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Viewing cable 07VIENTIANE257, NAS VIENTIANE: UPDATE ON METHAMPHETAMINE IN LAOS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07VIENTIANE257 2007-03-29 08:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Vientiane
VZCZCXRO8498
RR RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0257/01 0880817
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290817Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1055
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7223
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2144
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2829
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1893
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2199
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0535
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE AND CCJ 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JIATF-W 
HANOI PLEASE PASS TO HCM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM SNAR XC CH
SUBJECT: NAS VIENTIANE:  UPDATE ON METHAMPHETAMINE IN LAOS 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Almost everyone in the Lao lowlands, from 
the Prime Minister in Vientiane to street vendors in Pakse, 
is keenly aware that methamphetamine trafficking is on the 
increase and that the lives of thousands of Lao citizens have 
become more precarious as a result.  Lao law enforcement 
agencies do not have the capacity to effectively interdict 
illicit drugs, but with sufficient training and equipment, 
could provide a significant deterrent.  The Embassy and the 
Government of Laos (GOL) will focus existing law enforcement 
programs on the strategic golden triangle region of the 
northwest and the new Thailand-Vietnam highway that runs 
across Savannakhet Province.  Demand reduction programs 
remain Laos' most effective tool against methamphetamine, but 
addict treatment capacity is still unsatisfactory.  The 
Embassy and the GOL are preparing to launch a new drug 
awareness campaign that focuses on students as a means to 
stem the growth in ATS abuse. Methamphetamine addiction and 
associated crime appear to be increasing rapidly.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) While it took decades for the GOL to acknowledge 
that opium was a serious problem that had to be addressed, 
Lao officials have been very proactive where ATS is 
concerned.  The reason for this is that while methamphetamine 
addiction is penetrating all levels of Lao society, it is 
disproportionately impacting the urban middle class and the 
communist party elite.  Even professionals in the counter 
narcotics field have found that their families are not 
immune.  Consequently, the issue has great resonance and 
anti-ATS programs have unflinching support from the majority 
of GOL officials. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
--------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The law enforcement agencies of Laos do not have 
the capacity that they need to combat methamphetamine 
trafficking and transit.  The problems posed by corruption, 
long and porous borders, large neighbors who produce and 
consume ATS, and growing internal demand for yaa baa 
(methamphetamine) have combined to overwhelm the police.  The 
majority of officers lack even the most rudimentary of 
investigative skills, do not know how to conduct a suspect 
interview (without employing force), and often find 
themselves short of standard police equipment (handcuffs, 
flashlights, body armor).  The GOL currently has no 
counter-drug intelligence capability, and consequently has no 
information where the ATS entering Laos comes from or what 
organizations are involved.  All of this makes Laos a perfect 
transit route for major traffickers, as there is no 
significant threat of interdiction against any drugs or 
chemicals smuggled through Laos. 
 
4.  (SBU) Fortunately, law enforcement agencies in Laos can 
be trained.  The Customs Department, which cooperates 
effectively with the U.S., has demonstrated a relatively high 
level of motivation and competence with regard to drug 
interdiction.  Some provincial Counter Narcotics Units (CNU) 
have been so effective against street dealers that officers 
are now receiving death threats, and one officer in Udomxay 
proudly shows off the bullet wounds he suffered in a 
successful ATS raid. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Embassy and Lao National Commission for Drug 
Control and Supervision (LCDC) have agreed in principle to a 
new law enforcement strategy that will focus limited law 
enforcement program resources where they are needed most. 
UNODC and the GOL have identified the region of Northwest 
Laos that is bordered by China, Burma, and Thailand as a 
strategic zone for the interdiction of illicit drug 
trafficking.  Heroin and methamphetamine enter Laos here from 
Burma for transit to Thailand, Vietnam, China, and other 
nations in the region.  Precursor chemicals for the 
production of ATS move from China to Burma through this part 
of Laos.  USG funded law enforcement assistance will target 
primarily Counter Narcotics Units (CNUs) and Customs posts in 
Bokeo, Luang Namtha, and Udomxay provinces.  In addition the 
CNU and Customs post in Savannakhet will receive extra 
funding as they attempt to control trafficking between 
Vietnam and Thailand on the East-West Economic corridor that 
 
VIENTIANE 00000257  002 OF 004 
 
 
runs across the recently opened Savannakhet-Mukdahan Bridge. 
CNUs and customs offices in other areas will continue to 
receive sufficient support to sustain operations. 
 
