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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002726 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO YI UNMIK UNO LE IR
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 13 LUNCH WITH FRENCH FM KOUCHNER 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG R STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (U) June 13, 2007, 1:00 P.M. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Under Secretary Burns 
Ambassador Stapleton 
Ambassador Frank Wisner, U.S. Special Envoy for Kosovo Final 
Status Issues 
P Staff Bame 
Pol Espinoza (notetaker) 
 
France 
Foreign Minister Kouchner 
Political Director Araud 
A/S-equivalent for non-EU Europe Faure 
FM Cabinet Advisor Dumont 
FM Cabinet Advisor Errera 
Political Director Staff Veyssiere 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY: U/S Burns and French FM Kouchner discussed 
Kosovo, Lebanon, Darfur, Iran, and domestic French politics 
over lunch on June 13. Burns convinced Kouchner to agree to 
the principle of Kosovo independence and the U.S. strategy 
for moving forward in the UNSC.  Kouchner noted that while he 
agreed that Kosovo independence was the only possible 
outcome, the Quint should demonstrate first to the world that 
it had made every possible effort to find agreement between 
the parties and in the UNSC before moving to recognize Kosovo 
independence. President Sarkozy, he said, would have the 
final say for the GOF on the recognition of an independent 
Kosovo.  Kouchner agreed with Burns that U.S.-France unity on 
Lebanon was the key to past and future success on the ground 
and in the UNSC.  Burns noted the difference in Hizballah 
policies and expressed concern about the effects of inviting 
Hizballah to Kouchner's proposed conference in Paris. 
Kouchner insisted that Hizballah's presence was necessary for 
the credibility of political dialogue, but noted that France 
continued to fully support PM Siniora. 
 
¶4. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Kouchner highlighted his goals for 
the Darfur conference: (1) support for the Chad operation and 
for the sites where displaced individuals are concentrated, 
and (2) support for AMIS troops.  While not completely ruling 
out further sanctions, he questioned their timelines, while 
adding he had warned Khartoum that Europe might follow the 
United States if there was no progress. Kouchner did not 
believe sanctions would work in Iran and encouraged the USG 
to speak with Iran and reach out to the Iranian people. 
Burns explained USG policy and suggested that economic 
sanctions were a logical extension of U.S. and EU3 political 
pressure, though Russian and Chinese stances might require 
further sanctions outside the UNSC.  On domestic politics, 
Kouchner noted Sarkozy's strong mandate, but said that 
foreign policy would only see shifts in approach, not policy. 
 Kouchner flagged as his only key disagreement with Sarkozy 
Turkey's European integration.  (NOTE: This lunch was held on 
June 13, the day following the Kosovo political directors' 
quint meeting and a Burns' dinner with PolDir Araud.  The 
lunch preceded Burns' meeting with Presidential Diplomatic 
Advisor Jean-David Levitte. END NOTE) END SUMMARY 
 
------ 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) Kouchner told U/S Burns and Ambassador Wisner that, 
absent a UNSCR, we would need to demonstrate to the world 
that we had made every conceivable attempt to find an 
agreement between the parties and in the UN Security Council 
before moving to Quint recognition of an independent Kosovo. 
Burns stressed the importance of Quint unity and reviewed 
Quint discussions on a strategy to move forward based in 
large part on Sarkozy's G-8 proposal: (1) Quint agreement on 
Kosovo independence as the final outcome; (2) a push now in 
the Security Council for a UNSCR in order to gauge Russia's 
reaction; (3) if a Russian veto still remained likely, we 
would allow three to six months for dialogue between the 
parties and prepare mechanisms for independence without a 
UNSCR; and (4) if there is no agreement between the parties 
or in the UNSC at that time, the Quint and others would move 
to recognize an independent Kosovo.  Kouchner agreed in 
principle with the proposal, but did not appear to attach as 
much importance to a timetable. Somewhat jokingly, Kouchner 
referred to his birthday in early November as a possible 
deadline for dialogue to end and independence to begin. 
 
