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Viewing cable 07NICOSIA301, NATIONALISTS AND DEEP STATE STIRRING THE "TRNC" POT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NICOSIA301 2007-04-05 07:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO5632
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0301/01 0950757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050757Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7713
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0833
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: NATIONALISTS AND DEEP STATE STIRRING THE "TRNC" POT 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 140 
     B. NICOSIA 151 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In recent months, nationalist elements in 
the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" appear to be 
manufacturing and/or exploiting events in order to pressure 
pro-solution "President" Mehmet Ali Talat and "Prime 
Minister" Ferdi Soyer to toe a harder line more consistent 
with policies of the mainland Turkish "Deep State." 
Instigators may also intend to affect Turkish presidential 
and parliamentary elections by putting in play the "national 
issue" of Cyprus.  While we cannot assess the campaign's 
success in Ankara, the nationalist drumbeat here has forced 
Talat to look continually over his shoulder, vacillating as 
he contemplates negotiations under the July 8 Process 
framework.  Still regrouping after a series of electoral 
defeats, local nationalist parties such as Tahsin 
Ertugruloglu's UBP have not yet been able to craft a credible 
opposition message to take full advantage of Talat's 
shrinking political stature.  Soyer, in fact, has assured the 
Ambassador that the majority of Turkish Cypriots still 
support his "government."  Nonetheless, the political tide in 
the Turkish Cypriot community seems to be turning right, 
dampening hopes for movement on Cyprus Problem settlement 
negotiations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RELATIONS GETTING DOWNRIGHT UGLY 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Relations between "President" Talat's CTP-led 
"government" and local representatives of the Turkish "Deep 
State" have grown increasingly strained in 2007 (Ref A). 
With elections in Ankara around the corner, hard-line Turkish 
nationalist elements on Cyprus appear bent on injecting the 
Cyprus card into the mainland political process.  Should the 
AKP (which has strongly backed Talat and the CTP) lose 
political ground in Turkish elections later this year, 
anti-solution nationalists in the Turkish Cypriot community 
hope they will emerge from the political wilderness to which 
they have been exiled since the 2004 Annan Plan referendum 
and the end of the Denktash regime.  Right-wing groups, 
therefore, have stepped up their public sniping against 
Talat, Soyer, and the CTP "government" -- often with brazenly 
open support from mainland Turkish military brass stationed 
here.  A recent series of incidents, all widely reported in 
the Turkish Cypriot press, have provided ammunition for 
reactionary critics of the Talat administration.  It is 
unclear whether these incidents have been manufactured or 
merely seized upon as targets of opportunity -- but taken 
together, they smell of a nationalist smear campaign against 
the north's erstwhile pro-solution civilian leadership. 
 
--------------- 
Yet More Flags? 
--------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) In January, for example, an organization calling 
itself the "Flag at the Summit Association" began publicly 
lobbying to fly two massive flags on the summit of Besparmak 
(Pentadaktylos, in Greek) Mountain, a garish complement to 
the half-mile-long Turkish Cypriot flag painted on a 
prominent hillside closer to Nicosia.  The organization 
reportedly is holding fund-raisers to raise the 80,000 YTL 
($56,500) required for the project.  In early February, 
members garnered additional press coverage by conducting a 
tree-planting event on the slopes of Besparmak.  While the 
mainstream media, much of which still supports Talat, has 
tried to starve the story of oxygen, few have criticized the 
flag initiative.  One pro-solution activist privately told us 
that although most Turkish Cypriots understand that 
poke-in-the-eye gestures like this will only complicate 
settlement prospects, very few people are willing to be seen 
speaking out "against the flag" in the current, charged 
environment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Debate Over 1963 "Bathtub Massacre" Proves Irresistible 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  (SBU) In late February, public debate in the Turkish 
Cypriot community over an iconic photograph brought an 
immediate response from the nationalists.  The photo depicted 
a T/C family brutally murdered in the bathtub of their 
Nicosia home during the December 1963 outbreak of 
inter-communal violence in Cyprus.  Their killers are 
generally believed to have been Greek Cypriot EOKA 
 
NICOSIA 00000301  002 OF 003 
 
 
guerrillas; the famous photograph of the crime scene is 
etched in every Turkish Cypriot's brain, and "government" 
officials long ago transformed the home into the much-visited 
"Museum of Barbarism."  In a February 27 interview with 
prominent newspaper "Kibris," however, a former Turkish 
Resistance Organization (TMT) fighter cast doubt on the 
circumstances in which the photo was taken, claiming that he 
had discovered the corpses elsewhere and moved them to the 
bathtub for greater shock effect.  Far-left daily "Afrika" 
went further, publishing allegations that Turkish 
nationalists themselves committed the murders in hopes of 
provoking Turkey's intervention to end the inter-communal 
clashes. 
 
