VZCZCXRO7011
RR RUEHCN RUEHVC
DE RUEHGH #0101/01 0450722
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 140722Z FEB 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5543
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5900

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 SHANGHAI 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  MANUAL REVIEW 
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: PRE-PARTY CONGRESS INFIGHTING OVER PERSONNEL INTENSIFIES 
 
REF: A) 06 SHANGHAI 6957; B) SHANGHAI 23; C) 06 SHANGHAI 5219; D) BEIJING 618 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, 
Shanghai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary.  According to multiple East China contacts, the 
central party leadership was increasingly split over personnel 
issues and would only become more fractured with the approach of 
the 2007 Party Congress.  Vice President Zeng Qinghong was 
trying to work out a compromise that would allow him to remain 
on the Politburo Standing Committee despite having surpassed the 
"mandatory" retirement age of 68.  Moreover, President Hu 
Jintao, bolstered by the death of party elder Bo Yibo, was 
trying to sideline other leaders who had been allied with former 
President Jiang Zemin and was conducting secret investigations 
into their activities and those of Jiang's family.  Hu had 
already successfully removed Huang Ju from a position of 
influence with an internal party resolution banning Huang from 
all Politburo meetings and stripping him of his portfolio. 
Those currently expected to be promoted--possibly to the 
Politburo Standing Committee--included Liaoning Party Secretary 
Li Keqiang, Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping, Jiangsu Party 
Secretary Li Yuanchao, and Trade Minister Bo Xilai.  End summary. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Leadership Struggle Reaching New Heights 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) On February 2, Nanjing University Philosophy and Law 
Professor Gu Su said that top level leadership infighting was 
increasingly "violent" and almost to the status of an "open 
struggle."  During a February 5 conversation, Shanghai People's 
Congress Researcher Ms. Zhou Meiyan agreed that there was a 
growing division within the leadership over personnel issues, 
centering around President Hu Jintao and former President Jiang 
Zemin and his proteges.  Gu said it was natural for fractures in 
party unity to intensify in the six months prior to a Party 
Congress and expected that the fighting would get much uglier in 
the next few months. 
 
------------------------- 
Zeng Wants the Presidency 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Gu said that Vice President Zeng Qinghong was fighting 
for his political survival.  He referenced a January 10 Reuters 
report that cited "Beijing sources" as trying to convince Hu to 
abdicate the presidency in favor of Zeng.  According to Gu's 
Beijing contacts, Zeng himself was trying to wrest the title 
from Hu in an attempt to stay on the Politburo after the 17th 
Party Congress.  Zeng had played a key role in assisting Hu get 
rid of both former President Jiang Zemin and former Shanghai 
Party Secretary Chen Liangyu and felt that Hu owed him a favor. 
However, Hu was unwilling to relinquish the title of 
"President," in part because of the 2008 Olympics.  Hu did not 
want to give up the chance to burnish his international image as 
a world-class leader.  Since neither the Party Secretary nor the 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) titles would 
allow Hu to interact with other world leaders, Hu was unwilling 
to simply be the power behind the curtain while Zeng enjoyed the 
international limelight.  Zhou said that it would be unthinkable 
for Hu to voluntarily give up the title.  Even though it was a 
figurehead position with little real authority, Hu would not 
want to give up the one position that allowed him to interact 
with foreign leaders. 
 
¶4.  (S) According to Gu, Zeng had ultimately been responsible 
for planting the story in Reuters in an attempt to bring 
international attention to the issue and hence greater pressure 
on Hu to find a way to keep Zeng on the Politburo.  Zeng's 
supporters were arguing behind the scene that Hu had no right to 
hold all three titles.  Hu had invoked former paramount leader 
Deng Xiaoping's example of completely retiring and standing down 
from the CMC to pressure Jiang to step down.  Now, Zeng's 
supporters were arguing that Hu should also follow Deng's 
example and give up the presidency, noting that Deng never held 
all three titles and chiding Hu, saying "which Deng Xiaoping are 
you emulating?" 
 