6.  (SBU) What the officers in counter-narcotics agencies 
need are the skills, tools, and information necessary to do 
their jobs.  A good first step would be to pay the police an 
appropriate salary, comparable to what they could receive in 
the private sector, approximately $200-400 per month (a 
typical salary for security guards in Vientiane).  The 
majority of junior officers now receive only $20-40 per 
month, an open invitation to corruption.  Better training 
would also help, though Laos is not without training 
resources.  China provided training for several dozen 
narcotics officers in 2005-2006.  Laos participates in 
programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
Bangkok, and may receive additional USG supported training as 
funding allows.  Embassy Vientiane is also providing 
essential equipment to CNUs, albeit in limited quantities. 
The greatest challenge for USG law enforcement programs in 
Laos is the lack of cooperation between GOL agencies and the 
difficulty of convincing Ministry of Public Security (MOPS) 
officials that U.S. offers of assistance are sincere with no 
hidden agenda. 
 
DEMAND REDUCTION 
---------------- 
 
7.  (U) The GOL realizes that its law enforcement agencies 
are not currently able to bring ATS trafficking under 
control, and that demand reduction programs are the only 
viable way to stem the growth of methamphetamine abuse.  In a 
series of seminars given throughout the country, LCDC 
Chairman Soubanh Sririthirath has emphasized that officials 
need to find home-grown solutions to ATS, and that officials 
should not wait for external assistance that is unlikely to 
come.  Soubanh is particularly eager to undertake drug 
education programs that might help to stem the growth of 
methamphetamine addiction among students, probably the best 
hope that Laos has of reducing ATS abuse under the current 
circumstances. 
 
8.  (SBU) At the same time, Minister Soubanh has indicated 
that he is more than willing to work with any donor that can 
provide some assistance.  Fortunately, the number of 
potential donors appears to be on the rise, as evidenced by 
the opening of new provincial treatment centers funded by 
Thailand, China, and Brunei.  Unfortunately, however, these 
Programs tend to lack the quality control that is built into 
U.S.-funded programs.  The Thai treatment center has serious 
structural problems, and Brunei is facing funding gaps after 
stretching its funding to build two facilities instead of one 
first-rate one.  (Note: See para 13 for further details on 
problems in provincial centers.) 
 
2007 Lao National ATS Awareness Campaign 
 
9. (U) The Embassy and LCDC have agreed to use approximately 
$120,000.00 of demand reduction funds to support the 
Programme Facilitation Units, (PFU) 2007 ATS Civic Awareness 
Campaign.  Unlike some of the campaigns in previous years, 
all of the sub-elements of this year's campaign will be 
coordinated to deliver a single unified anti-drug theme.  The 
major components of this year's campaign will include: 
 
--Nationwide classroom instruction using printed materials 
from D.A.R.E., GTZ (German Government aid agency), and the 
Lao Ministry of Education.  Each lesson module will also have 
supplementary materials on a video compact disc. 
Provincial Committees for Drug Control (PCDC) will each 
receive VCD players and projectors to support classroom 
instruction (1 set per province). 
 
--Drug awareness pamphlets for general distribution, and VCDs 
of popular Lao artists performing anti-drug songs. 
 
--Sporting goods, imprinted with an anti-drug message that 
will promote a healthy lifestyle and constructive 
extracurricular activities. 
 
 
VIENTIANE 00000257  003 OF 004 
 
 
--Centralized train-the-trainer programs for the teachers and 
local officials who will carry out the awareness campaign. 
The training will include proper use of the instructional 
materials and equipment that the campaign will provide. 
 
--Public service announcements on radio and television. 
 
Addiction 
 
10.  (SBU) According to the GOL, Laos has approximately 
40,000 methamphetamine addicts.  The GOL reached this 
estimate based on data collected by village administrators, 
compiled the district level, reported by the provinces, and 
finally tabulated nationally.  Even LCDC lacks confidence in 
this number, as it relies on village officials to report 
accurately a statistic that may reflect poorly on their 
performance.  In one conversation that the NAS had with the 
medical director of a modest provincial treatment clinic, she 
stated that villages were underreporting addicts by at least 
33%.  The NAS believes that nationally, there could easily be 
as many as 200,000 ATS users, though not all of these are 
hard core addicts.  The GOL, UNODC, the NAS have all noted 
that while there are no reliable numbers on the growth of ATS 
trafficking and abuse, an abundance of anecdotal evidence 
suggests that that the situation is continuing to 
deteriorate. 
 
