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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAHA 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/25/2032 
TAGS: PGOV MARR JA
SUBJECT: LOWEST OKINAWAN VOTER TURNOUT SINCE REVERSION, CONSERVATIVE 
WINS UPPER HOUSE BY-ELECTION, REFORMIST WINS GINOWAN MAYORAL RACE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Carmela A Conroy, Acting Consul General, U.S. 
Consulate General Naha, U.S. Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  Summary:   Just 47.8% of Okinawa's eligible voters turned 
out for the national Diet upper house by-election, the lowest 
rate of participation in a national-level election since 
Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japan.  The ruling coalition's young 
female candidate defeated the consolidated reformist parties' 
candidate by a 5.5% margin.  LDP leaders hope, and opposition 
leaders suspect, that Aiko SHIMAJIRI's victory will make it more 
difficult for the presumed female reformist candidate to succeed 
in the July upper house elections.  The opposition candidate and 
the restive parties backing him failed to find a winning 
campaign theme.  In Ginowan City, the anti-base incumbent mayor 
easily fended off a weak conservative opponent.  Yoichi IHA took 
nearly 55% of the vote due to his challenger's "boring," 
unmotivated stumping style.  Opposition parties and the media 
are struggling to cope with an Okinawan public increasingly 
interested in candidates who might thicken Okinawan pocketbooks, 
rather than those promising to lighten the military "burden." 
End Summary. 
 
LDP/Komeito's Unlikely Candidate Takes Previously Reformist 
Upper House Seat 
¶2.  (C) As predicted by Okinawa's conservative and reformist 
party leadership alike, the inexperienced, unknown conservative 
candidate defeated her inexperienced, unknown reformist opponent 
in the upper house National Diet by-election.  ConGen Naha's 
impression of both candidates was that they were both utterly 
lacking in experience to prepare them for national-level elected 
office.  Nevertheless, language school owner-operator and 
mother-of-four Aiko SHIMAJIRI, 42, won the Upper House 
by-election, backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s 
heaviest hitters. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Early on, LDP leadership chortled about the superior 
visual appeal of Aiko SHIMAJIRI relative to the reformist 
candidate, former Rengo Okinawa chairman Yoshimasa KARIMATA. 
Throughout the campaign Shimajiri stayed on message, saying she 
intended to change politics "from the kitchen" and focus on 
social welfare issues.  She deflected all questions regarding 
military base issues by saying she would hew to the positions of 
conservative governor Hirokazu NAKAIMA.  Prime Minister Shinzo 
ABE stumped on Shimajiri's behalf on Okinawa's main island as 
well as in Miyako Jima, hometown of Shimajiri's opponent, as 
well as her husband and in-laws. 
 
 
NAHA 00000065  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  LDP Executive Director Hiroshi NAKAMATSU told us 
Shimajiri's win would give the LDP/Komeito alliance a head start 
on the July upper house elections.  The Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ)'s executive director Yasuhiro ARAKAKI and Sozo's 
Acting President Hiroshi GOYA confided to us that Shimajiri's 
candidacy had nothing to do with her qualifications, and 
everything to do with the July elections.  The presumed 
reformist candidate in July would be the Okinawa Socialist 
Masses Party (OSMP)'s Keiko ITOKAZU, who surrendered the upper 
house seat being contested in this by-election to run for 
prefectural governor in November 2006.  Shimajiri's election 
would put a spike through Itokazu's attempt to return to the 
upper house, they theorized, because Okinawan voters were 
unlikely to send two women in a row to the Diet. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The week before the April 22 election, opposition party 
chiefs seemed resigned to their loss.  The DPJ's Arakaki 
acknowledged that Karimata was a weak campaigner, and his 
supporting parties fragmented.  Arakaki admitted to being 
conflicted because Shimajiri's husband, Noboru, was a founding 
member of the DPJ's Okinawa branch.  Local contacts told the 
Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) that Karimata had 
counted on his Miyako Jima connections bringing the vote, both 
at home and with Miyako Jima "expats" living in Okinawa's Urasoe 
City.  Instead, the contacts said, Shimajiri's in-laws' superior 
popularity carried the day for their "yamatonchu" 
(mainland-born) daughter-in-law. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Early in his campaign Karimata stumbled by calling for 
the total elimination of bases from Okinawa--shaking his DPJ 
support.  He later angered supporters on the other end of the 
spectrum by seemingly downplaying the importance of base issues. 
 He published a ten-point manifesto, with base issues in ninth 
place on the list.  Questioned about that during a debate 
sponsored by the Ryukyu Shimpo, Karimata denied that the issues' 
position on the list was significant, and claimed all ten topics 
were of equal importance.  Later in the campaign Karimata 
avoided military issues except when pushed by the media.  His 
main theme was that he would work on eliminating the income 
disparity between Okinawa and mainland Japan, but he never 
developed this into a rallying cry.  After the election, a 
high-ranking official in Karimata's campaign told reporters that 
labor just couldn't compete with the well-funded LDP machine and 
business organizations. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Okinawa Times noted that the DPJ's participation in 
Karimata's campaign (and Okinawan politics at large) was 
complicating reformists' "joint struggle."  The Okinawa Times 
reported that even Rengo's national headquarters did not 
formally declare its support for Karimata "until the end" 
 
