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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN UNO GG UNMIK YI RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA WITH DAS BRYZA; FRENCH FAVOR 
PRUDENCE PENDING KOSOVO STATUS SETTLEMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 18053 
     ¶B. PARIS 363 
     ¶C. 06 PARIS 7057 
 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a February 14 meeting with EUR DAS 
Bryza, MFA A/S-equivalent for Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Terral argued for keeping Georgia/Abkhazia on the back burner 
for the time being to avoid provoking the Russians on Kosovo; 
Terral was particularly keen on the smoothest possible 
renewal of the UNOMIG mandate in advance of UNSC discussions 
on Ahtisaari's Kosovo package.  Bryza agreed on the 
desirability of lowering the temperature on the Caucasus to 
the extent possible, but made clear that the U.S. would 
respond to any Russian pressure tactics.  He urged the GOF to 
adopt a similar, reasonable but firm approach during its 
upcoming February 16 meeting with First DFM Karasin and the 
February 22 annual meeting in Moscow of foreign and defense 
ministers.  Bryza told Terral that Saakashvili intended to 
take a moderate approach on UNOMIG renewal, and suggested 
that Azerbaijan's recent willingness to demonstrate its 
energy independence may also be playing a role in persuading 
the Russians to shift to a more careful approach to the 
Caucasus.  In response to Terral's question about Russian 
sincerity in facilitating a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Bryza suggested that Lavrov's active participation in recent 
meetings suggested that positive Russian motives should not 
be excluded a priori.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) EUR DAS Matt Bryza met February 14 with MFA 
A/S-equivalent for Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Jean-Francois Terral to discuss next steps on 
Georgia/Abkhazia in the wake of the February 12-13 Friends' 
discussion in Geneva.  Terral had not yet seen a full report 
of the meeting but commented that it appeared to have gone 
surprisingly well, given Russia's increasingly hard-line 
positions on any number of other issues (including Putin's 
recent remarks at Wehrkunde).  Bryza agreed that there had 
been a positive shift in Russian attitudes on Abkhazia, at a 
minimum as a tactical matter.  FM Lavrov himself had assured 
him that Russia was now interested in seeking improved 
relations with Georgia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Terral agreed it was difficult to distinguish between 
Russian strategy and tactics.  But calling the Russian stance 
on Kosovo key, he argued for maintaining "the right 
temperature" in the Caucasus in view of "the long road ahead" 
on Kosovo.  Although France would remain "the champion of 
dialogue with Russia," including Georgia/Abkhazia, 
considerations of "time management" -- Terral noted that he 
personally spent 30 percent of his time working on Kosovo -- 
argued for putting Caucasus issues on the back burner for a 
while.  Such an approach should not be equated with surrender 
or acquiescence; but it would be prudent to try to avoid 
difficulties on these issues for the next 3-4 months.  Terral 
then explained that Russian First DFM Karasin would visit 
Paris February 19 and Moscow would host the annual meeting of 
Russian and French foreign and defense ministers February 22; 
he expected that both meetings would be dominated by Kosovo. 
Terral assured Bryza that France would not change its 
position on Kosovo and that it would resist "intellectually 
dishonest" Russian attempts -- he cited Russian Security 
Council Chairman Igor Ivanov's recent visit to Paris, see ref 
B -- to attempt linkages between Kosovo and the Caucasus.  At 
the same time, even if the GOF would continue to argue that 
Kosovo was unique and not a precedent (he declared that 
Russia did not care a whit about Kosovo and described the 
Russian position as entirely directed against the U.S.), he 
repeated that France perceived a need to reduce the 
temperature on Georgia/Abkhazia. 
 
¶4.  (C) Bryza responded that, even if the U.S. did not share 
Terral's concerns about time management per se, the U.S. did 
share its wish not to see any renewed flare-ups in the 
Caucasus.  Currently, he judged, things were moving in the 
right direction: the Friends were working to breathe life 
into existing mechanisms for Abkhazia; the Georgians were 
going along; the results of the recent meeting in Geneva were 
quite positive; and in Geneva the Abkhaz had not called into 
question Georgia's right to be present in the Upper Kodori 
Valley, despite other criticisms of the Georgian government. 
But reducing the temperature should not be viewed as 
willingness to give in; he cited the recent decision by 
Azerbaijan not to purchase any Russian gas as an example of 
quiet firmness that had sent shock waves through Russia and 
may have played a role in persuading the Russians to pursue, 
at least for the moment, a softer line on Georgia. 
 
¶5.  (C) Terral hoped that the next round of discussions on 
UNOMIG renewal would prove less contentious than the last 
one, arguing that it would be important to reduce to the 
maximum extent possible clashes with the Russians in order to 
increase the chances of success on Kosovo, given that the 
UNOMIG mandate would be up for renewal before consideration 
of any UNSCR on Kosovo.  Bryza responded that the U.S. 
generally agreed on the desirability of keeping the Caucasus 
quiet, and ideally would welcome a purely technical rollover 
of the UNOMIG mandate.  He added that the Georgians also 
appeared interested in a reasonable approach to mandate 
renewal and recounted how, at U.S. urging, Saakashvili had 
dropped an initial proposal for language criticizing the 
recent elections in Abkhazia.  Saakashvili was insisting now 
only on language referring to IDP right of return to Gali, 
which had already featured in earlier resolutions.  But Bryza 
emphasized again that the U.S. approach would depend to a 
large degree on the extent to which the Russians were 
prepared to adopt a similar approach.  The U.S. would not 
allow the Russians to bulldoze others, and would be prepared 
to counter Russian demands with its own proposals if 
necessary. 
 
¶6.  (C) Terral professed to have been impressed by the 
quality of recent discussions between Azerbaijani President 
Aliyev and President Chirac.  Aliyev had taken a firm line on 
resisting Russian pressure and had insisted on Azerbaijan's 
full independence, including with respect to gas and oil.  It 
was more difficult, he said, to assess Aliyev's position on 
Nagorno-Karabakh; for the moment he could afford to sit back 
and portray Kocharian as the main obstacle to a settlement. 
Terral solicited Bryza's judgment as to whether Russia was 
truly committed to working toward a settlement or was playing 
a duplicitous game.  Bryza said he had no way of knowing for 
certain; at the same time, it was difficult to dismiss as 
pure theatrics FM Lavrov's recent willingness to spend two 
hours brain-storming with the Minsk Group chairmen. 
 
¶7.  (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Bryza. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
ROSENBLATT