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Viewing cable 07DILI106, CONTINUED SYMPATHY FOR REINADO IN WESTERN DISTRICTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI106 2007-03-14 12:54 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Dili
P R 141254Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3358
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
MCC COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LISBON 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 
AMEMBASSY VATICAN 
AMEMBASSY DILI
S E C R E T DILI 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/14/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU TT
SUBJECT: CONTINUED SYMPATHY FOR REINADO IN WESTERN DISTRICTS 
 
REF: A) DILI 089, B) DILI 096 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C/NF) Summary: In a March 11-13 visit to East Timor's 
western districts Emboffs and US Defense Representative found 
that dissident military leader Major Alfredo Reinado retains 
strong backing across the region, though it remains unclear if 
his supporters would be willing to go beyond their current 
rhetoric to engage in demonstrations or violence.  Police and 
local leaders cautioned that further action against Reinado 
could lead to renewed civil unrest and possibly violence. 
However, such predictions are frequent and their realization 
much less so, therefore the extent of this threat remains to be 
seen.  Nevertheless, Reinado clearly enjoys a friendly and 
supportive environment in which he can operate, putting the 
International Stabilization Force (ISF) at a distinct 
disadvantage.  Also of concern are unconfirmed but worrying 
indications that Reinado may be regrouping his scattered forces 
and that more members of the "petitioners" group may be joining 
him.  None of the scenarios for what happens next in the Reinado 
saga can be regarded with equilibrium and it is likely that 
Reinado, whether at large, captured or killed, will continue to 
be a destabilizing factor.  Moreover, the issues he represents 
to the western population will remain in play and show little 
sign of being resolved soon, as the growing iconic image of 
Reinado as a "Robin Hood" figure loom larger than the man 
himself.  Charge and Emboffs briefed the Australian Ambassador 
on these observations on March 14, while also reiterating the 
USG's continued support for Australia's policy in East Timor. 
During the trip, covering over 500 kilometers through six 
districts, Emboffs saw few signs of hostility towards 
westerners, though there was some anti-Australia graffiti.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Emboffs and USDR traveled to the western districts of 
East Timor, March 11-13, traveling through six districts while 
stopping in the towns of Maliana, Suai, Same, Maubisse, Aileu, 
and Gleno.  The goal of the trip was to assess the current state 
of support for dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado, who is 
currently on the run from the ISF following a clash in Same on 
March 3-4 in which five of his men were killed (see reftel A). 
Emboffs were able to travel throughout the western districts 
without incident, finding the friendly reception encountered on 
previous trips to be the same. Overall, there were few signs of 
hostility toward foreigners, with the exception of a few 
sightings of anti-Australian graffiti.  In general, pro-Reinado 
sources emphasized that they blamed the government, not the 
Australians, for the raid on Reinado as the government had set 
the policy and issued the order. 
 
Widespread support for Reinado endures 
-------------------------------------- 
3. (C) Throughout our travels, it was evident that popular 
sympathy and support for Reinado remains strong, especially 
among youth, but also among community, opposition, and church 
leaders.  International interlocutors resident in these 
districts consistently reported that pro-Reinado sentiment was 
in fact the norm.  In Aileu, American citizen nuns who have 
lived there for more than a decade noted that most people 
question why the authorities are fixated on Reinado, who they 
see as not having harmed anyone, while neglecting problems they 
regard as far more urgent, such a the petitioner issue, security 
in Dili, and rice shortages.  The support that Reinado is 
receiving from various Catholic Church leaders is also 
significant.  (See Ref B on the views of the Bishop of Dili.) 
Father Natalino, the Catholic Church's sole representative in 
Suai and an unabashed Reinado supporter told us that when 
Australian troops called him to the local police station to 
question him about Reinado's whereabouts, he retorted that "he 
is hiding in my heart."  Other signs of pro-Reinado sentiment 
were also in evidence, such as the well-tended shrines in Suai 
 
honoring two Reinado subordinates who have been killed as well 
as several instances of pro-Reinado graffiti. 
 
4. (C) Despite the consistent expressions of support for Reinado 
and the consequent unhappiness with the decision taken by the 
President and Prime Minister requesting ISF to take military 
action to capture him, Emboffs observed life carrying on as 
normal throughout the West.  The clear exception to this was the 
town of Same which exhibited both the physical and psychological 
impact of the recent events there.  Emboffs in Same on March 12 
observed that it was visibly tense with evidence of substantial 
unrest.  There was extensive pro-Reinado graffiti around the 
market area and numerous piles of ash where tires had recently 
been burned.  Local police officers initially told us that 
things were calming, but the Director of Operations for the 
national police (PNTL) in Manufahi district later confided to a 
member of our locally-engaged staff that they feared reprisals 
from the local community, who perceived them as collaborating 
with the Australian troops.  In addition, local and 
international media reported this week that residents of Same 
are angry because Australian troops searched their homes, 
damaged over a dozen houses with their helicopter's rotor wash, 
and briefly detained some citizens, although Australian 
diplomatic sources said these reports sensationalized the 
situation and we were unable to get direct confirmation that 
these events occurred. 
 
