VZCZCXRO7894
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0711/01 0871439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281439Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1498
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000711 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: STONEWALLING ON UN-BROKERED CYPRUS TALKS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 256 
     ¶B. ANKARA 588 
     ¶C. ANKARA 57 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey's MFA characterizes recent Greek 
Cypriot steps to re-start UN-brokered talks and to facilitate 
a re-opening of the Ledra Street crossing of the Green Line 
in central Nicosia as "just for show."  The GOT believes G/C 
President Papadopoulos is feeling pressure from the EU and is 
doing whatever he can to alter his image as an 
obstructionist, with no intent of actually following through 
with genuine dialogue.  Meanwhile, they describe "TRNC 
President" Talat as "nervous" and concerned about being 
pressured to move forward with the UN talks without agreed 
terms of reference.  As Turkey nears presidential elections 
next month and parliamentary elections later in the year, 
hot-button nationalist issues such as Cyprus have taken on 
even greater significance.  As a result, the ability of Talat 
and the Turkish Cypriots to maneuver is likely to remain 
severely constrained, with GOT officials demonstrating little 
creativity on how to get Cyprus talks back on track.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
G/C Moves Just "For Show" 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Charge met March 26 with MFA Deputy Under Secretary 
for Northeast Mediterranean and Americas Haydar Berk about 
the latest snag in moving ahead with UN-brokered talks 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Berk's recent visit to 
the island and his meetings with "TRNC President" Talat and 
others.  Berk claimed the GOT continues to support the UN 
process, though he emphasized that Talat, Pertev and others 
suspect the ROC's latest steps are merely "for show" in order 
to reduce EU pressure on Nicosia. 
 
¶3. (C) Berk dwelled on Talat's concern that the Greek 
Cypriots will want to initiate a discussion on the property 
issue in the technical committees, then point to T/C 
intransigence when they refuse to engage on an issue they 
believe should more rightly be covered in the expert working 
groups as one of the issues to be resolved under a 
comprehensive settlement.  He admitted there had been hope 
within the GOT and in Northern Cyprus that Papadopoulos' 
recent initiative was a sign of a new level of flexibility on 
the G/C side.  However, as discussions continued, Berk 
claimed it became clear that the Greek Cypriots were 
summarily dismissing T/C concerns regarding the property 
issue and their expectation that working group and technical 
committee titles would accurately reflect what the Turkish 
Cypriots thought should be discussed (e.g. power-sharing when 
discussing "governance"; security guarantees for the T/C 
community when discussing "defense"). 
 
How To Get Back on Track? 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Charge responded that Papadopoulos' recent moves had, 
in our view, been successful in painting Talat as the 
intransigent party, and suggested it would be in Talat's best 
interest to agree to move forward with UN talks.  Doing so 
could facilitate progress, if only incremental, and help 
insulate the Cyprus issue from the mad dash to capture the 
nationalist vote that currently characterizes the Turkish 
political scene.  Charge also noted the perception that the 
Turkish military had taken a much harder line on 
Cyprus-related issues in recent months and said this was both 
unnecessary and unhelpful. 
 
¶5. (C) Berk acknowledged Turkey's electoral politics 
complicate matters with regard to Cyprus, but instead 
emphasized the GOT view that political steps on Cyprus should 
be reciprocal and simultaneous.  He referred to Talat's 
decision in December to remove the Ledra Street footbridge, 
noting that Talat had pressed hard to accomplish it. 
However, because the move had not been reciprocal, 
Papadopoulos' latest initiative, which in Turkish eyes merely 
"catches him up" with the T/C position, now raises the 
expectation that Talat must do more or else be seen as the 
intransigent party.  This despite the fact, according to 
Berk, that the T/C concerns associated with the UN talks 
noted above have not been addressed. 
 
¶6. (C) Responding to our question on how Ankara hoped to move 
the process forward, he said that Talat was "more nervous 
than we expected" during their March 17-18 visit to the 
island and unlikely to overcome his concerns. Talat wished to 
"re-evaluate the entire process" before deciding how to 
proceed.  Berk also expressed the view that if the USG could 
take "two or three bold steps" (e.g. allow direct flights 
between Ercan airport and U.S. POEs), it would help to 
 
ANKARA 00000711  002 OF 002 
 
 
pressure Papadopoulos to take more seriously the need to 
engage with Talat as an equal partner.  Charge outlined steps 
the USG has already taken to help alleviate the economic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and said the focus now 
should be managing the situation and keeping the technical 
talks on track -- not waiting for a grand initiative from the 
U.S. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: As noted ref c, TGS has laid down markers 
that it sees itself as the ultimate protector of Turkish 
national interests, including (or especially) Cyprus.  The 
GOT, or at least senior levels at MFA, appear to have little 
stomach for inserting themselves in a Cyprus issue that has 
always been a lightning rod for Turkish nationalists.  The 
debate swirling around Turkey's presidential election process 
-- and the degree to which nationalist issues have moved to 
the center of that debate (ref b) -- makes it all the more 
likely that Talat and the Turkish Cypriots will have little 
room to maneuver.  Despite our continued arguments (and the 
inherent logic) in support of continued T/C engagement in UN 
talks, we see little prospect for Turkish concurrence. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
MCELDOWNEY