¶5.  (S) Gu said that according to the "68 rule," which had been 
applied to Politburo members in previous instances (i.e., if 
Politburo members were over 68 at the time of the Party 
Congress, they needed to retire), Zeng would need to step down 
at the 2007 Party Congress.  The only way for Zeng to remain was 
either if the Politburo agreed to make an exception to the rule 
for Zeng or if he was granted the title of President, Party 
Secretary or CMC Chairman, the holders of which were allowed to 
 
SIPDIS 
stay on if they were 70 or below.  (Note:  The age "rules" 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
referred to by Gu above are informal norms observed in recent 
years within the Party.  To the best of our knowledge, such 
norms have never been codified or adopted as Party "rules."  End 
note.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Zeng Qinghong: The Man With the Files 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) According to Gu, Hu's advisors were currently split on 
how to handle the situation, with some saying Hu should find a 
compromise solution that allowed Zeng to stay on as a reward for 
his demonstrated loyalty and assistance.  Others, however, 
argued that Zeng was too dangerous to keep on board.  Hu and 
Premier Wen Jiabao tended to side with the latter advisors. 
Zeng, as Jiang's hatchet man and head of the Organization 
Department for many years, had access to the personnel files of 
all of the top leaders, including all of their secrets.  Hu and 
Wen were leaning towards those who argued that the longer Zeng 
stayed in power, the more likely he was to cause trouble.  Gu 
compared Zeng to Kang Sheng, the infamous head of the secret 
police under Mao Zedong, noting that "such a figure cannot have 
a happy ending" in the Chinese political system. 
 
¶7.  (S) During a February 8 conversation, JP Morgan China Vice 
President and Treasurer Andrew Zhang characterized Zeng as a 
"palace eunuch" who was entrusted with significant power and 
answered to both Hu and, to some extent, Jiang.  Separately on 
February 8, Carlyle Group Managing Director and Chief China 
Representative Luo Yi said he thought it would be better if Zeng 
were running the party rather than Hu.  Zeng was more decisive 
and had a stronger power base. 
 
--------------------------- 
Hu Fights Fire With Fire... 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) According to Gu, Hu had made his share of enemies as 
Party Secretary.  Many provincial leaders in Guangdong, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, and Shanghai disliked Hu for his economic 
policies that tended to negatively impact their vested 
interests.  Also, Jiang Zemin and many of his proteges were 
counted among Hu's enemies.  Andrew Zhang said that Jiang's 
influence was fairly constrained now.  He had made a deal with 
Hu over the summer to cooperate with the Chen Liangyu ouster in 
exchange for guarantees of protection for his sons and nephew, 
who was currently the police chief in Shanghai (Ref A).  Gu said 
although Jiang himself was "not so strong" anymore, he still 
maintained some influence.  Moreover, many of his proteges, who 
stood to lose out at the Party Congress unless Hu's power was 
checked, were beginning to feel desperate and were more willing 
to fight.  Ms. Zhou agreed that Jiang did, indeed, retain some 
influence in Chinese politics. 
 
¶9.  (C) Zhang said he did not believe Hu feared Zeng on the 
presidency issue.  He noted that the same day as the Reuters 
report was issued, Hu made a speech to the Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission (CDIC) to discuss the anti-corruption 
campaign.  Zhang viewed the speech as Hu pointedly telling 
everyone in the party that he was unquestionably in charge. 
 