11.  (U) Unfortunately the national ATS treatment capacity is 
less than 1200 beds or 2400 patients per year even if every 
space available were used.  Effective treatment capacity, 
taking into consideration the number of fully trained staff, 
appropriate patient density, and currently available funding, 
is not more than 600 at one time or 1200 per year. 
 
12.  (U) The Somsagna Treatment Center in Vientiane, operated 
by the city, is the nation's largest facility, with a normal 
resident population of between 500 and 700 men and 20 to 40 
women.  Capacity there will increase by 128 following the USG 
funded renovation of the women's rehabilitation wing.  The 
renovated dormitory will feature a much lower and more 
therapeutically effective patient density; were all of the 
existing Somsagna structures rebuilt to this standard, the 
total patient load, including the new wing, would not exceed 
500.  Somsagna has the most capable and experienced staff in 
the nation and other facilities send their staffs there for 
training (paid for in some cases by the Embassy). 
 
13.  (SBU) Within Laos, addict treatment is a provincial 
responsibility, and the national government does not have a 
budget to support treatment centers.  Thailand, the U.S., and 
China constructed new 100 bed treatment facilities 
respectively in Pakse, Savannakhet, and Udomxay.  Brunei 
built two clinics in Xaignaboury Province, each rated at 70 
beds, but in truth able to hold no more than 30 apiece.  All 
of these facilities have opened in the past 15 months,and 
were handed over to their respective Provincial governments 
for operation, but none are fully functional.  The reasons 
for this are: 
 
--Other than the U.S. center in Savannakhet, none were handed 
over complete with furniture and medical supplies, and the 
provinces did not allocate funds to furnish the facilities. 
 
--Addicts' families lack confidence in the proficiency of the 
staffs, and send patients to the Somsagna instead. 
 
--Provinces allocated budgets too small to operate the 
facilities, and charge patients too much for many to afford. 
 
14.  (SBU) Minister Soubanh has publicly acknowledged that 
the new centers' financial problems, and has suggested that 
Laos create a national trust fund for their support.  Until 
that is in place, the GOL should consider upgrading 
Somsagna, the one facility that is fully utilized 
(approximately 185% of optimum capacity) before looking at 
new venues for treatment centers that provincial governments 
will be challenged to support. 
 
CRIME 
 
 
VIENTIANE 00000257  004 OF 004 
 
 
15.  (SBU) The perception among many urban Lao that violent 
crime is on the increase is the most obvious indicator of how 
ATS trafficking is impacting Lao society.  Accurate 
statistics on violent crime are not readily available from 
the GOL, and even homicides often go unreported in the press. 
 Word of a February 28 home invasion in an upscale Vientiane 
neighborhood circulated widely on the streets, but was never 
mentioned in the media.  In this particular case, a 
methamphetamine addict apparently in need a fix killed two 
elderly women in a desperate robbery attempt, then slit his 
own throat when the police, alerted by neighbors, confronted 
the man before he had an opportunity to make his getaway. 
 
16.  (SBU) The double homicide came only a few months after 
two expatriate NGO staff members were assaulted with machetes 
by a group of four young men in central Vientiane.  The 
tourist areas of Vientiane are now frequented by young 
thieves seeking to pick a pocket or snatch a bag.  For the 
first time in decades, youth gangs have appeared on the 
capital's streets.  Members of the diplomatic community have 
reported thefts by their household staffs.  In those 
relatively rare cases where investigation provides some 
insight into the motivation behind these crimes, the need to 
pay for the ATS addiction of the perpetrator or a relative 
almost always emerges as a primary cause.  Though there are 
all too few reliable statistics on crime or addiction, petty 
theft, violent crime, and methamphetamine abuse all appear to 
be rising in parallel. 
 
17.  (SBU) Comment.  Methamphetamine has now become Laos' 
greatest illicit drug program, eclipsing opium.  Future U.S. 
assistance to Laos may need to focus more heavily on law 
enforcement and demand reduction programs than in the past. 
The situation is not beyond rescue, and the right combination 
of aid and regional cooperation could help to bring ATS back 
under control.  End comment. 
HASLACH