¶6. (C) Political Director Araud nonetheless remained guarded 
 
PARIS 00002726  002 OF 003 
 
 
about French recognition of Kosovo and feared a European 
clash on the issue -- particularly with the Italians and 
Spanish.  Kouchner was less worried about the Spanish, with 
whom he would meet that evening, and he suggested that 
Secretary Rice could bring the Italians along with a phone 
 
SIPDIS 
call.  Araud focused on legal concerns throughout the 
conversation and reiterated that a Russian veto would put 
Europe in an incredibly difficult legal situation.  Wisner 
said that the U.S. understood the political difficulties and 
would do its best to assist. 
 
¶7. (C) Wisner explained that the U.S. thought constructive 
dialogue between the parties could only take place if both 
the Serbs and Kosovars understood that independence was the 
final outcome.  Serbia, Wisner said, might be more willing to 
engage on specific issues of concern if the Quint made clear 
that recognition of an independent Kosovo was inevitable. 
Burns added that dialogue would be most useful if led by 
Ahtisaari.  Kouchner countered that Foreign Ministers must be 
involved in the process and reiterated his earlier proposal 
(from a Quint telephone conference the previous week) that 
Quint ministers visit the region together.  He explained that 
Ahtisaari, for whom he had great admiration, had not been 
able to identify the right interlocutors and influential 
people in the region with whom to make his case. 
 
¶8. (C) Kouchner feared violence in the coming weeks against 
ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, and insisted that Quint partners 
deliver a clear message to Pristina about the sensitivity of 
the coming months.  Wisner agreed to pass the message to the 
Kosovars, but added that he would also be taking a positive 
agenda to Pristina, pushing them to move forward quickly on 
reforms and other preparations for independence; a lot of 
work remained to be accomplished.  He agreed to provide 
Kouchner and Araud an account of his June 14-17 Kosovo trip. 
Kouchner agreed to take a similar message during his upcoming 
mission to the region, and added he would be traveling across 
Kosovo, not only to Pristina. 
 
------- 
LEBANON 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) U/S Burns stressed to Kouchner that U.S.-French unity 
on Lebanon policy was the cornerstone of any success we had 
had on the ground and in the UN Security Council.  It was 
vital that we preserve that cooperation without surprise 
initatives, such as the GOF-proposed conference, and continue 
to put pressure on Syria not to reinsert itself into Lebanon. 
 Kouchner agreed that U.S.-French cooperation was essential 
and noted that his proposed conference for Lebanon would only 
be a forum for political dialogue; it was not a signal of any 
impending policy change.  Kouchner added that the invitation 
to Hizballah in no way meant that the GOF did not support 
Siniora, but was a reaction to the reality of Lebanon. 
Siniora and the March 14 movement did not represent the 
majority of Lebanese, he said.  Kouchner clarified that the 
event would be at the sub-cabinet level and added that 
Siniora had agreed on June 12 to send a representative to the 
conference.  "If they don't all come, we won't have it," 
Kouchner noted. 
 
¶10. (C) Burns acknowledged differences over policy on 
Hizballah, and wondered whether Hizballah's participation in 
the conference would undermine UNSC efforts to maintain 
pressure on it to disarm.  Kouchner responded that "inviting 
them would not change anything."  Hizballah, Kouchner argued, 
had to be a part of the political dialogue, or the forum 
would lack credibility.  Burns suggested, and Kouchner agreed 
in principle, that the question of illegal arms and financial 
support from Syria to groups other than the LAF had to be a 
part of the discussion. 
 
¶11. (C) Kouchner said he was not overly concerned about a 
possible summer offensive by Syria and Hizballah against 
Israel, but did not rule out the possibility.  He said that 
the current problem was Fatah al-Islam, which was responsible 
for the incidents inside the Palestinian refugee camps. 
Kouchner judged that there was a new unity in Lebanon to back 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  Araud added that Hizballah 
had nothing to gain from attacking Israel, but that Syria was 
a different matter.  Lebanese Hizballah and Syria, Araud 
insisted, were not the same entity. 
 
