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UNCLAS NAIROBI 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI BRENDAN DOHERTY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA & SOMALIA SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF S/WCI 
AMBASSADOR CLINT WILLIAMSON 
 
REF: STATE 23457 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Welcome to Kenya, a stable, dynamic 
democracy and a key regional partner for the United 
States.  Our partnership with Kenya focuses on five major 
goals: cooperate to fight insecurity and terrorism; 
combat disease and save lives; promote prosperity, fight 
poverty and invest in people; advance shared democratic 
values, human rights, and good governance; and 
collaborate to foster peace and stability in East Africa. 
While corruption, insecurity and inter-ethnic conflict 
remain major obstacles to Kenya achieving the aspirations 
of its citizens, there is a positive process of change 
underway that our partnership is designed to support. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In addition to managing this robust bilateral 
partnership with Kenya, the U.S. Mission in Nairobi also 
has the mandate to implement U.S. policy in Somalia.  The 
U.S. has three principal goals in Somalia: support the 
establishment of a stable national government based on 
national reconciliation; promote security and stability 
on the ground - which includes combating terrorism; and 
respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. 
These goals are mutually reinforcing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. Mission Kenya: A Vital Regional Platform 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The U.S. Mission in Kenya serves as a vital regional 
platform to promote U.S. interests throughout much of 
Africa.  It is the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in 
sub-Saharan Africa, comprising 18 federal government 
agencies or offices, most of which have regional 
mandates.  Among these agencies are the U.S. Agency for 
International Development/East Africa, Peace Corps, Library 
of Congress, Center for Disease Control, and the 
Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, 
Homeland Security and Justice. 
 
¶4. (U) Aside from our bilateral relationships with Kenya 
and Somalia, described below, U.S. Mission Kenya also 
represents the USG to United Nations bodies headquartered 
in Nairobi (UNEP and U.N. Habitat) and engages with 
diplomatic missions and international NGOs involved in 
promoting peace, stability and development in southern 
Sudan and the Great Lakes region. 
 
The U.S.-Kenya Partnership 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Our partnership with Kenya focuses on five major 
goals: cooperate to fight insecurity and terrorism; 
combat disease and save lives; promote prosperity, 
fight poverty and invest in people; advance shared 
democratic values, human rights, and good governance; 
and collaborate to foster peace and stability in East 
Africa.  U.S. foreign assistance to Kenya is geared 
to achieving these goals.  That assistance came to 
about $480 million in 2006.  It is expected to rise to 
$550 million this year. 
 
¶6. (U) The U.S. private sector also has a robust 
relationship with Kenya.  Bilateral trade in 2006 
amounted to $800 million.  U.S. investments in 
Kenya total about $300 million.  The American 
Chamber of Commerce in Kenya actively promotes 
corporate social responsibility by its member firms, 
which account for about ten percent of Kenya's GDP. 
 
¶7. (U) There were 86,500 American tourists in Kenya 
in 2006.  About 6,000 Americans live in Kenya. 
 
Counter-Terrorism: Priority Number One 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Al-Qaeda bombed our Embassy on August 7, 1998. 
It also attacked an Israeli-owned hotel and Israeli 
chartered aircraft in Kenya in 2002.  Al-Qaeda retains 
the ability to operate in and around Kenya.  Working 
with Kenya against the threat from terrorism remains 
 
the first priority on our bilateral agenda.  We have 
provided training to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions.  We have provided civil aviation security 
and safety equipment and training to Kenyan agencies 
under the Safe Skies for Africa program.  The U.S. Navy 
Maritime Operations and Training Coastal Security 
Program with the Kenyan Navy, Police, and Kenyan 
Wildlife Service is the only inter-ministerial 
counter-terrorism effort in Kenya.  Our Anti-terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) office has established a robust police 
training program, and a coastal security program that 
promises to improve Kenya's capacity to secure its 
extensive coastline, through the combined efforts of 
ATA, the Kenya-U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO), the 
Djibouti-based Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA), the Defense Attache's Office (DAO), and 
the Economic and Political sections.  Cooperation with 
the Kenyan Government on this program is excellent and 
should serve as a model for such multi-sectoral 
projects.  As a top priority, our counter-terrorism 
efforts benefit from the cooperation of all Mission 
agencies, including DOJ's Resident Legal Advisor, FBI, 
USAID, and DHS.  CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs teams have 
been active in Kenya since 2003, providing humanitarian 
assistance and building infrastructure in the poorest 
and most remote regions of the country. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Polling data consistently shows that violent 
crime is a top concern of Kenyan voters while terrorism 
does not figure at all as an issue of concern to them. 
Kenya's political leadership shares this perspective. 
Members of the U.S. Mission and their family members 
have been severely wounded and killed in criminal 
attacks in recent months.  We fully understand why the 
topic of insecurity resonates more with the Kenyan 
public than does the topic of terrorism.  The resource 
increases and reforms required for the judicial and law 
enforcement sectors to better respond to the terrorist 
threat would equally promote improved response to 
threats to the general public posed by violent criminal 
gangs.  We find that the most effective way to advocate 
for the necessary resource increases and legislation is 
to speak in terms of addressing Kenya's chronic 
insecurity threats, of which terrorism is but a part. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Kenya, nonetheless, has an international 
obligation to enact counter-terrorism and anti-money 
laundering legislation in accordance with the UN 
conventions it has signed.  The issue of 
counter-terrorism legislation has become controversial 
in Kenya, with elements of the press, the political 
class, the human rights community, and Muslim leadership 
criticizing such legislation as anti-Muslim.  The 
Government of Kenya has not institutionalized the 
necessary integrated legal framework nor organized a 
joint counter-terrorism task force of police and 
prosecutors, despite significant U.S. financial support 
and advocacy.  Military aspects of our counter-terrorism 
activities, particularly training, suffered a loss of 
funds due to Kenya's failure to conclude an Article 98 
agreement.  The lack of an overarching Kenyan 
counter-terrorism strategy and legal framework limits 
the impact of our efforts. 
 
Military Cooperation Strong 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite Kenya's ratification of the Rome 
Treaty and failure thus far to conclude an Article 98 
Agreement with the U.S. (which effectively froze IMET 
and FMF for Kenya as of March 2005), the 
military-military relationship remains strong.  (Note: 
A Presidential waiver restored IMET in SEP 06.)  Our 
cooperation includes training, combined exercises, 
some provision of equipment, an intelligence exchange 
program, and senior DOD visits.  Our strong support of 
the Kenyan military also includes the African 
Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program 
(ACOTA) which prepares Kenyan battalions for United 
Nations or African Union mandated peace-keeping 
 
deployments with training and equipment. 
 
Politics: Intense Campaigning by Two Unstable Coalitions 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU)  This is an election year in Kenya.  Kenyan 
politics is evolving into a system of two unstable 
coalitions fiercely competing for power.  Ethnic voting 
blocs, patronage and money, rather than issues and 
ideology, dominate politics.  While most observers favor 
President Mwai Kibaki's chances of re-election, 
conventional wisdom may change if the opposition unites 
behind a candidate with national popularity.  However, 
the opposition Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya may have 
difficulty retaining its unity once it makes a choice 
among its contending presidential aspirants.  Neither 
coalition can be counted on to observe electoral codes 
of conduct or practice self-restraint.  There is a 
distinct danger of politicians inciting ethnic 
animosity for political mobilization purposes. 
 
¶13. (U) Following the election in 2002 of President 
Mwai Kibaki, political space and civil liberties 
increased dramatically, a far cry from the torture 
chambers and political imprisonments of the preceding 
24 years under former President Daniel arap Moi.  With 
greatly improved respect for human rights, a variety of 
media and civil society organizations thrive, measuring 
the performance of the government by higher standards 
than in the past.  Kenyans themselves demand and expect 
democratic behavior from their government.  This was 
vividly demonstrated during the constitutional referendum 
of late 2005 during which voters demonstrated their 
ability to (mostly peacefully) oppose a largely 
government-supported initiative.  It was also seen in 
the public outcry against the government's attack on free 
media during the March 2006 raids on the Standard Media 
House.  Other good governance success stories are the 
effectiveness and independence of the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya, which the Mission has assisted, and the Kenyan 
National Commission on Human Rights.  Particularly in 
light of public exposure of two massive corruption 
scandals in mid-2004 and early 2006, Parliament has more 
fully assumed its role of checking the power of the 
executive through oversight committees.  The executive, 
however, continues to wield considerable power over the 
legislature. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Kenya continues to be led by politicians who 
came of age during the colonial era.  President Kibaki, 
his Vice President and his Ministers of Defense and of 
Security (among other cabinet members) were all in their 
30s when Kenya achieved independence in 1963.  The three 
top opposition leaders, as well as the "young Turks" of 
the Kibaki administration, were all teenagers or young 
children at the time of independence.  Kenya is 
in the midst of a crucial generational transition of 
political leadership that will be fully realized 
following either the 2007 or, at the latest, the 2012 
general elections.  Kenya since independence has developed 
one of Africa's most vibrant civil societies and most 
highly educated electorates (73 percent adult literacy). 
The country's future political leadership will better 
reflect post-independence Kenyan society. 
 
¶15. (SBU) There are several long-awaited pieces of 
legislation pending before Parliament of particular 
interest to the United States.  The draft Anti-Money 
Laundering Bill, is required for Kenya to meet its 
international obligations and to strengthen efforts against 
corruption, drug trafficking, and terrorism.  Also awaiting 
discussion in Parliament are a bill providing for public 
access to government information, viewed as a key 
anti-corruption mechanism; and a bill which would permit 
the funding of political parties from government coffers 
to level the playing field and reduce pressures to raise 
campaign funds through corruption.  We are also advocating 
on behalf of pending anti-trafficking in persons 
legislation, labor reforms and legislation to address the 
growing problem of narcotics trafficking. 
 
 
The Economy: Corruption Holding Back Development 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶16. (U) The Kenyan economy grew by an estimated six percent 
in 2006, continuing a steady economic recovery that began 
in 2002 after over a decade of debilitating economic 
stagnation in the 1990s.  The current expansion is fairly 
broad-based, and is built on a stable macro-environment 
fostered by government, and the resilience, 
resourcefulness, and improved confidence of the private 
sector.  The recovery, however, is just that - a recovery 
phase that began from a low base of economic activity in 
¶2002.  Growth needs to be higher, and on a sustained basis, 
to begin to noticeably reduce poverty.  Currently, 56 
percent of Kenyans live on a dollar-a-day or less and 
unemployment/under-employment is also about 50 percent. 
Accelerating growth to achieve Kenya's potential will 
require continued de-regulation of business, improved 
delivery of government services, massive investment in new 
infrastructure (especially roads), reduction of chronic 
insecurity caused by crime, and improved economic 
governance generally (see below). 
 
¶17. (U) Tourism is now Kenya's top economic sector, 
followed by flowers, tea and coffee.  Africa is Kenya's 
largest export market, followed by the EU.  Kenya is the 
regional center for industry and services, with Mombasa 
handling imports and exports for the whole region. 
Critical to more rapid growth in Kenya and the wider 
region is expanded capacity and improved efficiency at 
Mombasa Port, which despite some improvements since 2002 
remains plagued by mismanagement and corruption. 
 
¶18. (U)  Kenya continues to benefit from the Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Its apparel industry is 
struggling to hold its ground against Asian competition 
following the renewal by Congress in November 2006 of the 
AGOA third country fabric provision, meant to provide more 
time to develop local cotton and fabric production that 
meets the buyers' rigorous standards.  Kenya's main exports 
to the U.S. are AGOA-program garments. 
 
¶19. (U) Rains in 2006 ended two previous years of drought 
and avoided rationing of hydro-electric power.  Kenya 
nonetheless faces profound environmental challenges brought 
on by high population growth, deforestation, shifting 
climate patterns, and the overgrazing of cattle in marginal 
areas in the north and west of the country.  Significant 
portions of the population will continue to require 
emergency food assistance in the coming years. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Corruption is the greatest challenge facing the 
Kenyan economy.  In the first year after taking office, the 
new government took some bold action, including passing 
important anti-corruption legislation and removing nearly 
half of the country's judges following allegations of 
corruption.  However, the expectations of dramatic 
action against grand scale senior-level corruption 
(Anglo-Leasing and Goldenberg cases) have not been met. 
There have been only a few prosecutions of senior officials 
from either the former or the current regime for 
corruption, despite ample evidence of wrongdoing and public 
outcry, in particular following the publication of reports 
in early 2006 detailing the extent of the rot.  However, 
Kenya's press, civil society, Parliament, and general 
public have shown that they will not suffer quietly while 
the country's coffers are emptied.  The revelations of 
corruption scandals by an opposition MP and the press, 
commonly referred to by the name of the fictitious 
financial corporation involved - i.e., Anglo-Leasing - 
are noteworthy because they demonstrate more space for 
public criticism in Kenya. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Confronting corruption in the government is a 
high priority for the U.S. Mission in Kenya.  As part of 
our support for Kenyan anti-corruption efforts, the Mission 
helped create the Department of Public Prosecutions' (DPP) 
specialized anti-corruption unit and has supported training 
and other capacity building activities.  Parliament has 
 
contributed a moderate degree of accountability and has 
questioned the effectiveness of the government's 
anti-corruption institutions.  The Mission supports a 
legislative strengthening program designed to empower key 
committees and promote quality legislation. 
 
