member-states' PolDirs, carrying 
over into the Troika meeting later in the day.  Bramao Ramos 
told Fried he and his EU counterparts had spent three hours 
on July 11 developing an "increasingly" common position and 
would have another meeting July 23 to flesh out the details. 
Serbian President Tadic is ready privately to look the other 
way so that we "just get it done," according to Bramao Ramos. 
 He said the EU needs 120 days to pull it together.  A/S 
Fried noted that helping develop a common EU position on 
Kosovo that allowed us to move to supervised independence 
together would be a major and laudable accomplishment for the 
Portuguese Presidency.  It could also set a precedent for 
effective U.S.-EU collaboration when there is blockage in the 
UNSC. 
 
¶3. (C) Over lunch with the 27 member-states' PolDirs, Fried 
outlined his recent trip to the region.  The current UNSC 
draft represented a huge compromise on our part, but is 
nevertheless likely to be rejected, he noted.  Serbian PM 
Kostunica, who told Fried that he would permit Serbia only to 
discuss "supervised autonomy," not independence, lambasted 
the Sarkozy plan from the G8 Summit as "an American proposal 
from a French mouth."  He rejected the new "minimalist" 
resolution without having seen it.   President Tadic, on the 
other hand, claimed to recognize the reality of the situation 
but lamented that he could not allow himself to be 
rhetorically outflanked by the nationalists. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Fried commented that Serbia, like Russia, is 
misreading Europe and the U.S.:  what appears to them as 
insurmountable divisions were merely open discussions towards 
a common position.  Fried underscored President Bush's 
commitment to Kosovo's independence and noted that President 
Sarkozy also described independence as "inevitable."  To 
further demonstrate the point, most EU PolDirs replied that 
their governments' opinions were in line with that of the 
United States.  The Greek and the Spaniard were the two 
exceptions.  The Greek was hostile, adamantly stressing his 
government's absolute need to have a UNSCR.  The more 
conciliatory Spaniard underlined the need to avoid a choice 
between unity and a UNSCR.  The British representative noted 
that if Russian intransigence forced recognition of Kosovo 
without a UNSCR, it would be the Russians themselves who 
forced such an outcome.  The Italian strongly enorsed the 
British and U.S. view. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Fred pledged not to force a UN vote or risk a 
vetowithout consultation with the EU. He underscored te USG 
desire to achieve a UNSCR yet noted that w must also prepare 
contingency plans.  The Kosovrs will not likely declare 
unilateral independenc because they have faith in the West's 
ability t achieve a resolution.  Despite the fact that the 
Kosovars have agreed to delay precipitate action,the West's 
time is not unlimited, and we will no be able to ask the 
Kosovars to delay again, Frie underscored. 
 
¶6. (C) Discussion of Kosovo contiued into the Troika 
following lunch. A/S Fried cmmented that the U.S and the EU 
have a very goodchance to make this work.  We will get there 
togther, replied Bramao Ramos, but must continue to be 
flexible.  Robert Cooper added that the differenes the U.S. 
has seen and heard on Kosovo from th EU are not 
irreconcilable, "they only reflect mmber states working 
 
LISBON 00001858  002 OF 004 
 
 
through their differences."  Solana, Cooper reported, had 
delivered the same message to the Kosovars during a recent 
trip:  "You know you will have independence -- what matters 
is how to get there." 
 
Russia 
-------- 
¶7. (C) A/S Fried noted that the U.S. needs to find away to 
avoid its two customary modes with Russia -- extreme 
enthusiasm and extreme disappointment.  There are some issues 
on which we work well with the Russians, such as 
non-proliferation and counterterrorism, and others where we 
do not.  On missile defense (MD), the USG is working hard to 
move discussions forward.  The Russians were surprised by our 
agreement to cooperate on MD, particularly our willingness to 
work with Russia following their offer to discuss MD 
cooperation involving the Garbala radar station in Azerbaijan 
and even facilities in Russia itself.  If Russia's aim, 
however, was merely to block cooperation between the U.S. and 
our Polish and Czech allies, they will fail. 
 
¶8. (C) Russia has a mixed record on energy.  Western 
companies are active there, but Russia,s monopolistic 
efforts to corner transport of Central Asian gas and increase 
leverage over European consumers are unhelpful, Fried said. 
Russia's willingness to suspend gas supplies to the Ukraine 
was worrying and is a likely preview of further negative 
actions.  The USG supports southern routes and, in 
particular, the European-backed Nabuco pipeline project to 
diversify supply and to allow Central Asians to access the 
European market without Russian control. 
 
NATO-EU Cooperation 
------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Council Secretariat DG for External and 
Political-Military Affairs Robert Cooper noted operational 
difficulties in Afghanistan for the EU's ESDP mission. 
Cooper noted that the U.S. could be a great help by offering 
to use common command, control, communications, and 
intelligence (CCCI) equipment.  Also, without an operational 
agreement between NATO and the EU to share situational 
awareness reports, the EU mission would be in unnecessary 
danger.  Cooper suggested that direct relations with the U.S. 
could allow for relevant information to be passed, avoiding 
the political blockages that exist through multilateral 
channels.  A/S Fried agreed that the theological dispute 
between NATO and the EU was unwise and promised to follow up 
on Cooper's suggestions.  (Note:  Cooper noted that he had 
also forwarded these suggestions directly to his Pentagon 
contacts.  End note. 
 