------ 
DARFUR 
------ 
 
¶12. (C) Kouchner characterized Khartoum's signature to the 
Hybrid Force agreement as a deliverable from his visit to the 
 
PARIS 00002726  003 OF 003 
 
 
region, but was somewhat pessimistic about the agreement's 
significance.  He said that Khartoum had accepted to receive 
"experts," which was how the Chinese referred to their troop 
contribution -- but Kouchner questioned the practical 
implications of Khartoum's language. 
 
¶13. (C) Burns pushed Kouchner on individual Sudan sanctions, 
laying out the U.S. position that sanctions would help to 
increase pressure on the regime.  Convincing China in the 
UNSC was an uphill battle.  Kouchner indicated that sanctions 
were not the priority for France at the moment, but that he 
had warned Khartoum that Europe could follow the USG if there 
was no progress. 
 
¶14. (C) Khartoum, despite having never been invited to the 
Paris ministerial, had recently refused to attend, Kouchner 
said.  "They want our money, but they won't take our soldiers 
-- it's not possible." The minister, after expressing his 
hope that Secretary Rice would attend, laid out two key 
issues he hoped the ministerial would address: (1) support 
for the Chad operation and aid for sites where displaced 
people were living-- he described the situation as desperate, 
and (2) support for the AMIS forces who had not been paid 
since January.  Kouchner said that UNSYG Ban Ki-moon had 
accepted to attend, as well as the Chinese, though he was not 
convinced that the FM would really come.  He expressed deep 
frustration that there would be no Africans present at the 
conference. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶15. (C) Kouchner pushed back on Burns' proposal that the USG 
and Europe implement sanctions against Iran outside the 
framework of the UN Security Council if China and Russia 
proved unwilling to cooperate fully, insisting that sanctions 
were ineffective and "cannot get what we need."  The Minister 
counseled that pressure on the regime had to come from inside 
the country, and that our strategy had to include talking to 
Iran and the Iranian people -- whom he judged to be largely 
against the Ayatollahs.  Kouchner insisted that while they 
might not talk to the USG, they would talk to France. 
 
¶16. (C) Burns explained that U.S. policy on Iran was clear -- 
Iran would not become a nuclear military power, and the 
United States would not talk to Iran directly until it 
suspended enrichment.  Use of force, while a last resort, 
would not be taken off the table.  Solana, Burns said, had 
warned the Secretary the previous day that he did not believe 
Larijani was prepared to make any concessions.  Everyone, 
Burns stressed, was now against Iran, and sanctions could 
help to couple economic and political pressure on the regime. 
Kouchner suggested that the Iran issue would require further 
discussion.   COMMENT: Araud openly disagreed with Kouchner's 
characterization of sanctions and their impact.  Kouchner's 
comments appeared to be more of a critique of U.S. and EU-3 
policy since the crisis began; he offered no operational way 
forward. Kouchner's presentation did not track with the 
existing French approach on holding Iran firmly to its IAEA 
and UNSC commitments.  Kouchner's negativism on sanctions 
also contrasted with Diplomatic Advisor Levitte's views 
(septel).  END COMMENT 
 
------------------------------------ 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) Kouchner described the Socialist Party (PS) as near 
its end while fighting out an internal battle.  A new party 
would emerge, but he was not convinced of its ability to 
build a strong coalition.  He described Segolene Royal as 
childish, and mocked her current politicking.  Kouchner said 
that the Sarkozy administration had a solid mandate for 
moving forward on the domestic front, but that he didn't 
expect any major new foreign policy changes, only different 
approaches.  For the moment, he noted, his only major foreign 
policy difference with Sarkozy was over Turkey's European 
vocation.  Kouchner off-handedly commented that he could 
imagine resigning from the government if he were to disagree 
with Sarkozy on a issue of serious principle. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON