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Viewing cable 07SEOUL1670, LEE MYUNG-BAK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON U.S.-ROK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL1670 2007-06-01 08:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1670/01 1520808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY  ADX C83019/MSI1725)
O 010808Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4822
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2581
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2694
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8075
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001670 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - PARA 1 LAST SENTENCE FIXED 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: LEE MYUNG-BAK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON U.S.-ROK 
RELATIONS AND NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: SEOUL 1418 
 
Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Members of presidential contender Lee Myung-bak's 
foreign policy team told poloffs on May 30 that Lee would 
likely advocate a "pragmatic" approach to the U.S.-ROK 
alliance, aimed principally to preserve room to 
strengthen the relationship after the election without 
alienating progressives by mentioning the word "alliance" 
before the election.  According to these academics, who are 
three of a number of Lee's foreign policy advisors, Lee 
would avoid making North Korea or foreign policy issues 
key election issues.  However, as the clear front-runner 
in the presidential race, Lee must provide at least a minimum 
 vision on how he would deal with North Korea.  For now, Lee, 
more interested in not losing votes than anything else, is 
painting a somewhat pedestrian, middle-of-the-road picture, 
emphasizing investment, trade and aid to raise the DPRK living 
standard in order to bring about reunification in some 
distant future.   END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Poloffs on May 30 met with Kim Woo-sang, Director 
of Yonsei University's Institute of East & West Studies, 
Cha Du-hyeong, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses 
Research Fellow, and Cho Yun-young, Chung Ang University 
Professor of International Relations.  Kim, Cho and Cha are 
three of a number of foreign policy advisors who are 
working to prepare Lee for the upcoming presidential 
campaign. 
 
3.  (C) In general, they said, Lee Myung-bak will attempt 
to focus on domestic and economic issues, which he perceives 
as his strengths.  He will wait until challenged before 
addressing foreign policy concerns.  That opportunity will 
likely come on June 19 in Daejeon, when the GNP primary 
candidates will engage in a televised debate on 
international affairs and security policy. 
 
RELATIONS WITH U.S. 
------------------- 
 
4. (C) Kim said that Lee sees a stronger alliance 
relationship with the U.S. as vital for the ROK's security 
in the region.  He assured us a Lee administration would 
handle U.S.-ROK relations much better than President Roh or 
former President Kim Dae-jung, and the ROK "would be an 
entirely different country."  However, for public 
consumption, Lee would likely refer to the need for 
"pragmatic relations" with the U.S., staying away from 
referring to the "alliance."  This would allow Lee to 
tighten the relationship after the election, without 
alienating those who chafe at too much American influence. 
 
5.  (C) In a revealing aside, Kim recounted that during a 
recent ROK-Japan academic seminar, a retired Japanese 
Ambassador had bluntly said that the ROK had to maintain 
its alliance with the U.S. or else Japan may no longer be 
able to treat the ROK as a friend, and the ROK would 
therefore have to seek protection from China.  Kim said 
that he had replied that Japan's position in the event of 
severed ties with the U.S. would be even worse, because 
Japan would have to yield to China, whereas the ROK could 
at least choose between favoring Japan or China. 
 
NORTH KOREA AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Kim said that he expected candidate Lee -- assuming 
he receives the GNP nomination, which the advisors clearly 
were counting on -- to try to keep North Korea from 
becoming a major campaign issue.  People cared much more 
about the economy and domestic issues, and the public 
generally wanted engagement policy to continue.  That said, 
Lee would change the tone of engagement policy to emphasize 
the reciprocity that President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine 
Policy" had initially envisioned.  Lee's take on engagement 
would entail greater penetration of western values into the 
DPRK, which, Kim admitted, might be difficult for the DPRK 
to accept. President Roh Moo-hyun's version of 
 
engagement policy was "simple appeasement," Kim scoffed. 
If Lee had been president last October when North Korea 
tested nuclear weapons, he would have pushed for full 
enforcement of UNSCR 1718 and full ROK participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative. 
 
7.  (C) Lee has enquired of his advisors whether he should 
discuss North Korean human rights during the campaign. 
According to Cha, Lee will likely discuss not "human 
rights," which is a volatile term, but rather North Koreans' 
"right to happiness."  This phraseology would avoid a 
backlash from the DPRK, while putting the issue on the 
table in broad terms.  They all noted that no one could 
attack the "right to happiness" as either too strong 
or too weak. 
 