¶10.  (C) Slovenian PolDir Mitja Drobnic also commented during 
the Troika meeting that Turkey was blocking NATO efforts and 
could damage the NATO mission in Afghanistan if unchecked. 
He requested U.S. support in pressuring Turkey to do the 
right thing.  A/S Fried agreed that the U.S. at times shared 
Europe's frustration with Turkey but wanted to move it in the 
right direction while ensuring its stability and development. 
 He said an unstable Turkey could have a catastrophic affect 
on the region. 
 
VWP 
-------- 
¶11. (C) As requested by the EU, A/S Fried described U.S. 
efforts to reform the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, noting that 
the current situation is inadequate and that we are working 
to include all EU states.  We propose to strengthen security 
provisions, using the Australian model that does not require 
a visa but instead uses electronic advance notice, while also 
allowing flexibility so that all EU states are covered.  The 
current legislation has amendments that restrict that 
flexibility, but the administration -- along with EU 
Embassies in Washington -- is working to improve the text. 
 
African Issues 
-------------- 
¶12. (U) Following lunch, the Troika meeting turned to Africa 
and the Middle East. 
 
¶13.  (C) SUDAN: The international community has to work 
together to establish at least minimum stability in Sudan, 
according to Portuguese PolDir Bramao Ramos.  After the June 
26 meeting on Africa, he said he was cautiously optimistic. 
 
LISBON 00001858  003 OF 004 
 
 
The EU would continue to support the security mission in 
Darfur until the end of 2007 and wanted to help establish a 
hybrid UN-AU mission follow-on. Cooper stressed that the EU 
recognized Sudan/Darfur as a medium to long term problem but 
was not willing to make an open-ended commitment.  A/S Fried 
affirmed US support for the slight uptick in international 
response in Darfur and noted that the international community 
would have to work together to maintain pressure on Khartoum. 
 EC Deputy PolDir Lars-Erik Lundin noted that the AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) program had 400 million euros overall but is 
now facing a two-month funding gap of 45 million euros. 
Would the U.S. be able to help cover the gap?  A/S Fried 
promised to convey the request to the Department's Africa 
Bureau. 
 
¶14.  (C) CHAD: Cooper reported that the humanitarian crisis 
had become a regional conflict affecting neighboring nations. 
 Chad was seeking international protection, and Cooper raised 
the possibility of establishing a UN presence to manage 
refugee and internally displaced camps.  Bramao Ramos added 
that the EU viewed Chad's problems in connection with the 
situation in Sudan and wanted to help the African Union (AU) 
establish a larger role in the international response. 
 
¶15.  (C) SOMALIA: The EU was concerned about how best to 
create conditions to prompt Ethiopia to withdraw from 
Somalia.  Bramao Ramos suggested that perhaps U.S. and EU 
counterterrorism experts could establish an information 
sharing program to discuss the terrorism threat in Somalia 
and Eritrea. 
 
¶16.  (C) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Bramao Ramos noted 
that opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba, who is still in 
Portugal for medical treatment, is aware he would not be 
allowed to remain indefinitely.  However, Bemba could decide 
against returning to DRC out of personal safety concerns and 
instead decide to stir up problems as an exiled opposition 
leader.  Another equally dangerous scenario would be if 
Kabila struck out against Bemba supporters in a preemptive 
attack to crush the opposition.  Either move could be 
disastrous. Bramao Ramos asked that we monitor the situation 
closely. 
 
¶17.  (U) AFRICA SUMMIT: A/S Fried hailed the Portuguese 
effort to hold an EU-Africa summit but expressed his hope 
that Portugal would send a strong signal of support for good 
governance by not extending an invitation to Zimbabwean 
President Robert Mugabe.  Bramao Ramos responded that 
Portugal would find a solution and that the need to Europe to 
develop a joint strategy with all of Africa could not be held 
hostage to the EU's concerns about one country. 
 
Middle East 
---------------- 
¶18.  (C) Cooper was hopeful that Tony Blair could improve 
institution building in the Palestinian Territories and make 
the most of the current opportunity to work with Fatah 
leaders.  A/S Fried agreed that institution-building and 
engagement with Fatah was the best we could do presently. 
Rather than fearing the development of a "three state 
solution" with Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, A/S Fried 
stressed that we should work with Abbas to find a positive 
way forward. EC Deputy PolDir Lars-Erik Lundin encouraged 
pressing Israel to loosen border controls which were creating 
an economic crisis in Gaza. International assistance was not 
a sustainable replacement for indigenous economic activity, 
he said. 
 
¶19.  (C) All parties agreed that Iran was dangerous, played a 
negative role in the region, and remained largely opaque to 
the international community.  Given the difficulties of 
gauging the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and the 
true level of internal political opposition, it was 
impossible to judge the timing horizon on Iran's nuclear 
ambitions.  Despite the lack of momentum in the international 
community's efforts to turn up the heat on Iran, A/S Fried 
agreed that the Solana/Larijani dialogue should continue in 
the hope of a future breakthrough.  In response to A/S 
Fried's mention of enhancing international sanctions, Cooper 
noted that the EU already had implemented sanctions against 
Iran that exceeded UNSCR 1737 requirements and, in some 
areas, even surpassed US measures. 
 
 
LISBON 00001858  004 OF 004 
 
 
Guantanamo 
---------------- 
¶20.  (C) Slovenian PolDir Mitja Drobnic commended State's 
Legal Adviser John Bellinger for his work on counterterrorism 
issues and international humanitarian law but added that 
Guantanamo was damaging the image of the US in Europe.  A/S 
Fried agreed that Guantanamo was a complex issue and urged 
European partners to be constructive in efforts to resettle 
detainees.  He stressed that we needed to establish a 
dialogue and an international strategy to respond effectively 
to the terrorist threat. 
 
Hoffman