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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR CD DEL 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL BWC TBIO FR UK IS
SUBJECT: CW/BW AND EXPORT CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH 
ISRAEL, FEBRUARY 12-13, 2007 
 
REF: A) GROMOLL-CROWLEY E-MAIL FROM 2/22 B) STATE 
     194383 C) STATE 17199 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (B and 
D). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  International Security and Nonproliferation 
DAS Donald Mahley led a team of experts from State and 
Commerce to Israel on February 11-13 for consultations on 
chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation and export 
controls.  In the discussions, Israeli MFA Director for Arms 
Control Alon Bar reiterated Israel's commitment to preventing 
proliferation of chemical or biological weapons.  He said 
that Israel is familiar with the CWC and BWC and supports 
their objectives, but is not prepared to join them under the 
current regional security situation.  The Israeli delegation 
asked about the role that challenge inspections could play in 
Iran and noted steps the GOI is taking to strengthen its 
export controls on dual-use and military items.  Talks on BW 
issues focused on the importance of national measures to 
combat the threat and on Israeli efforts to ensure safeguards 
on dual-use research.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Alon Bar, joined by his Deputy Tammy 
Rahamimoff-Honig, Itamar Yaar (NSC), Schmuel Limone (MOD), 
Ohad Orenstein (Industry/Labor/Trade) and several MOD 
briefers held consultations on a range of multilateral arms 
control and export control mechanisms with DAS Mahley, ISN/CB 
Director Robert Mikulak, ISN/CB Deputy Director Jennie 
Gromoll, Sarah Heidema from the DOC, and an Embassy 
representative.  As planned, the main focus for discussion 
was implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
GOI officials requested DAS Mahley continue the decade-long 
tradition of keeping  the GOI apprised of ongoing 
implementation efforts and the U.S. experience, in practical 
terms, with key elements of the treaty.  Discussions also 
touched upon issues relating to the Biological Weapons 
Convention, Wassenaar, MTCR, and Australia Group.  MFA Deputy 
Director General for Strategic Affairs (A/S-equivalent) 
Miriam Ziv reviewed the talks in a lunch following the 
February 12 meeting.  DAS Mahley discussed these same topics 
with Israeli experts at the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies (formerly the Jaffee Center) in Tel Aviv on February 
¶13.  The delegation's visit renewed expert-level contacts and 
provided both the USG and GOI with better understandings of 
the other's positions on CW/BW and export control issues. 
 
------------------------------ 
GOI views on ratifying the CWC 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C)  As anticipated, the Israeli team reiterated that the 
GOI had signed the CWC during an optimistic time at the 
height of the Peace Process in the early-1990's.  Bar noted 
that the regional situation was different today.  He 
maintained that Israel unilaterally follows guidelines 
established under all the WMD regimes and should be 
recognized for doing so even though the political context 
does not allow for Israeli membership.  Given official GOI 
involvement in the preparatory work for CWC implementation, 
it is keenly aware of the details of the Convention. 
 
¶4. (C)  DAS Mahley impressed upon GOI officials that only 
North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon remain as 
significant non-member states.  OPCW Director-General Pfirter 
has efforts underway to bring the Middle Eastern hold-outs on 
board.  As always, U.S. experts are prepared to work with the 
GOI on the intricacies of CWC implementation at any time the 
GOI deems it would be propitious to ratify the Convention. 
Bar emphasized that the GOI had welcomed DG Pfirter in 
Jerusalem only a short time ago and that Israeli experts had 
traveled to The Hague as a gesture of interest in the CWC. 
They had explained that the political threshold was too high 
at this juncture to consider putting the CWC before the 
Knesset.  However, he allowed that political considerations 
can change. 
 
¶5. (C) MOD adviser Limone emphasized that he had participated 
in the Preparatory Committee work on challenge inspections, 
confidentiality, and health and safety.  The GOI's national 
 
SIPDIS 
lab had passed OPCW proficiency tests and provided samples 
 
for the OPCW database.  Should the Israeli leadership decide 
to join the CWC, there would be little change in Israel's 
position on key CWC issues.  Their views on ratification, 
however, have changed, given the regional environment 
vis--vis the CWC.  The national mood is one of apprehension 
and suspicion.  Iran is a growing threat and is in blatant 
violation of its treaty obligations.  Even a challenge 
inspection could allow them to go "scot-free."  He said that 
the GOI has postponed joining, but has not ruled it out. 
 
¶6. (C) Limone argued that the Syrians and Lebanese (and 
Egyptians less vocally) who showed up for OPCW meetings on 
universality in the Middle East take pains to point out their 
attendance does not indicate political movement toward 
joining.  The EU demarches all three countries each year on 
non-proliferation and UNSCR 1540, but to no avail.  He 
contrasted the behavior of the Arab hold-outs with that of 
Israel, which he maintained takes non-proliferation seriously 
and continues to assess developments in the treaty regimes. 
Israel holds detailed bilaterals with the Australians after 
Australia Group (CW/BW export control) meetings.  In his view 
(shared by Bar), Israel is therefore not in the same 
non-state party category as Syria and North Korea.  DAS 
Mahley responded that, in lieu of improvement in the overall 
situation, the U.S. will continue to encourage all four 
regional states to join the CWC as a step in the right 
direction and in support of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle 
East. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
CWC and OPCW adapting; CW destruction difficulties remain 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU)  DAS Mahley noted that in this tenth anniversary 
year, the U.S. assessment of the functioning of the CWC and 
the implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was positive.  The OPCW is one of 
the more effective multilateral organizations which does a 
reasonable job of adapting to the chemical weapons (CW) 
threat.  It has not been as successful in regard to CW 
destruction; the Russians are struggling to achieve 
destruction of 20 percent of their stockpile by the 
treaty-mandated date for 100 percent; the U.S. has so far 
been able to destroy only 40 percent of its declared 
stockpile, due in part to domestic regulatory issues, even 
though the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on the program. 
 Over the last decade the OPCW and member states have 
developed a stable and effective inspection regime.  We are 
considering how to adapt to a future situation when CW 
destruction is complete and there is a large inspectorate and 
changes in technology -- as well as somewhat outdated lists 
of declared chemicals. 
 
