VZCZCXRO3904
PP RUEHMR RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0637/01 1131540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231540Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6959
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S 
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2032 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL PGOV KPKO PINS PINR
KDEM, EAID, MOPS, AU-1, IO, SU 
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UN AND AEC 
OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cameron R. Hume.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Khartoum's rejection of the international 
community's concept for Darfur peacekeeping continues to 
impede resolution of the crisis.  UN officials caution, 
however, that UN bureacratic obstacles -- and a dearth of 
willing troop-contributing countries -- will delay force 
deployment for a potential six months.  International 
observers maintain that President Bashir appears increasingly 
oriented toward historic divide and conquer strategies and a 
belief that Sudan can weather international reaction.  This 
hardening occurs despite divergent viewpoints within Bashir's 
inner circle, and growing domestic unhappiness over Darfur. 
The Deputy Secretary noted it is not clear that Khartoum has 
decided that working with the international community is in 
its best interest. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Discussion at the Deputy Secretary's April 15 dinner 
with Acting UN Special Representative for the Secretary 
General Taye Zerihoun, Assessment and Evaluation Commission 
Chairman Tom Vraalsen, and UNOCHA Humanitarian Coordinator 
Manuel da Silva centered on the strategy and psyche of 
Khartoum's political leadership, and how to leverage that to 
resolve Darfur.  The Deputy Secretary observed that he found 
little reason for optimism during the course of his visit. 
The Deputy Secretary noted it is not clear that Khartoum has 
decided that working with the international community is in 
its best interest.  Vraalsen endorsed the Deputy's 
assessment, noting the government continues to play out the 
strategy utilized against the South.  They have set their 
minds on a course, and intend to follow it. 
 
------------------- 
THE SUDANESE PSYCHE 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Zerihoun questioned whether the political landscape 
was so clear cut.  Politically, Khartoum has lost a lot in 
Darfur, he argued.  If elections were held today in Darfur, 
Bashir would lose.  The National Congress Party is not 
popular, burdened by past atrocities in the South and the 
West.  Vraalsen countered that neither the SPLM nor the NCP 
are sure about their chances in the 2009 comprehensive 
elections.  Zerihoun agreed, but speculated that the NCP will 
push the SPLM to stand on the unity card (a unified "New 
Sudan" along the lines of the vision of the late John Garang) 
in order to strengthen its hand.  The SPLM's hesitancy to 
develop a strong platform in the face of a looming 2011 
southern plebiscite would fractUre an otherwise secured v/te.Q 
 
¶4. (C) Both0d! Sihva afd ZriHot^,`hnWevev, strecsd!surrd.tQQ4mnseo~ Weuhi(BQwirgs!yb.er{irclu-@ xc onFm2noEbuQm5JhmCmo%3gdt` qn%Q!ib5takQy,0j~st3er`m@nh&aurE{Ql/Q 
Ygcgm{$aBgqmc QEm|Qb`6)h}ag#C5}9$un4(|Hyay|{ l%EqE6e&r(QV[:_0.Q*4sYu`Q~PQk!Yi5`6[dqE~Q`::c uaxYQe.  "But," the Acting SRSG admitted, 
"old patterns still persist.  Khartoum continues to raise the 
stakes when that is no longer necessary." 
 
¶5. (C) Hume assessed that Khartoum's calculus assumes that we 
will always pay for AMIS no matter how ineffective.  The 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs agreed, noting 
Rwandan President Kagame's criticism that AMIS' continuing 
presence in Darfur allows us avoid serious decisions.  The 
Deputy Secretary noted that it is clear that Bashir has not 
yet embraced the idea that the international community could 
be of use.  Cooperation early on could have yielded a 
short-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur similar to Sierra 
Leone.  Stability in the region would have lessened the 
current political pressures on his inner circle. 
 
¶6. (C) Da Silva urged the dinner's participants to recognize 
that Bashir is less of a president and more a referee 
balancing competing powers and players.  The Assistant 
Secretary disagreed, noting "that may have been the case 
 
SIPDIS 
during the Naivasha peace process which culminated in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but Darfur is different. 
Bashir is the embodiment of the obstacle."  Khartoum,s 
approach is his approach.  The Fall 2006 military campaign to 
rout DPA opponents following its May 2005 signing, and now 
the divisive approach to a political solution, stem directly 
from him. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000637  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
HYBRID IMPEDIMENTS: KHARTOUM AND THE UN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) According to Zerihoun, competing interpretations of a 
hybrid force were the largest obstacle to deploying 
peacekeepers to Darfur.  Khartoum defines the hybrid as a 
UN-bankrolled AMIS supplemented by the UN light and heavy 
support packages.  UNSC members see a robust UN peacekeeping 
mission complementing the existing AMIS force.  The heavy 
support package costs $300 million dollars.  Bashir believes 
incorrectly that this covers the addition of 3,500 UN 
peacekeeping personnel plus the current AMIS force. 
 