NAHA 00000065  003 OF 005 
 
 
because it was unhappy about DPJ-driven changes to Karimata's 
campaign themes.  NCIS learned from their contacts that the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) decided to concentrate its 
resources on the Ginowan mayoral race, and paid lip service only 
to Karimata's campaign.  OSMP's and its star Itokazu's support 
for Karimata was lukewarm, as they were still grumbling that 
Rengo had put insufficient energy behind Itokazu in the November 
'06 gubernatorial campaign.  Sozo, a political party founded by 
former LDP maverick Mikio SHIMOJI, left its members free to vote 
as they wished. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Just  47.8% of Okinawa's eligible voters turned out for 
this national Diet upper house by-election, the lowest rate of 
participation in a national-level election since Okinawa's 1972 
reversion to Japan.  It "bested" the previous record low, 54.24% 
for the 2004 upper house election, by over six points. 
Shimajiri received 255,862 votes, Karimata 228,844 votes, and 
virtually invisible independent candidate Hiroyuki KINJO took 
just 9,142 votes. 
 
Anti-Military Gadfly Iha Retains Ginowan City Mayor's Office 
¶9.  (C)  The reformist incumbent Ginowan City mayor, Yoichi IHA, 
55, easily defended his seat from a conservative challenger. 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is located roughly in 
the center of Ginowan City, population around 100,000.  Iha has 
been a vocal opponent of MCAS Futenma, and his anti-base 
initiatives have included putting bumper stickers and magnets 
demanding MCAS Futenma be closed on municipal vehicles. 
Conservative contacts believed he was vulnerable, however, 
because he paid too little attention to running the city, and 
too much to quixotic anti-base activities. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Our contacts said that the result in Ginowan City was 
not so much Iha winning, as conservative candidate Shingi HOKAMA 
losing.  Prefectural Vice Governor Zengi NAKAZATO complained to 
ConGen Maher that Hokama had pledged to use his Ginowan City 
retirement bonus to fund his campaign, then reneged and expected 
the LDP to make up the difference.  The LDP's Nakamatsu 
characterized Hokama as a boring speaker who was too lazy or 
haughty to actively campaign.  The LDP wrote Ginowan City off as 
a loss well before the election.  Prime Minister Abe did not 
visit Ginowan City during his April 15 visit to Okinawa, 
Nakamatsu said, to avoid giving Iha grounds to claim he had 
defeated the LDP at the highest level. 
 
¶11.  (C)  With two races to draw them, 60.39% of registered 
voters in Ginowan City participated in the April 22 elections. 
In the mayoral race, Iha took 21,643 votes to Hokama's 17,801. 
In the upper house by-election, Ginowan City voters chose 
conservative candidate Shimajiri (20,247 votes) over reformist 
 
NAHA 00000065  004 OF 005 
 
 
candidate Karimata (17,989 votes).  During the last 
gubernatorial election, the majority in Ginowan City voted for 
conservative Nakaima.  We believe that Ginowan voters' choices 
demonstrate that candidates' personal strengths-or lack 
thereof-are more important than their party support.   Iha's win 
was a sign of Hokama's unpopularity, not of Ginowan City voters' 
support for the reformist agenda. 
 
