VZCZCXYZ0069
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0275/01 1301525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101525Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0916
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0097
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0641
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0064
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ENRG CVIS KO YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA, SERBIA, MISSILE 
DEFENSE, AND VISAS 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 269 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 
1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary/Introduction: In a frank, productive 
90-minute conversation May 9, FM Jan Kubis told the 
Ambassador that: 
--Slovakia is still with the EU on voting for a Kosovo 
resolution.  Slovakia would like to finesse the language of 
the UNSCR to avoid direct endorsement for the Ahtisaari plan, 
but still guarantee the clear result outlined by Ahtisaari. 
The decision on co-sponsorship would be made closer to a vote. 
--The impasse in forming a new Serbian government could lead 
to new elections and a greater victory by the Radicals. 
--PM Fico met with a very self-assured and relaxed Putin in 
Moscow.  They discussed the Transpetrol buyback but did not 
make any commitments. 
--Fico's public comments on Missile Defense emphasize the 
need for greater consultations with Europe and Russia, but 
despite the PM's personal objections, Kubis has full 
authority to decide the GOS position on the presence of 
Missile Defense in the Czech Republic and Poland.  Fico 
recognizes the sovereign right of Poland and the Czech 
Republic to decide. 
--Since his return from Washington, Kubis' media message has 
tried to explain the complexities of the Visa Waiver 
legislative process and urge Slovaks not to overstay. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Kubis expressed gratitude for the excellent reception 
and meetings he got in Washington and New York the week of 
April 16.  He described the meetings as useful, friendly, 
open, and pragmatic.  He was glad he had an opportunity to 
"explain" to the Secretary and the NSC what some statements 
from Slovakia and Prime Minister Robert Fico really mean, and 
what they do not mean, on issues such as Kosovo and missile 
defense. 
 
Kosovo: Still In Line, with a few Minor Adjustments 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶3. (C) Kubis said it would be premature for Slovakia to 
commit to co-sponsoring the UN Security Council Resolution on 
Kosovo, and he urged that we give the Slovak delegation the 
latest full draft text so Slovakia can have more input. 
Kubis pointed out that if he agreed to sponsor the UNSCR two 
months ahead of the vote, it would open a hornet's nest in 
the Slovak parliament.  He emphasized that voting with the EU 
on the UNSCR would not be a problem for the GOS.  In fact, he 
was in Qatar May 7 making that very point.  In terms of 
co-sponsorship, however, the underlying message was that we 
should work on finessing the language in the resolution, and 
ask again closer to the vote. 
 
¶4. (C) Kubis said Slovakia's only problem with the "13-points 
paper" (elements of the resolution) was "endorsement" of the 
Ahtisaari plan.  He said the language needed to be finessed 
to make the outcome clear, but to stop short of directly 
endorsing the Ahtisaari plan.  Slovakia was preparing 
suggested alternate language, consistent with that in the 
U.S.-EU Summit document and in PermRep Burian's statement. 
He thanked the U.S. for the goodwill, understanding, and 
flexibility in working out these details, acknowledging, "We 
know we're causing headaches sometimes."  The goal is to 
provide support to the Ahtisaari plan indirectly, for example 
endorsing UNSYG Ban's recommendation.  He mentioned adding 
preambular language that could refer to the recent UNSC 
Mission and note that the international community was taking 
into account the views of Belgrade and Pristina.  MFA 
Political Director Miroslav Lajcak paraphrased that Slovakia 
can accept "Ahtisaari plus or Ahtisaari minus, but not 
Ahtisaari period." 
 
¶5. (C) Primarily, Kubis is interested in hearing more about 
our thinking, saying the lanugage must be finely calibrated 
to do what we want.  He speculated about separating support 
for the "Comprehensive Proposal for Settlement" from 
Ahtisaari's "Report" recommending independence.  Kubis 
appreciated that we had flexibility to endorse the Settlement 
but use lesser language for the Report.  He said this might 
help with the Russians, but he also wondered aloud whether 
not coming to grips with the issue now would only prolong the 
agony for several months. 
 
Russia on Kosovo 
---------------- 
¶6. (C) Fico did discuss Kosovo during his May 4 official 
visit to Moscow, clarifying in private meetings that Slovakia 
would vote with the EU on the UNSCR.  Kubis said there is 
definitely a way to bring Russia around.  They are dancing on 
thin ice.  They will never endorse the Ahtisaari plan or 
impose something on Serbia against Serbia's will, but they 
are looking for a way out.  Titov told Kubis this was not 
about numbers, meaning the substance of the resolution 
mattered much more in their internal decision-making than did 
U.S.-EU unity.  The Russians would rather not veto but were 
willing to do so.  Ivanov told Kubis, "We wish to agree with 
our partners on Kosovo, but if we can't, we don't exclude a 
veto."  Kubis also got the impression from a conversation 
with Lavrov during the Yetsin funeral that the Russians do 
not believe Kosovo is the top priority issue for the Bush 
Administration.  It is certainly not as important as U.S. 
cooperation with Russia on other issues like Iran.  Lavrov 
said Russia understood Serbia's future was in the EU and 
NATO.  On UNSCR 1244, Kubis speculated whether it was 
possible to bring the Russians around through language that 
did not explicitly abolish it so much as simply creating 
another resolution to take us to the next stage. 
 
