VZCZCXRO0116
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0304/01 0591207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281207Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6290
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREC KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR: CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES 
 
REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 174 
  (B) KHARTOUM 197 
 
KHARTOUM 00000304  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In the February 12 Ceasefire Commission First (CFC) 
Chamber, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander (FC) 
Aprezi expressed his dissatisfaction with the CFC Secretariat's 
presentation of cases for the February 7 Joint Commission (JC) 
meeting.  He reviewed his efforts to persuade the Government of 
Sudan to allow the deployment of non-signatory representatives to 
sector-level CFCs and made a plea to international observers to 
consider additional financial support for the Second Chamber.  The 
FC proposed the creation of a "working team" - having roughly the 
same composition as the CFC, excluding the Government of Sudan - to 
conduct an analysis of the Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament 
plan, though no structure or timelines were specified.  The CFC 
Second Chamber deliberated the status of reinstating non-signatory 
representatives to the sectors, with the FC on the one hand pleading 
for Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Non-Signatory Faction's (SLA/NSF) patience and the Movements on 
the other declaring that they would no longer participate in the 
forum until they received pay and a clear statement of intent from 
AMIS.  Following the meeting, the non-signatories delivered a joint 
letter affirming their refusal to attend any future meetings.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
------------------------------------------ 
INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL ANGLES OF THE CFC 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) AMIS FC commenced the February 12 session of the CFC with a 
review of outcomes from the previous week's JC meeting (Ref A).  He 
conveyed extreme dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
Sec-retariat, particularly with regard to selection of the cases that 
came before the JC and their manner of presentation, which allowed 
many of the incidents to be viewed in isolation and dismissed by the 
parties as "criminal" acts rather than ceasefire violations.  Aprezi 
noted his "embarrassment" of the CFC Secretariat's lack of rigor and 
that "if the CFC has no integrity then we cannot bring peace to 
Darfur."  The lengthy discussion highlighted the numerous process 
problems - introducing cases in the CFC, ordering investigations, 
requesting follow-up information from sectors, disseminating 
information to CFC participants - that plague the body.  To avoid 
similar confusion in the future, the U.S. observer proposed, and 
gained consensus, that any documents provided to the JC must be 
approved by the CFC Chairman or Vice Chairmen. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Questions regarding representation, even within the CFC 
First Chamber, persist.  JEM-Peace Wing representatives requested 
that AMIS provide transport for several of their field commanders to 
Khartoum to resolve internal problems with the political leadership 
(Ref B).  The FC declined the request, pointing out that these were 
political matters that should be addressed in appropriate channels. 
He then chastised AU political officer Betty M'gaya (and, 
indirectly, Deputy Head of Mission Hassan Gibril), for their inertia 
in facilitating the resolution of these matters through political 
intervention.  (COMMENT: M'gaya could only manage a meek "I serve 
two masters!" in response to the FC's criticisms.  The leadership 
crisis within the JEM-Peace Wing and its impact on the CFC serve to 
highlight the divisions that exist between the AMIS military and 
political structures.  The FC states his dislike for intervening in 
political issues but appears compelled to do so in the absence of 
any adequate efforts by the Deputy Head of Mission's office. 
Building political officer capacity should remain a priority for the 
UN Light Support Package integration.  END COMMENT.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
VEHICLE SNATCHING STILL A CONCERN 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Vehicle snatching remains a top concern for the Force 
Commander, particularly in light of several successful carjackings 
involving AMIS.  Aprezi delivered a lengthy diatribe aimed primarily 
at SLA/Minawi, exhorting the SLA to take responsibility for their 
"areas of control."  The FC noted too that while the increase in 
vehicle thefts is an alarming trend, it may not constitute an act 
that qualifies as a ceasefire violation.  In this vein, he 
questioned the decision to task Sector 1 with conducting a formal 
investigation into the January 26 carjacking of a PAE vehicle in El 
Fasher, stating that it looked more like banditry than a ceasefire 
violation.  The U.S. observer protested a reversal of this decision, 
pointing out that PAE - unlike NGOs or other organizations supports 
AMIS and that this single incident was only one of several recent 
carjackings (or attempts) that occurred in close proximity to AMIS 
HQ.  The FC consented to allow the decision to stand and press 
 
KHARTOUM 00000304  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sector 1 to carry out its investigation. 
 
