VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0565/01 0871737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281737Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6187
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4364
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0489
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3251
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0389
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3451
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4571
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1032
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0678

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTBS MO FR AL
SUBJECT: MFA ON SAHARA: SEEKING ANOTHER WASHINGTON MEETING 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Wayne J. Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.(C) Summary and action request: MFA sources are upbeat on 
the results of the Western Sahara roadshow, but recognize 
there is much to be done.  They are pressing for a high-level 
Washington meeting the week of April 2, and also seeking a 
follow-up with UNSYG Ban.  It is unlikely the Moroccans will 
have much more of substance for a return meeting, but are 
likely to use it to push for a 12 month MINURSO rollover and 
seek U.S. commitment to support its diplomatic efforts to see 
its autonomy ideas.  They want a long rollover to provide 
time to negotiate and to win hearts and minds on the ground 
(and perhaps to get past September elections here).  While 
they hope the delegation could meet Secretary Rice, they 
would likely not insist on that level.  Embassy would 
appreciate being instructed to convey Washington's answer on 
the proposed consultation to the GOM.  End summary and action 
request. 
 
2.(C) DCM met March 27 with Youssef Amrani, Director-General 
for Bilateral Affairs (the #4 in the Ministry).   Amrani was 
upbeat, having just returned from a Latin American tour with 
Minister Benaissa and CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid 
which included stops in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, 
and Mexico.  Amrani underlined that they did not go to 
Venezuela.  The purpose of the trip was to build support for 
Morocco's approach on autonomy for Sahara.   He asserted that 
Latin interlocutors reacted positively to the plan, but 
stressed that the solution must be negotiated.  Amrani said 
Morocco was feeling confident -- the GOM is no longer on the 
defensive over Sahara.  He was pleased that Morocco is 
willing to depart from what he termed its "inherited 
Bonapartist" (i.e. highly centralized) structures in favor of 
decentralization and autonomy.  He emphasized that Morocco is 
open to dialogue with the POLISARIO. 
 
3.(C) Polcouns followed up the same day with International 
Organizations Chief (A/S equiv.) Nasser Bourita, who has been 
the key working level contact for (and likely architect of) 
the diplomatic push.  He said he had been to Paris to meet 
with the GOF for further discussions, indicating that the GOM 
is consulting first with friends, principally the USG and 
France and secondarily with Spain, while keeping the UN and 
other P5 members informed.  It wanted to complete visits to 
all UNSC members before presenting the plan.  With the four 
principals having met the Belgians and gone to Rome that very 
day, a few more stops remain, including African members. 
 
4.(C) Bourita urged that Washington accept the GOM proposal 
to send a delegation the week of April 2.  The GOM is also 
seeking to see UNSYG Ban Ki Moon and Personal Envoy Van 
Walsum the same week, but planned to present its papers in 
final to the UN only April 10.  He understood that the 
Secretary might not be available, but indicated the 
 
SIPDIS 
delegation would be happy instead to meet again with U/S 
Burns.  Moroccan goals for a USG meeting were: 
 
--to present additional details about the autonomy plan and 
answers to USG questions, and to convey that Morocco is 
willing to be as flexible as possible in negotiations. 
 
--to discuss what should be published about the plan. 
Morocco does not intend to provide all the details to the 
UNSC that it had shared with the USG. 
 
--to discuss follow on strategy, particularly GOM interest in 
obtaining a longer-term, preferably 12-month rollover. 
 
5.(C) Overall Moroccan strategy was now focused on 
negotiations.  They would seek agreement with the POLISARIO 
and Algeria.  That agreement could be put to an up or down 
referendum in the territory, which if positive, could be 
construed as self-determination.  No option of independence 
need explicitly be presented, he said, contending that self 
determination had in other UN decolonization cases been such 
a process.  Bourita said that if the POLISARIO did not want 
to negotiate, Morocco could find some subset with would. 
 
6.(C) Bourita said a 12-month rollover was important, 
although he responded in the negative to Polcouns query 
whether this was linked to the Government's desire to 
concentrate on the upcoming September elections.   This 
longer period was instead necessary to give Morocco more time 
-- to negotiate with the other parties and for Van Walsum and 
others to engage, to come up with more ideas on some of the 
existing issues, to intensify its hearts and minds confidence 
building efforts in the territory, and also so that this 
would not come to the UNSC during the throes of the General 
Assembly. 
 
7.(C) COMMENT:  European diplomats reported that MFA 
Minister-Delegate Fassi Fihri briefed the EU COMs April 23 
stressing Morocco's interest in negotiations and that it 
would be very flexible in those negotiations.  Fassi Fihri, 
asked about Kalihenna's comment to the press that if 
negotiations did not proceed that the GOM would implement 
autonomy anyway, refuted the CORCAS head, saying that Morocco 
would, however proceed with a strong version of its 
nation-wide program of decentralization.  A French diplomat, 
appreciating Washington's close coordination with Paris, 
reported that Egyptian President Mubarak had told the French 
he was prepared to host talks between morocco and Algeria on 
the Sahara and regional issues.  The Europeans remain very 
concerned about the Russian position in the UNSC, given 
Russia's apparent interest in driving a wedge between Europe 
and Algeria.  Polcouns pointed out that the Moroccan 
invitation to the GOR to tender for a nuclear power plant may 
have partly been intended to blunt the traditional Russian 
tilt toward Algiers.  End Comment. 
 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Bush