VZCZCXRO5620
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1156/01 0950755
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050755Z APR 07 ZDK
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001156 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 
TAGS: EUN MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: REFORMING ESDP CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 00311 
 
Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Several distinct, but related, efforts are 
underway within the EU to improve the effectiveness of crisis 
response capabilities under the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) which after 7 years of operation and (shortly) 
17 missions, is increasingly seen as having reached the 
limits of operational capacity.  There are discussions of the 
need for improved planning, and better integration of the 
civilian and military components of ESDP. We are assured that 
no one envisions a replay of the 2003 Tervuren debate, but 
there is gathering momentum for a more effective 
civilian-military planning process within ESDP. End summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Improving Effectiveness 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) The European Union is engaged in several 
restructuring and reform processes designed to respond to 
identified weaknesses and shortfalls in crisis management 
response capabilities. These processes are separate, but 
related. Some are aimed at general restructuring for 
increased effectiveness, and others are driven by specific 
mission requirements and lessons learned.  There is a 
pervasive sense within the security-related structures of the 
EU that the expanding pace of ESDP engagements cannot be 
maintained without meaningful improvements in efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Including the impending deployment of the 
Kosovo post-status mission and the police 
monitoring/mentoring mission in Afghanistan, ESDP will have 
fielded 17 missions (four of which have been military) on 
four continents since its inception in 1999. 
 
--------------------------------- 
The Hampton Court Process 
---------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) In December 2005, the EU Heads of State and 
Government, meeting in an informal Summit outside of London, 
concluded that there was a need to improve the effectiveness 
of the EU's civilian crisis management "instruments."  In a 
subsequent paper on crisis management structures, Javier 
Solana noted that the EU was "currently close to the limits 
of our capacity." He concluded that further steps are needed 
to increase efficiency, professionalism and capacity. In the 
view of Solana and the Council Secretariat, the EU's "added 
value" in crisis management is its ability to bring together 
civilian and military assets. The 2005 papers called for 
strengthening command and control of deployed missions, 
clarifying chains of command and responsibility, and to 
ensure access to "planned operational facilities in order to 
deal with situations twenty-four hours/ seven days a week as 
necessary."  The declared full operational capability of the 
EU Operations Center in January 2007 is one component of this 
program. Other initiatives underway include dividing the 
current directorate for civilian crisis management into two 
components. One will constitute a Civilian Crisis Planning 
Capability (CCPC) which will be dedicated to operational 
planning and control of deployed missions, and the "rump" 
directorate would do concept development and work with 
international partners. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) As part of this Hampton Court process, 
newly-arrived Director General of the EU Military Staff, LTG 
David Leakey, is taking steps to enhance and improve the 
Military Staff's support to civilian planning and operations. 
The Military Staff, currently numbering some 190 officers, 
provides military expertise and support to the Military 
Committee. It covers many of the expected staff roles 
(personnel, intelligence, exercises, current operations, 
logistics, and CIS) but does not have a standing planning 
capability. There are planners within the EUMS, and 
individual officers are assigned to work with the civilian 
directorate on specific mission planning.  A closer, more 
systematic linkage and more effective support - within 
existing resources -- are among Leakey's goals.  A French 
paper submitted to the PSC on March 27, drew a connection 
between this process of improving EU crisis management 
structures and the need for a permanent planning structure 
within the EU Military Staff they identified as part of the 
 
BRUSSELS 00001156  002 OF 003 
 
 
DRC lessons rQrce 
generation, infstics were also 
notessed. The Secretariat paed shortum, Spain, SwedFrance, Portugal, 
Geece and Germany) argued that there is a need fQr a limited 
standing planning capability withQn the EU in order to 
address the problems made evident by the EUFOR DRC mission. 
The Ministes did not endorse the need for an EU OperatiQnal 
Headquarters. 
 
----------------- 
PSC Qonsideration 
----------------- 
¶6. (C/NF)  UQ comments on the original Secretariat paper 
submitted to the PSC argued that the ability to stnd up the 
existing Operations Center provides the EU with an additional 
capability toplan and run operations in circumstances where 
a joint civilian-military response is required and where no 
national HQ has been identified. They call for a clearer role 
for the Civ-Mil cell within the EUMS in strategic contingency 
planning, and for the Operational Commander to establish 
procedures in the OPLAN for in-theater coordination with 
other actors. 
 
¶7. (C/NF) In PSC discussions March 27, Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal pressed for further consideration of internal 
planning requirements, and France proposed ideas on EU 
pre-planning in the phase before the identification of an 
OHQ. Their non-paper proposed that "the EUMS should be 
reinforced with a permanent planning capability for military 
operations." Another paper urged that "consideration be given 
to the provision of residual (EU and non-EU) capability in 
the planning of future operations."   The UK stressed that 
the priorities facing ESDP were the successful launch of the 
mission in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the implementation of 
the Hampton Court Agenda. They accepted the conclusion that 
there is scope for practical and technical improvements as a 
result of a bottom-up lessons learned process, provided it 
was not used as a means to re-open "hard-fought" agreements 
on terms of reference for the Operations Center or the EUMS. 
 
-------------- 
State of Play 
-------------- 
¶8. (C/NF) We were assured by the German ESDP Counselor on 
March 30 that in discussing planning needs for the EU, there 
is no desire to reignite the "Tervuren" debate of 2003. He 
maintained that Germany, both as EU Presidency and as a 
matter of national policy, is determined to avoid any 
controversy with the US over developments within ESDP. He 
said that Germany had fallen away from the EU OHQ idea even 
during the Schroeder administration, and that under the 
current government, there is no support for such an approach. 
He said that the French had retreated from their initial 
proposals, and that there seemed to be a growing consensus 
that what is needed is civilian-military planning, rather 
than a solely military capability. A March 27 Secretariat 
paper makes the case for moving in that direction. This is 
seen as an area in which the EU can bring "added-value," and 
as a capability that does not exist elsewhere. The need to 
move toward an EU role in noncombatant evacuation operations 
(NEO) is another common thread running through the various 
 
BRUSSELS 00001156  003 OF 003 
 
 
analyses. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
¶9. (C/NF) These separate internal processes are easily 
conflated, and there are those within the Council Secretariat 
who tend to blur the distinctions in conversations with us. 
It is clear that previous missions -both civilian and 
military -- have been run on a shoestring and a prayer. They 
have been spared disaster largely by their small scale and a 
good dose of luck. The comparatively large scale - and the 
risks -- of the upcoming missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan 
have focused hearts and minds in Brussels as well as 
influential Member State capitals. In our judgment, it is 
virtually certain that the Operations Center will be 
activated to oversee the Kosovo mission. We also judge that 
some limited standing civilian-military planning capability 
is probably an inevitable development, and that ESDP NEOs are 
a likely future development. We are told that the UK views 
the current tug-of-war with the French as one of scope rather 
than philosophy. Unless the EU is prepared to abandon its 
comprehensive approach to crisis management entirely (a 
decision we see as unlikely), a critical mass among Member 
States will continue to develop for a more effective command 
and control system and better integration between the 
civilian and military components of ESDP. 
 
McKinley 
.