¶10.  (S) Moreover, Gu noted that Hu had ordered the re-arrest of 
Shanghai real estate tycoon Zhou Zhengyi in December because of 
Zhou's connections to both Chen Liangyu and Jiang Zemin's elder 
son, Jiang Mianheng, who was closely tied to Zhou through 
several real estate deals (Ref B).  Indeed, at Hu's behest, the 
CDIC was currently "seriously investigating" Jiang Mianheng. 
Because of the sensitivity of the case, information was not 
being published, but was going directly to Hu.  As Gu said, 
"it's up to Hu what to do with it."  (Comment: Hu's 
reinvestigation of Jiang Mianheng, if true, would give Hu 
increased ammunition to use against Jiang, should Jiang forget 
their "agreement" and attempt to be more active on personnel 
issues.  It may also suggest that Hu believed that Jiang's 
influence was still significant enough that Hu needed to 
actively check it in the run up to the Party Congress.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶11.  (C) Gu opined that Hu was likely behind the removal of 
filters on internet searches connecting Jiang Mianheng to Zhou 
Zhengyi and Chen Liangyu reported in a January 28 "Asia Weekly" 
(Yazhou Zhoukan) article.  Although he had not personally tried 
to run a search, Gu said that the removal of the filters would 
be a "significant" development.  On February 3, Poloff searched 
"Jiang Mianheng" and both "Zhou Zhengyi" and "Chen Liangyu" in 
Chinese from his home computer.  Several recent and past 
articles linking the men together with scandals did, indeed, 
show up under Google search results, including links for such 
dissident sites as "Secret China," "Renminbao," and the 
Falungong-controlled "Peace Hall" and "Epoch Times."  While 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
Poloff could read the summaries of the articles, none of the 
articles would load.  Ms. Zhou discounted the appearance of such 
links as a political phenomenon.  Zhou had also performed 
similar searches at home and attributed the results to 
information overload, noting that it was impossible for search 
engines to completely block the results, although they could 
effectively block the content. 
 
----------------------- 
...and Maybe Some Water 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Carlyle's Yi Luo discounted the Reuters article on Zeng 
seeking the Presidency, noting that he had heard that a deal had 
been struck allowing Zeng to stay on as head of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).  He said 
that the position would provide Zeng rank, status, and 
power--and presumably age limits--comparable to that of 
president, although it was less important from an international 
perspective.  On the same day that Luo relayed this information, 
albeit several hours later, Reuters published another article 
saying that, indeed, such a deal had been proposed and "Zeng's 
political fate would be finalized" during the summer leadership 
meetings.  According to the press report, Hu made the offer as a 
counter to calls for Zeng to take over the presidency. 
 
------------------ 
Hu Wins the Elders 
------------------ 
 
¶13.  (S) According to Gu, Hu's influence received an unexpected 
boost with the death of party elder Bo Yibo.  Although Bo had 
not actively opposed Hu, he had been one of Jiang's most ardent 
supporters because of Jiang's willingness to help promote Bo's 
son, Trade Minister Bo Xilai.  Bo Yibo had helped Jiang, for 
instance, formulate and sell the "68 rule" in order to rid Jiang 
of one of his top rivals, Qiao Shi, at the Party Congress in 
¶1997.  While the elders' role in politics has been diminished 
over the past decade, they still had some political influence. 
With the senior Bo's passing, party elder Wan Li, who strongly 
favored Hu, had now become the top elder.  Hu was also being 
supported by party elders Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan.  Qiao was the 
patron of CDIC Chairman Wu Guanzheng.  Although generally seen 
as a neutral figure in factional politics, Wu was nonetheless 
providing critical assistance to Hu. 
 
------------------------------- 
Throwing the Princelings a Bone 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Gu said that Hu recognized he needed to maintain good 
relations with the elders by promoting some princelings to 
high-level positions.  Hu, for instance, supported promoting Bo 
Xilai to the Politburo and a Vice Premier position, possibly to 
replace Wen as Premier after Wen stepped down in 2013.  Hu also 
supported transferring Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping to 
Beijing as a Politburo member and possibly Vice Premier in 
charge of industry.  Hu did not see these men as a threat to 
him.  Moreover, promoting them played well with many elders who 
were concerned that the children of veteran party leaders needed 
leading roles themselves in order to protect the interests of 
the Party and the elders. 
 