¶8. (C) Zerihoun also revealed UN thinking on the hybrid's 
mandate at odds with U.S. policy.  He noted that a new 
resolution would provide a Chapter VI mandate.  At most, he 
argued, it might include Chapter VII elements, but it was 
clear a new resolution would be required.  The Deputy 
countered, disagreeing with Zerihoun's approach.  "You can't 
let Khartoum out from underneath a Chapter VII mandate in 
exchange for a peacekeeping force."  The Acting SRSG 
maintained that UNSCR 1706 covered a period when the 
international community believed AMIS would be transitioning 
to a UN peacekeeping force.  The AU/UN hybrid option was not 
that force, and its Chapter VII mandate does not apply.  The 
Assistant Secretary pressed for details from Zerihoun on the 
latest vision for hybrid peacekeeping operations, 
particularly those linked to command and control.  Zerihoun 
clarified that the AU/UN Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa 
would not impact UN command over peacekeepers in the field. 
There would be a similar cell in El Fasher, in addition to AU 
officers assigned to New York and UN officers assigned to 
Addis. 
 
¶9. (C) This is a difficult period to launch a peacekeeping 
mission, Zerihoun continued.  The UN is overstretched, and in 
the wake of procurement scandals such as the Oil for Food 
program, the bureaucracy has become more cumbersome.  "Look 
at the timeframe we are working under -- the AMIS mandate 
expires in two and half months.  UN assistance to AMIS was 
agreed upon in November.  It is now April, and we are nowhere 
close to where we need to be on personnel."  The difficulties 
we are facing with light and heavy support are a fraction of 
what we will face attracting troop contributing countries for 
the hybrid force.  Even with assessed dues, only three or 
four African nations have said they would contribute to a 
hybrid mission. 
 
---------------------------- 
DARFUR: HOW TO MOVE FORWARD? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked why the Darfur Joint 
Assessment Mission remained incomplete.  Da Silva noted that 
while the security situation had a slight impact, the 
decision to suspend the DJAM was a political one -- 
completing the humanitarian assessment would give Khartoum 
cover to orchestrate its plans for Darfur under the cover of 
an international flag.  The Deputy Secretary and USAID's Bill 
Garvelink pressed for reconsideration of this decision, 
particularly as rebel groups splinter further. 
 
¶11. (C) Zerihoun queried the Deputy Secretary about whether 
improved bilateral relations between Khartoum and Washington 
might improve the chance for a sustainable solution to Darfur 
and the situation on the ground.  "We played that card," the 
Assistant Secretary stressed, "and they did not accept it." 
The Deputy Secretary continued that the Sudanese appear 
unable to see their way forward -- they want improved 
bilateral relations and a free hand to continue to manage 
Darfur as they have to date."  Vraalsen argued that the 
current impasse requires the U.S. to hit Khartoum hard -- 
giving those questioning Bashir's strategy a chance to move 
to the fore.  Khartoum feels comfortable, they won the 1706 
battle -- the international community blinked.  The Charge 
followed Vraalsen's point, noting that with revenue 
shortfalls stemming from poor sales of Sudanese heavy acidic 
crude oil selling 50% below market value and an expanding 
budget deficit, sanctions may be timely enough to do the 
trick. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Participants 
 
USG Participants 
 
KHARTOUM 00000637  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer 
NSC Director for African Affairs Bobby Pittman 
USAID Advisor Bill Garvelink 
Charge d'Affaires Cameron R. Hume 
D Staff Gustavo Delgado 
D Staff Ted Wittenshein 
Political Officer Erin Y. Tariot 
 
Guests 
 
Acting SRSG Taye Zerihoun 
UNOCHA Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator Manuel da Silva 
AEC Chairman Ambassador Tom Vraalsen 
UNMIS Advisor Joshua Lincoln 
UNMIS Advisor Karin Wermsterner 
HUME