--------------------- 
JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Following AMIS' briefing at the JC on the Janjaweed 
disarmament plan, Aprezi proposed creating a "working team" - having 
roughly the same composition as the CFC, excluding the Sudanese 
government - to conduct an analysis of the Janjaweed disarmament 
plan.  This team will present its findings to a similar government 
team, headed by the government CFC representative, and the two 
groups will forward their recommendations for approval at the 
appropriate political level.  Beyond the generic discussion of the 
need for a "real" disarmament plan, there was no concrete talk of 
timelines, specific objectives or structure to move the process 
forward.  (NOTE: The Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament plan 
is rife with deficiencies, not least of which is its failure to 
define which groups must be disarmed.  The plan, which the 
Government of Sudan provided to AMIS in July 2006, has not undergone 
a comprehensive analysis by AMIS or the international community, and 
no official feedback has been furnished to the Government of Sudan, 
according to its CFC representative.  The U.S. and other 
shareholders should lend technical expertise to critique the plan 
and suggest detailed modalities for its implementation and 
verification. END NOTE.) 
 
---------------------------- 
CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the First Chamber, the FC made the case again for 
establishment of "fully functional" (as called for in the JC 
communique) CFC Second Chambers at the Sector level.  He noted, 
however, the challenge posed by the proliferation of rebel factions, 
each one claiming it deserves representation and, therefore, payment 
of Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA).  Aprezi absorbed comments 
from CFC participants on possible ways forward - including reducing 
MSA, changing the number of representatives per sector or 
re-distributing representatives based on the presence of their 
forces - and acknowledged that step one is gaining Government of 
Sudan agreement to allow the deployment of non-signatories to 
Sectors, followed by coordination with the international community 
to fund MSA.  The FC remarked that he would go to Khartoum February 
15-18 to meet senior GoS military officers and other officials to 
press his case. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Non-signatory representatives from JEM and SLA/NSF attended 
the CFC Second Chamber but only "to make their final statements of 
grievance." Substantive agenda items were not addressed.  The Force 
Commander briefed JEM and SLA/NSF on the results of the JC and his 
intention to pursue the Second Chamber issue directly with the 
Government of Sudan and international partners. He expressed 
confidence that the Government of Sudan would eventually relent but 
that the issue of funding was in the political sphere and largely 
out of his control. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The non-signatory representatives, for their part, remained 
unconvinced by the FC's statements.  JEM representative General 
Bashir declared that they were "fed up" with AMIS' ambiguous 
pronouncements and impotent efforts to gain any traction on this 
issue at the political level.  Both Bashir and SLA/NSF 
representative Colonel Abdou Ismael voiced extreme frustration with 
the perpetual delays in the resolution of their status, pay, 
facilitation of communications and inclusion in the information 
chain.  They asserted that they would no longer attend Second 
Chamber meetings until these issues were addressed.  On February 13, 
JEM and SLA/NSF delivered a joint letter officially informing AMIS 
of their decision to cease participation in the Second Chamber. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The establishment of effective sector-level CFC Second 
Chambers is an important step in facilitating humanitarian access to 
non-signatory-controlled areas and in encouraging non-signatory 
cooperation on potential ceasefire violations.  The Government of 
Sudan claims that they are unable to assure the security of the 
non-signatories in the field but, in reality it believes the 
representatives will act as spies.  The international community can 
play a constructive role in this effort by continuing to urge the 
Government of Sudan to accept the sector-level Second Chamber 
concept and in following through with sufficient funding. END 
COMMENT. 
 
HUME