¶15.  (S) Luo and Zhang agreed that Xi was moving to Beijing. 
Luo said that the Zhejiang Governor's son had recently told him 
of the transfer.  Zhang noted that Xi was a contender for a slot 
on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC).  Regarding Bo Xilai, 
Zhang said Bo was positioning himself and being considered for a 
promotion, noting that while Bo was not particularly well-liked 
by foreigners, he was respected within the Chinese bureaucracy. 
Luo concurred that Bo wanted to move up, assessing that he is 
open and capable, but added that friction between Bo Yibo and Hu 
Jintao had led Hu to dislike Bo Xilai. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Huang Ju: Sidelined and Moving Out 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) One of the issues being most hotly contested was who 
would fill Huang Ju's position as Executive Vice Premier with 
responsibility for economic policy.  Gu said that while some 
were still saying that Huang was almost dead, he believed that 
Huang was not that sick and that there was a major political 
element to his "illness."  Huang had been closely tied to Chen 
Liangyu's misdeeds and many had argued that since Chen had been 
arrested, Huang was no longer fit to hold a leadership position. 
 Indeed, Gu said that three or four months ago, the party passed 
an internal resolution banning Huang from attending Politburo 
Standing Committee meetings and stripping him of his leadership 
responsibilities because of his "economic problems."  According 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
to the resolution, for the sake of appearances, Huang would 
retain his titles, although he had effectively been fired.  Gu 
confirmed other reports that Huang had returned to Shanghai. 
 
¶17.  (C) Zhang said that Huang would be replaced as Vice Premier 
at the National People's Congress.  Luo believed that it would 
not happen that quickly, unless Huang died first.  Instead, 
Huang would be dealt with at the Party Congress.  Luo heard that 
Huang was genuinely ill and had asked to travel to the United 
States for treatment but had been denied by party leaders.  At 
any rate, Luo said, Huang "clearly has no influence."  (Comment: 
Other sources have also recently told us that Huang Ju was near 
death.  End comment.) 
 
¶18.  (C) Zhang said the two top contenders to replace Huang were 
People's Bank of China President Zhou Xiaochuan and Finance 
Minister Jin Renqing.  Zhang said that Zhou was seen as too 
focused on international issues and not enough on domestic 
problems.  Jin, on the other hand, was seen as more focused on 
domestic interests, which many Chinese economists and economic 
policymakers saw as necessary. 
 
¶19.  (S) Luo discounted either Zhou or Jin as strong candidates 
and said that Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan was the front runner for 
the job.  Wang was well regarded and had strong economic 
credentials.  Luo said that his friend and his friend's father, 
who Luo said was the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office and a 
senior leader, had recently had dinner with Zeng Qinghong and 
Wang Qishan.  Luo said that it was made clear at the dinner that 
Wang was being considered for Huang's job.  Luo described Wang 
as capable, open, and progressive.  He noted that Wang had 
strong financial credentials, having served as a deputy governor 
of the People's Bank of China and a former vice governor of 
Guangdong Province. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Hu Pushing Jiang Supporters Out; Playing the Corruption Card 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶20.  (S) According to Gu, Hu had also ordered secret CDIC 
investigations into PBSC members Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun 
and was using the evidence collected to force their resignations 
at the upcoming Party Congress.  Li supposedly had "mafia" 
connections from his days in Liaoning and corruption problems 
from his days in Henan.  Hu and Wen on several occasions had 
confronted Li with the information they had received leading Li 
to tender his resignation on several occasions.  Hu had rejected 
his offer up to this point to keep a face of unity on the Party 
but intended to force Li out at the Party Congress.  Hu had not 
yet decided if he would allow Li to be prosecuted at a later 
date.  Gu also noted that Hu disliked current Organization 
Department head Wang Gang and hoped to move him to a ceremonial 
position.  Wang had been too closely associated with Jiang. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Dirty Deeds and They're Done Dirt Cheap 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (S) Zhang claimed that Hu was untouchable from the 
corruption standpoint in that he, his wife, his son, and his 
daughter were all clean.  As a point of comparison, he noted 
that both Zeng Qinghong and Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan were of 
"the same type but for a different price."  He noted that the 
base rate to purchase influence with Zeng Qinghong was around 
500,000 RMB, while it only cost 50,000 RMB for influence with 
Zeng Peiyan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Wen Jiabao: Great Administrative Assistant, Lousy Leader 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Gu noted that there was no daylight between Hu and Wen 
on policy or personnel issues.  According to Zhang, Wen operated 
as a "butler, a personal secretary, or a staff assistant" to Hu. 
 He made sure that all the paper was in order, but was not, 
himself, decisive nor was he a strategic thinker.  Zhang noted 
that Wu Yi had been a primary contender for Wen's position at 
the last Party Congress but that Jiang had blocked her from 
taking on that position.  Wu had more support and respect than 
Wen did throughout the leadership. 
 