5.  (SBU) Few mainstream Turkish Cypriots accepted Afrika's 
revisionist version of events (and indeed, despite some doubt 
about where the family was killed, no serious evidence has 
emerged suggesting that anyone other than EOKA pulled the 
trigger).  Nonetheless, nationalist veterans' groups, led by 
the Turkish Cypriot Fighters' Association, used press 
coverage of the story to re-ignite public discussion of Greek 
Cypriot "barbarism" -- and slander any traitors who 
questioned the long-held "official" version of events.  They 
orchestrated the return to the island of the husband/father 
of the victims, Brigadier General (retired) Nihat Ilhan, a 
former Turkish Army physician, who was feted by NGOs and 
political parties alike as he attended "Martyrs' Day" events. 
 Pressed for comment, Talat described as "false and shameful" 
the suggestion that ethnic Turks had perpetrated the 
massacre.  Other politicians hurriedly declared their support 
for Ilhan -- and, by extension, for Turkey. 
 
----------------------- 
Shake HIS Hand?  Never! 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (U) A "handshake crisis" erupted on March 18 when the 
Commander of the Turkish forces on the island, Lieutenant 
General Hayri Kivrikoglu, allegedly refused to shake "Prime 
Minister" Ferdi Soyer's hand at a dinner reception in honor 
of Ilhan.  The two argued at the dinner, and Soyer reportedly 
stormed out.  According to a right-wing journalist who 
published an "expose" on the spat in the press, Kivrikoglu 
told Soyer he would not shake the hand of a "Prime Minister" 
who did not play the (Turkish) national anthem or hang 
Ataturk posters and Turkish flags at his party's general 
assembly earlier that day.  Soyer insisted that there had 
been posters and flags (which were, indeed, visible on 
television coverage of the event).  "Don't you believe we are 
Turkish?" Soyer reportedly asked the general.  "Prove you 
are!" Kivrikoglu replied. 
 
7.  (C) Reaction to the Soyer-Kivrikoglu spat was widespread 
and broke along ideological lines.  Tahsin Ertugruloglu of 
the right-wing UBP endorsed the general's behavior, calling 
it "a natural reaction to bad conduct."  In a subsequent 
meeting with the Ambassador, he commented that that if Soyer 
did not behave like a "proper 'Prime Minister,'" he should 
expect "ugly incidents."  Soyer and the CTP should decide to 
which "state" they belong.  Retired Fighters' Association 
chairman Salih Direktor urged Soyer to apologize to the 
Turkish Cypriot people for not defending them adequately, for 
having changed school history texts (Ref B) to "appease" 
Greek Cypriots, and for singing a socialist anthem, rather 
than the national anthem, at his party congress.  Eighteen 
opposition mayors visited Kivrikoglu March 22 to express 
their gratitude to Turkey for respecting the martyrs, the 
flag, and the national anthem. 
 
8.  (SBU) Scrambling to protect their right flank, members of 
the ruling CTP echoed Soyer's defense of the party's 
"Turkishness."  Party Secretary General Omer Kalyoncu was 
quick to point out, however, that "certain circles" were 
using the handshake scandal for political point-scoring -- 
disrespecting the "free will of the Turkish Cypriot people," 
who had elected CTP on its pro-solution platform.  He blamed 
the UBP for "hiding behind Kivrikoglu."  Calls from 
pro-solution NGOs for the general to apologize (and butt out 
of politics) went unheeded. 
 