5. (C) At present, it appears that the pro-Reinado sentiment is 
primarily passive.  While we saw several days of unrest in Dili 
last week apparently by Reinado supporters in response to the 
March 3-4 ISF operations in Same, this was limited in scale and 
quickly subsided.  Despite calls to "call off the ISF" coming 
from multiple quarters, ranging from opposition parties and 
youth groups to the Church, these calls have not been 
accompanied by any notable mobilization.  Nonetheless, the 
importance of this "passive" support should not be dismissed. 
While the pro-Reinado populace is not actively agitating, they 
comprise a remarkably friendly and advantageous environment in 
which he can operate.  Without him doing something to call 
attention to his location, he may be able to continue to evade 
capture efforts.  Moreover, many interlocutors in the western 
districts claimed that the currently passive support could 
easily translate into action if Reinado was captured or killed. 
In conversation with Emboffs on March 12, the Covalima district 
youth coordinator for the opposition Democratic Party (PD) 
stated that the youth of Suai would not under any circumstances 
accept either the arrest or death of Reinado. 
 
Petitioners joining up? 
----------------------- 
6. (C) Besides Reinado's broader popularity, another concern is 
the prospect that he and his men may be regrouping, possibly 
with new members from the petitioner group joining.  Sources in 
both Gleno and Aileu reported that the petitioners, whose main 
bases have been in these towns for many months, have disappeared 
and their current location remains unknown. The Australian 
Defense Force (ADF) based in Gleno reported that the petitioners 
"started disappearing" on March 3 as the operation in Same got 
underway.  Sources close to the petitioners have relayed to 
Emboffs that they are scared that the operation against Reinado 
will soon extend to them and that they are simply hiding in the 
hills.  However, several petitioners told a reliable journalist 
source that they are intent on joining Reinado.  Indications 
that petitioners as well as other sympathizers are endeavoring 
to join Reinado have come from other sources as well. 
Meanwhile, in the last few days Reinado has been actively using 
local media to draw links between himself and historical figures 
which waged rebellions against the Portuguese.  Observers note 
that Reinado's best chance to avoid capture and increase his 
ability to influence the situation would be to lay low for now 
and wait for election results, but that his penchant for the 
lime light may result in an earlier action, with potential to 
bring things to a head again. 
 
Staying the course~for now 
 
-------------------------- 
7. (S/NF) Charge and Emboffs briefed Australian Ambassador 
Margaret Twomey on these findings on March 14.  Ambassador 
Twomey was eager to hear our impressions of popular sentiment in 
the western districts and agreed that a key outstanding question 
was the extent to which this sympathy for Reinado would turn 
into active support.  She also concurred with our assessment 
that Reinado's popularity is stems from the broad perception 
that he is standing up to an unjust Fretilin government which 
has accomplished little for the people in the western districts, 
and despite the crisis of the last year has continued to 
demonstrate a lack of will to address pressing problems, ranging 
from failures of the judicial sector to immediate food 
shortages.  She agrees that Reinado the symbol is more of a 
threat than the man.  Ambassador Twomey told us that she 
personally sympathizes with those who complain about ineffective 
governance, but that taking up arms is not the solution.  Charge 
expressed to Ambassador Twomey that the USG fully supports the 
Australian government in its efforts to restore stability to 
East Timor, but that we remain concerned over potential 
implications of the Reinado situation, whether he remains an 
outlaw at large, or is caught or killed. When asked if the 
Australian government was considering ways to resolve the 
situation to avoid violence or a potential popular backlash, she 
told us that her experience in the last nine months has proved 
that negotiations with Reinado are fruitless. 
 
8. (S/NF) While at present, the Australian-UN-GOET consensus 
that dialogue with Reinado is out of the question remains 
steadfast, pressures continue from a number of quarters for the 
government in particular to soften this stance.  A reliable 
source today relayed to us that the Church leadership is working 
behind the scenes to convince both the President and Prime 
Minister to resume dialogue with Reinado.  This pressure seems 
to be emerging despite Church leaders' avowed reluctance to be 
involved in facilitating such a dialogue themselves. (Ref B). 
Australian Ambassador Twomey on March 14 relayed her frustration 
with some of the previous government "waffling" on the Reinado 
issue.  Some observers believe that accepting the terms of 
surrender that Reinado has relayed to the government and the ISF 
may be an acceptable compromise way out of the current dilemma. 
 
9. (C/NF) Comment: None of the scenarios for what happens from 
here can be regarded with equilibrium.  If Reinado remains at 
large, the credibility of the GOET and ISF will continue to 
erode and he his mythical stature will likely grow.  While it is 
possible that his group could remain too scattered and weakened 
to do anything (a view held by some international observers), it 
is not at all clear that this is the case.  The possibility of 
Reinado emerging at the head of a larger threat than his group 
represented previously cannot be discounted at this point. 
Moreover, the longer he remains free, the more likely that we 
will see the government start to bend in its resolve, an 
occurrence which will have implications for the ISF and GOA's 
role in the country.  His surrender would be the ideal solution, 
with capture and imprisonment as the next best outcome, helping 
to remove the threat of this armed group and hopefully 
diminishing his hero status and shifting his case to a judicial 
process.  Nonetheless, such a development is highly likely to 
cause another round of unrest in Dili such as that seen for 
several nights last week, and possibly a much more widespread 
reaction.  The risk of widespread unrest would be significantly 
increased if Reinado were to be killed in the effort to capture 
him, and such a development would likely make him a martyr.  In 
many ways Reinado is far less important as an individual than 
for what he represents to a large portion of a disaffected 
populace.  End comment. 
HARSHA