Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07IRANRPODUBAI26, UNODC OFFICIAL VIEWS IRAN DRUG CHIEF REPLACEMENT A SIGN OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07IRANRPODUBAI26.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI26 2007-04-23 16:01 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Iran RPO Dubai
VZCZCXRO3921
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0026/01 1131601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 231601Z APR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0101
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0058
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0094
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IRAN, INL, INR, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/23/2027 
TAGS: IR KCRM PGOV PREL PINR SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIAL VIEWS IRAN DRUG CHIEF REPLACEMENT A SIGN OF 
HARDLINER RESURGENCE 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  The head of Tehran's UNODC office sees the 
recent dismissal of Fada Hossein Maleki as head of the Drug 
Control Headquarter as a sign that President Ahmadi-Nejad got 
the upper hand over Expediency Council head Rafsanjani. 
Although appointed by Ahmadi-Nejad, Maleki reportedly moved into 
Rafsanjani's camp as he came to see value in international 
engagement on the drug issue.  When he reportedly confronted 
Ahmadi-Nejad over the president's decision not to let him attend 
a ministerial level meeting in Vienna, Ahmadi-Nejad fired him 
but was unable to actually get rid of him until the crisis over 
the British sailors strengthened his position over pragmatists, 
in Arbitrio's view.  The UN official noted that while he 
believed hardliners currently had the upper hand in Iran, the 
internal political dynamics could shift again. He also said 
Iranians increasingly recognize that their own government is the 
source of Iran's tense international relations.  End summary. 
 
2.(S/NF) UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Tehran-based Field 
rep Roberto Arbitrio (Italian citizen, please protect) opined in 
an April 21 meeting with IRPOffs that the recent dismissal of 
Fada Hossein Maleki as secretary-general of the Drug Control 
Headquarters demonstrates that currently hardliners have the 
upper hand in Iran.  Arbitrio's account fills in holes from 
recent conflicting reports in the Iranian press whether or not 
Maleki was on his way out, prior to the definitive news of 
Brigadier General Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moqaddam's swearing-in April 
ΒΆ11.  Arbitrio's assessment is based on a conversation between 
his staff and Maleki and therefore only tells Maleki's side of 
the story.  Arbitrio's updates on the drug situation in Iran and 
Iran's regional cooperation to be provided septel. 
 
Maleki unemployed or not? 
------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) As background, Arbitrio said that when UNODC Director 
General Costa visited Iran in November 2006, Maleki appealed to 
him for assistance in helping Iran approach the international 
community on the drug issue via Afghanistan and specifically 
NATO.  Maleki's interest in international engagement, Arbitrio 
said, was the result of UNODC's efforts over a year and a half 
to convince him of the benefits of such activities.  He noted 
that in Costa's subsequent meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad, the 
president did not specifically reiterate the point about 
reaching out to NATO, calling only for regional engagement. 
Nonetheless, UNODC assumed his endorsement, given that Maleki 
was seen as close to Ahmadi-Nejad, who had appointed him. 
 
4.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio, Costa took this request on board 
and worked on organizing a ministerial level delegation from 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to address major donors in 
Vienna.  When he heard the meeting was moving ahead, Maleki was 
reportedly very happy and grateful, and said he would attend. 
However, when the Iranian authorities sent passports to the 
Tehran UNODC office for the trip, Maleki's was missing.  Late 
February, UNODC in Tehran heard that perhaps Maleki would not go 
and perhaps no one else would go either.  However, in Vienna, 
the Iranian mission told UNODC that all was on track.  By 
February 27, Arbitrio, already in Vienna, heard no one was 
traveling from Iran.  Reportedly, the Pakistanis were very upset 
when they heard the Iranians were pulling out, and Afghanistan 
and Pakistan eventually sent a lower level delegation. 
 
5.(S/NF) On March 2, Iranian Ambassador Soltaniyeh requested a 
meeting with Costa, attended by Arbitrio.  Soltaniyeh reportedly 
made no apologies for Iran's no-show, simply saying that Maleki 
had a "personal commitment," and reiterated Iran's interest in 
increasing international cooperation.  Costa was reportedly very 
upset by Iran's handling of the matter but said he would 
continue to try to facilitate international contacts. 
 
6.(S/NF) Arbitrio said his staff later (no date given) talked 
directly to Maleki about what had happened.  Maleki reportedly 
said that when he learned about the ministerial meeting, he 
requested a meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad.  After the president 
"reluctantly" gave him an appointment, he told Maleki he would 
not approve the meeting.  When Maleki pressed for a reason, 
saying that Costa had organized the meeting as a response to the 
president's request, Ahmadi-Nejad gave no explanation. 
 
7.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio's readout of the conversation 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
with Maleki, others lobbied the president to change his mind 
about Iranian attendance at the Vienna meeting, including 
Judiciary chief Shahroudi and Foreign Minister Mottaki, without 
success.  Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi could not even 
get a meeting with the president, according to Maleki.  Maleki 
claimed he managed to get a second meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad in 
which he pleaded to be allowed to go.  When Ahmadi-Nejad did not 
change his mind, Maleki claimed he told the president he was 
making a mistake, and Ahmadi-Nejad reportedly responded by 
firing him. 
 
8.(S/NF) Maleki reportedly then contacted Expediency Council 
Chair Rafsanjani, who got angry that he had not been consulted. 
According to Iran's drug policy, the president is the chair of 
the Drug Control Headquarters, but the Expediency Council plays 
a supervisory role.  After some kind of intervention by 
Rafsanjani, Maleki's dismissal was reportedly rescinded, and 
Maleki traveled mid-March to Vienna for a different 
anti-narcotics meeting.  In Vienna, Maleki reportedly reassured 
Costa that he was still in charge.  Arbitrio said it was a 
strange delegation that traveled with Maleki, less than half of 
whom seemed pro-Maleki, most pro-IRGC.  When Maleki met with 
Costa, the delegation insisted on providing its own interpreter, 
which Arbitrio said was not standard. 
 