Fico's Visit to Russia 
---------------------- 
¶7. (C) Kubis described President Vladimir Putin as very 
composed, self-assured, relaxed, even laughing.  His messages 
were strong, but delivered in a calm, relaxed, even gracious 
manner. 
 
¶8. (C) There was no clarity on the fate of Slovakia's 
Transpetrol oil pipeline.  It was discussed but not decided. 
Fico asked Putin to use his influence to clear up the legal 
quagmire so that a sale could go forward.  Russian company 
Gazprom is a leading contender, and Kubis admitted that the 
Russians have the most control over the outcome. 
Nonetheless, he said Economy Minister Jahnatek raised 
Slovakia's four conditions for a sale, like a mantra, at 
meetings at every level. 
 
¶9. (C) Kubis replayed a conversation he had with Igor Ivanov, 
whom he has known for many years and with whom he has very 
frank discussions.  Ivanov lamented a real problem of 
miscommunication with partners in the West.  There are good 
meetings at the top levels, but no channels for negotiation, 
preparation, implementation.  Non-political issues become 
politicized.  The channels are not working, neither with the 
U.S. nor with the EU. Mistakes are being made on all sides. 
Ivanov even admitted that Moscow went too far with its 
threats about the CFE treaty, but now it has become Putin's 
line, and it is too late to fix.  Upcoming elections in both 
the U.S. and Russia will box us in for another year or two, 
Ivanov told Kubis. 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
¶10. (C) Based on both Fico's comments in Moscow--that he 
personally opposed U.S. plans for missile defense in the 
Czech Republic and Poland, would never allow MD on Slovak 
territory, and that Putin had threatened to aim Russian nukes 
at U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe--and additional 
headlines from Fico's May 9 Austria trip criticizing 
insufficient consultation on MD, the Ambassador cautioned 
Kubis that Fico's unhelpful comments were getting old.  These 
were gratuitous shots at the U.S., since we had never asked 
Slovakia for anything.  Kubis said he understood our concern, 
but he defended Fico's line about insufficient consultation, 
saying that it was a common refrain in Europe.  Mainstream 
Europeans are ambivalent.  The perception of lack of greater 
consultations "gave the Russians a chance to play with all of 
us." 
 
¶11. (C) Kubis pointed out that in all official meetings, Fico 
emphasized that the GOS position on MD will respect 
Slovakia's commitments as a NATO member, that Kubis was 
representing the government's policy on this issue, and that 
it was the sovereign right of the Czech Republic and Poland 
to decide.  Kubis said Fico could have cut him off any number 
of times, but the PM only expressed support: "This is my 
foreign minister, and he speaks for the GOS policy."  Kubis 
said that Fico is a politician, and his voters expect a 
certain line, but he was really trying to control himself 
 
within certain limits. 
 
¶12. (C) In Fico's meeting, Putin laughed out loud when 
talking about missile defense, asking rhetorically if the 
Americans really thought the Russians were so naive.  He said 
it would be a dangerous game to bring nuclear weapons into 
Central Europe, where currently there are none, and that MD 
was part of a U.S. strategy to install an automized system of 
nuclear weapons.  He told Fico that the U.S. had offered to 
test the system against Russian missiles, to make sure it 
works.  Then, with no humor at all, Putin calmly said, "So if 
they (American MD facilities) come, we'll point our missiles 
at them."  Kubis said, "I'm not sure the Russians are 
bluffing.  So now it's coming back to Europe, two nuclear 
states targeting us." 
 
Serbia 
------ 
¶13. (C) Kubis interprets the new head of parliament's 
election as Kostunica's final warning shot to Tadic, "Give me 
everything I want or I will go with the Radicals."  However, 
Tadic's own political supporters will never allow this. Kubis 
and his team are worried that events in Serbia are leading to 
new elections that will result in gains for the Radicals.  On 
the one hand, this will relieve Kostunica and Tadic of 
responsibility for losing Kosovo, but it will not lead to a 
brighter future for Serbs. 
 
Visas 
----- 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Kubis about being too 
optimistic about Visa Waiver legislation in the Homeland 
Security Bill.  Kubis said he well understood the legislative 
complexities, and in his media appearances since his return 
from the U.S. he had tried to explain the situation, in 
addition to urging Slovaks not to overstay.  As a result, 
Slovaks had criticized him for not fighting hard enough for 
visa-free travel, but Kubis would keep to his message. 
VALLEE