8. (C) Kim referred to recent DPRK criticism of Lee over 
statements Lee made during a visit to Panmunjum as 
counterproductive to DPRK aims because it increased Lee's 
credibility among GNP conservatives.  Lee said, 
"continued concessions to North Korea led to the death 
of innocent civilians," and, "It is ironic that North 
Korea is developing nuclear weapons to make itself a 
powerful nation when its people are the poorest."  Kim 
said that it was likely that the criticism would 
diminish later in the campaign as the DPRK accepts 
that they would have to build a relationship with 
Lee as the likely next president of the ROK.  At the 
same time, the prospect of a North-South summit meeting, 
which the advisors saw as plausible in mid-August, 
clearly struck a nerve.  A summit would hurt Lee's 
standing because the media would focus obsessively on 
it for as much as one month beforehand and afterward, Kim 
said.  In addition, Cha said, ten million South Koreans, 
many of them senior citizens with relatives in the North, 
could have an emotional response to a summit.  Although 
this group is generally conservative, they might vote in 
favor of a progressive candidate if they perceived 
heightened prospects for more family reunifications. 
 
NORTH KOREA DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
---------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Kim said that Lee Myung-bak and his advisors were 
fleshing out the North Korea "3,000 Unification Plan" that 
would be similar to the U.S. Marshall Plan.  The goal would 
be to raise North Korea's per capita income to USD 3,000 per 
year (Note: The OECD estimated the DPRK's per capita GDP as 
USD 797 in 2004) within ten years (reftel).  The economic 
assumptions are heroic:  USD 40 billion invested, initially 
in infrastructure and then in a "giant" version of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex in multiple locations, aimed 
at achieving DPRK per capita income growth of 17 percent 
per year for 10 years.  During this same period, the ROK's 
per capita income would be expected to increase from its 
present level (about USD 18,000/yr) to about USD 40,000 
per year.  Together, these changes would make unification 
affordable, but the Lee plan focuses on DPRK economic 
development rather than setting out a timeline for 
unification. 
 
10. (C) Politically, the "3,000 Unification Plan" could 
only go forward if (a) North Korea were continuing to make 
progress on denuclearization; (b) North Korea agreed to 
the increased level of economic engagement;  and (c) Japan 
contributed to the economic development package.  On (a), 
Kim said that he hoped that the U.S. would agree that this 
economic development plan could begin as long as there was 
continued progress on denuclearization, rather than 
insisting on its completion, which "will take years," 
beforehand.  On (b), Kim said that he was aware that North 
Korea could very likely regard an offer to invest USD 40 
billion in its economy as a threat, but that the hope was 
that improved DPRK-U.S. relations in connection with 
denuclearization, along with security guarantees, would 
ease DPRK concerns.  On (c) the three agreed that Japan 
would likely contribute 10 billion USD to the effort if the 
abductee issue was resolved. 
 
11. (C) What if the DPRK did not make progress on 
denuclearization?  Then the plan would be to work with the 
U.S. and the international community to enforce UNSCR 1718 
and PSI.  Kim said that close cooperation with all 
concerned nations would be vital. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (C) North Korea policy is not Lee Myung-bak's strong 
suit and he is struggling to come up with new ideas.  As 
the clear front-runner in the presidential sweepstakes, 
candidate Lee recognizes that has to put some flesh 
behind his image as a "pragmatic conservative," but 
at the same time, he knows he has more to lose than 
gain in being adventurous.  Lee's strategy, therefore, 
is one of muddling through, entertaining various 
ideas on North Korea, without firm commitments. 
This appears to be his plan on choosing foreign 
policy advisors too.  Professor Kim has been close 
to Lee for several years, but as the campaign heats up, 
he faces stiff competition for Lee's ear from a cadre of 
Korea University professors and alumni, among them, 
notably, former FM Han Seung-soo and political science 
professor Hyun In-taek.  Lee's camp is reportedly run like 
a company where different teams compete to have their ideas 
endorsed by their "CEO."  Therefore, while Kim, Cha and Cho 
are currently key members of Lee's policy-making team, it 
remains to be seen how they will fare in Lee's 
ultra-competitive camp. 
VERSHBOW