9.(S/NF) Per Arbitrio's Foreign Ministry sources, the source of 
the tension between Maleki and Ahmadi-Nejad was Maleki's growing 
closeness with Rafsanjani.  As Maleki reportedly came to see the 
value of engagement on the drug issue to Iran's overall foreign 
policy, he gradually moved towards Rafsanjani, who was more 
sympathetic to this view than Ahmadi-Nejad.  Ahmadi-Nejad was 
reportedly unhappy about the situation but only saw his chance 
to act upon it in the aftermath of the British sailors crisis. 
According to Arbitrio, Ahmadi-Nejad had orchestrated the 
incident to get the upper hand over the pragmatists.  Arbitrio 
believes that one consequence of the situation was that 
Ahmadi-Nejad succeeded in dismissing Maleki.  Two days after the 
sailors' release, Maleki received his dismissal letter.  What 
was particularly unusual, the letter did not include an onward 
assignment. 
 
10.(S/NF) Arbitrio also commented he was surprised how 
out-of-the-loop the Foreign Ministry had been on the issue, 
saying that UNODC heard before the ministry did that Maleki was 
not being allowed to attend the ministerial meetings in Vienna. 
 
Starting over with a new head 
----------------------------- 
 
11.(S/NF) Maleki's replacement, Ahmadi-Moqaddam, also retains 
his role as Chief of Police and supposedly has the protection of 
the president.  He is reportedly married to the president's 
sister.  He comes out of the IRGC and reportedly met 
Ahmadi-Nejad working on security issues in Kurdistan.  He was 
also deputy commander of the Basij.  Rafsanjani reportedly 
criticized Moqaddam for helping Ahmadi-Nejad in the presidential 
elections.  Arbitrio said that Maleki had earlier told him 
before that Ahmadi-Nejad wanted to replace him with Moqaddam, in 
order to get the police inside the Drug Control Headquarters. 
 
12.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who was in Dubai en route to Pakistan, said 
he would meet Moqaddam for the first time after his return to 
Iran.  He expressed frustration at having to rebuild a 
relationship with the new head and - he hoped - convince him of 
the benefits of international engagement on the drug issue. 
Arbitrio could not say he understood what Ahmadi-Nejad's policy 
on the issue was.  Maleki's dismissal could have been the result 
of policy differences on this issue of international engagement, 
or it could have been simply intended to punish Maleki for 
switching alliances.  He also noted that other issues could have 
been at play.  Maleki had come from mid-level ranks of the 
Ministry of Interior and as such was not widely accepted by the 
police.  This supposedly caused problems in implementing Drug 
Control Headquarters policy.  Now, the drug office and the 
anti-narcotics police are unified, but Arbitrio said it was too 
soon to judge whether this would have positive or negative 
effects on drug policy.  He also repeated a rumor that Moqaddam 
may have been appointed to the new position in essence to 
sideline him because of unhappiness with his performance 
regarding the deteriorating security situation in Sistan-va 
Baluchistan. 
 
Hardliners on the upsurge 
------------------------- 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
13.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who very clearly caveats between what he 
knows and what he surmises, said he believes that as a result of 
the seizure of the British sailors, the hardliners generally 
have the upper hand in Iran.  He noted, however, that this could 
change at any time, making Iranian decision-making hard to 
predict.  He believes that Ahmadi-Nejad knows he faces a 
legitimacy gap, demonstrated in every democratic exercise in 
Iran, including the December 2006 elections and the push-back he 
has gotten from the Majles.  Arbitrio said the Iranians he knows 
believe the hardliners know they will lose in any future 
election absent any change, so the hardliners are either 
plotting to forego elections or to make sure elections are held 
in a crisis situation.  Therefore, in Arbitrio's view, 
Ahmadi-Nejad uses crises like the nuclear issue and the British 
sailors to artificially create consensus and to confront 
pragmatists.  Arbitrio also believes that Ahmadi-Nejad, who he 
has met in two short meetings as well as the long meeting with 
Costa, suffers from a Napoleonic complex (Arbitrio estimated his 
height at 168 cm).  He had heard that the president has fired 
people for being taller than him. 
 
14.(S/NF) The religious-military alliance sees itself above 
democracy, and isolation and tension simply empowers them. 
Arbitrio also claimed that Iran is increasingly militarized, 
citing visible anti-aircraft weapons both around Tehran and en 
route to Esfahan.  He is also increasingly doubtful of the 
Supreme Leader's control over the situation.  He thinks the 
Supreme Leader feels more threatened by Rafsanjani than by 
Ahmadi-Nejad, particularly given Rafsanjani's calls to reassess 
the role of the Supreme Leader.  Arbitrio also said that he is 
hearing for the first time in a long time that there are limits 
to Rafsanjani's scope of action, and he doubted reformers could 
have much impact on the political scene. 
 
15.(S/NF) Arbitrio said there is a real fear in Iran that war is 
on the horizon.  UNODC and embassies are doing contingency 
planning, he has stocked up on food and water at home, and 
embassies are counting their nationals.  One ambassador told him 
that until three months ago, he thought conflict was unlikely 
but that he was now discouraged and saw no sign that Iran would 
pursue a sensible solution.  One change Arbitrio noted among 
Iranian people with whom he has contact, however, was that in 
the past they blamed US policy for the tense bilateral 
relations, but now they've realized that their president is to 
blame.  They are more worried what the "Iranian Hizballah" will 
do and say next than what the US will do.  They also see that it 
is no longer a US-Iran issue, but that the international 
community is unified in their objections to Iranian behavior. 
BURNS