---------------------------- 
Li Yuanchao: Leaving Jiangsu 
---------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (C) On February 2, Nanjing University History and 
Anthropology Professor Hua Tao said there were concrete signs 
that indicated Li Yuanchao might be promoted soon.  While 
initial rumors had him going to Shanghai as Party Secretary, 
lately people had been saying Li would move to Beijing.  Hua 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
noted that Li Mingchao had recently been transferred to Jiangsu 
as Deputy Party Secretary.  Li Mingchao was originally from 
Jiangsu, where he had worked as director of the Jiangsu Public 
Security Bureau.  From there, he had transferred to Yunnan as 
Deputy Party Secretary.  Hua understood Li Mingchao's lateral 
return to Jiangsu indicated he was in line to replace Li 
Yuanchao. 
 
¶24.  (S) Gu said that according to recent rumors, Jiangsu Party 
Secretary and Hu protege Li Yuanchao was heading to Beijing and 
 
SIPDIS 
the Politburo with a concurrent post as either head of the 
Organization Department or Director of the General Office. 
Zhang expected that Li had a good chance at winning a slot on 
the Politburo Standing Committee.  Luo said that Li had told 
mutual friends in Beijing that he expected to be going back to 
Beijing soon.  It was not clear, however, if it was to head the 
Organization Department or to take up a position as vice 
premier. 
 
¶25.  (C) On February 2, Nanjing University Sociology Professor 
Zhou Xiaohong relayed that he too had heard Li Yuanchao would be 
leaving Jiangsu as either head of the Organization Department or 
Shanghai Party Secretary.  Li had good leadership skills and was 
very low key.  Professor Zhou acknowledged that it would be 
difficult for an outsider to govern Shanghai and said that there 
was some basis for sending Li there as a "Shanghainese."  Zhou 
said that Li's father had served as a vice mayor of Shanghai 
during the Mao Era or early Deng Era.  Separately, William Doo, 
a senior executive with the Hong Kong-based New Century real 
estate development company, said on February 12 that he had been 
told by "informed persons" that Li had been born in Shanghai and 
spent his childhood there.  Shanghai's Zhou Meiyan said that it 
was possible that Li's father had something to do with the 
former East China Bureau (Huadong Ju) early on in the days of 
the regime, but doubted he had ever served directly in the city. 
 Ms. Zhou, however, did not view Li as a Shanghainese, but 
rather saw recent discussion of Li's Shanghai ties as efforts to 
bolster  Li's credibility should he end up coming to Shanghai. 
(Note: Li had previously pointed out to the Ambassador (Ref C) 
that his son was studying at Shanghai's Fudan University, as he 
had in his youth.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Li Yuanchao Happy to Discuss Anything But Taiwan 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶26.  (S) Luo described Li as very strategic, open and pro-U.S. 
and joked that if China were a democracy, he would quit his day 
job to campaign for Li.  At a January 31 dinner with Carlyle 
co-founder Daniel Daniello and Carlyle Member and former Office 
of Management and Budget Director Dick Darman, Li said that 
China and the United States could discuss and resolve many 
different issues, from foreign exchange rates, to IPR, to the 
bilateral trade imbalance.  Certain issues, such as Taiwan, 
however, were non-negotiable.  If Taiwan provoked China, China 
would have to retaliate, even "if there were another country 
involved."  Li expressed concern that Chen Shui-bian might "try 
to do something stupid" this year.  Li also asked Darman many 
questions about the current political climate in the United 
States, including the views toward China of Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
and various U.S. presidential candidates.  Li also raised 
concerns about former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
because of his views on Taiwan, noting that the Mayor had warmly 
welcomed Chen Shui-bian in 2001 on a stopover in New York, but 
had not been available for visiting PRC officials. 
 