------------------------------- 
Smoothing Things Over...For Now 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The CTP-led civilian "government" is clearly worried 
about the implications of an open fight with the military -- 
especially after this year's bruising fight between Talat and 
the army over the removal of the Ledra Street bridge.  "PM" 
Soyer has made public moves to put the handshake episode 
 
NICOSIA 00000301  003 OF 003 
 
 
behind him.  During a "Martyrs' Commemoration" speech on 
March 25, he made soothing noises toward the army, declaring 
that there should be no ill-will between Turkey and the 
"TRNC." Kivrikoglu's deputy, Major General Mehmet Eroz, 
reportedly made a point of immediately shaking Soyer's hand. 
It is unclear that this charm offensive has been totally 
effective, however.  April 2 press reports quoted Kivrikoglu 
saying he would never forgive Soyer for disrespecting 
Turkishness. 
 
10. (C) In private, CTP insiders understand that their cold 
war with the military and their UBP allies is far from over. 
Soyer privately told the Ambassador March 27 that 
anti-solution forces (both here and on the mainland) "hate" 
him.  Nationalist forces were trying to destroy the CTP's 
pro-solution base of support, he said, by provoking the party 
of Talat to take uncharacteristic, hard-line steps.  The UBP 
was hoping to exploit tension on the island that was spiking 
in response to upcoming presidential elections in Turkey, 
Soyer continued.  The "PM" was confident, however, that the 
majority of Turkish Cypriots still supported his government. 
 
11. (C)  CTP's greatest asset may indeed prove to be the 
weakness of nationalist feeling in the north.  Although hope 
for Cyprus reunification and support for the EU have both 
fallen precipitously in the T/C community, Ertugruloglu 
conceded recently to the Ambassador that his nationalist, 
anti-solution UBP did not yet have a lock on mainstream 
Turkish Cypriot sympathies.  Nonetheless, the party has been 
clearly seeking to capitalize on its ideological similarities 
to the "Deep State" -- credible rumors abound that the 
military has been funding the UBP, veterans' groups, and 
other nationalist forces that clearly hope to muster greater 
public support over time. 
 
------------------------------------- 
But Tension Likely To Bubble Up Again 
------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  We have yet to see a smoking gun that 
links Besparmak, the Bathtub Murders, and the handshake row. 
Nor is it certain that nationalist forces manufactured these 
particular scandals as part of a broader effort to discredit 
Talat, Soyer or the CTP.  Nonetheless, the right wing has 
taken advantage of these and similar events and hopes they 
can help it gather political steam.  While public bickering 
over the handshake and bathtub seem certain to fade, the 
underlying animosity between the "TRNC government" and 
nationalists (including the UBP, the DP of Serdar Denktash, 
the Turkish military, and army proxies like the T/C Fighters' 
Association) seems set to spike as Turkish elections draw 
near.  Political friction in north Cyprus is at least partly 
a proxy battle between Erdogan's AKP and the mainland "Deep 
State." 
 
13.  (C) Meanwhile, Soyer's fears that the nationalists were 
attempting to provoke Talat to move right are more than 
well-founded; we'd say a turn already has occurred.  One 
might only look to the July 8 UN process for proof  Despite 
signing the agreement eight months ago and pledging to 
implement it in a November exchange of letters with UN Under 
Secretary Gambari, it now appears "President" Talat is 
 
SIPDIS 
seeking to ditch the document and return to the 2004 Annan 
Plan as a basis for CyProb negotiations, a complete 
non-starter on the Greek Cypriot side.  Nationalist pressures 
undoubtedly underpin Talat's backwards slide into 
inflexibility. 
 
14  (C) Talat's credibility at home and internationally is 
best-served politically by returning to his pro-solution beat 
and supporting the Gambari framework; this is especially true 
now, when RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos is scoring 
significant political points by showing uncharacteristic 
flexibility.  In his meetings with Talat, Soyer, and other 
Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Ambassador has stressed that an 
active UN process would help reduce tension between 
nationalists and pro-settlement forces in northern Cyprus and 
keep the island from being used as a political pawn in 
mainland Turkish politics and Turkey's EU accession 
negotiation.  We will continue to urge an immediate start to 
the Working Groups/Technical Committees process, although 
serious Turkish Cypriot engagement will require encouragement 
from Ankara -- from both AKP and the military.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER