VZCZCXRO6480
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0014/01 0861426
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 271426Z MAR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0074
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0040
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0069
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0067

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; PARIS FOR WALLER; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU 
FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/27/2027 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR KNNP
SUBJECT: A PRO-VELAYATI CONSERVATIVE DISCUSSES IRANIAN POLITICS 
 
REF: IRPO DUBAI 0012 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000014  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  In a conversation that predated passage of 
UNSCR 1747, an Iranian doctor with reportedly close connections 
to conservative circles discussed Iran's nuclear issue and the 
domestic political situation.  He predicted Iran would 
eventually cave to international pressure and suspend 
enrichment, but he clearly felt Iran was entitled to nuclear 
weapons to protect itself from a perceived nuclear threat from 
Israel.  The principal focus of his political remarks was 
extolling the positive influence of former Foreign Minister 
Velayati, who he maintained wanted to build bridges with the 
West.  While he did not in any way seek a "channel" between 
Velayati and the US, at one point he solicited USG financial 
backing for Velayati's next campaign run, a subject IRPO did not 
pursue.  We hear multiple views concerning who has the ear of 
the Supreme Leader, so this report should not be considered 
definitive by any means, but the source offered some noteworthy 
views regarding politics in Iran.  End summary 
 
2.(S/NF) An Iranian doctor reportedly well connected to 
conservative circles discussed Iran's nuclear dilemma and 
domestic politics with IRPO Director in mid-March.  (He called 
the Supreme Leader a former patient but said he could not help 
his undefined problem with his arm, and said his current 
patients include the Supreme Leader's son and the governor of 
the province of Tehran, but did not say for what.)  He discussed 
a number of issues, including the nuclear issue, domestic 
politics, IRGC, Basij, and Ansar-e Hizballah (reftel).  His 
views on regional politics, as well as on drug abuse in Iran (he 
also runs a drug addiction clinic), will be reported septel. 
 
His view: Iran will accept suspension 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) In a conversation prior to passage of UNSCR 1747, the 
doctor predicted Iran will accept the enrichment suspension 
requirement (no time frame given), because pressure from 
sanctions will leave it no choice.  Nonetheless, he was very 
critical of what he saw as the US acting as the "arbitrator" of 
who can have nuclear technology and who cannot.  It was clear he 
believed that Iran's goal was to build nuclear weapons.  Given 
that he claimed "all" Iranians believe Israel would use nuclear 
weapons against Iran as a first strike, he appeared to feel Iran 
was justified in arming itself. 
 
4.(S/NF) What troubled the doctor most was the notion that 
President Ahmadi-Nejad -- whom he does not support -- would reap 
the political benefits from any subsequent improvement of 
relations with the West should Iran suspend enrichment and enter 
into negotiations.  Rehashing the old argument from Iranians 
over who gets credit for any rapprochement with the US, he 
claimed Ahmadi-Nejad's principal goal at this point is to get 
reelected in 2009 and that he needed to do something to reverse 
his sinking popularity. 
 
5.(S/NF) In contrast to the doctor's views, several other 
sources seemed to think Iran would need more incentives to 
suspend.  One source suggested allowing Iran to ask for a 
reciprocal precondition for talks, such as US first unfreezing 
Iran's assets.  Another source suggested Iranians could announce 
they have reached a percentage of enrichment which would be 
"acceptable" to West, then say they are stopping activity 
because their factories are "not ready."  Another claimed that 
Iran would trust the UK more than it would trust Russia to do 
enrichment for them. 
 
His view: Velayati for president 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.(S/NF) The doctor acknowledged, however, that the call on 
whether or not to suspend enrichment was not the president's, 
but ultimately the Supreme Leader's.  He further claimed that 
Ali Velayati, foreign minister under President Rafsanjani, was 
the most influential voice on the Supreme Leader's foreign 
policy committee.  (Note: this is a reference to the Strategic 
Council for Foreign Relations, created by the Supreme Leader in 
June 2006 to act as an advisory panel on foreign relations.  It 
is not clear how influential this body has been in foreign 
policy decision-making.  Endnote)  The doctor maintained that 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000014  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ahmadi-Nejad has no voice on this committee. 
 
7.(S/NF) The doctor, clearly a fan of Velayati, reportedly 
served on former FM Velayati's failed 2005 presidential 
campaign.  He said Velayati plans to run again in 2009, and he 
plans to join his campaign again.  The doctor claimed Velayati's 
star is rising in Iran, along with Tehran Mayor Qalibaf.  He 
thought Velayati made a mistake in pulling out of the 2005 
election. 
 
8.(S/NF) He claimed that Rafsanjani will not run for president 
again in 2009 and has already lent his support to Velayati.  He 
maintained that Velayati had the confidence of both the Supreme 
Leader and Rafsanjani and that the Supreme Leader knew that any 
advice from Velayati already had Rafsanjani's support.  The 
doctor said that Velayati shares foreign policy goals with 
Rafsanjani and that he wants to establish ties with the rest of 
world.  On the other hand, he indicated differences between the 
two on domestic policy but did not elaborate.  (Note: He also 
claimed that Velayati, numerous others in politics today, and 
himself were members of the Hojjatiyeh prior to the revolution, 
which he called the "pure" resistance to the Shah.  However, he 
said both he and Velayati, as well as many others, had since 
left the group.  Endnote) 
 
Takes money to win an election 
------------------------------ 
 
9.(S/NF) The doctor accused Ahmadi-Nejad of misusing large 
amounts of Tehran municipal funds to buy votes during the 
election, such as $120 "loans" to Basij members.  He also 
accused current Tehran Mayor Qalibaf of corrupt practices in the 
election, saying he used money for his campaign that police 
received (not clear whether legitimately or illegitimately) for 
resolving problems people had with importing goods into Iran. 
 
10.(S/NF) In what was otherwise a normal conversation with a new 
contact, at one point the doctor changed tacks and said the US 
should help pave the way for better relations by playing a role 
in deciding who wins the 2009 elections.  He said that it will 
take money to win the elections, and Velayati needs some.  He 
gave IRPO Director the business card of a company he said was a 
trading company he set up to raise funds for Velayati's 
campaign.  He suggested that the US allow this trading company 
to import goods normally blocked by sanctions to allow Velayati 
to start compiling funds.  IRPO Director did not pursue the 
matter.  When asked why Velayati would not have access to 
Rafsanjani's reported immense wealth if Rafsanjani was backing 
him, the doctor responded that Rafsanjani was under such 
scrutiny for corruption these days from Ahmadi-Nejad, who 
"hated" him, he could not risk it.  The doctor also maintained 
that the Iranian diaspora did not contribute money for Iranian 
political campaigns. 
 
His view: Ahmadi-Nejad made many mistakes 
----------------------------------------- 
 
11.(S/NF) Despite his argument about the importance of financial 
backing to win the presidency, the doctor underscored the 
Supreme Leader's role in influencing elections.  He claimed that 
after Khatami twice won the presidential election, the Supreme 
Leader decided to ensure future winners had his pre-approval. 
For this reason, he mobilized the IRGC and the Basij in the 2005 
presidential elections, but, said the doctor, the results 
backfired on him.  Khameini did not realize how much influence 
others, particularly Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, would have on 
Ahmadi-Nejad.  The doctor was very critical of Ahmadi-Nejad, who 
he said made many mistakes in his first six months, including 
listening to Mesbah-Yazdi.  He said President Ahmadi-Nejad's 
popularity is now on the decline but that the Supreme Leader 
will not drop him as president. 
 
Rumor mill 
---------- 
 
12.(S/NF) Another source, an Iranian-American who travels 
frequently to Iran, said he heard rumors in Iran that 150 MPs 
were prepared to impeach Ahmadi-Nejad, but the Supreme Leader 
told them not to because Khameini knows he is dying.  Another 
source maintained that the Supreme Leader is worried that if he 
dies and Ahmadi-Nejad is impeached, the Islamic system will 
fall.  In the meantime, the Supreme Leader is reportedly trying 
to select his own replacement.  One source maintained that 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000014  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Rafsanjani is proposing former President Khatami, but supposedly 
only because he knows the Supreme Leader will say no and then 
maybe consider Rafsanjani.  Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi is reportedly 
proposing Judiciary chief Shahrudi, while others are advocating 
replacing the position of supreme leader with a council.  One 
rumor is that the Supreme Leader is refusing chemotherapy to 
hide visible signs of his illness.  (Note:  It is important to 
note how rumor-prone Iran is.  End note) 
 
13.(S/NF) Comment:  Another contact, a purported former IRGC 
general, was dismissive of Velayati's influence on foreign 
policy and claimed that Hassan Rohani, formerly Iran's top 
nuclear negotiator and now the Supreme Leader's representative 
on the Supreme National Security Council, has a stronger voice. 
We often hear different prognoses from different Iranians as to 
who is the ascendant power.  Some Iranians have predicted that 
Qalibaf or Larijani will be the next president; this is the 
first time we have heard the prediction for Velayati.  We would 
also note that while we frequently hear claims that Rafsanjani 
is a pragmatist seeking closer ties with the West, we hear this 
less said about Velayati.  In any case, all Iranian prominent 
figures seem to be towing the party line in statements 
surrounding passage of UNSCR 1747, with none right now arguing 
for rapprochement over enrichment.  Velayati called the UNSC's 
intervention in Iran's nuclear case illegal and said that Iran 
will not suspend uranium enrichment even for a short period of 
time.  He said that putting up with international pressure was 
the high price the country was to pay for materializing great 
projects such as development of nuclear energy.  He called 
access to the nuclear fuel cycle the redline of the ruling 
system on the nuclear issue.  "Iran will not withdraw from this 
redline but will rather use various political, international and 
economic levers to reduce the inevitable cost," he added.  We 
were surprised by the request for USG funding for Velayati, and 
it discredited the contact to a degree, although the rest of his 
comments seemed genuine.  The goal of such an inquiry may have 
been just to test the reaction, or it may have demonstrated our 
interlocutor's ignorance of US policy, despite having lived in 
the US 15 years.  It may also have been simply an attempt at 
personal gain. 
BURNS