¶8. (C) ISN/CB Office Director Mikulak added that one treaty 
requirement -- sampling and analysis -- has only begun and is 
potentially a useful tool for inspectors.  Inspectors use 
blinding software to insure that only scheduled chemicals are 
displayed, thus protecting commercial secrets.  The 
equipment, however, is cumbersome (1500 lbs for analysis 
on-site).  He also pointed out the importance of domestic 
implementation vis-a-vis non-state actors.  There is a 
systematic effort underway in The Hague, where the OPCW and 
the U.S. are using pressure and assistance to encourage 
member states to put penal legislation into place.  This is 
required under UNSCR 1540 as well. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Routine and challenge inspections 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The U.S. team noted that challenge inspections have 
not occurred and have never been considered something to be 
done routinely to clarify declarations.  The threshold is 
much higher for an illicit program.  There are some team 
chiefs that want to expand the scope of their routine 
inspections in industry, but their numbers are dwindling. 
The U.S. continues to push for increased inspections at 
commercial facilities and is making some progress in shifting 
the focus to those developing countries we suspect of 
dual-use enterprises.  The U.S. has fared well during OPCW 
inspections, only having a few uncertainties, in some cases 
 
related to records unavailable at the time of the inspection 
and provided subsequently.  We continue to make clear that 
the CWC schedules of chemicals are for verification purposes 
only and do not constitute a full list of chemical weapons or 
their ingredients.  The U.S. is reluctant to modify the 
schedules.  However, there are indications of CW being 
produced from chemicals that are not on the lists and thus 
not subject to declaration and inspection. 
 
¶10. (C) The Israeli team was interested in whether there is a 
level of inspection between routine and challenge.  OPCW 
Director-General Pfirter had replied that it was not a simple 
answer.  Mikulak noted that the OPCW had inquired of parties 
about undeclared facilities; however, there are no measures 
other than a challenge inspection to allow inspection of 
undeclared sites.  Limone maintained that challenge 
inspections are now seen as a punitive tool.  He asked why 
USG had not pushed for a challenge inspection in Iran despite 
the fact that U.S. officials had said Iran was in violation 
of the CWC with alleged maintenance of chemical weapons 
production facilities.  DAS Mahley explained that a challenge 
inspection had become such a high-profile instrument that if 
one could not be confident of finding a "smoking gun" by 
means of the inspection, there was a real danger that 
pursuing the inspection would actually provide diplomatic 
"top cover" for the proliferators.  However the USG continues 
to examine scenarios of how it could work with a variety of 
CWC Parties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Export controls and tracking arms sales/transfers 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11. (C/NF) Limone reported that the GOI had ensured domestic 
legislation was in place; the GOI is in the last stages of 
pushing updated export control laws through the Knesset.  He 
said that Israel is careful about exporting dual-use 
equipment that could be used for military purposes.  MOD 
intelligence officers briefed the delegation on Iranian arms 
trafficking/support for Hizballah and regional efforts to 
develop CW/BW.  MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic 
Affairs (A/S-equivalent) Miriam Ziv later expressed 
particular interest in how the Russians track arms 
sales/transfers (especially those to Syria).  Experts from 
both sides agreed that most countries do not have 
"post-shipment verification mechanisms" (beyond an end-user 
certificate).  The Israelis said that they had asked a 
recipient country for such an assurance for their exports and 
were "refused."  The GOI claimed that although they maintain 
"exchanges" with key Wassenaar, MTCR and AG players, Israel 
is viewed with suspicion -- particularly from the Nordics and 
Russia -- for implementing the measures unilaterally. 
 
---------- 
BWC issues 
---------- 
 
¶12. (C) During discussions on the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), Mahley pointed out that the U.S. had led 
the effort to defeat the legally-binding verification 
protocol and now felt universally vindicated by this stance, 
especially given developments in biotechnology and the 
security environment.  Some states parties remain hopeful 
that the next U.S. administration will revive the 
negotiations on a legally-binding mechanism.  However, the 
success of the 2003-2005 BWC Work Program has shown that 
national measures, to include penal legislation, are the most 
critical in countering the growing BW threat -- especially 
from non-state actors.  The norm -- and legal obligations -- 
established by the BWC continue to be recognized.  Efforts at 
pathogen security, codes of conduct for life scientists and 
the correlation between BW and disease surveillance had been 
made clear in the Geneva expert meetings -- most importantly 
to the non-aligned states.  Participation in "Work Program" 
meetings doubled from that during the Protocol negotiations 
and a good number of non-aligned countries had requested 
assistance. 
 
¶13. (C) The Israeli NSC representative noted positive efforts 
by the Israeli Academy of Science to develop recommended 
measures for ensuring proper safeguards for dual-use 
 
biological research, drawing heavily on the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences "Fink Report."  These comments were 
echoed by academics in a February 13 discussion in Tel Aviv 
at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. 
 
¶14. (U) DAS Mahley and his delegation have cleared this 
message. 
 
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