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sdohasntsc  05/17/2007 07:49:31 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  MAY07 Archive

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C O N F I D E N T I A L        DOHA 00439

SIPDIS
CXDOHA:
    ACTION: P/E
    INFO:   AMB FCS DCM RAO PAO DAO

DISSEMINATION: P/E /2
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MRATNEY
DRAFTED: P/E:APYOTT
CLEARED: EUR/SCE:PHANISH

VZCZCDOI532
PP RUEHC RUEHGG RUEHPS
DE RUEHDO #0439/01 1211058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011058Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6540
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0022

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000439 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL UNSC XH QA
SUBJECT: QATARIS WILL SUPPORT KOSOVO RESOLUTION ON PRINCIPLE 
 
REF: DOHA 386 
 
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
told S/R Frank Wisner that Qatar "will support the same 
position you support" on Kosovo. He appreciated consultation 
on the matter. He said a Serbian envoy had tried to convince 
him to back a "middle way" -- but the Qataris were not 
swayed. The Qataris wondered how to overcome Russian 
opposition in the Security Council. The MFA's Assistant 
Minister suggested "listening" to Russia on the frozen 
conflicts on its periphery. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Special Representative for Kosovo Final Status Issues 
Ambassador Frank Wisner told Qatar's Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Al Mahmoud, in their meeting April 29 
that Kosovo will become independent. The question was whether 
this would occur in an orderly manner, as envisioned in UN 
Sepcial Envoy Ahtisaari's proposal, or more chaotically. 
Under the Ahtisaari plan, minorities would be protected and a 
system would allow for the return of refugees. "There is no 
way for Kosovo to return to Serbian sovereignty," Wisner 
said. On behalf of the Secretary, Wisner thanked Al Mahmoud 
for Qatar's support on this issue in the UN Security Council. 
 
¶3. (C) Al Mahmoud characterized the U.S. position on Kosovo 
over the years as "very respectable -- we will never forget 
it." Our "duty" now is to help Kosovo achieve independence 
the "proper" way. "In the end our position will be clear," he 
said. "We will support the same cause you support." 
 
¶4. (C) Al Mahmoud noted that he had recently met an envoy 
from Serbia who claimed that Russia, China, and Indonesia 
support Serbia's position. The GOQ doubted China was in that 
category, however. The Serbian envoy had tried to sell a 
"middle way." According to Al Mahmoud's account, he told the 
Serb such a path was "untenable" and tried to convince him 
that acceptance of independence, as the Indonesians had done 
in the case of East Timor, was the better way. Ambassador 
Wisner answered that if there was any hope of a middle way, 
Ahtisaari would have found it. 
 
¶5. (C) Al Mahmoud recounted how the Serbian president told 
Qatar's Ambassador to Belgrade, who was presenting his 
credentials, that Serbia would not use military force against 
Kosovo if the UNSC supports independence. Ambassador Wisner 
agreed that Serbia did not intend to involve its army and 
police, but rogue elements or extra-governmental groups 
remained a danger. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Wisner explained that Kosovo's day of 
independence would be just the starting point for the new 
nation. It would need international recognition and economic 
assistance. He said the United States looks forward to 
working closely with Qatar on these priorities, and welcomed 
engagement through our missions at the UN. 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Wisner had met the previous day (April 28) 
with Mohamed al-Rumaihi, Assistant Minister for Follow-Up 
Affairs at the MFA and holder of the UN portfolio, and the 
Qatari Permanent Representative to the UN, Nasser al-Nasser, 
over luncheon. 
 
¶8. (C) Rumaihi, who had a detailed knowledge of the issue, 
said that the GOQ held Ahtisaari in high regard and believed 
him to be entirely fair. He suggested some steps that would 
entice Serbia to accept the outcome of a UNSC resolution, 
such as: help fulfilling conditions for EU membership, an 
arrangement with the European states to offer a Schengen 
"free pass" visa to Serbs, and a plan to ensure that Serbs in 
Kosovo were well-protected. 
 
¶9. (C) Rumaihi said that though under some pressure from 
Islamic states, Qatar did not look at Kosovo as an Islamic 
issue. Rather, it was a question of natural rights. He said 
that an endorsement by the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference at its mid-May meeting in Islamabad would be 
helpful, particularly to the Indonesians. Rumaihi suggested 
that Pakistan or Egypt propose language to the OIC on 
supporting independence for Kosovo, and encouraged U.S. 
engagement with Pakistan in the run-up to the conference. 
 
¶10. (C) "How to satisfy Russia?" Rumaihi wondered. This would 
be hard for Qatar; "the Five Permanent members must do it," 
he said. The GOQ believes that Russia "needs to be listened 
to" on dormant conflicts on its periphery. Al-Nasser 
predicted that Russia would not veto a Security Council 
resolution. But the question of how Russia would "save face" 
remained. 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Wisner said that the U.S. appreciates 
Qatar's support. The U.S. will seek a resolution early in May 
and will seek to work with Russia toward a successful 
resolution. "If we fail, we will talk to you about containing 
the violence," he said. But it was Washington's aim to do 
everything possible to prepare Kosovo for its independence. 
Ratney