Reformists Struggling to Adapt to Voters' Rebalanced Concerns 
¶12.  (C)  Bashing the military and military bases has long been 
a staple of reformist campaigning in Okinawa.  The results of 
two 2006 elections shook Okinawan reformist politicians' faith 
in that platform.  In January 2006, voters in Nago City chose a 
conservative mayor who pledged to work for economic 
development-and would work with the central government to ensure 
local concerns were taken into account in relocating MCAS 
Futenma to Nago City.   Reformist candidates pledged to demand 
economic development and reject the FRF. 
 
¶13.  (C)  In November 2006, Okinawans chose as their governor a 
former Ministry of Finance bureaucrat and Okinawa Electric 
Company leader who focused on pocketbook issues.  His opponent 
was reformist super-star and long-time anti-base absolutist 
Itokazu, who had in her 2005 upper house Diet election drawn 
more votes than any candidate in any Okinawan race before, or 
since.  Prior to the gubernatorial race, LDP leaders told us 
that facing Itokazu as the sole opposition candidate was their 
worst-case scenario.  In the end, though, voters decided Nakaima 
could better deliver on the issues they cared most about: their 
pocketbooks. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Reformists are finally acting on what opinion surveys 
and voters have repeatedly shown, that Okinawans now place 
higher priority on pocketbook ("kurashi") issues (unemployment, 
access to health care, income) than on military base ("kichi") 
issues.  As one OSMP leader put it during the campaign, "The 
serious disparities (in individual incomes, assets, jobs) 
throughout the island are increasing and causing social 
distress.  Even with equality in opportunity, this situation is 
serious and needs to be addressed." 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Karimata and his supporters tried to focus on 
pocketbook and welfare issues.  Only when prodded (usually by 
one of the local daily newspapers), would they roll out their 
traditional talking points on "base problems."  They would note 
the need for closing MCAS Futenma immediately and relocating it 
outside the prefecture, or preferably, outside the country. 
The more extreme reformists would rail against strengthening the 
"base functions" in Okinawa.  Quickly, however, they would 
return to "kurashi" issues. 
 
NAHA 00000065  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) On April 5 the Okinawa Times expressed its irritation 
that both upper house candidates were avoiding base issues. 
"For the people of this prefecture," the editors asserted, 
"there are no issues more important than base transformation and 
Futenma relocation and the elimination of the safety issues 
regarding the facility."  The paper's editors added that, "(The 
two candidates) must make clear their positions on base issues, 
including the big changes that are taking place at Kadena Air 
Base regarding the deployment of the Patriot missiles and F-22 
and the parachute jumps." 
 
¶17.  (SBU) On April 17, the Okinawa Times ran a more forceful 
editorial in response to a poll it recently conducted with the 
Asahi Shimbun.  The poll showed that 64% of Okinawan voters 
responded that "kurashi" issues were their top concern in the 
election, and just 15% cited "kichi" issues as the most 
important topic.  "What is this all about?" the editors fumed. 
"Have the people of Okinawa forgotten the pain associated with 
the unresolved base issues such as Futenma relocation -- ten 
years after the release of the [Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa] final report?" 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In an April 23 editorial, the Ryukyu Shimpo 
acknowledged that the voters showed that they were interested in 
"realistic responses" to practical issues, rather than 
philosophical "island of bases" versus "island of peace" 
arguments traditionally dividing reformists from conservatives 
in Okinawa.  Okinawa Times editors admitted there was public 
support for Shimajiri's theme, that "kurashi no mondai" 
(lifestyle problems) had superceded "kichi no mondai" (base 
problems). 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Both papers went on to argue that, despite the ruling 
parties' victory, the GOJ must tread carefully on the Futenma 
replacement facility, as it could be interpreted as increasing 
the base burden on Okinawa, ergo increasing the "disparity" 
between Okinawa and mainland Japan.  The Okinawa Times chided 
its readers, "We must not turn our eyes away from the historical 
facts regarding the oppression of the peoples' "kurashi" by the 
U.S. base presence."   The Ryukyu Shimpo asserted that the July 
elections -- the most important political battle of the year -- 
would be a referendum on the Abe Administration.  Comment: We 
have observed that, for the Okinawa newspapers, the next 
election is invariably the most important political battle of 
the year.  End Comment. 
CONROY