--------------- 
Smear Campaign? 
--------------- 
 
¶27.  (S) Gu said that Zeng or his followers were likely behind 
recent rumors that Li Yuanchao was coming under investigation by 
the CDIC (Ref D).  Gu said that his contacts were not too 
concerned about the rumor, noting that Li did not appear to have 
any "real problems," unlike Chen Liangyu.  Gu explained that the 
former "Jiang Clique" might be trying to discredit Li since he 
was also a candidate to replace Huang Ju as Executive Vice 
Premier, a slot that members of the "Jiang Clique" felt should 
go to someone they preferred.  Both Luo and Zhang agreed that 
the rumor might indeed be a sign that Li was being considered 
for higher positions. 
 
¶28.  (S) Hua Tao and Chairman of the Nanjing University Taiwan 
Research Institute Professor Cui Zhiqing also dismissed those 
rumors, although Hua noted that decisions on whom to investigate 
were generally political decisions and that a person with even a 
few problems could have difficulties if the right people wanted 
to create them.  Although Ms. Zhou felt that it would be 
impossible for someone that close to Hu to come under 
investigation, she did note that there had been a number of 
 
SHANGHAI 00000101  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
Jiangsu officials to come under CDIC investigation and arrest 
over the past year, including a vice governor and head of the 
Provincial Construction Department. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Hu Looking to Move His Fifth Generation Team to Beijing 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶29.  (S) According to Gu, Hu needed to move some of his key 
Fifth Generation supporters to the Politburo in order to pave 
the way for them to take over the reigns when he retires. 
According to Luo, one of the only people Hu had from his "team" 
in a position of influence in Beijing right now was Deputy 
Director of the General Office Ling Jihua.  In fact, if Li 
Yuanchao did not take the job as Organization Department head, 
Luo assessed that it would go to Ling. 
 
¶30.  (S) Gu said that Hu planned to bring Liaoning Party 
Secretary Li Keqiang up to Beijing as well.  Both Zhang and Luo 
 
SIPDIS 
agreed with this assessment, noting that Li Keqiang was a prime 
candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee.  Zhang pointed 
out that Li Keqiang's career had virtually mirrored Hu Jintao's. 
 Luo said that Li Keqiang was the clear frontrunner to move up 
and potentially succeed Hu as Party Secretary. 
 
¶31.  (S) In a conversation with Hu's son, Hu Haifeng, Luo had 
tried to point out that frontrunners did not, in fact, always 
make the best candidates and often ended up not getting the job. 
 Luo put in a plug with Hu Haifeng for Li Yuanchao, suggesting 
Hu Haifeng advise his father that Li Yuanchao should also be 
considered as a successor.  Separately, Luo pointed out to 
Pol/Econ Section Chief that Hu Jintao, himself, had not been the 
top pick to succeed Jiang, but had, instead, been the number 
three choice.  However, when last Luo met Li Yuanchao in late 
January, Li lamented that he was not as young as the other 
contenders for Hu's job. 
JARRETT