VZCZCXRO4365
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHGZ #0486/01 1140139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240139Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5992
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5317
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6265
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USUN NEW YORK 0020

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUANGZHOU 000486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/VO, CA/FPP, CA/EX, DS/IP/EAP, DC/CR, DS/CR/VF, DS/CR/PF, 
AND INL/HSTC 
BEIJING FOR RSO, DHS, CG AND FPU 
NVC FOR FPU 
USICE/HQ FOR HQINT, HQOAI, CAO AND FDL 
US UN FOR RSO-PASS TO DS/FLD/NYFO 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT ASEC CVIS KFRD CH KCRM INL HSTC
SUBJECT: Fuzhou Alien Smuggler's advice - study in the U.S. 
 
THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
REF: A. 06 Guangzhou 32403 B. Guangzhou 00063 C. 06 Guangzhou 27925 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Through an aggressive outreach program, Post 
actively encourages Chinese students to attend colleges and 
universities in the United States.  However, Post continues to 
encounter well-organized attempts by visa brokers and snakeheads to 
send applicants, primarily from Fujian, to the United States using 
the student visa in lieu smuggling by air or sea.  The Brokers 
provide fraudulent students with fake academic credentials, 
financial documents, as well as work and residency papers.  Despite 
challenging conditions, Post's FPU and NIV units continue[t1] to 
work closely to identify the mala fide students while facilitating 
travel for bona fide students.  End Summary 
 
I MUST GO TO THIS ESL PROGRAM 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Beginning in early January 2007, NIV officers detected 
several F-1 student visa applicants with odd commonalities.  They 
all intended to attend ESL programs either at Language Systems in 
Alhambra, CA, or FLS in Boston, MA.  All of these applicants claimed 
to be enrolled at well known universities in Guangzhou or from high 
schools in the Guangzhou area.  The vast majority of them were from 
Fuqing, a city in Fujian near the capital, Fuzhou.  In total, 
eighteen cases with the same fraud pattern were detected in the 
space of two months. 
 
DID YOU HANG UP THE PHONE? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) NIV initially attempted to verify their student status 
using the contact information provided on the DS-156s.  However, the 
individuals answering the phones provided contradictory information. 
 For example, one call to the applicant's cell phone was answered by 
a woman who claimed she was the maid then stated she was a cousin 
after learning the purpose of the call. A NIV FSN then called the 
father's alleged employer.  The employee working at the alleged 
company stated the father was not available and gave a cell phone 
number that was supposedly the father's.  However, the number was 
identical to the number of the alleged cousin/maid. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a singular and unique event, a NIV FSN and an officer 
overheard an argument between two individuals perpetrating the 
fraud.  During one call, the NIV FSN had to switch lines to answer 
another phone call.  Once she returned to the original call, she 
discovered that the line was still open and two Cantonese 
individuals were arguing.  The individuals were arguing about 
whether to have the alleged father not return the calls to the 
Consulate or say that the father was on a business trip. 
 
¶5. (SBU) As the two continued to discuss the fraud, one opined that 
"anyone can use a U.S. visa to enter the United States.  Even if 
authorities later found out that fake documents were used in a visa 
application, one could simply hire an attorney and stay in the 
United States." 
 
¶6. (SBU) The same individuals also mentioned another applicant that 
was refused under 221g for further information.  The individuals 
worried that somehow the Consulate had detected clues in his case 
and suspected this was also one reason why another applicant was 
asked to return for a second interview at the Consulate. 
 
I Am a Guangzhou Student 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Based on the above information and the commonalities 
between the different applicants, FPU initiated an investigation 
that ultimately uncovered a large and rather sophisticated visa 
fraud operation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Based on the destination ESL schools, FPU located 13 
related cases.  FPU contacted each of the universities and high 
schools the applicants were allegedly enrolled in or had graduated 
from.  In all cases, the universities and high schools denied the 
applicants had either enrolled at or graduated from their 
 
GUANGZHOU 00000486  002 OF 002 
 
 
institutions. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A review of their DS-156s uncovered the fact that all of 
the students were from outside the Guangzhou area even though they 
claimed to live in the city.  The applicants used six common 
addresses in Guangzhou, using each address two or three times.  One 
address was used by six different applicants.  Through searches of 
these addresses, an additional 5 cases were located matching the 
profile. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Calls to their contact numbers were either answered by 
individuals who denied the applicant or applicant's parents were at 
the number or stated that they were a relative.  However, the people 
answering the phone either spoke Cantonese or Cantonese accented 
Mandarin, not the Fuzhou dialect and accent that would be expected 
based on the applicant's origin. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite repeated requests and attempts, none of the 
students returned to the Consulate for a second interview. 
 
Ticket to America 
----------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Based on statistics from December 2005 to February 2006, 
905 students applied for visas in Guangzhou, of which only 35.5% 
were refused.  Of the 905 students, 131 were from Fuqing and of 
those, the refusal rate was 70.4%. 
 
¶13. (SBU) 2007 showed a staggering growth in the number of students. 
 From December 2006 to February 2007, 1392 students applied for 
visas, a 53% growth from last year.  In addition, the number of 
students from Fuqing grew to 217, a 66% increase from last year. 
The overall refusal rate climbed to 45.7%, with the refusal rate 
from Fuqing students climbing to 90.4%. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The growth of Fuqing student visa applications confirms 
previous predictions.  In 2006, a SEVIS study performed by FPU 
showed a 970% increase in the number of students from Fuqing (from 
34 applicants in 2004 to 363 in 2005).  Given that 217 people have 
already applied during the winter cycle period, FPU is expecting a 
tremendous number of applicants from Fuqing and adjoining areas 
during the regular student application season starting in April and 
ending in August 2007. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Organized student visa fraud as described continues to 
affect bona fide students negatively.  Fraudulent applicants occupy 
interviewing slots and uses staff resources that could be directed 
toward outreach and assisting legitimate student visa cases. 
Fraudulent applicants increase Post's reported refusal rate for 
students, creating a negative impression about our support for bona 
fide students.  This is compounded by the lack of cooperation by 
Chinese law enforcement who continues to show a lack of interest in 
widespread document fraud involving financial records, transcripts, 
property deeds, and household registries.  In fact, the lack of 
interest appears to be encouraging more and more fraudulent 
applicants to apply for a student visa.  End Comment. 
 
 
GOLDBERG 
[t1]3 uses of "continues" in this paragraph.