HIV/AIDS and the President's Emergency Plan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (U) The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
achieved impressive advances in 2006, and those successes 
continue in 2007.  Kenya has the second largest 
single-country PEPFAR program in the world.  Five Mission 
elements coordinated their programs to implement USD 208 
million worth of activities in the areas of prevention, 
treatment and care in 2006.  Thanks in part to efforts with 
our Kenyan partners, the HIV prevalence rate among adults 
declined from 6.8 percent in 2003 to 6.1 percent in 2005 
(UNAIDS).  PEPFAR's impressive results include an increase 
in the number of U.S.-supported anti-retroviral treatment 
(ART) sites from three to more than 200 in just over two 
years.  In 2006, PEPFAR funding bought drugs for 58,000 of 
the estimated 111,000 Kenyans on ART.  By the end of 2007, 
we will be directly supporting over 70,000 Kenyans on ART. 
 
Kenya,s Ethnic & Religious Demographics 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (U) Kenya's population of 34 million is comprised of 
over forty ethnic groups representing three of Africa's 
major socio-linguistic families (Bantu, Nilotic and 
Cushitic).  The two largest and most politically relevant 
communities are the Kikuyu (mostly pro-government) and 
the Luo (mostly pro-opposition). 
 
¶24. (U) Kenya's religious demographics are roughly 80 
percent Christian, 10 percent Muslim and 10 percent other 
(mostly African traditional religions).  Most Kenyan 
Muslims practice a moderate, often Sufi-influenced Islam. 
While a handful of Kenyan Muslims have been radicalized, 
imported radical dogma has not been widely embraced. 
 
Somalia 
------- 
 
¶25. (U) The U.S. Mission in Kenya has the mandate to 
implement U.S. policy in Somalia.  Many of Somalia's 
political leaders maintain residences in Nairobi.  The 
United Nation's political office for Somalia is located 
in Nairobi as are the "Somalia Affairs" offices of 
most major multilateral organizations and diplomatic 
missions.  Kenya is the current Chair of the 
InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which 
has a mandate from the African Union (AU) to promote 
peace, stability and national reconciliation in Somalia. 
Kenya is an active participant in Somalia diplomacy and 
security issues. 
 
¶26. (SBU) The U.S. has three principal goals in Somalia: 
support the establishment of a stable national government 
based on national reconciliation; promote security and 
stability on the ground - which includes combating 
terrorism; and respond to the humanitarian needs of the 
Somali people.  These goals are mutually reinforcing. 
Somalia will not be stable as long as foreign terrorists 
are active there.  Similarly, achieving a stable national 
government will help ensure that Somalia is not exploited 
as a base of operations by foreign terrorists.  Helping 
the Somali people to counter the impact of drought, 
flooding, and near-continuous warfare for the past 15 
years, and to address their development aspirations, will 
contribute to achieving a firm foundation for a lasting 
national government. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Kenya took the lead, through the 
InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in 
the Somali National Reconciliation Conference that took 
place over 23 months in Kenya.  Since the conclusion of 
the conference, Kenya has continued to support the 
strengthening of the Somali Transitional Federal 
 
Government (TFG) and institutions (TFIs) which emerged 
from the conference and were established in 2004.  As a 
result of Ethiopia's intervention in late December 2006, 
the Islamic Courts that controlled most of southern and 
central Somalia during the second half of 2006 
collapsed.  In early January 2007 the TFG moved its 
capital from Baidoa back to Mogadishu and began a 
process of establishing governing bodies and appointing 
administrative officials.  Early assessments of efforts 
by President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi to reach out 
to all segments of Somali society to establish a 
broad-based government have been mixed. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Ethiopian forces, whose presence is widely 
opposed within Somalia, have remained to provide 
security until such time as either an AU peace 
support mission is deployed within Somalia or TFG 
capacity to provide security is greatly improved. 
At this time, only Uganda has agreed to provide troops 
for an African peace support mission.  The AU, Kenya, 
and the U.S. are soliciting additional contributions of 
troops from African nations in order to stand up a peace 
support mission as soon as possible.  The U.S., UNDP and 
European partners are working to enhance the capacity of 
TFG police and security forces to provide security. 
 
Strong Reasons to be Upbeat about East Africa 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶29. (U) Kenya's renewed economic vitality and new-found 
democratic space give us strong reasons for optimism 
about its prospects for real progress toward achieving 
the aspirations of its people.  Likewise, we see cause 
for optimism that Somalia may be on the verge of finally 
achieving stability, national reconciliation and re-entry 
into the international community, shedding its status as 
a refuge and launching pad for global terrorism.  This is 
an exciting time to visit U.S. Mission Kenya.  Welcome! 
 
RANNEBERGER